ABSTRACT:Much of the discussion of care prioritization during the COVID-19 pandemic has focused on access to high-technology, intensive care under crisis conditions. This is understandable in light of initial fears that widespread triage and rationing measures would become necessary. However, as observations about the interplay between social determinants of health and COVID-19 infection rates and outcomes have become increasingly clear, attention has also been directed to inequalities in health and healthcare in the US. In this paper, we address another less-discussed set of issues: problems of discrimination and injustice involving people with intellectual disabilities confronted by COVID-19 that go beyond those seen in policies governing triage and rationing. After discussing the proper role of quality of life judgments in healthcare, we consider a range of issues relevant to people with intellectual disabilities, including staffing and structures in group-home facilities, the need for adaptive communication, and the role of support persons during care. Addressing some of these issues will require policy changes that may be widely beneficial; adjustments particular to individuals will also need to be evaluated from the perspective of whether they create undue risks. To address these issues, we draw insights from disability anti-discrimination law as it interfaces with the ethics of patient care, especially the distinction between accommodations for individual patients and modifications of policies addressing access to services and healthcare.
{"title":"Justice and Intellectual Disability In A Pandemic","authors":"Ryan H. Nelson, L. Francis","doi":"10.1353/ken.2020.0017","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1353/ken.2020.0017","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT:Much of the discussion of care prioritization during the COVID-19 pandemic has focused on access to high-technology, intensive care under crisis conditions. This is understandable in light of initial fears that widespread triage and rationing measures would become necessary. However, as observations about the interplay between social determinants of health and COVID-19 infection rates and outcomes have become increasingly clear, attention has also been directed to inequalities in health and healthcare in the US. In this paper, we address another less-discussed set of issues: problems of discrimination and injustice involving people with intellectual disabilities confronted by COVID-19 that go beyond those seen in policies governing triage and rationing. After discussing the proper role of quality of life judgments in healthcare, we consider a range of issues relevant to people with intellectual disabilities, including staffing and structures in group-home facilities, the need for adaptive communication, and the role of support persons during care. Addressing some of these issues will require policy changes that may be widely beneficial; adjustments particular to individuals will also need to be evaluated from the perspective of whether they create undue risks. To address these issues, we draw insights from disability anti-discrimination law as it interfaces with the ethics of patient care, especially the distinction between accommodations for individual patients and modifications of policies addressing access to services and healthcare.","PeriodicalId":46167,"journal":{"name":"Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal","volume":"30 1","pages":"319 - 338"},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2020-11-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1353/ken.2020.0017","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45172477","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
ABSTRACT:The success of public health responses to the COVID-19 pandemic is sensitive to public trust in experts. Despite a great deal of attention to attitudes towards experts in the context of such crises, one significant feature of public trust remains underexamined. When public policy claims to follow the science, citizens are asked not just to believe what they are told by experts, but to follow expert recommendations. I argue that this requires a more demanding form of trust, which I call recommendation trust. I argue for three claims about recommendation trust: recommendation trust is different from both epistemic and practical trust; the conditions for well-placed recommendation trust are more demanding than the conditions for well-placed epistemic trust; and many measures that have been proposed to cultivate trust in experts do not give the public good reasons to trust in expert-led policy.
{"title":"Should I Do as I’m Told? Trust, Experts, and COVID-19","authors":"M. Bennett","doi":"10.1353/ken.2020.0014","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1353/ken.2020.0014","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT:The success of public health responses to the COVID-19 pandemic is sensitive to public trust in experts. Despite a great deal of attention to attitudes towards experts in the context of such crises, one significant feature of public trust remains underexamined. When public policy claims to follow the science, citizens are asked not just to believe what they are told by experts, but to follow expert recommendations. I argue that this requires a more demanding form of trust, which I call recommendation trust. I argue for three claims about recommendation trust: recommendation trust is different from both epistemic and practical trust; the conditions for well-placed recommendation trust are more demanding than the conditions for well-placed epistemic trust; and many measures that have been proposed to cultivate trust in experts do not give the public good reasons to trust in expert-led policy.","PeriodicalId":46167,"journal":{"name":"Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal","volume":"30 1","pages":"243 - 263"},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2020-11-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1353/ken.2020.0014","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46508335","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
ABSTRACT:The COVID-19 pandemic in the US has inspired conversations about which features of the pandemic’s impacts were(n’t) unexpected, as well as why and how. Looming in the background of these discussions are political questions about the blameworthiness of particular institutions and leaders therein, and what COVID-19 disasters within US institutions mean for future discussions about how to reform those institutions. This paper will argue that the inequitable harms of the COVID-19 pandemic in four especially hard-hit US institutions—jails and prisons, meat processing plants, hospitals, and eldercare facilities—were: (1) not so unpredictable as claimed by some commentators, (2) traceable to institutional flaws known prior to the pandemic, and (3) can be fruitfully understood through the lens of “fundamental cause theory,” which offers a model for why and how social resources and deprivations create predictable patterns of harms from health hazards, even when the hazards are new.
{"title":"The Predictable Inequities of COVID-19 in the US: Fundamental Causes and Broken Institutions","authors":"S. Valles","doi":"10.1353/ken.2020.0012","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1353/ken.2020.0012","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT:The COVID-19 pandemic in the US has inspired conversations about which features of the pandemic’s impacts were(n’t) unexpected, as well as why and how. Looming in the background of these discussions are political questions about the blameworthiness of particular institutions and leaders therein, and what COVID-19 disasters within US institutions mean for future discussions about how to reform those institutions. This paper will argue that the inequitable harms of the COVID-19 pandemic in four especially hard-hit US institutions—jails and prisons, meat processing plants, hospitals, and eldercare facilities—were: (1) not so unpredictable as claimed by some commentators, (2) traceable to institutional flaws known prior to the pandemic, and (3) can be fruitfully understood through the lens of “fundamental cause theory,” which offers a model for why and how social resources and deprivations create predictable patterns of harms from health hazards, even when the hazards are new.","PeriodicalId":46167,"journal":{"name":"Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal","volume":"30 1","pages":"191 - 214"},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2020-11-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1353/ken.2020.0012","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46400386","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
ABSTRACT:When central authority fails in socially crucial tasks, mutual aid, solidarity, and grassroots organization frequently arise as people take up slack on the basis of informal networks and civil society organizations. We can learn something important about the possibility of horizontal organization by studying such experiments. In this paper we focus on the rationality, care, and effectiveness of grassroots measures to respond to the pandemic and show how they illustrate core elements of anarchist thought. We do not argue for the correctness of any version of anarchist politics, nor claim that the bulk of this grassroots work was done with anarchist ideas explicitly in mind. Nonetheless, the current pandemic, like many social crises before it, serves as a sort experiment in political implementation.
{"title":"Anarchist Responses to a Pandemic: The COVID-19 Crisis as a Case Study in Mutual Aid","authors":"N. Jun, M. Lance","doi":"10.1353/ken.2020.0019","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1353/ken.2020.0019","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT:When central authority fails in socially crucial tasks, mutual aid, solidarity, and grassroots organization frequently arise as people take up slack on the basis of informal networks and civil society organizations. We can learn something important about the possibility of horizontal organization by studying such experiments. In this paper we focus on the rationality, care, and effectiveness of grassroots measures to respond to the pandemic and show how they illustrate core elements of anarchist thought. We do not argue for the correctness of any version of anarchist politics, nor claim that the bulk of this grassroots work was done with anarchist ideas explicitly in mind. Nonetheless, the current pandemic, like many social crises before it, serves as a sort experiment in political implementation.","PeriodicalId":46167,"journal":{"name":"Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal","volume":"30 1","pages":"361 - 378"},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2020-11-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1353/ken.2020.0019","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43484590","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"From the Issue Co-Editors","authors":"Quill R Kukla, Travis N. Rieder","doi":"10.1353/ken.2020.0011","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1353/ken.2020.0011","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":46167,"journal":{"name":"Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal","volume":"30 1","pages":"xiii - xiii"},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2020-11-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1353/ken.2020.0011","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48793157","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
ABSTRACT:Public discourse about ethics in the COVID-19 pandemic has tended to focus on scarcity of resources and the protection of civil liberties. We show how these preoccupations reflect an established disaster imaginary that orients the ethics of response. In this paper, we argue that pandemic ethics should instead be oriented through a relational account of persons as vulnerable vectors embedded in existing networks of care. We argue for the creation of a new disaster imaginary to shape our own understandings of the interrelated social, political, and economic hardships under conditions of social distancing. We develop a pandemic ethics framework rooted in uBuntu and care ethics that makes visible the underlying multidimensional structural inequities of the pandemic, attending to the problems of resource scarcity and inequities in mortality while insisting on a response that surges existing and emergent forms of solidarity.
{"title":"Surging Solidarity: Reorienting Ethics for Pandemics","authors":"Jordan Pascoe, Mitch Stripling","doi":"10.1353/ken.2020.0022","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1353/ken.2020.0022","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT:Public discourse about ethics in the COVID-19 pandemic has tended to focus on scarcity of resources and the protection of civil liberties. We show how these preoccupations reflect an established disaster imaginary that orients the ethics of response. In this paper, we argue that pandemic ethics should instead be oriented through a relational account of persons as vulnerable vectors embedded in existing networks of care. We argue for the creation of a new disaster imaginary to shape our own understandings of the interrelated social, political, and economic hardships under conditions of social distancing. We develop a pandemic ethics framework rooted in uBuntu and care ethics that makes visible the underlying multidimensional structural inequities of the pandemic, attending to the problems of resource scarcity and inequities in mortality while insisting on a response that surges existing and emergent forms of solidarity.","PeriodicalId":46167,"journal":{"name":"Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal","volume":"30 1","pages":"419 - 444"},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2020-11-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1353/ken.2020.0022","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45659140","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
ABSTRACT:The COVID-19 pandemic required strong state responsibility for the health of its citizens and the effective allocation of healthcare resources. In Russia, extreme circumstances reveal hidden Soviet patterns of public health. This article illuminates how Russia has implemented some changes within its health insurance structures but also has maintained the paternalistic style of state governing within public health practices. The authors examine key neo-Soviet trends in Russian society revealed during the pandemic: the ethics of silence, a culture of non-disclosure, and doublethinking. Additionally, we argue that both modern Russian medicine and healthcare demonstrate gaps in implementing robust bioethical frameworks compared with the United States. Using a robust analysis of healthcare and state practice during the COVID-19 pandemic within the framework of global bioethics, this article aims to respond to Russian history and culture in order to advance the development of bioethics.
{"title":"How Soviet Legacies Shape Russia’s Response to the Pandemic: Ethical Consequences of a Culture of Non-Disclosure","authors":"Nataliya Shok, Nataliya Nadezhda Beliakova","doi":"10.1353/ken.2020.0020","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1353/ken.2020.0020","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT:The COVID-19 pandemic required strong state responsibility for the health of its citizens and the effective allocation of healthcare resources. In Russia, extreme circumstances reveal hidden Soviet patterns of public health. This article illuminates how Russia has implemented some changes within its health insurance structures but also has maintained the paternalistic style of state governing within public health practices. The authors examine key neo-Soviet trends in Russian society revealed during the pandemic: the ethics of silence, a culture of non-disclosure, and doublethinking. Additionally, we argue that both modern Russian medicine and healthcare demonstrate gaps in implementing robust bioethical frameworks compared with the United States. Using a robust analysis of healthcare and state practice during the COVID-19 pandemic within the framework of global bioethics, this article aims to respond to Russian history and culture in order to advance the development of bioethics.","PeriodicalId":46167,"journal":{"name":"Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal","volume":"30 1","pages":"379 - 400"},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2020-11-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1353/ken.2020.0020","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44447598","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
ABSTRACT:The wide-ranging effects of the COVID-19 pandemic have amplified social inequalities and revealed vulnerabilities in public systems. These dual effects are especially salient in the context of criminal justice systems, and activists and policymakers have called for reconfiguring justice system practices in response. This paper discusses and defends one of these proposals: rapidly reducing the number of people currently incarcerated by releasing people from jails and prisons. Drawing on moral and political philosophy and criminal law theory, I provide a rigorous case for why it is morally unjustified to continue to incarcerate people as usual under present circumstances—this position is intuitive to many and already reflected in emergency policies in jurisdictions worldwide. The paper proceeds by way of two arguments. First, I argue that we ought to release people from jails and prisons to prevent meting out disproportionately severe punishments, which are unjustified on standard theories of punishment. The second argument appeals to what I call the public interest constraint on criminal law policy: defending the idea that we ought not make use of the instruments of the criminal law if the downstream consequences of doing so run contrary to public welfare and wellbeing or undermine the provision of substantive common goods. I argue that circumstances related to the coronavirus pandemic trigger the constraint. Though the idea that we ought to take broad social costs into account in designing criminal justice policy may seem intuitive, it has radical implications for thinking about decarceration and the ethics of justice system practices during the coronavirus pandemic and beyond. In the last part of the paper, I propose and discuss three concrete policies that work to mitigate some of the potential negative consequences of emergency release.
{"title":"Incarceration, COVID-19, and Emergency Release: Reimagining How and When to Punish","authors":"Lauren Lyons","doi":"10.1353/ken.2020.0016","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1353/ken.2020.0016","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT:The wide-ranging effects of the COVID-19 pandemic have amplified social inequalities and revealed vulnerabilities in public systems. These dual effects are especially salient in the context of criminal justice systems, and activists and policymakers have called for reconfiguring justice system practices in response. This paper discusses and defends one of these proposals: rapidly reducing the number of people currently incarcerated by releasing people from jails and prisons. Drawing on moral and political philosophy and criminal law theory, I provide a rigorous case for why it is morally unjustified to continue to incarcerate people as usual under present circumstances—this position is intuitive to many and already reflected in emergency policies in jurisdictions worldwide. The paper proceeds by way of two arguments. First, I argue that we ought to release people from jails and prisons to prevent meting out disproportionately severe punishments, which are unjustified on standard theories of punishment. The second argument appeals to what I call the public interest constraint on criminal law policy: defending the idea that we ought not make use of the instruments of the criminal law if the downstream consequences of doing so run contrary to public welfare and wellbeing or undermine the provision of substantive common goods. I argue that circumstances related to the coronavirus pandemic trigger the constraint. Though the idea that we ought to take broad social costs into account in designing criminal justice policy may seem intuitive, it has radical implications for thinking about decarceration and the ethics of justice system practices during the coronavirus pandemic and beyond. In the last part of the paper, I propose and discuss three concrete policies that work to mitigate some of the potential negative consequences of emergency release.","PeriodicalId":46167,"journal":{"name":"Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal","volume":"30 1","pages":"291 - 317"},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2020-11-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1353/ken.2020.0016","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48684222","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
ABSTRACT:Are lockdown measures ethically justified? This paper outlines some of the key issues relevant to answering that question, paying particular attention to how decisions are framed. Section 1 argues that ethical reasoning about lockdown ought to be guided by a distinction between prudential and ethical reasons, grounded in a concern to respect the separateness of persons, but also that—as public health messaging implies—it can be unclear whether measures are in individuals’ prudential interests or not. Section 2 suggests that a similar set of problems affect attempts to adopt alternative cost-benefit-analysis frameworks for assessing lockdown. Section 3 suggests an answer to these shared problems: we need a process for determining when wellbeing claims and systems of categorization are ethically apt. Section 4 argues that settling the question of aptness is our key ethical task in assessing lockdown.
{"title":"The Ethics of Lockdown: Communication, Consequences, and the Separateness of Persons","authors":"S. John","doi":"10.1353/ken.2020.0015","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1353/ken.2020.0015","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT:Are lockdown measures ethically justified? This paper outlines some of the key issues relevant to answering that question, paying particular attention to how decisions are framed. Section 1 argues that ethical reasoning about lockdown ought to be guided by a distinction between prudential and ethical reasons, grounded in a concern to respect the separateness of persons, but also that—as public health messaging implies—it can be unclear whether measures are in individuals’ prudential interests or not. Section 2 suggests that a similar set of problems affect attempts to adopt alternative cost-benefit-analysis frameworks for assessing lockdown. Section 3 suggests an answer to these shared problems: we need a process for determining when wellbeing claims and systems of categorization are ethically apt. Section 4 argues that settling the question of aptness is our key ethical task in assessing lockdown.","PeriodicalId":46167,"journal":{"name":"Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal","volume":"30 1","pages":"265 - 289"},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2020-08-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1353/ken.2020.0015","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49394085","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
ABSTRACT:In spring 2020, in response to the COVID-19 crisis, many world leaders imposed universal lockdowns. We argue that these restrictions have not been accompanied by the epistemic practices morally required for their adoption or continuation. While in theory lockdowns can be justified, governments did not meet and have not yet met their justificatory burdens. We will not argue that less stringent policies were optimal or better justified. Rather, we explain how government leaders failed and have continued to fail to meet their epistemic duties by relying upon data, models, and evidence of insufficiently good quality to justify their actions.
{"title":"How Government Leaders Violated Their Epistemic Duties During the SARS-CoV-2 Crisis","authors":"Eric Winsberg, J. Brennan, Chris W. Surprenant","doi":"10.1353/KEN.2020.0013","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1353/KEN.2020.0013","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT:In spring 2020, in response to the COVID-19 crisis, many world leaders imposed universal lockdowns. We argue that these restrictions have not been accompanied by the epistemic practices morally required for their adoption or continuation. While in theory lockdowns can be justified, governments did not meet and have not yet met their justificatory burdens. We will not argue that less stringent policies were optimal or better justified. Rather, we explain how government leaders failed and have continued to fail to meet their epistemic duties by relying upon data, models, and evidence of insufficiently good quality to justify their actions.","PeriodicalId":46167,"journal":{"name":"Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal","volume":"30 1","pages":"215 - 242"},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2020-05-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1353/KEN.2020.0013","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42436036","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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