If the free speech clause of the First Amendment is interpreted to mean that speech is to be granted special protection not accorded to other forms of conduct, then a free speech principle, distinct from a principle of general liberty, must be posited and must receive a distinct justification. A defense of a free speech principle must explain why the harm principle either does not apply in the case of speech or applies with less force than in the case of all other forms of human conduct. In this article, I argue that none of the defenses of the right to free speech on offer succeeds in showing why even significantly harmful speech is deserving of special protection not afforded non-speech conduct. More work needs to be done to justify a free speech principle and, until such work is done, the belief in the existence of a free speech principle that undergirds and justifies our current free speech practices is no more than an article of faith.
{"title":"Free Speech Skepticism.","authors":"Susan J Brison","doi":"10.1353/ken.2021.0008","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1353/ken.2021.0008","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>If the free speech clause of the First Amendment is interpreted to mean that speech is to be granted special protection not accorded to other forms of conduct, then a free speech principle, distinct from a principle of general liberty, must be posited and must receive a distinct justification. A defense of a free speech principle must explain why the harm principle either does not apply in the case of speech or applies with less force than in the case of all other forms of human conduct. In this article, I argue that none of the defenses of the right to free speech on offer succeeds in showing why even significantly harmful speech is deserving of special protection not afforded non-speech conduct. More work needs to be done to justify a free speech principle and, until such work is done, the belief in the existence of a free speech principle that undergirds and justifies our current free speech practices is no more than an article of faith.</p>","PeriodicalId":46167,"journal":{"name":"Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2021-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1353/ken.2021.0008","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"39088135","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In the face of the increasing substitution of free speech for academic freedom, I argue for the distinctiveness and irreplaceability of the latter. Academic freedom has evolved alongside universities in order to support the important social purpose universities serve. Having limned this evolution, I compare academic freedom and free speech. This comparison reveals freedom of expression to be an individual freedom, and academic freedom to be a group-differentiated freedom with a social purpose. I argue that the social purpose of academic freedom behooves an inclusive approach to group differentiation.
{"title":"The Evolving Social Purpose of Academic Freedom.","authors":"Shannon Dea","doi":"10.1353/ken.2021.0012","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1353/ken.2021.0012","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>In the face of the increasing substitution of free speech for academic freedom, I argue for the distinctiveness and irreplaceability of the latter. Academic freedom has evolved alongside universities in order to support the important social purpose universities serve. Having limned this evolution, I compare academic freedom and free speech. This comparison reveals freedom of expression to be an individual freedom, and academic freedom to be a group-differentiated freedom with a social purpose. I argue that the social purpose of academic freedom behooves an inclusive approach to group differentiation.</p>","PeriodicalId":46167,"journal":{"name":"Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2021-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1353/ken.2021.0012","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"39088139","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
ABSTRACT:The primary claim of this paper is that COVID-19 stigma must be understood as a structural phenomenon. Doing so will inform the interventions we select and prioritize for the amelioration of such stigma, which is an ethical priority. Thinking about stigma as a macrosocial determinant of health driven by structural factors suggests that downstream remedies are unlikely to be effective in significantly reducing stigma. This paper develops and defends this claim, setting up a recommendation to use a “bundle” of legal and policy levers at meso- and macro- levels to reduce the adverse and inequitable impact of COVID-19 stigma. In Section II, this commentary offers a basic account of the concept of stigma in general, the justification for conceptualizing it as a structural phenomenon, and some of the basic advantages of doing so. Section III moves on to frame infectious and communicable disease stigma in Western history not only as a way of demonstrating its structural features, but also to highlight the use of laws and policies as levers for public health change. Section IV urges explicit adoption of insights and methods from legal epidemiology and offers examples of specific legal and policy recommendations for addressing these stigmas. Section V concludes.
{"title":"Structural Stigma, Legal Epidemiology, and COVID-19: The Ethical Imperative to Act Upstream","authors":"D. Goldberg","doi":"10.1353/ken.2020.0018","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1353/ken.2020.0018","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT:The primary claim of this paper is that COVID-19 stigma must be understood as a structural phenomenon. Doing so will inform the interventions we select and prioritize for the amelioration of such stigma, which is an ethical priority. Thinking about stigma as a macrosocial determinant of health driven by structural factors suggests that downstream remedies are unlikely to be effective in significantly reducing stigma. This paper develops and defends this claim, setting up a recommendation to use a “bundle” of legal and policy levers at meso- and macro- levels to reduce the adverse and inequitable impact of COVID-19 stigma. In Section II, this commentary offers a basic account of the concept of stigma in general, the justification for conceptualizing it as a structural phenomenon, and some of the basic advantages of doing so. Section III moves on to frame infectious and communicable disease stigma in Western history not only as a way of demonstrating its structural features, but also to highlight the use of laws and policies as levers for public health change. Section IV urges explicit adoption of insights and methods from legal epidemiology and offers examples of specific legal and policy recommendations for addressing these stigmas. Section V concludes.","PeriodicalId":46167,"journal":{"name":"Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2020-11-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1353/ken.2020.0018","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47399083","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
S. Hurst, Eva Maria Belser, C. Burton-Jeangros, Pascal Mahon, C. Hummel, Settimio Monteverde, T. Krones, Stéphanie Dagron, C. Bensimon, Bianca Schaffert, Alexander H. Trechsel, Luca Chiapperino, Laure Kloetzer, T. Zittoun, R. Jox, Marion Fischer, A. D. Ave, P. G. Kirchschlaeger, S. Moon
ABSTRACT:Countries deciding on deconfinement measures after initial lock-downs in response to the COVID-19 pandemic often include the continued confinement of those most vulnerable to the disease in these plans as a matter of course. Such continued confinement, however, is neither innocuous nor obviously justified. In this paper, we examine more systematically the requirements for the protection of vulnerable persons, the situation in institutions, legal implications, requirements to sustain vulnerable persons, and self-determination. Based on this exploration, we recommend that continued confinement cannot be the only measure in place to protect vulnerable persons. Protections are needed to enable participation in the public sphere and the exercise of rights for persons particularly vulnerable to fatal courses of COVID-19. The situation in long-term care homes warrants particular caution and in some cases immediate mitigation of lock-down measures that have isolated residents from their caregivers, advocates, and proxies. Vulnerable persons should retain the choice to place themselves at risk, as long as they do not impose risks on others. Vulnerable persons who choose to remain in confinement should be protected against loss of their jobs or income, and against the risk of discrimination in the labor market. Risk and crisis communication stresses the importance of listening to the people and setting up participatory approaches. Associations and lobbies representing the views of groups of those particularly vulnerable to COVID-19 (e.g., the elderly, those with diseases placing them at particular risk) should be consulted and involved in outlining deconfinement measures. Moreover, most vulnerable persons are autonomous and competent and should be allowed to voice their own opinion.
{"title":"Continued Confinement of Those Most Vulnerable to COVID-19","authors":"S. Hurst, Eva Maria Belser, C. Burton-Jeangros, Pascal Mahon, C. Hummel, Settimio Monteverde, T. Krones, Stéphanie Dagron, C. Bensimon, Bianca Schaffert, Alexander H. Trechsel, Luca Chiapperino, Laure Kloetzer, T. Zittoun, R. Jox, Marion Fischer, A. D. Ave, P. G. Kirchschlaeger, S. Moon","doi":"10.1353/ken.2020.0021","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1353/ken.2020.0021","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT:Countries deciding on deconfinement measures after initial lock-downs in response to the COVID-19 pandemic often include the continued confinement of those most vulnerable to the disease in these plans as a matter of course. Such continued confinement, however, is neither innocuous nor obviously justified. In this paper, we examine more systematically the requirements for the protection of vulnerable persons, the situation in institutions, legal implications, requirements to sustain vulnerable persons, and self-determination. Based on this exploration, we recommend that continued confinement cannot be the only measure in place to protect vulnerable persons. Protections are needed to enable participation in the public sphere and the exercise of rights for persons particularly vulnerable to fatal courses of COVID-19. The situation in long-term care homes warrants particular caution and in some cases immediate mitigation of lock-down measures that have isolated residents from their caregivers, advocates, and proxies. Vulnerable persons should retain the choice to place themselves at risk, as long as they do not impose risks on others. Vulnerable persons who choose to remain in confinement should be protected against loss of their jobs or income, and against the risk of discrimination in the labor market. Risk and crisis communication stresses the importance of listening to the people and setting up participatory approaches. Associations and lobbies representing the views of groups of those particularly vulnerable to COVID-19 (e.g., the elderly, those with diseases placing them at particular risk) should be consulted and involved in outlining deconfinement measures. Moreover, most vulnerable persons are autonomous and competent and should be allowed to voice their own opinion.","PeriodicalId":46167,"journal":{"name":"Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2020-11-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1353/ken.2020.0021","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45316751","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
ABSTRACT:Much of the discussion of care prioritization during the COVID-19 pandemic has focused on access to high-technology, intensive care under crisis conditions. This is understandable in light of initial fears that widespread triage and rationing measures would become necessary. However, as observations about the interplay between social determinants of health and COVID-19 infection rates and outcomes have become increasingly clear, attention has also been directed to inequalities in health and healthcare in the US. In this paper, we address another less-discussed set of issues: problems of discrimination and injustice involving people with intellectual disabilities confronted by COVID-19 that go beyond those seen in policies governing triage and rationing. After discussing the proper role of quality of life judgments in healthcare, we consider a range of issues relevant to people with intellectual disabilities, including staffing and structures in group-home facilities, the need for adaptive communication, and the role of support persons during care. Addressing some of these issues will require policy changes that may be widely beneficial; adjustments particular to individuals will also need to be evaluated from the perspective of whether they create undue risks. To address these issues, we draw insights from disability anti-discrimination law as it interfaces with the ethics of patient care, especially the distinction between accommodations for individual patients and modifications of policies addressing access to services and healthcare.
{"title":"Justice and Intellectual Disability In A Pandemic","authors":"Ryan H. Nelson, L. Francis","doi":"10.1353/ken.2020.0017","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1353/ken.2020.0017","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT:Much of the discussion of care prioritization during the COVID-19 pandemic has focused on access to high-technology, intensive care under crisis conditions. This is understandable in light of initial fears that widespread triage and rationing measures would become necessary. However, as observations about the interplay between social determinants of health and COVID-19 infection rates and outcomes have become increasingly clear, attention has also been directed to inequalities in health and healthcare in the US. In this paper, we address another less-discussed set of issues: problems of discrimination and injustice involving people with intellectual disabilities confronted by COVID-19 that go beyond those seen in policies governing triage and rationing. After discussing the proper role of quality of life judgments in healthcare, we consider a range of issues relevant to people with intellectual disabilities, including staffing and structures in group-home facilities, the need for adaptive communication, and the role of support persons during care. Addressing some of these issues will require policy changes that may be widely beneficial; adjustments particular to individuals will also need to be evaluated from the perspective of whether they create undue risks. To address these issues, we draw insights from disability anti-discrimination law as it interfaces with the ethics of patient care, especially the distinction between accommodations for individual patients and modifications of policies addressing access to services and healthcare.","PeriodicalId":46167,"journal":{"name":"Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2020-11-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1353/ken.2020.0017","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45172477","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
ABSTRACT:The success of public health responses to the COVID-19 pandemic is sensitive to public trust in experts. Despite a great deal of attention to attitudes towards experts in the context of such crises, one significant feature of public trust remains underexamined. When public policy claims to follow the science, citizens are asked not just to believe what they are told by experts, but to follow expert recommendations. I argue that this requires a more demanding form of trust, which I call recommendation trust. I argue for three claims about recommendation trust: recommendation trust is different from both epistemic and practical trust; the conditions for well-placed recommendation trust are more demanding than the conditions for well-placed epistemic trust; and many measures that have been proposed to cultivate trust in experts do not give the public good reasons to trust in expert-led policy.
{"title":"Should I Do as I’m Told? Trust, Experts, and COVID-19","authors":"M. Bennett","doi":"10.1353/ken.2020.0014","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1353/ken.2020.0014","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT:The success of public health responses to the COVID-19 pandemic is sensitive to public trust in experts. Despite a great deal of attention to attitudes towards experts in the context of such crises, one significant feature of public trust remains underexamined. When public policy claims to follow the science, citizens are asked not just to believe what they are told by experts, but to follow expert recommendations. I argue that this requires a more demanding form of trust, which I call recommendation trust. I argue for three claims about recommendation trust: recommendation trust is different from both epistemic and practical trust; the conditions for well-placed recommendation trust are more demanding than the conditions for well-placed epistemic trust; and many measures that have been proposed to cultivate trust in experts do not give the public good reasons to trust in expert-led policy.","PeriodicalId":46167,"journal":{"name":"Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2020-11-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1353/ken.2020.0014","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46508335","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
ABSTRACT:The COVID-19 pandemic in the US has inspired conversations about which features of the pandemic’s impacts were(n’t) unexpected, as well as why and how. Looming in the background of these discussions are political questions about the blameworthiness of particular institutions and leaders therein, and what COVID-19 disasters within US institutions mean for future discussions about how to reform those institutions. This paper will argue that the inequitable harms of the COVID-19 pandemic in four especially hard-hit US institutions—jails and prisons, meat processing plants, hospitals, and eldercare facilities—were: (1) not so unpredictable as claimed by some commentators, (2) traceable to institutional flaws known prior to the pandemic, and (3) can be fruitfully understood through the lens of “fundamental cause theory,” which offers a model for why and how social resources and deprivations create predictable patterns of harms from health hazards, even when the hazards are new.
{"title":"The Predictable Inequities of COVID-19 in the US: Fundamental Causes and Broken Institutions","authors":"S. Valles","doi":"10.1353/ken.2020.0012","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1353/ken.2020.0012","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT:The COVID-19 pandemic in the US has inspired conversations about which features of the pandemic’s impacts were(n’t) unexpected, as well as why and how. Looming in the background of these discussions are political questions about the blameworthiness of particular institutions and leaders therein, and what COVID-19 disasters within US institutions mean for future discussions about how to reform those institutions. This paper will argue that the inequitable harms of the COVID-19 pandemic in four especially hard-hit US institutions—jails and prisons, meat processing plants, hospitals, and eldercare facilities—were: (1) not so unpredictable as claimed by some commentators, (2) traceable to institutional flaws known prior to the pandemic, and (3) can be fruitfully understood through the lens of “fundamental cause theory,” which offers a model for why and how social resources and deprivations create predictable patterns of harms from health hazards, even when the hazards are new.","PeriodicalId":46167,"journal":{"name":"Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2020-11-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1353/ken.2020.0012","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46400386","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
ABSTRACT:When central authority fails in socially crucial tasks, mutual aid, solidarity, and grassroots organization frequently arise as people take up slack on the basis of informal networks and civil society organizations. We can learn something important about the possibility of horizontal organization by studying such experiments. In this paper we focus on the rationality, care, and effectiveness of grassroots measures to respond to the pandemic and show how they illustrate core elements of anarchist thought. We do not argue for the correctness of any version of anarchist politics, nor claim that the bulk of this grassroots work was done with anarchist ideas explicitly in mind. Nonetheless, the current pandemic, like many social crises before it, serves as a sort experiment in political implementation.
{"title":"Anarchist Responses to a Pandemic: The COVID-19 Crisis as a Case Study in Mutual Aid","authors":"N. Jun, M. Lance","doi":"10.1353/ken.2020.0019","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1353/ken.2020.0019","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT:When central authority fails in socially crucial tasks, mutual aid, solidarity, and grassroots organization frequently arise as people take up slack on the basis of informal networks and civil society organizations. We can learn something important about the possibility of horizontal organization by studying such experiments. In this paper we focus on the rationality, care, and effectiveness of grassroots measures to respond to the pandemic and show how they illustrate core elements of anarchist thought. We do not argue for the correctness of any version of anarchist politics, nor claim that the bulk of this grassroots work was done with anarchist ideas explicitly in mind. Nonetheless, the current pandemic, like many social crises before it, serves as a sort experiment in political implementation.","PeriodicalId":46167,"journal":{"name":"Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2020-11-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1353/ken.2020.0019","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43484590","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"From the Issue Co-Editors","authors":"Quill R Kukla, Travis N. Rieder","doi":"10.1353/ken.2020.0011","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1353/ken.2020.0011","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":46167,"journal":{"name":"Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2020-11-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1353/ken.2020.0011","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48793157","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
ABSTRACT:Public discourse about ethics in the COVID-19 pandemic has tended to focus on scarcity of resources and the protection of civil liberties. We show how these preoccupations reflect an established disaster imaginary that orients the ethics of response. In this paper, we argue that pandemic ethics should instead be oriented through a relational account of persons as vulnerable vectors embedded in existing networks of care. We argue for the creation of a new disaster imaginary to shape our own understandings of the interrelated social, political, and economic hardships under conditions of social distancing. We develop a pandemic ethics framework rooted in uBuntu and care ethics that makes visible the underlying multidimensional structural inequities of the pandemic, attending to the problems of resource scarcity and inequities in mortality while insisting on a response that surges existing and emergent forms of solidarity.
{"title":"Surging Solidarity: Reorienting Ethics for Pandemics","authors":"Jordan Pascoe, Mitch Stripling","doi":"10.1353/ken.2020.0022","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1353/ken.2020.0022","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT:Public discourse about ethics in the COVID-19 pandemic has tended to focus on scarcity of resources and the protection of civil liberties. We show how these preoccupations reflect an established disaster imaginary that orients the ethics of response. In this paper, we argue that pandemic ethics should instead be oriented through a relational account of persons as vulnerable vectors embedded in existing networks of care. We argue for the creation of a new disaster imaginary to shape our own understandings of the interrelated social, political, and economic hardships under conditions of social distancing. We develop a pandemic ethics framework rooted in uBuntu and care ethics that makes visible the underlying multidimensional structural inequities of the pandemic, attending to the problems of resource scarcity and inequities in mortality while insisting on a response that surges existing and emergent forms of solidarity.","PeriodicalId":46167,"journal":{"name":"Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2020-11-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1353/ken.2020.0022","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45659140","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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