Pub Date : 2022-05-26DOI: 10.1080/09662839.2022.2076558
Nele Marianne Ewers-Peters
ABSTRACT With the growing density and the plethora of security organisations on the regional and international level, the research programme on interorganisational relations has received increasing scholarly attention. The complexity of European security – in light of the Ukraine conflict since 2014, Russia’s more assertive foreign policy behaviour, and on-going crisis management operations in the Africa, the Mediterranean Sea and Middle East – has revived EU-NATO cooperation. The analysis from the perspective of member states and how they can be positioned in the EU-NATO interorganisational relations, however, has received little exploration. This article, therefore, addresses the roles and positions of member states within the relations between the EU and NATO as Europe’s prime security organisations. Member states have numerous political strategies at their disposal to trigger, strengthen or obstruct interorganisational relations, ranging from forum-shopping to hostage-taking and brokering. Drawing on insights from regime theory, network analysis, organisation theory and interorganisationalism, this article proposes a typology of member states in EU-NATO cooperation. Against the backdrop of this special relationship, the typology is developed which aims to detect and illustrate member states’ positions and strategies.
{"title":"Positioning member states in EU-NATO security cooperation: towards a typology","authors":"Nele Marianne Ewers-Peters","doi":"10.1080/09662839.2022.2076558","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/09662839.2022.2076558","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT With the growing density and the plethora of security organisations on the regional and international level, the research programme on interorganisational relations has received increasing scholarly attention. The complexity of European security – in light of the Ukraine conflict since 2014, Russia’s more assertive foreign policy behaviour, and on-going crisis management operations in the Africa, the Mediterranean Sea and Middle East – has revived EU-NATO cooperation. The analysis from the perspective of member states and how they can be positioned in the EU-NATO interorganisational relations, however, has received little exploration. This article, therefore, addresses the roles and positions of member states within the relations between the EU and NATO as Europe’s prime security organisations. Member states have numerous political strategies at their disposal to trigger, strengthen or obstruct interorganisational relations, ranging from forum-shopping to hostage-taking and brokering. Drawing on insights from regime theory, network analysis, organisation theory and interorganisationalism, this article proposes a typology of member states in EU-NATO cooperation. Against the backdrop of this special relationship, the typology is developed which aims to detect and illustrate member states’ positions and strategies.","PeriodicalId":46331,"journal":{"name":"European Security","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.6,"publicationDate":"2022-05-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46258807","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-05-09DOI: 10.1080/09662839.2022.2069464
Sarah Backman
ABSTRACT In a relatively short time, cybersecurity has risen to become one of the EU’s security priorities. While the institutionalisation of EU-level cybersecurity capacities has been substantial since the first EU cybersecurity strategy was published, previous research has also identified resistance from member states to allow the EU to have more control over their cybersecurity activities. Despite a growing literature on EU cybersecurity governance, there are currently extensive gaps in the understanding of this tension. This study suggests that an explanatory factor can be found in the so-far overlooked dynamic of the relative prevalence of risk vs. threat-based security logics in the EU cybersecurity approach. By distinguishing between risk and threat-based logics in the development of the EU cybersecurity discourse over time, this study highlights a shift towards an increasing threat-based security logic in the EU cybersecurity approach. The identified development highlights securitising moves enacting to a larger extent than before objects and subjects of security traditionally associated with national security. The study identifies specific areas of member state contestation accompanying this shift and concludes with a discussion on the findings in relation to the development of the EU as a security actor in the wider international cybersecurity landscape.
{"title":"Risk vs. threat-based cybersecurity: the case of the EU","authors":"Sarah Backman","doi":"10.1080/09662839.2022.2069464","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/09662839.2022.2069464","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT In a relatively short time, cybersecurity has risen to become one of the EU’s security priorities. While the institutionalisation of EU-level cybersecurity capacities has been substantial since the first EU cybersecurity strategy was published, previous research has also identified resistance from member states to allow the EU to have more control over their cybersecurity activities. Despite a growing literature on EU cybersecurity governance, there are currently extensive gaps in the understanding of this tension. This study suggests that an explanatory factor can be found in the so-far overlooked dynamic of the relative prevalence of risk vs. threat-based security logics in the EU cybersecurity approach. By distinguishing between risk and threat-based logics in the development of the EU cybersecurity discourse over time, this study highlights a shift towards an increasing threat-based security logic in the EU cybersecurity approach. The identified development highlights securitising moves enacting to a larger extent than before objects and subjects of security traditionally associated with national security. The study identifies specific areas of member state contestation accompanying this shift and concludes with a discussion on the findings in relation to the development of the EU as a security actor in the wider international cybersecurity landscape.","PeriodicalId":46331,"journal":{"name":"European Security","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.6,"publicationDate":"2022-05-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43575473","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-05-09DOI: 10.1080/09662839.2022.2070006
Anne Heyerdahl
ABSTRACT Protective security management aims at protecting against malicious acts. It has, in a relatively short period, undergone substantial changes. One such change is the introduction of risk management. This article investigates a debate about a standard for security risk assessment (SRA) in Norway. It focuses on sense-making by security professionals, drawing on a unique interview material. The analysis utilises Michael Power’s theory on risk governance, as well as insights from security studies. A central finding is that the SRA approach was introduced to create more analytical security management. The importance of analysing one’s values (assets) makes it key to scrutinise the organisation’s characteristics, goals and vulnerabilities, regarded as moving security management in the direction of corporate governance. The article investigates how understanding of risk assessment and security interplay, and identifies a tension between risk (assessment) and the goal of protection, which makes security management risk averse. A requirement of creating sound security is viewed as a potential for burdensome organisational responsibility and blame. The analysis identifies elements of what is often described as resilience (attention towards vulnerabilities), but without the political reading (neo-liberal abdication of the state), thus contributing to the literature on resilience.
{"title":"From prescriptive rules to responsible organisations – making sense of risk in protective security management – a study from Norway","authors":"Anne Heyerdahl","doi":"10.1080/09662839.2022.2070006","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/09662839.2022.2070006","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT Protective security management aims at protecting against malicious acts. It has, in a relatively short period, undergone substantial changes. One such change is the introduction of risk management. This article investigates a debate about a standard for security risk assessment (SRA) in Norway. It focuses on sense-making by security professionals, drawing on a unique interview material. The analysis utilises Michael Power’s theory on risk governance, as well as insights from security studies. A central finding is that the SRA approach was introduced to create more analytical security management. The importance of analysing one’s values (assets) makes it key to scrutinise the organisation’s characteristics, goals and vulnerabilities, regarded as moving security management in the direction of corporate governance. The article investigates how understanding of risk assessment and security interplay, and identifies a tension between risk (assessment) and the goal of protection, which makes security management risk averse. A requirement of creating sound security is viewed as a potential for burdensome organisational responsibility and blame. The analysis identifies elements of what is often described as resilience (attention towards vulnerabilities), but without the political reading (neo-liberal abdication of the state), thus contributing to the literature on resilience.","PeriodicalId":46331,"journal":{"name":"European Security","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.6,"publicationDate":"2022-05-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45562384","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-04-12DOI: 10.1080/09662839.2022.2057188
Sten Hansson, Mari-Liis Madisson, A. Ventsel
ABSTRACT Governments spread strategic narratives via media to influence foreign audiences and policy makers. A frequent but understudied feature of strategic narratives is the discursive construction of blame. In this article, we use the coverage of the adoption of 5G cellular technology in Russian state-funded news portals as an example to show how to interpret blame narratives about international security issues. We combine methods and insights from the discourse-analytic studies of blame and the research into the uses of strategic narratives in international relations to reveal how various articulations of blame are used to (de)legitimise particular actors and actions, sow discord, and foster alliances. Our analysis sheds new light on blame discourses that are more sophisticated and indirect than straightforward accusations and may serve multiple strategic goals at once. It also contributes to scholarship on Russia’s strategic communication about China as well as the United States and its allies.
{"title":"Discourses of blame in strategic narratives: the case of Russia’s 5G stories","authors":"Sten Hansson, Mari-Liis Madisson, A. Ventsel","doi":"10.1080/09662839.2022.2057188","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/09662839.2022.2057188","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT Governments spread strategic narratives via media to influence foreign audiences and policy makers. A frequent but understudied feature of strategic narratives is the discursive construction of blame. In this article, we use the coverage of the adoption of 5G cellular technology in Russian state-funded news portals as an example to show how to interpret blame narratives about international security issues. We combine methods and insights from the discourse-analytic studies of blame and the research into the uses of strategic narratives in international relations to reveal how various articulations of blame are used to (de)legitimise particular actors and actions, sow discord, and foster alliances. Our analysis sheds new light on blame discourses that are more sophisticated and indirect than straightforward accusations and may serve multiple strategic goals at once. It also contributes to scholarship on Russia’s strategic communication about China as well as the United States and its allies.","PeriodicalId":46331,"journal":{"name":"European Security","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.6,"publicationDate":"2022-04-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48034959","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-03-24DOI: 10.1080/09662839.2022.2052724
Tine Elisabeth Brøgger
ABSTRACT Literature on European security and defence cooperation usually asserts that differences in national security interests and security cultures prevent agreement beyond the “lowest common denominator”. I propose that it is possible for states to agree on mutually binding commitments also in this policy field. Using Nordic security and defence cooperation as a case study, I examine what characterises their mutual commitments and how we might account for them. The article adds to the literature on European security and defence cooperation by suggesting that binding commitments in security and defence would not have come about in the Nordic context without a sense of “Nordic togetherness”. This conclusion is important because it demonstrates that a shared sense of identity and norms is significant for understanding how security and defence cooperation between states is possible.
{"title":"Beyond the “lowest common denominator”? Mutually binding commitments in European security and defence cooperation: the case of the Nordic states","authors":"Tine Elisabeth Brøgger","doi":"10.1080/09662839.2022.2052724","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/09662839.2022.2052724","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT Literature on European security and defence cooperation usually asserts that differences in national security interests and security cultures prevent agreement beyond the “lowest common denominator”. I propose that it is possible for states to agree on mutually binding commitments also in this policy field. Using Nordic security and defence cooperation as a case study, I examine what characterises their mutual commitments and how we might account for them. The article adds to the literature on European security and defence cooperation by suggesting that binding commitments in security and defence would not have come about in the Nordic context without a sense of “Nordic togetherness”. This conclusion is important because it demonstrates that a shared sense of identity and norms is significant for understanding how security and defence cooperation between states is possible.","PeriodicalId":46331,"journal":{"name":"European Security","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.6,"publicationDate":"2022-03-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42802974","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-03-02DOI: 10.1080/09662839.2022.2038568
Gordon D. Cumming, Roel van der Velde, T. Chafer
ABSTRACT Strategic narratives now face unrealistic expectations as to what they can achieve in the military field. This article asks when and how such narratives lose traction during protracted military interventions. To address these questions, which are crucial at a time when so much modern warfare takes place in the “fourth” dimension, this study develops a conceptual framework that focuses initially on the weakening of a narrative’s content and, subsequently, on its loss of normative resonance and verisimilitude. The latter two factors are beyond the control of even the most skilful strategic narrator, particularly where narratives are required to appeal to audiences with different norms. Our framework is applied to the case of France’s military operations in Mali (Serval) and the Western Sahel (Barkhane). It finds that, whereas France’s compelling Serval narrative was congruent with strong French and Malian public backing, its Barkhane narrative weakened over time, resonating less with prevailing societal norms, becoming less attuned to events on the ground and ultimately coinciding with a sharp decline in public support in France and Mali. It concludes that strategic narratives afford agency to policymakers but are constantly open to contestation and struggle to cope with diverse audiences and deteriorating “evenemential” contexts.
{"title":"Understanding the public response: a strategic narrative perspective on France’s Sahelian operations","authors":"Gordon D. Cumming, Roel van der Velde, T. Chafer","doi":"10.1080/09662839.2022.2038568","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/09662839.2022.2038568","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT Strategic narratives now face unrealistic expectations as to what they can achieve in the military field. This article asks when and how such narratives lose traction during protracted military interventions. To address these questions, which are crucial at a time when so much modern warfare takes place in the “fourth” dimension, this study develops a conceptual framework that focuses initially on the weakening of a narrative’s content and, subsequently, on its loss of normative resonance and verisimilitude. The latter two factors are beyond the control of even the most skilful strategic narrator, particularly where narratives are required to appeal to audiences with different norms. Our framework is applied to the case of France’s military operations in Mali (Serval) and the Western Sahel (Barkhane). It finds that, whereas France’s compelling Serval narrative was congruent with strong French and Malian public backing, its Barkhane narrative weakened over time, resonating less with prevailing societal norms, becoming less attuned to events on the ground and ultimately coinciding with a sharp decline in public support in France and Mali. It concludes that strategic narratives afford agency to policymakers but are constantly open to contestation and struggle to cope with diverse audiences and deteriorating “evenemential” contexts.","PeriodicalId":46331,"journal":{"name":"European Security","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.6,"publicationDate":"2022-03-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42978520","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-02-07DOI: 10.1080/09662839.2022.2031990
A. Friede
ABSTRACT This article analyses changes in national defence policies across the Baltic Sea region after the exogenous shock of the Ukraine crisis in 2014. It draws on Punctuated Equilibrium Theory for theoretical guidance, particularly to understand the mechanisms leading to large-scale policy change after periods of relative stability. Since the outbreak of the Ukraine crisis, defence budgets in the Baltic Sea region have increased dramatically. Baltic Sea states invested in neglected capability development and redirected policy planning towards territorial and collective defence. By contrast, the Russian-Georgian conflict in 2008 had a negligible effect on the paradigm guiding defence planning processes, delayed and lukewarm policy responses let adaptation pressure grow. The empirical findings suggest that policy change reinforced post-2014 because a normative consensus emerged on why Europe's security order is at risk, a critical threshold of urgency was reached, setting off positive feedback cycles, and receptive policy venues, such as NATO, as well as capable external policy actors, such as the USA and the UK, put Baltic Sea security back on the agenda.
{"title":"In defence of the Baltic Sea region: (non-)allied policy responses to the exogenous shock of the Ukraine crisis","authors":"A. Friede","doi":"10.1080/09662839.2022.2031990","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/09662839.2022.2031990","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT This article analyses changes in national defence policies across the Baltic Sea region after the exogenous shock of the Ukraine crisis in 2014. It draws on Punctuated Equilibrium Theory for theoretical guidance, particularly to understand the mechanisms leading to large-scale policy change after periods of relative stability. Since the outbreak of the Ukraine crisis, defence budgets in the Baltic Sea region have increased dramatically. Baltic Sea states invested in neglected capability development and redirected policy planning towards territorial and collective defence. By contrast, the Russian-Georgian conflict in 2008 had a negligible effect on the paradigm guiding defence planning processes, delayed and lukewarm policy responses let adaptation pressure grow. The empirical findings suggest that policy change reinforced post-2014 because a normative consensus emerged on why Europe's security order is at risk, a critical threshold of urgency was reached, setting off positive feedback cycles, and receptive policy venues, such as NATO, as well as capable external policy actors, such as the USA and the UK, put Baltic Sea security back on the agenda.","PeriodicalId":46331,"journal":{"name":"European Security","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.6,"publicationDate":"2022-02-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45987650","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-02-04DOI: 10.1080/09662839.2022.2031991
Tobias Liebetrau
ABSTRACT Cyber conflict short of war plays an increasingly important role in contemporary security politics. Dedicated to a study of three European NATO members – the Netherlands, France and Norway, this article expands the existing focus of the study of cyber conflict short of war beyond its dominating US context. It compares and assesses how the countries perceive and respond to a changing strategic environment characterised by increasing cyber conflict short of war. The analysis demonstrates that all three countries acknowledge that cyber operations short of war alter the strategic environment and challenge the idea of deploying offensive cyber capabilities as purely a warfare matter. However, it also identifies a strategic vacuum, as none of them have formulated strategies that describe in detail how military and intelligence entities are supposed to approach and manage the new strategic environment. The article asserts that the current lack of strategic guidance is a fundamental challenge that puts European societies at risk and undermines democratic governance as navigating the new space of strategic cyber competition is a significant challenge to contemporary European statecraft. It concludes by noting three avenues for how to ameliorate this situation and fill the vacuum.
{"title":"Cyber conflict short of war: a European strategic vacuum","authors":"Tobias Liebetrau","doi":"10.1080/09662839.2022.2031991","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/09662839.2022.2031991","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT Cyber conflict short of war plays an increasingly important role in contemporary security politics. Dedicated to a study of three European NATO members – the Netherlands, France and Norway, this article expands the existing focus of the study of cyber conflict short of war beyond its dominating US context. It compares and assesses how the countries perceive and respond to a changing strategic environment characterised by increasing cyber conflict short of war. The analysis demonstrates that all three countries acknowledge that cyber operations short of war alter the strategic environment and challenge the idea of deploying offensive cyber capabilities as purely a warfare matter. However, it also identifies a strategic vacuum, as none of them have formulated strategies that describe in detail how military and intelligence entities are supposed to approach and manage the new strategic environment. The article asserts that the current lack of strategic guidance is a fundamental challenge that puts European societies at risk and undermines democratic governance as navigating the new space of strategic cyber competition is a significant challenge to contemporary European statecraft. It concludes by noting three avenues for how to ameliorate this situation and fill the vacuum.","PeriodicalId":46331,"journal":{"name":"European Security","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.6,"publicationDate":"2022-02-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45191808","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-02-01DOI: 10.1080/09662839.2022.2028277
M. Sezal, Francesco Giumelli
ABSTRACT State defence and security policies rely mostly on their military capabilities. The latter are ensured through research and development (R&D) as well as procurement, which are subject to defence industry dynamics. Furthermore the defence sector is heavily dependent on public funds; the latter can be more easily allocated if related R&D has a spill-over effect on the civilian sector, creating the potential for a bigger and more globally (or regionally) integrated market. This article investigates, then, how technology moves, and whether defence sector innovations create spin-offs in the civilian sector in the Netherlands. We aim to provide an industry-centred perspective on defence sector dynamics and potentials. For this, the article attempts to answer the following questions: Are defence technologies transferred to the civilian sector? What lessons can be derived from the Dutch case? To address these research puzzles the article’s theoretical framework builds on the technology-transfer literature in analysing the case study of the Netherlands. The basis for this is 23 interviews with representatives of Dutch defence companies that were carried out both in a workshop and in one-to-one settings in May and June 2020.
{"title":"Technology transfer and defence sector dynamics: the case of the Netherlands","authors":"M. Sezal, Francesco Giumelli","doi":"10.1080/09662839.2022.2028277","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/09662839.2022.2028277","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT State defence and security policies rely mostly on their military capabilities. The latter are ensured through research and development (R&D) as well as procurement, which are subject to defence industry dynamics. Furthermore the defence sector is heavily dependent on public funds; the latter can be more easily allocated if related R&D has a spill-over effect on the civilian sector, creating the potential for a bigger and more globally (or regionally) integrated market. This article investigates, then, how technology moves, and whether defence sector innovations create spin-offs in the civilian sector in the Netherlands. We aim to provide an industry-centred perspective on defence sector dynamics and potentials. For this, the article attempts to answer the following questions: Are defence technologies transferred to the civilian sector? What lessons can be derived from the Dutch case? To address these research puzzles the article’s theoretical framework builds on the technology-transfer literature in analysing the case study of the Netherlands. The basis for this is 23 interviews with representatives of Dutch defence companies that were carried out both in a workshop and in one-to-one settings in May and June 2020.","PeriodicalId":46331,"journal":{"name":"European Security","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.6,"publicationDate":"2022-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46273622","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-02-01DOI: 10.1080/09662839.2022.2029847
Silvia D’Amato, Andrea Terlizzi
ABSTRACT This paper investigates the extent to which the European Union is strategically engaging against terrorism. It builds on traditional scholarship on strategic thinking and elaborates an analytical framework to empirically assess strategic policy formulation at the supranational level in the case of terrorism. The framework revolves around three analytical categories: i) threat assessment; ii) objectives setting; and iii) policy measures. Through qualitative content analysis of text data, we show that, while objectives are clearly presented in the documents, the threat that the strategy is supposed to counter is unspecified. In addition to that, the formulation of concrete policy measures remains largely vague. Overall, the article adds to the growing academic debate on EU security governance and offers fresh empirical insights on strategic thinking in counterterrorism policy.
{"title":"Strategic European counterterrorism? An empirical analysis","authors":"Silvia D’Amato, Andrea Terlizzi","doi":"10.1080/09662839.2022.2029847","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/09662839.2022.2029847","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT This paper investigates the extent to which the European Union is strategically engaging against terrorism. It builds on traditional scholarship on strategic thinking and elaborates an analytical framework to empirically assess strategic policy formulation at the supranational level in the case of terrorism. The framework revolves around three analytical categories: i) threat assessment; ii) objectives setting; and iii) policy measures. Through qualitative content analysis of text data, we show that, while objectives are clearly presented in the documents, the threat that the strategy is supposed to counter is unspecified. In addition to that, the formulation of concrete policy measures remains largely vague. Overall, the article adds to the growing academic debate on EU security governance and offers fresh empirical insights on strategic thinking in counterterrorism policy.","PeriodicalId":46331,"journal":{"name":"European Security","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.6,"publicationDate":"2022-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41577656","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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