Pub Date : 2020-01-01DOI: 10.1017/S0265052520000126
Timothy M. Costelloe
Abstract This essay examines Hume’s treatment of money in light of his view of the imagination. It begins with his claim that money is distinct from wealth, the latter arising, according to vulgar reasoning, from the power of acquisition that it represents, or, understood philosophically, from the labor that produces it. The salient features that Hume identifies with the imagination are then put forth, namely its power to combine ideas creatively and the principle of easy transition that characterizes its movement among them. Two issues that these features explain are then discussed: first, why people take value to lie in the material of which money is made, and, second, why they assign value to what they take money to represent, namely, wealth. In both cases, the imagination creates a new relation, an illusion or fiction, that cannot be traced directly to experience. In the case of money, the faculty conjoins what is intangible (the power of acquisition) with the physical qualities of specie; in the case of property it produces a causal relation that connects persons with objects to constitute stable possession that constitutes ownership. Hume also appeals to the imagination to explain the rules of property that subsequently develop (present possession, occupation, prescription, and transference). The essay concludes by emphasizing that being based on the imagination is not in itself indicative of any instability in either money or property and the practices they enshrine, a feature they share with other phenomena (such as the self and continued existence) that Hume also traces to the same faculty.
{"title":"“SHINING BITS OF METAL”: MONEY, PROPERTY, AND THE IMAGINATION IN HUME’S POLITICAL ECONOMY","authors":"Timothy M. Costelloe","doi":"10.1017/S0265052520000126","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/S0265052520000126","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract This essay examines Hume’s treatment of money in light of his view of the imagination. It begins with his claim that money is distinct from wealth, the latter arising, according to vulgar reasoning, from the power of acquisition that it represents, or, understood philosophically, from the labor that produces it. The salient features that Hume identifies with the imagination are then put forth, namely its power to combine ideas creatively and the principle of easy transition that characterizes its movement among them. Two issues that these features explain are then discussed: first, why people take value to lie in the material of which money is made, and, second, why they assign value to what they take money to represent, namely, wealth. In both cases, the imagination creates a new relation, an illusion or fiction, that cannot be traced directly to experience. In the case of money, the faculty conjoins what is intangible (the power of acquisition) with the physical qualities of specie; in the case of property it produces a causal relation that connects persons with objects to constitute stable possession that constitutes ownership. Hume also appeals to the imagination to explain the rules of property that subsequently develop (present possession, occupation, prescription, and transference). The essay concludes by emphasizing that being based on the imagination is not in itself indicative of any instability in either money or property and the practices they enshrine, a feature they share with other phenomena (such as the self and continued existence) that Hume also traces to the same faculty.","PeriodicalId":46601,"journal":{"name":"Social Philosophy & Policy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2020-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1017/S0265052520000126","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"56897680","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-01-01DOI: 10.1017/S0265052521000066
Keith E. Whittington
Abstract Conservatives in the United States have grown increasingly critical of universities and their faculty, convinced that professors are ideologues from the political left. Universities, for their part, have increasingly adopted a mantra of diversity and inclusivity, but have shown little interest in diversifying the political and ideological profile of their faculties. This essay argues that the lack of political diversity among American university faculty hampers the ability of universities to fulfill their core mission of advancing and disseminating knowledge. The argument is advanced through a series of four questions: Is it true that university faculty are not ideologically diverse? Why might it be true? Does it matter? How might it be fixed.
{"title":"THE VALUE OF IDEOLOGICAL DIVERSITY AMONG UNIVERSITY FACULTY","authors":"Keith E. Whittington","doi":"10.1017/S0265052521000066","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/S0265052521000066","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Conservatives in the United States have grown increasingly critical of universities and their faculty, convinced that professors are ideologues from the political left. Universities, for their part, have increasingly adopted a mantra of diversity and inclusivity, but have shown little interest in diversifying the political and ideological profile of their faculties. This essay argues that the lack of political diversity among American university faculty hampers the ability of universities to fulfill their core mission of advancing and disseminating knowledge. The argument is advanced through a series of four questions: Is it true that university faculty are not ideologically diverse? Why might it be true? Does it matter? How might it be fixed.","PeriodicalId":46601,"journal":{"name":"Social Philosophy & Policy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2020-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1017/S0265052521000066","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"56897942","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-01-01DOI: 10.1017/S0265052521000054
F. Schauer
Abstract Freedom of thought is often explicitly protected in constitutions and human rights documents, and even more often employed as a rallying cry against state tyranny. It is not so clear, however, just what freedom of thought is, what it would be to threaten it, and how, if at all, it differs from basic liberty or freedom. This essay seeks to analyze the idea of freedom of thought, to pose some skeptical questions about its alleged independent existence, and to ask, again with a skeptical mindset, what it is to protect it and why its protection should be so commonly valued.
{"title":"FREEDOM OF THOUGHT?","authors":"F. Schauer","doi":"10.1017/S0265052521000054","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/S0265052521000054","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Freedom of thought is often explicitly protected in constitutions and human rights documents, and even more often employed as a rallying cry against state tyranny. It is not so clear, however, just what freedom of thought is, what it would be to threaten it, and how, if at all, it differs from basic liberty or freedom. This essay seeks to analyze the idea of freedom of thought, to pose some skeptical questions about its alleged independent existence, and to ask, again with a skeptical mindset, what it is to protect it and why its protection should be so commonly valued.","PeriodicalId":46601,"journal":{"name":"Social Philosophy & Policy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2020-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1017/S0265052521000054","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"56897928","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-01-01DOI: 10.1017/S026505252100011X
Khalil M. Habib
Abstract According to Tocqueville, the freedom of the press, which he treats as an extension of the freedom of speech, is a primary constituent element of liberty. Tocqueville treats the freedom of the press in relation to and as an extension of the right to assemble and govern one’s own affairs, both of which he argues are essential to preserving liberty in a free society. Although scholars acknowledge the importance of civil associations to liberty in Tocqueville’s political thought, they routinely ignore the importance he places on the freedom of the press and speech. His reflections on the importance of the free press and speech may help to shed light on the dangers of recent attempts to censor the press and speech.
{"title":"PERSECUTION AND THE ART OF FREEDOM: ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE ON THE IMPORTANCE OF FREE PRESS AND FREE SPEECH IN DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY","authors":"Khalil M. Habib","doi":"10.1017/S026505252100011X","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/S026505252100011X","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract According to Tocqueville, the freedom of the press, which he treats as an extension of the freedom of speech, is a primary constituent element of liberty. Tocqueville treats the freedom of the press in relation to and as an extension of the right to assemble and govern one’s own affairs, both of which he argues are essential to preserving liberty in a free society. Although scholars acknowledge the importance of civil associations to liberty in Tocqueville’s political thought, they routinely ignore the importance he places on the freedom of the press and speech. His reflections on the importance of the free press and speech may help to shed light on the dangers of recent attempts to censor the press and speech.","PeriodicalId":46601,"journal":{"name":"Social Philosophy & Policy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2020-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1017/S026505252100011X","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"56898053","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-01-01DOI: 10.1017/S0265052520000059
Natalie Gold
Abstract “Das Adam Smith Problem” is the name given by eighteenth-century German scholars to the question of how to reconcile the role of self-interest in the Wealth of Nations with Smith’s advocacy of sympathy in Theory of Moral Sentiments. As the discipline of economics developed, it focused on the interaction of selfish agents, pursuing their private interests. However, behavioral economists have rediscovered the existence and importance of multiple motivations, and a new Das Adam Smith Problem has arisen, of how to accommodate self-regarding and pro-social motivations in a single system. This question is particularly important because of evidence of motivation crowding, where paying people can backfire, with payments achieving the opposite effects of those intended. Psychologists have proposed a mechanism for the crowding out of “intrinsic motivations” for doing a task, when payment is used to incentivize effort. However, they argue that pro-social motivations are different from these intrinsic motivations, implying that crowding out of pro-social motivations requires a different mechanism. In this essay I present an answer to the new Das Adam Smith problem, proposing a mechanism that can underpin the crowding out of both pro-social and intrinsic motivations, whereby motivations are prompted by frames and motivation crowding is underpinned by the crowding out of frames. I explore some of the implications of this mechanism for research and policy.
摘要“亚当·斯密问题”是18世纪德国学者对如何调和《国富论》中利己主义与斯密在《道德情操论》中所倡导的同情的问题所起的名字。随着经济学学科的发展，它关注的是追求私人利益的自私行为者之间的相互作用。然而，行为经济学家重新发现了多重动机的存在和重要性，并提出了一个新的Das Adam Smith问题，即如何在单一系统中适应自我考虑和亲社会的动机。这个问题尤其重要，因为有证据表明，在动机拥挤的情况下，付钱给人可能适得其反，与预期的效果相反。心理学家提出了一种机制，当报酬被用来激励努力时，完成任务的“内在动机”就会被挤出。然而，他们认为亲社会动机不同于这些内在动机，这意味着挤出亲社会动机需要不同的机制。在这篇文章中，我提出了一种新的Das Adam Smith问题的答案，提出了一种机制，可以支持亲社会动机和内在动机的挤出，即动机是由框架推动的，动机拥挤是由框架挤出来的。我将探讨这一机制对研究和政策的一些影响。
{"title":"HOW SHOULD WE RECONCILE SELF-REGARDING AND PRO-SOCIAL MOTIVATIONS? A RENAISSANCE OF “DAS ADAM SMITH PROBLEM”","authors":"Natalie Gold","doi":"10.1017/S0265052520000059","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/S0265052520000059","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract “Das Adam Smith Problem” is the name given by eighteenth-century German scholars to the question of how to reconcile the role of self-interest in the Wealth of Nations with Smith’s advocacy of sympathy in Theory of Moral Sentiments. As the discipline of economics developed, it focused on the interaction of selfish agents, pursuing their private interests. However, behavioral economists have rediscovered the existence and importance of multiple motivations, and a new Das Adam Smith Problem has arisen, of how to accommodate self-regarding and pro-social motivations in a single system. This question is particularly important because of evidence of motivation crowding, where paying people can backfire, with payments achieving the opposite effects of those intended. Psychologists have proposed a mechanism for the crowding out of “intrinsic motivations” for doing a task, when payment is used to incentivize effort. However, they argue that pro-social motivations are different from these intrinsic motivations, implying that crowding out of pro-social motivations requires a different mechanism. In this essay I present an answer to the new Das Adam Smith problem, proposing a mechanism that can underpin the crowding out of both pro-social and intrinsic motivations, whereby motivations are prompted by frames and motivation crowding is underpinned by the crowding out of frames. I explore some of the implications of this mechanism for research and policy.","PeriodicalId":46601,"journal":{"name":"Social Philosophy & Policy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2020-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1017/S0265052520000059","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"56897591","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-01-01DOI: 10.1017/s0265052521000157
Mary-Catherine Harrison
Daniel Jacobson is Professor of Philosophy and Director of the Benson Center for the Study of Western Civilization at the University of Colorado, Boulder. He works on a range of topics in ethics, moral psychology, aesthetics, and themoral andpolitical philosophy of J. S.Mill. He has published extensively on issues concerning sentimentalism, the philosophy of emotion, and freedom of speech. Jacobson was Project Leader of The Science of Ethics, a three-year project funded by the John Templeton Foundation. His essay, “Utilitarianism without Consequentialism: The Case of John Stuart Mill,” was chosen byThe Philosophers’ Annual as one of the ten best philosophy articles published in 2008. Jacobson is co-editor (with Justin D’Arms) of the volume, Moral Psychology and Human Agency: Philosophical Essays on the Science of Ethics (2014). Jacobson and D’Arms are currently working on a collaborative book project, Rational Sentimentalism, and have published a series of articles developing their view.
丹尼尔·雅各布森(Daniel Jacobson)是科罗拉多大学博尔德分校哲学系教授兼本森西方文明研究中心主任。他的研究领域包括伦理学、道德心理学、美学以及穆勒的道德和政治哲学。他发表了大量关于感伤主义、情感哲学和言论自由的文章。雅各布森是由约翰邓普顿基金会资助的为期三年的“伦理学科学”项目负责人。他的文章《没有结果主义的功利主义:约翰·斯图亚特·密尔的案例》被《哲学家年鉴》选为2008年出版的十大最佳哲学文章之一。雅各布森与贾斯汀·达阿姆斯(Justin D 'Arms)合著了《道德心理学与人类能动性:伦理学哲学论文集》(2014)。雅各布森和达阿姆斯目前正在合作写一本名为《理性感伤主义》的书，并发表了一系列文章来阐述他们的观点。
{"title":"CONTRIBUTORS","authors":"Mary-Catherine Harrison","doi":"10.1017/s0265052521000157","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/s0265052521000157","url":null,"abstract":"Daniel Jacobson is Professor of Philosophy and Director of the Benson Center for the Study of Western Civilization at the University of Colorado, Boulder. He works on a range of topics in ethics, moral psychology, aesthetics, and themoral andpolitical philosophy of J. S.Mill. He has published extensively on issues concerning sentimentalism, the philosophy of emotion, and freedom of speech. Jacobson was Project Leader of The Science of Ethics, a three-year project funded by the John Templeton Foundation. His essay, “Utilitarianism without Consequentialism: The Case of John Stuart Mill,” was chosen byThe Philosophers’ Annual as one of the ten best philosophy articles published in 2008. Jacobson is co-editor (with Justin D’Arms) of the volume, Moral Psychology and Human Agency: Philosophical Essays on the Science of Ethics (2014). Jacobson and D’Arms are currently working on a collaborative book project, Rational Sentimentalism, and have published a series of articles developing their view.","PeriodicalId":46601,"journal":{"name":"Social Philosophy & Policy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2020-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1017/s0265052521000157","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"56897671","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-01-01DOI: 10.1017/S0265052521000133
Karim Nader
Abstract In this essay, I explore ethical considerations that might arise from the use of collaborative filtering algorithms on dating apps. Collaborative filtering algorithms can predict the preferences of a target user by looking at the past behavior of similar users. By recommending products through this process, they can influence the news we read, the movies we watch, and more. They are extremely powerful and effective on platforms like Amazon and Google. Recommender systems on dating apps are likely to group people by race, since they exhibit similar patterns of behavior: users on dating platforms seem to segregate themselves based on race, exclude certain races from romantic and sexual consideration (except their own), and generally show a preference for white men and women. As collaborative filtering algorithms learn from these patterns to predict preferences and build recommendations, they can homogenize the behavior of dating app users and exacerbate biased sexual and romantic behavior.
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Pub Date : 2020-01-01DOI: 10.1017/S026505252100008X
M. McGrath
Abstract Suffering can make sacred, so it may partly be nature, and not culture alone, that leads us to apprehend a sacred aspect in victims of oppression. Those who recognize this sacredness show piety—a special form of respect—toward members of oppressed groups. The result is a system of social constructions often dismissed as “identity politics.” This essay starts with an analysis of the intentionality of piety and sacredness and how they relate to suffering, sacrifice, sanctions, pollution, and purification. It then argues that the sacralization of oppressed groups is an expression of the perennial human disposition to acknowledge sacredness and to respond piously. The essay then analyzes this sacred status as socially constructed. Based on the sacred-making (that is, “sacrificial”) power of suffering, the sacred status elicits piety, gives its bearers special authority, surrounds them with sanctions, and calls for symbolic sacrificial punishments of the impious. By dissecting sacrificial politics as a system of social constructions, we see that, although the oppressed groups are made sacred, certain people in the oppressor groups—“the Pious”—continue to exercise fundamental power. This essay, by displaying the inner logic of this cultural phenomenon, helps us both to sympathize with and to critique the system and then to pose questions about what good or bad the system might be doing.
{"title":"THE AUTHORITY OF THE SACRED VICTIM","authors":"M. McGrath","doi":"10.1017/S026505252100008X","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/S026505252100008X","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Suffering can make sacred, so it may partly be nature, and not culture alone, that leads us to apprehend a sacred aspect in victims of oppression. Those who recognize this sacredness show piety—a special form of respect—toward members of oppressed groups. The result is a system of social constructions often dismissed as “identity politics.” This essay starts with an analysis of the intentionality of piety and sacredness and how they relate to suffering, sacrifice, sanctions, pollution, and purification. It then argues that the sacralization of oppressed groups is an expression of the perennial human disposition to acknowledge sacredness and to respond piously. The essay then analyzes this sacred status as socially constructed. Based on the sacred-making (that is, “sacrificial”) power of suffering, the sacred status elicits piety, gives its bearers special authority, surrounds them with sanctions, and calls for symbolic sacrificial punishments of the impious. By dissecting sacrificial politics as a system of social constructions, we see that, although the oppressed groups are made sacred, certain people in the oppressor groups—“the Pious”—continue to exercise fundamental power. This essay, by displaying the inner logic of this cultural phenomenon, helps us both to sympathize with and to critique the system and then to pose questions about what good or bad the system might be doing.","PeriodicalId":46601,"journal":{"name":"Social Philosophy & Policy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2020-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1017/S026505252100008X","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"56897996","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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