Pub Date : 2021-10-02DOI: 10.1080/13523260.2021.1985287
Maria Giulia Amadio Viceré
ABSTRACT Despite the Lisbon Treaty's modifications in the foreign and security policy domain, the EU has frequently relied on third parties to address external conflicts and crises. Using the Ukrainian conflict as a case study, this article adopts the orchestration model to explain why and how the EU enlists intermediary actors over which it has no formal control to pursue its objectives. It finds that in this conflict the EU outsourced part of its crisis management activities to the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe because it lacked the civilian and military capabilities, as well as the regulatory competence and reputation to challenge Russia. Indeed, the Ukrainian case shows that orchestration has emerged as a crucial governance arrangement for the functioning of EU crisis management, raising serious questions about the EU overall capacity to act as a security provider in an international system marred by contestation and hard security concerns.
{"title":"Externalizing EU crisis management: EU orchestration of the OSCE during the Ukrainian conflict","authors":"Maria Giulia Amadio Viceré","doi":"10.1080/13523260.2021.1985287","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/13523260.2021.1985287","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT Despite the Lisbon Treaty's modifications in the foreign and security policy domain, the EU has frequently relied on third parties to address external conflicts and crises. Using the Ukrainian conflict as a case study, this article adopts the orchestration model to explain why and how the EU enlists intermediary actors over which it has no formal control to pursue its objectives. It finds that in this conflict the EU outsourced part of its crisis management activities to the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe because it lacked the civilian and military capabilities, as well as the regulatory competence and reputation to challenge Russia. Indeed, the Ukrainian case shows that orchestration has emerged as a crucial governance arrangement for the functioning of EU crisis management, raising serious questions about the EU overall capacity to act as a security provider in an international system marred by contestation and hard security concerns.","PeriodicalId":46729,"journal":{"name":"Contemporary Security Policy","volume":"42 1","pages":"498 - 529"},"PeriodicalIF":5.9,"publicationDate":"2021-10-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45181808","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-10-02DOI: 10.1080/13523260.2021.1992150
Jonathan Tappe, Fredrik Doeser
ABSTRACT This article introduces supervised machine learning to the study of German strategic culture, analyzing both how German strategic culture has changed and the impact of strategic culture on Germany's military engagement between 1990 and 2017. In contrast with previous qualitative research on strategic culture, supervised machine learning can yield measurable and empirical insights into strategic culture and its effects at any given point in time over a very long period, based on the reproduction of human coding of a very extensive set of security policy documents. The article shows that German strategic culture has changed slowly and in a nonlinear way after the Cold War, and that strategic culture, when controlling for confounding variables and the temporal order, has a measurable impact on Germany's military engagement. The article demonstrates the analytical value of machine learning for future studies of strategic culture.
{"title":"A machine learning approach to the study of German strategic culture","authors":"Jonathan Tappe, Fredrik Doeser","doi":"10.1080/13523260.2021.1992150","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/13523260.2021.1992150","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT This article introduces supervised machine learning to the study of German strategic culture, analyzing both how German strategic culture has changed and the impact of strategic culture on Germany's military engagement between 1990 and 2017. In contrast with previous qualitative research on strategic culture, supervised machine learning can yield measurable and empirical insights into strategic culture and its effects at any given point in time over a very long period, based on the reproduction of human coding of a very extensive set of security policy documents. The article shows that German strategic culture has changed slowly and in a nonlinear way after the Cold War, and that strategic culture, when controlling for confounding variables and the temporal order, has a measurable impact on Germany's military engagement. The article demonstrates the analytical value of machine learning for future studies of strategic culture.","PeriodicalId":46729,"journal":{"name":"Contemporary Security Policy","volume":"42 1","pages":"450 - 474"},"PeriodicalIF":5.9,"publicationDate":"2021-10-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47662444","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-09-30DOI: 10.1080/13523260.2021.1984725
Linus Hagström, Karl Gustafsson
ABSTRACT Recent research has explored how the Sino-American narrative struggle around COVID-19 might affect power shift dynamics and world order. An underlying assumption is that states craft strategic narratives in attempts to gain international support for their understandings of reality. This article evaluates such claims taking a mixed-methods approach. It analyzes American and Chinese strategic narratives about the pandemic, and their global diffusion and resonance in regional states that are important to the U.S.-led world order: Australia, India, South Korea, Turkey, and the United Kingdom. While the article confirms that strategic narratives remain a highly popular policy instrument, it argues that their efficacy appears limited. Overall, the five states in question either ignored the Sino-American narrative power battle by disseminating their own strategic narratives, or they engaged in “narrative hedging.” Moreover, even China’s narrative entrepreneurship was enabled and constrained by pre-existing master narratives integral to the current U.S.-led world order.
{"title":"The limitations of strategic narratives: The Sino-American struggle over the meaning of COVID-19","authors":"Linus Hagström, Karl Gustafsson","doi":"10.1080/13523260.2021.1984725","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/13523260.2021.1984725","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT\u0000 Recent research has explored how the Sino-American narrative struggle around COVID-19 might affect power shift dynamics and world order. An underlying assumption is that states craft strategic narratives in attempts to gain international support for their understandings of reality. This article evaluates such claims taking a mixed-methods approach. It analyzes American and Chinese strategic narratives about the pandemic, and their global diffusion and resonance in regional states that are important to the U.S.-led world order: Australia, India, South Korea, Turkey, and the United Kingdom. While the article confirms that strategic narratives remain a highly popular policy instrument, it argues that their efficacy appears limited. Overall, the five states in question either ignored the Sino-American narrative power battle by disseminating their own strategic narratives, or they engaged in “narrative hedging.” Moreover, even China’s narrative entrepreneurship was enabled and constrained by pre-existing master narratives integral to the current U.S.-led world order.","PeriodicalId":46729,"journal":{"name":"Contemporary Security Policy","volume":"42 1","pages":"415 - 449"},"PeriodicalIF":5.9,"publicationDate":"2021-09-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48095800","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-09-27DOI: 10.1080/13523260.2021.1980984
Vladimir Rauta, S. Monaghan
ABSTRACT The United Kingdom’s integrated defense and security review put “grey zone” or “hybrid” challenges at the center of national security and defense strategy. The United Kingdom is not alone: The security and defense policies of NATO, the European Union, and several other countries (including the United States, France, Germany, and Australia) have taken a hybrid-turn in recent years. This article attempts to move the hybrid debate toward more fertile ground for international policymakers and scholars by advocating a simple distinction between threats and warfare. The United Kingdom’s attempts to grapple with its own hybrid policy offer a national case study in closing the gap between rhetoric and practice, or stagecraft and statecraft, before an avenue of moving forward is proposed—informally, through a series of questions, puzzles, and lessons from the British experience—to help international policy and research communities align their efforts to address their own stagecraft-statecraft dichotomies.
{"title":"Global Britain in the grey zone: Between stagecraft and statecraft","authors":"Vladimir Rauta, S. Monaghan","doi":"10.1080/13523260.2021.1980984","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/13523260.2021.1980984","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT The United Kingdom’s integrated defense and security review put “grey zone” or “hybrid” challenges at the center of national security and defense strategy. The United Kingdom is not alone: The security and defense policies of NATO, the European Union, and several other countries (including the United States, France, Germany, and Australia) have taken a hybrid-turn in recent years. This article attempts to move the hybrid debate toward more fertile ground for international policymakers and scholars by advocating a simple distinction between threats and warfare. The United Kingdom’s attempts to grapple with its own hybrid policy offer a national case study in closing the gap between rhetoric and practice, or stagecraft and statecraft, before an avenue of moving forward is proposed—informally, through a series of questions, puzzles, and lessons from the British experience—to help international policy and research communities align their efforts to address their own stagecraft-statecraft dichotomies.","PeriodicalId":46729,"journal":{"name":"Contemporary Security Policy","volume":"42 1","pages":"475 - 497"},"PeriodicalIF":5.9,"publicationDate":"2021-09-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49446863","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-09-27DOI: 10.1080/13523260.2021.1983243
J. Knopf
ABSTRACT The nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) constitutes just one component of broader arrangements that provide global nuclear governance. In recent decades, the other props in the global nuclear order beyond its nonproliferation elements have been eroding, thereby putting more weight on the contributions of the NPT and other aspects of the nonproliferation regime. Unfortunately, recent progress in building up the NPT-based nonproliferation regime seems also to have halted. This article outlines the elements of the global nuclear order and identifies signs of erosion in that order. It discusses whether a greater commitment to nuclear disarmament might help counter that erosion and highlights the underlying cognitive dimension of efforts to avoid nuclear war.
{"title":"Not by NPT alone: The future of the global nuclear order","authors":"J. Knopf","doi":"10.1080/13523260.2021.1983243","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/13523260.2021.1983243","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT\u0000 The nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) constitutes just one component of broader arrangements that provide global nuclear governance. In recent decades, the other props in the global nuclear order beyond its nonproliferation elements have been eroding, thereby putting more weight on the contributions of the NPT and other aspects of the nonproliferation regime. Unfortunately, recent progress in building up the NPT-based nonproliferation regime seems also to have halted. This article outlines the elements of the global nuclear order and identifies signs of erosion in that order. It discusses whether a greater commitment to nuclear disarmament might help counter that erosion and highlights the underlying cognitive dimension of efforts to avoid nuclear war.","PeriodicalId":46729,"journal":{"name":"Contemporary Security Policy","volume":"43 1","pages":"186 - 212"},"PeriodicalIF":5.9,"publicationDate":"2021-09-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42235006","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-09-17DOI: 10.1080/13523260.2021.1978159
Kjølv Egeland
ABSTRACT What might prompt a nuclear-armed state to give up its arsenal? Nuclear disarmament has provided a nominally shared goal for virtually all the world’s states for decades, yet surprisingly little effort has been devoted to systematically theorizing its drivers. This article aims to begin filling this void. I proceed in three steps. First, I discuss the conceptual, material, and ideational features of renunciation to arrive at a rudimentary understanding of what, fundamentally, nuclear disarmament as a political process involves. Second, I scope out the empirical evidence on which a general theory of nuclear renunciation might be based. Third, synthesizing the dominant explanations for the cases discussed in the second part, I outline a basic account of nuclear relinquishment and discuss the compatibility of this account with common assumptions about disarmament practice. I conclude that the best evidence available suggests that adversarial politics and stigmatization are necessary conditions for renunciation.
{"title":"A theory of nuclear disarmament: Cases, analogies, and the role of the non-proliferation regime","authors":"Kjølv Egeland","doi":"10.1080/13523260.2021.1978159","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/13523260.2021.1978159","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT What might prompt a nuclear-armed state to give up its arsenal? Nuclear disarmament has provided a nominally shared goal for virtually all the world’s states for decades, yet surprisingly little effort has been devoted to systematically theorizing its drivers. This article aims to begin filling this void. I proceed in three steps. First, I discuss the conceptual, material, and ideational features of renunciation to arrive at a rudimentary understanding of what, fundamentally, nuclear disarmament as a political process involves. Second, I scope out the empirical evidence on which a general theory of nuclear renunciation might be based. Third, synthesizing the dominant explanations for the cases discussed in the second part, I outline a basic account of nuclear relinquishment and discuss the compatibility of this account with common assumptions about disarmament practice. I conclude that the best evidence available suggests that adversarial politics and stigmatization are necessary conditions for renunciation.","PeriodicalId":46729,"journal":{"name":"Contemporary Security Policy","volume":"43 1","pages":"106 - 133"},"PeriodicalIF":5.9,"publicationDate":"2021-09-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48291245","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-09-16DOI: 10.1080/13523260.2021.1978761
Michal Smetana, J. O’Mahoney
ABSTRACT We introduce “antifragility” as a conceptual framework to understand the impact of occasional violations of regime norms on the health of respective regimes. Contrary to the prevailing understanding of norm violation as a strictly negative phenomenon that leaves regimes damaged, we show that normative deviance is, under certain conditions, a stressor that helps predominantly antifragile systems learn, improve, and adapt to changes in both internal and external environments. We apply this conceptual framework to the case of the NPT regime and the prominent violations of its nonproliferation norms by India in the 1970s (as a “contestation from outside”) and Iraq in the 1990s (as a “contestation from within”). Our findings question the prevailing catastrophizing narrative about the strictly negative impact of norm violations on regime stability and contribute to contemporary scholarly debates about norm dynamics within the NPT.
{"title":"NPT as an antifragile system: How contestation improves the nonproliferation regime","authors":"Michal Smetana, J. O’Mahoney","doi":"10.1080/13523260.2021.1978761","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/13523260.2021.1978761","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT We introduce “antifragility” as a conceptual framework to understand the impact of occasional violations of regime norms on the health of respective regimes. Contrary to the prevailing understanding of norm violation as a strictly negative phenomenon that leaves regimes damaged, we show that normative deviance is, under certain conditions, a stressor that helps predominantly antifragile systems learn, improve, and adapt to changes in both internal and external environments. We apply this conceptual framework to the case of the NPT regime and the prominent violations of its nonproliferation norms by India in the 1970s (as a “contestation from outside”) and Iraq in the 1990s (as a “contestation from within”). Our findings question the prevailing catastrophizing narrative about the strictly negative impact of norm violations on regime stability and contribute to contemporary scholarly debates about norm dynamics within the NPT.","PeriodicalId":46729,"journal":{"name":"Contemporary Security Policy","volume":"43 1","pages":"24 - 49"},"PeriodicalIF":5.9,"publicationDate":"2021-09-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48519113","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-07-03DOI: 10.1080/13523260.2021.1928963
M. Onderco, Madeline Zutt
ABSTRACT What is the impact of emerging technologies on nuclear security and disarmament? Current rapid technological advances are taking place against the backdrop of increased investments in modernizing nuclear arsenals, rising tensions among great powers, and increased pressure on nuclear arms control agreements. Yet, the anticipated net effect of these emerging technologies on the nuclear landscape remains ambiguous. Through a survey with 85 experts and a series of elite interviews with 14 decision-makers, this article contends that while emerging technologies destabilize nuclear deterrence by increasing nuclear risk, they can also create fresh opportunities for nuclear disarmament. Given that new technologies are changing the nature of nuclear threats, this article also argues that we need to change the way we think about arms control if we want to respond effectively to the threats posed by emerging technologies.
{"title":"Emerging technology and nuclear security: What does the wisdom of the crowd tell us?","authors":"M. Onderco, Madeline Zutt","doi":"10.1080/13523260.2021.1928963","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/13523260.2021.1928963","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT What is the impact of emerging technologies on nuclear security and disarmament? Current rapid technological advances are taking place against the backdrop of increased investments in modernizing nuclear arsenals, rising tensions among great powers, and increased pressure on nuclear arms control agreements. Yet, the anticipated net effect of these emerging technologies on the nuclear landscape remains ambiguous. Through a survey with 85 experts and a series of elite interviews with 14 decision-makers, this article contends that while emerging technologies destabilize nuclear deterrence by increasing nuclear risk, they can also create fresh opportunities for nuclear disarmament. Given that new technologies are changing the nature of nuclear threats, this article also argues that we need to change the way we think about arms control if we want to respond effectively to the threats posed by emerging technologies.","PeriodicalId":46729,"journal":{"name":"Contemporary Security Policy","volume":"42 1","pages":"286 - 311"},"PeriodicalIF":5.9,"publicationDate":"2021-07-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/13523260.2021.1928963","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45366240","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-05-01DOI: 10.1080/13523260.2021.1920117
P. Frankenbach, Andreas Kruck, Bernhard Zangl
ABSTRACT In the mid-2000s, India turned from a nuclear pariah of the international community into a de facto recognized nuclear power. Why and how did this status elevation come about? Realist, liberal, and constructivist perspectives point to important motivations but fail to elucidate the process of India’s (re-)integration. Our strategic cooptation argument conceives of India’s status upgrade as an exchange of institutional privileges for institutional support. To stabilize the nuclear non-proliferation regime, the United States and other nuclear powers offered India the privilege of being recognized as nuclear power—and of taking part in international nuclear trade—in return for India’s promise to provide additional support to the non-proliferation regime. This deal materialized because India was able and willing to provide the needed support and because the institutional setting provided favorable conditions for circumventing and overcoming third-party resistance. We thus establish “strategic cooptation” as a mode of adapting international security institutions.
{"title":"India’s recognition as a nuclear power: A case of strategic cooptation","authors":"P. Frankenbach, Andreas Kruck, Bernhard Zangl","doi":"10.1080/13523260.2021.1920117","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/13523260.2021.1920117","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT In the mid-2000s, India turned from a nuclear pariah of the international community into a de facto recognized nuclear power. Why and how did this status elevation come about? Realist, liberal, and constructivist perspectives point to important motivations but fail to elucidate the process of India’s (re-)integration. Our strategic cooptation argument conceives of India’s status upgrade as an exchange of institutional privileges for institutional support. To stabilize the nuclear non-proliferation regime, the United States and other nuclear powers offered India the privilege of being recognized as nuclear power—and of taking part in international nuclear trade—in return for India’s promise to provide additional support to the non-proliferation regime. This deal materialized because India was able and willing to provide the needed support and because the institutional setting provided favorable conditions for circumventing and overcoming third-party resistance. We thus establish “strategic cooptation” as a mode of adapting international security institutions.","PeriodicalId":46729,"journal":{"name":"Contemporary Security Policy","volume":"42 1","pages":"530 - 553"},"PeriodicalIF":5.9,"publicationDate":"2021-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/13523260.2021.1920117","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49667690","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-04-03DOI: 10.1080/13523260.2021.1882812
Eugenio Lilli
ABSTRACT This article explores the nature and the desirability of private sector contribution to national strategies of cyber deterrence. The article starts by developing a variation of the concept of cyber deterrence, called RCDC deterrence, which is simultaneously restrictive, comprehensive, dynamic, and complemental. Second, it applies RCDC deterrence to identify and analyze specific areas of cyber deterrence that can benefit the most from private sector contribution. Third, the article cautions about the potential security, legal, and moral issues that could arise from such private contributions. Instead of offering definitive answers on these complex issues, the article ends by suggesting avenues for further research. The ultimate objective is to assist decision-makers in designing policies and regulations aimed at maximizing the benefits of public–private cooperation in cyber deterrence while mitigating its potential downsides.
{"title":"Redefining deterrence in cyberspace: Private sector contribution to national strategies of cyber deterrence","authors":"Eugenio Lilli","doi":"10.1080/13523260.2021.1882812","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/13523260.2021.1882812","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT This article explores the nature and the desirability of private sector contribution to national strategies of cyber deterrence. The article starts by developing a variation of the concept of cyber deterrence, called RCDC deterrence, which is simultaneously restrictive, comprehensive, dynamic, and complemental. Second, it applies RCDC deterrence to identify and analyze specific areas of cyber deterrence that can benefit the most from private sector contribution. Third, the article cautions about the potential security, legal, and moral issues that could arise from such private contributions. Instead of offering definitive answers on these complex issues, the article ends by suggesting avenues for further research. The ultimate objective is to assist decision-makers in designing policies and regulations aimed at maximizing the benefits of public–private cooperation in cyber deterrence while mitigating its potential downsides.","PeriodicalId":46729,"journal":{"name":"Contemporary Security Policy","volume":"42 1","pages":"163 - 188"},"PeriodicalIF":5.9,"publicationDate":"2021-04-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/13523260.2021.1882812","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45736861","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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