Pub Date : 2021-07-03DOI: 10.1080/0163660X.2021.1970336
Dominic Tierney
At a press conference in 2015, Barack Obama predicted that Russian intervention in Syria would end in ignominy and Moscow would be “stuck in a quagmire.” Rather than repeat America’s own tough experience in recent Middle Eastern wars, however, the Russian operation helped Syrian president Bashar al-Assad seize the initiative and recapture Aleppo. Since the 9/11 attacks, major American wars in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Libya have all been strategic failures. During the same period, however, US rivals Russia and Iran achieved significant success during campaigns in Georgia, Ukraine, Syria, and Iraq. Why does the United States lose, whereas Russia and Iran win? The answer does not lie with military spending, given the dramatic US advantage in defense budgets. Instead, the explanation is cultural. War today is primarily civil war, and when states intervene in foreign internal conflicts, cultural factors are a stronger predictor of battlefield outcomes than material resources. That puts the United States at a disadvantage for three reasons. First, America’s idealistic domestic culture encourages a crusading vision of war and unrealistic goals, whereas Russia’s and Iran’s domestic cultures spur a more pragmatic approach. Second, US military culture prioritizes conventional interstate war over intervention in foreign internal conflicts, whereas Russia and Iran have a broader view of the military’s mission. Third, Washington often intervenes in distant countries where there is a chasm between American culture and the target state’s culture, while Russia
{"title":"Why the United States Is Losing—And Russia and Iran Are Winning","authors":"Dominic Tierney","doi":"10.1080/0163660X.2021.1970336","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/0163660X.2021.1970336","url":null,"abstract":"At a press conference in 2015, Barack Obama predicted that Russian intervention in Syria would end in ignominy and Moscow would be “stuck in a quagmire.” Rather than repeat America’s own tough experience in recent Middle Eastern wars, however, the Russian operation helped Syrian president Bashar al-Assad seize the initiative and recapture Aleppo. Since the 9/11 attacks, major American wars in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Libya have all been strategic failures. During the same period, however, US rivals Russia and Iran achieved significant success during campaigns in Georgia, Ukraine, Syria, and Iraq. Why does the United States lose, whereas Russia and Iran win? The answer does not lie with military spending, given the dramatic US advantage in defense budgets. Instead, the explanation is cultural. War today is primarily civil war, and when states intervene in foreign internal conflicts, cultural factors are a stronger predictor of battlefield outcomes than material resources. That puts the United States at a disadvantage for three reasons. First, America’s idealistic domestic culture encourages a crusading vision of war and unrealistic goals, whereas Russia’s and Iran’s domestic cultures spur a more pragmatic approach. Second, US military culture prioritizes conventional interstate war over intervention in foreign internal conflicts, whereas Russia and Iran have a broader view of the military’s mission. Third, Washington often intervenes in distant countries where there is a chasm between American culture and the target state’s culture, while Russia","PeriodicalId":46957,"journal":{"name":"Washington Quarterly","volume":"44 1","pages":"69 - 87"},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2021-07-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"59334681","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-07-03DOI: 10.1080/0163660X.2021.1970903
T. Crawford
Military alignment between Russia and China is increasing. Although some still downplay its significance, alarm is warranted. Many perceive the dangerous trend but conclude that the United States can do little to detach Moscow from Beijing. Still, there are serious calls for the United States to find ways to improve relations with Moscow and draw it away from China. These are, in essence, calls for the United States to use a wedge strategy—a policy to move or keep a potential adversary out of an opposing alliance. Yet, when it comes to how to do that, debate is constricted by the usual grooves of foreign policy orthodoxy and flawed answers to two basic questions: first, what is the mainspring of Russia-China convergence? Misdiagnosis here makes it harder to discern potential remedies and easier to prescribe ones that make matters worse. Second, what is the essential danger that their convergence poses? Confusion here makes it harder to gauge whether this can and should be changed at an acceptable cost. I argue that the mainspring of Russia-China convergence is their growing encirclement by the United States’ amalgamating system of formal military alliances, such as NATO, and less formal strategic partnerships, such as with India, Georgia, and Ukraine. This increasing organization of military relations against Russia and China pushes them together in a way that would not otherwise occur. The main problem this convergence poses for US grand strategy is not that Russia and China will better combine military forces, but that increased expectations of support from Moscow will encourage greater Chinese risktaking in Asia. The political focus of a wedge strategy to divide Russia from
{"title":"How to Distance Russia from China","authors":"T. Crawford","doi":"10.1080/0163660X.2021.1970903","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/0163660X.2021.1970903","url":null,"abstract":"Military alignment between Russia and China is increasing. Although some still downplay its significance, alarm is warranted. Many perceive the dangerous trend but conclude that the United States can do little to detach Moscow from Beijing. Still, there are serious calls for the United States to find ways to improve relations with Moscow and draw it away from China. These are, in essence, calls for the United States to use a wedge strategy—a policy to move or keep a potential adversary out of an opposing alliance. Yet, when it comes to how to do that, debate is constricted by the usual grooves of foreign policy orthodoxy and flawed answers to two basic questions: first, what is the mainspring of Russia-China convergence? Misdiagnosis here makes it harder to discern potential remedies and easier to prescribe ones that make matters worse. Second, what is the essential danger that their convergence poses? Confusion here makes it harder to gauge whether this can and should be changed at an acceptable cost. I argue that the mainspring of Russia-China convergence is their growing encirclement by the United States’ amalgamating system of formal military alliances, such as NATO, and less formal strategic partnerships, such as with India, Georgia, and Ukraine. This increasing organization of military relations against Russia and China pushes them together in a way that would not otherwise occur. The main problem this convergence poses for US grand strategy is not that Russia and China will better combine military forces, but that increased expectations of support from Moscow will encourage greater Chinese risktaking in Asia. The political focus of a wedge strategy to divide Russia from","PeriodicalId":46957,"journal":{"name":"Washington Quarterly","volume":"44 1","pages":"175 - 194"},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2021-07-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42836749","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-07-03DOI: 10.1080/0163660X.2021.1970335
R. Joyce, Becca Wasser
The Biden administration has promised to revise US global force posture and alter the vast constellation of overseas forces, bases, and capabilities that underpin America’s ability to deter adversaries, counter threats, and protect allies. It has signaled an intent to reduce US presence in the Middle East to make it more commensurate with the region’s relative strategic importance (i.e., “rightsize” forces) and bolster its posture in the Indo-Pacific, much like previous administrations attempted to do. To this end, the administration has a Global Force Posture Review underway and has already drawn down US combat forces in Afghanistan, effectively ending the almost 20-year US presence in the country. This impulse to remake the US global footprint reflects a desire to address a new era of strategic competition with China and to expend finite resources and taxpayer dollars more efficiently. It is not the first push to revise US force posture. The Trump administration also attempted to make changes, including controversial plans to draw down forces in South Korea and Germany, while simultaneously seeking to stand up a new base and enhance US troop numbers in Poland. Such moves were, in theory, intended to correct US global posture to be more in line with the Department of Defense’s refocus on preparing for a future conflict with China and Russia.
{"title":"All About Access: Solving America’s Force Posture Puzzle","authors":"R. Joyce, Becca Wasser","doi":"10.1080/0163660X.2021.1970335","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/0163660X.2021.1970335","url":null,"abstract":"The Biden administration has promised to revise US global force posture and alter the vast constellation of overseas forces, bases, and capabilities that underpin America’s ability to deter adversaries, counter threats, and protect allies. It has signaled an intent to reduce US presence in the Middle East to make it more commensurate with the region’s relative strategic importance (i.e., “rightsize” forces) and bolster its posture in the Indo-Pacific, much like previous administrations attempted to do. To this end, the administration has a Global Force Posture Review underway and has already drawn down US combat forces in Afghanistan, effectively ending the almost 20-year US presence in the country. This impulse to remake the US global footprint reflects a desire to address a new era of strategic competition with China and to expend finite resources and taxpayer dollars more efficiently. It is not the first push to revise US force posture. The Trump administration also attempted to make changes, including controversial plans to draw down forces in South Korea and Germany, while simultaneously seeking to stand up a new base and enhance US troop numbers in Poland. Such moves were, in theory, intended to correct US global posture to be more in line with the Department of Defense’s refocus on preparing for a future conflict with China and Russia.","PeriodicalId":46957,"journal":{"name":"Washington Quarterly","volume":"44 1","pages":"45 - 67"},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2021-07-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44080569","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-07-03DOI: 10.1080/0163660X.2021.1969090
Leigh Sarty
US relations with China and Russia remain deeply problematic. Any hopes for change for the better under a Biden presidency were quickly dashed by the harsh Sino-US exchanges in Alaska in March and by the fallout from “SolarWinds,” Moscow’s brazen hacking attempt. No breakthroughs were expected or forthcoming at the US-Russia summit meeting in June, while celebrations of the Communist Party of China’s 100th anniversary in July reconfirmed Beijing’s strident foreign policy course. What’s more, Washington’s principal authoritarian rivals have been cooperating to mutual advantage. Summits between Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin have been a hallmark of Sino-Russian diplomacy since 2013. It was telling that, right after the US-China encounter in Alaska, Foreign Ministers Wang and Lavrov met in Guilin, China to pointedly condemn Western “interference” in their internal affairs. The evolving Sino-Russian partnership has sparked much interest and growing concern among strategists. Andrea Kendall-Taylor and David Shullman have warned of Beijing and Moscow’s “dangerous convergence.” Christopher Walker and Jessica Ludwig paint an even starker portrait of Sino-Russian “sharp power”: by “preying upon the openness of democratic systems,” they write, Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin are engaged in “making the world safe for
{"title":"“East Rising, West Falling”: Not So Fast, History Suggests","authors":"Leigh Sarty","doi":"10.1080/0163660X.2021.1969090","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/0163660X.2021.1969090","url":null,"abstract":"US relations with China and Russia remain deeply problematic. Any hopes for change for the better under a Biden presidency were quickly dashed by the harsh Sino-US exchanges in Alaska in March and by the fallout from “SolarWinds,” Moscow’s brazen hacking attempt. No breakthroughs were expected or forthcoming at the US-Russia summit meeting in June, while celebrations of the Communist Party of China’s 100th anniversary in July reconfirmed Beijing’s strident foreign policy course. What’s more, Washington’s principal authoritarian rivals have been cooperating to mutual advantage. Summits between Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin have been a hallmark of Sino-Russian diplomacy since 2013. It was telling that, right after the US-China encounter in Alaska, Foreign Ministers Wang and Lavrov met in Guilin, China to pointedly condemn Western “interference” in their internal affairs. The evolving Sino-Russian partnership has sparked much interest and growing concern among strategists. Andrea Kendall-Taylor and David Shullman have warned of Beijing and Moscow’s “dangerous convergence.” Christopher Walker and Jessica Ludwig paint an even starker portrait of Sino-Russian “sharp power”: by “preying upon the openness of democratic systems,” they write, Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin are engaged in “making the world safe for","PeriodicalId":46957,"journal":{"name":"Washington Quarterly","volume":"44 1","pages":"91 - 106"},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2021-07-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42376106","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-07-03DOI: 10.1080/0163660X.2021.1970334
Akira Igata, Brad Glosserman
Japan has been on a run for the last eight years. Former Prime Minister Abe Shinzo, whose two terms in office in 2006–07 and 2012–20 made him the country’s longest-serving prime minister, vowed to reinvigorate Japan after two decades of stagnation, and he made important progress. While he was applauded for his diplomatic activism and for revamping the national security bureaucracy, little attention has been paid to the rise of economic statecraft during his tenure within Japan’s foreign policy and national security calculus, a policy and focus that continues in the Suga administration. This new emphasis is poorly understood both within Japan and among its diplomatic partners. It has the potential, however, to be as, if not more, important and impactful than Abe’s other changes. It prepares Japan for 21st-century challenges created by the emergence of the digital economy as well as the opportunities and vulnerabilities that are part of ubiquitous and instantaneous connectivity and the great power competition between liberal and illiberal systems that defines this era. And it closely aligns Tokyo and Washington to maximize their capabilities in this struggle.
{"title":"Japan’s New Economic Statecraft","authors":"Akira Igata, Brad Glosserman","doi":"10.1080/0163660X.2021.1970334","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/0163660X.2021.1970334","url":null,"abstract":"Japan has been on a run for the last eight years. Former Prime Minister Abe Shinzo, whose two terms in office in 2006–07 and 2012–20 made him the country’s longest-serving prime minister, vowed to reinvigorate Japan after two decades of stagnation, and he made important progress. While he was applauded for his diplomatic activism and for revamping the national security bureaucracy, little attention has been paid to the rise of economic statecraft during his tenure within Japan’s foreign policy and national security calculus, a policy and focus that continues in the Suga administration. This new emphasis is poorly understood both within Japan and among its diplomatic partners. It has the potential, however, to be as, if not more, important and impactful than Abe’s other changes. It prepares Japan for 21st-century challenges created by the emergence of the digital economy as well as the opportunities and vulnerabilities that are part of ubiquitous and instantaneous connectivity and the great power competition between liberal and illiberal systems that defines this era. And it closely aligns Tokyo and Washington to maximize their capabilities in this struggle.","PeriodicalId":46957,"journal":{"name":"Washington Quarterly","volume":"44 1","pages":"25 - 42"},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2021-07-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49548434","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-07-03DOI: 10.1080/0163660X.2021.1969089
A. Panda
Having declared his nuclear deterrent “complete” following the testing of three intercontinental-range ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and a thermonuclear device in 2017, North Korean leader Kim Jong Un has been overseeing a period of qualitative nuclear modernization and quantitative force expansion. North Korea’s nuclear forces continued to grow during the short-lived period of diplomacy with South Korea and the United States in 2018 and 2019. In January 2021, in reviewing the accomplishments of the five-year period following North Korea’s Seventh Party Congress in 2016, Kim alluded to “tactical nuclear weapons” among other significant accomplishments concerning his nuclear forces during that era. This was a notable statement. Traditionally, North Korea has referred to its nuclear capabilities euphemistically as “strategic” weapons. When references to tactical nuclear weapons (TNW) would appear in state media, they would reference US nuclear capabilities; North Korea has never acknowledged that the United States withdrew its last nuclear weapons from the Korean Peninsula in December 1991. Does Kim Jong Un intend to deploy tactical nuclear weapons? If so, how might these weapons manifest in the country’s existing nuclear forces and what challenges may arise for the United States and South Korea? This article examines North Korean claims to date concerning TNWs, explores the practical implications of these capabilities for Pyongyang’s strategy, and argues that these weapons are likely to be a component of the country’s growing nuclear force.
{"title":"A Call to Arms: Kim Jong Un and the Tactical Bomb","authors":"A. Panda","doi":"10.1080/0163660X.2021.1969089","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/0163660X.2021.1969089","url":null,"abstract":"Having declared his nuclear deterrent “complete” following the testing of three intercontinental-range ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and a thermonuclear device in 2017, North Korean leader Kim Jong Un has been overseeing a period of qualitative nuclear modernization and quantitative force expansion. North Korea’s nuclear forces continued to grow during the short-lived period of diplomacy with South Korea and the United States in 2018 and 2019. In January 2021, in reviewing the accomplishments of the five-year period following North Korea’s Seventh Party Congress in 2016, Kim alluded to “tactical nuclear weapons” among other significant accomplishments concerning his nuclear forces during that era. This was a notable statement. Traditionally, North Korea has referred to its nuclear capabilities euphemistically as “strategic” weapons. When references to tactical nuclear weapons (TNW) would appear in state media, they would reference US nuclear capabilities; North Korea has never acknowledged that the United States withdrew its last nuclear weapons from the Korean Peninsula in December 1991. Does Kim Jong Un intend to deploy tactical nuclear weapons? If so, how might these weapons manifest in the country’s existing nuclear forces and what challenges may arise for the United States and South Korea? This article examines North Korean claims to date concerning TNWs, explores the practical implications of these capabilities for Pyongyang’s strategy, and argues that these weapons are likely to be a component of the country’s growing nuclear force.","PeriodicalId":46957,"journal":{"name":"Washington Quarterly","volume":"44 1","pages":"7 - 24"},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2021-07-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45774690","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-07-03DOI: 10.1080/0163660X.2021.1970902
Jessica E. Brandt
Democracies are engaged in a broad, persistent asymmetric competition with authoritarian challengers who seek to reshape the global order to suit their interests. The competition is playing out across multiple intersecting domains, and the information space is a critical theater. In this competition, Russia and China intentionally choose tools that give them the upper hand. In the political domain, Russia and China take advantage of permissive influence regimes, covertly funneling millions of dollars to political parties and civil society groups to sway policy decisions. They exploit democracies’ visible domestic challenges—from inequality to polarization—in the service of deepening social divides. And they conduct cyberattacks against legislatures, businesses, media organizations, and other entities to cripple a target society or retaliate against those that would hold them accountable. In the economic domain, Russia deploys corruption as an instrument of national strategy, transforming the grift that was once simply a routine feature of its own society into a weapon for subverting democratic ones. Both regimes cultivate economic dependencies, make coercive investments, and deploy unfair trade practices as leverage. In the technology domain, China is investing significant resources into attaining an edge in global markets. As it does so, it is shaping the standards for how new technologies will be developed and the norms that will govern how they will be used for decades to come, with potentially significant consequences for the rights to privacy and expression of individuals worldwide.
{"title":"How Autocrats Manipulate Online Information: Putin’s and Xi’s Playbooks","authors":"Jessica E. Brandt","doi":"10.1080/0163660X.2021.1970902","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/0163660X.2021.1970902","url":null,"abstract":"Democracies are engaged in a broad, persistent asymmetric competition with authoritarian challengers who seek to reshape the global order to suit their interests. The competition is playing out across multiple intersecting domains, and the information space is a critical theater. In this competition, Russia and China intentionally choose tools that give them the upper hand. In the political domain, Russia and China take advantage of permissive influence regimes, covertly funneling millions of dollars to political parties and civil society groups to sway policy decisions. They exploit democracies’ visible domestic challenges—from inequality to polarization—in the service of deepening social divides. And they conduct cyberattacks against legislatures, businesses, media organizations, and other entities to cripple a target society or retaliate against those that would hold them accountable. In the economic domain, Russia deploys corruption as an instrument of national strategy, transforming the grift that was once simply a routine feature of its own society into a weapon for subverting democratic ones. Both regimes cultivate economic dependencies, make coercive investments, and deploy unfair trade practices as leverage. In the technology domain, China is investing significant resources into attaining an edge in global markets. As it does so, it is shaping the standards for how new technologies will be developed and the norms that will govern how they will be used for decades to come, with potentially significant consequences for the rights to privacy and expression of individuals worldwide.","PeriodicalId":46957,"journal":{"name":"Washington Quarterly","volume":"44 1","pages":"127 - 154"},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2021-07-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43095582","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-04-03DOI: 10.1080/0163660X.2021.1932093
Yukio Hatoyama
Former President Donald Trump was the first US president to bring the US-China conflict into the open. His successor, President Joe Biden, has consistently indicated that the rift between the two countries can no longer be closed. The tone of the Biden administration’s Interim National Security Strategic Guidance, released on March 3, 2021, suggests that, differences in rhetoric aside, little distinguishes the new administration’s position on China from that of the Trump administration. Meanwhile, there has been no change in behavior on the part of China since the Biden administration took office. As the US-China rift is essentially the result of a “Thucydides trap,” the lack of dramatic change in US-China relations with the incoming administration comes as no surprise. However, even if the conflict between the United States and China is inevitable, we cannot sit back and watch as tensions escalate, for there is no doubt that any zero-sum competition between the two global powers would undermine peace and prosperity in East Asia and throughout the world. On April 16, 2021, Japanese Prime Minister Yoshihide Suga held meetings with President Biden in Washington DC and issued the US-Japan Joint
{"title":"US-China Rivalry and Japan’s Strategic Role","authors":"Yukio Hatoyama","doi":"10.1080/0163660X.2021.1932093","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/0163660X.2021.1932093","url":null,"abstract":"Former President Donald Trump was the first US president to bring the US-China conflict into the open. His successor, President Joe Biden, has consistently indicated that the rift between the two countries can no longer be closed. The tone of the Biden administration’s Interim National Security Strategic Guidance, released on March 3, 2021, suggests that, differences in rhetoric aside, little distinguishes the new administration’s position on China from that of the Trump administration. Meanwhile, there has been no change in behavior on the part of China since the Biden administration took office. As the US-China rift is essentially the result of a “Thucydides trap,” the lack of dramatic change in US-China relations with the incoming administration comes as no surprise. However, even if the conflict between the United States and China is inevitable, we cannot sit back and watch as tensions escalate, for there is no doubt that any zero-sum competition between the two global powers would undermine peace and prosperity in East Asia and throughout the world. On April 16, 2021, Japanese Prime Minister Yoshihide Suga held meetings with President Biden in Washington DC and issued the US-Japan Joint","PeriodicalId":46957,"journal":{"name":"Washington Quarterly","volume":"44 1","pages":"7 - 19"},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2021-04-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/0163660X.2021.1932093","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41995092","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-04-03DOI: 10.1080/0163660X.2021.1934257
L. Sukin, T. Dalton
One of the Biden administration’s top foreign policy challenges is to reinvigorate US alliances. Regional threats in Eastern Europe and Northeast Asia have become more complex in recent years, just as President Trump hastened allies’ and partners’ doubts about US security commitments. It is tempting for officials in Washington and in allied capitals to think or hope that increasing the salience of nuclear deterrence can help to meet the challenges of deterring growing threats and assuring nervous allies. This temptation is especially pertinent in Northeast Asia, which lacks the multi-party alliance and nuclear sharing structures institutionalized in Europe through the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Proponents of more nuclear salience argue that forward-deployment of US nuclear weapons or forming nuclear planning groups with Japan and South Korea would strengthen deterrence of North Korea and China. They argue that such steps would also assure worried officials in Tokyo and Seoul about the credibility of US security ties and would prevent leaders in Japan and South Korea from deciding that they need to develop their own, independent nuclear arsenals. In these prescriptions, elevating the role of nuclear weapons would improve security with relatively few risks or second-order consequences. The broad diagnosis that growing threats require renewed US alliance deterrence and assurance initiatives in Northeast Asia is correct. Yet, is augmenting
{"title":"Reducing Nuclear Salience: How to Reassure Northeast Asian Allies","authors":"L. Sukin, T. Dalton","doi":"10.1080/0163660X.2021.1934257","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/0163660X.2021.1934257","url":null,"abstract":"One of the Biden administration’s top foreign policy challenges is to reinvigorate US alliances. Regional threats in Eastern Europe and Northeast Asia have become more complex in recent years, just as President Trump hastened allies’ and partners’ doubts about US security commitments. It is tempting for officials in Washington and in allied capitals to think or hope that increasing the salience of nuclear deterrence can help to meet the challenges of deterring growing threats and assuring nervous allies. This temptation is especially pertinent in Northeast Asia, which lacks the multi-party alliance and nuclear sharing structures institutionalized in Europe through the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Proponents of more nuclear salience argue that forward-deployment of US nuclear weapons or forming nuclear planning groups with Japan and South Korea would strengthen deterrence of North Korea and China. They argue that such steps would also assure worried officials in Tokyo and Seoul about the credibility of US security ties and would prevent leaders in Japan and South Korea from deciding that they need to develop their own, independent nuclear arsenals. In these prescriptions, elevating the role of nuclear weapons would improve security with relatively few risks or second-order consequences. The broad diagnosis that growing threats require renewed US alliance deterrence and assurance initiatives in Northeast Asia is correct. Yet, is augmenting","PeriodicalId":46957,"journal":{"name":"Washington Quarterly","volume":"44 1","pages":"143 - 158"},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2021-04-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/0163660X.2021.1934257","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47647739","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-04-03DOI: 10.1080/0163660X.2021.1934253
Fiona S. Cunningham
Warning signs that nuclear weapons could become a key component of US-China competition have appeared in the last two years, after those weapons have remained firmly in the background of the relationship for decades. On October 1, 2019, China showcased a series of sophisticated nuclear missiles as the finale to its military parade commemorating the 70th anniversary of the founding of the People’s Republic. In April 2020, the United States insisted on Chinese participation in trilateral negotiations with Russia about a future nuclear arms control agreement. Chinese officials flatly refused to participate. In May 2020, an op-ed by the editor of theGlobal Times, a Chinese tabloid known for its hardline, nationalistic editorial line, called for China to increase its arsenal size. US officials seized on the op-ed as evidence that China was planning a sprint to nuclear parity with the United States and Russia. In China, the op-ed sparked public debate and a vocal defense of the adequacy of China’s small arsenal by a recently retired Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) nuclear researcher.
{"title":"Cooperation under Asymmetry? The Future of US-China Nuclear Relations","authors":"Fiona S. Cunningham","doi":"10.1080/0163660X.2021.1934253","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/0163660X.2021.1934253","url":null,"abstract":"Warning signs that nuclear weapons could become a key component of US-China competition have appeared in the last two years, after those weapons have remained firmly in the background of the relationship for decades. On October 1, 2019, China showcased a series of sophisticated nuclear missiles as the finale to its military parade commemorating the 70th anniversary of the founding of the People’s Republic. In April 2020, the United States insisted on Chinese participation in trilateral negotiations with Russia about a future nuclear arms control agreement. Chinese officials flatly refused to participate. In May 2020, an op-ed by the editor of theGlobal Times, a Chinese tabloid known for its hardline, nationalistic editorial line, called for China to increase its arsenal size. US officials seized on the op-ed as evidence that China was planning a sprint to nuclear parity with the United States and Russia. In China, the op-ed sparked public debate and a vocal defense of the adequacy of China’s small arsenal by a recently retired Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) nuclear researcher.","PeriodicalId":46957,"journal":{"name":"Washington Quarterly","volume":"44 1","pages":"159 - 180"},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2021-04-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/0163660X.2021.1934253","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42371430","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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