Pub Date : 2021-04-03DOI: 10.1080/0163660X.2021.1932088
Nien-chung Chang-Liao, Chi Fang
For decades, one key dimension of US policy toward Taiwan has been “strategic ambiguity.” With its equivocal reassurance in defending Taiwan, while recognizing there is “one China,” Washington has sought both to prevent Beijing from launching an unprovoked attack on the island and to dissuade Taipei from declaring the island’s de jure independence from the mainland. Since Washington established diplomatic ties with the PRC in 1979, this policy has allowed the United States to maintain cooperative and beneficial relationships with both sides of the Taiwan Strait, contributing to peace and prosperity in the region. In recent years, however, there have been clear signs that cross-Strait relations have become less stable and more war-prone. China’s belligerence toward Taiwan is increasing—in particular, it has intensified its military exercises in the air and in the waters surrounding Taiwan—prompting a renewed debate over the appropriate level of US security assurances for the island. A growing number of scholars and analysts are calling for a clearer, enhanced US commitment to deter Chinese aggression, shifting Washington’s Taiwan policy to one of “strategic clarity.” The US government seemed to be moving in this direction. The Trump administration received Taiwanese leaders in US government facilities, dispatched cabinet-level officials to the island, and sold a large quantity of advanced weapons to Taipei. The Biden administration, while revitalizing traditional US
{"title":"The Case for Maintaining Strategic Ambiguity in the Taiwan Strait","authors":"Nien-chung Chang-Liao, Chi Fang","doi":"10.1080/0163660X.2021.1932088","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/0163660X.2021.1932088","url":null,"abstract":"For decades, one key dimension of US policy toward Taiwan has been “strategic ambiguity.” With its equivocal reassurance in defending Taiwan, while recognizing there is “one China,” Washington has sought both to prevent Beijing from launching an unprovoked attack on the island and to dissuade Taipei from declaring the island’s de jure independence from the mainland. Since Washington established diplomatic ties with the PRC in 1979, this policy has allowed the United States to maintain cooperative and beneficial relationships with both sides of the Taiwan Strait, contributing to peace and prosperity in the region. In recent years, however, there have been clear signs that cross-Strait relations have become less stable and more war-prone. China’s belligerence toward Taiwan is increasing—in particular, it has intensified its military exercises in the air and in the waters surrounding Taiwan—prompting a renewed debate over the appropriate level of US security assurances for the island. A growing number of scholars and analysts are calling for a clearer, enhanced US commitment to deter Chinese aggression, shifting Washington’s Taiwan policy to one of “strategic clarity.” The US government seemed to be moving in this direction. The Trump administration received Taiwanese leaders in US government facilities, dispatched cabinet-level officials to the island, and sold a large quantity of advanced weapons to Taipei. The Biden administration, while revitalizing traditional US","PeriodicalId":46957,"journal":{"name":"Washington Quarterly","volume":"44 1","pages":"45 - 60"},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2021-04-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/0163660X.2021.1932088","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47089332","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-04-03DOI: 10.1080/0163660X.2021.1932097
S. Rozelle, M. Boswell
China’s economy has doubled in size every eight years since 1979, making it over 32 times bigger now then it was then and the second largest in the world today. Four decades of growth have ushered more than 400 million people in China into the global middle class. According to the World Bank, China is currently an upper middle-income country. The country is the only major economy on earth to report growth in 2020 in the wake of the coronavirus pandemic. What are the prospects for China to continue its spectacular economic rise and become a high-income country? In this article, we aim to draw attention to an underappreciated factor that we believe may complicate China’s continued economic ascent: hundreds of millions of poorly educated, increasingly underemployed workers hailing from China’s rural hinterland.
{"title":"Complicating China’s Rise: Rural Underemployment","authors":"S. Rozelle, M. Boswell","doi":"10.1080/0163660X.2021.1932097","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/0163660X.2021.1932097","url":null,"abstract":"China’s economy has doubled in size every eight years since 1979, making it over 32 times bigger now then it was then and the second largest in the world today. Four decades of growth have ushered more than 400 million people in China into the global middle class. According to the World Bank, China is currently an upper middle-income country. The country is the only major economy on earth to report growth in 2020 in the wake of the coronavirus pandemic. What are the prospects for China to continue its spectacular economic rise and become a high-income country? In this article, we aim to draw attention to an underappreciated factor that we believe may complicate China’s continued economic ascent: hundreds of millions of poorly educated, increasingly underemployed workers hailing from China’s rural hinterland.","PeriodicalId":46957,"journal":{"name":"Washington Quarterly","volume":"44 1","pages":"61 - 74"},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2021-04-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/0163660X.2021.1932097","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46406795","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-04-03DOI: 10.1080/0163660X.2021.1933739
Jude Blanchette, Evan S. Medeiros
As the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) prepares to commemorate on July 1 the 100th anniversary of its founding in 1921, it continues to confound policymakers and scholars with its expanding illiberalism amid persistent resilience, defying expectations of eventual moderation and inevitable collapse. From the vantage point of 2021, the CCP has demonstrated that it can adapt to both new and legacy challenges or, at a minimum, find creative ways to kick the can down the road. Not only is the Party resilient, it is also successful: today’s Communist Party controls more wealth, commands a more powerful military force, and can exert its influence over farther reaches of the globe than at any other point in its history. The CCP’s repeated ability to defy the odds—from war to global recession— has given rise to triumphalist narratives at home that highlight past successes as proof of a political model superior to electoral democracies. A regime that can oversee decades of breakneck economic growth deserves praise, careful study, and perhaps replication, with Xi Jinping highlighting the “the China solution” (中国方案) in a 2016 speech commemorating the CCP’s 95th anniversary. Indeed, events of the past 12 months, due to China’s rapid virus control and economic rebound, have supercharged this domestic sense of validation among both the Party and the people.
{"title":"Is the Chinese Communist Party Ready for the Future?","authors":"Jude Blanchette, Evan S. Medeiros","doi":"10.1080/0163660X.2021.1933739","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/0163660X.2021.1933739","url":null,"abstract":"As the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) prepares to commemorate on July 1 the 100th anniversary of its founding in 1921, it continues to confound policymakers and scholars with its expanding illiberalism amid persistent resilience, defying expectations of eventual moderation and inevitable collapse. From the vantage point of 2021, the CCP has demonstrated that it can adapt to both new and legacy challenges or, at a minimum, find creative ways to kick the can down the road. Not only is the Party resilient, it is also successful: today’s Communist Party controls more wealth, commands a more powerful military force, and can exert its influence over farther reaches of the globe than at any other point in its history. The CCP’s repeated ability to defy the odds—from war to global recession— has given rise to triumphalist narratives at home that highlight past successes as proof of a political model superior to electoral democracies. A regime that can oversee decades of breakneck economic growth deserves praise, careful study, and perhaps replication, with Xi Jinping highlighting the “the China solution” (中国方案) in a 2016 speech commemorating the CCP’s 95th anniversary. Indeed, events of the past 12 months, due to China’s rapid virus control and economic rebound, have supercharged this domestic sense of validation among both the Party and the people.","PeriodicalId":46957,"journal":{"name":"Washington Quarterly","volume":"44 1","pages":"21 - 43"},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2021-04-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/0163660X.2021.1933739","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45485837","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-04-03DOI: 10.1080/0163660X.2021.1933740
B. Roberts
With its March 2021 Interim National Security Strategic Guidance, the Biden administration set down its first markers on nuclear policy. On international nuclear diplomacy, it committed to “head off costly arms races and reestablish our credibility as a leader in arms control,” “pursue new arms control arrangements” “where possible,” “engage in meaningful dialogue with Russia and China on a range of emerging military technological developments that implicate strategic stability,” and “renew”US leadership of international nonproliferation diplomacy. This was in the context of a commitment “to elevate diplomacy as our tool of first resort.” On deterrence strategy, the administration committed to “reduce the role of nuclear weapons in our national security strategy, while ensuring our strategic deterrent remains safe, secure, and effective and that our extended deterrence commitments to our allies remain strong and credible.” This was in the context of commitments “to reinvigorate and modernize our alliances” and “to make smart and disciplined choices regarding our national defense.” The new administration now faces the challenge of turning these goals into a practical governance agenda: how should it do so? What can it reasonably expect to accomplish in four years or eight? What steps should it avoid? It has been urged to bold action by many, on the argument that “we are sleepwalking toward the nuclear precipice,” in part because “our strategies reflect old thinking.” How bold should it be?
拜登政府在2021年3月发布的《临时国家安全战略指导意见》(Interim National Security Strategic Guidance)中，确立了核政策的第一个标志。在国际核外交方面，它承诺“阻止代价高昂的军备竞赛，重建我们作为军备控制领导者的信誉”，“在可能的情况下”“寻求新的军备控制安排”，“与俄罗斯和中国就一系列涉及战略稳定的新兴军事技术发展进行有意义的对话”，并“更新”美国在国际防扩散外交方面的领导地位。这是在承诺“将外交提升为我们的第一手段”的背景下进行的。在威慑战略方面，奥巴马政府承诺“减少核武器在我们国家安全战略中的作用，同时确保我们的战略威慑力量保持安全、可靠和有效，我们对盟友的延伸威慑承诺保持强大和可信。”这是在承诺“重振和现代化我们的联盟”和“在我们的国防方面做出明智和有纪律的选择”的背景下进行的。新政府现在面临着将这些目标转化为实际治理议程的挑战:它应该如何做到这一点?在四年或八年的时间里，它能合理地期望完成什么?应该避免哪些步骤?许多人敦促中国采取大胆行动，理由是“我们正在梦游般地走向核悬崖”，部分原因是“我们的战略反映了旧思维”。它应该有多大胆?
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Pub Date : 2021-04-03DOI: 10.1080/0163660X.2021.1934997
Musiwaro Ndakaripa
Since the early 2000s, Zimbabwe has been under sanctions imposed by the United States and the European Union that have shaped Zimbabwe’s domestic politics as well as the country’s relations withWestern nations. The Zimbabwean government under President Emmerson Mnangagwa, who was inaugurated on November 24, 2017, blames the sanctions for the country’s economic meltdown—Zimbabwe is currently facing foreign currency and cash shortages, an inflation rate of 288.5 percent from October 2018 to October 2019, and excessive utility costs and low wages resulting in drastically decreased demand for goods and services. Most citizens are now subjected to extreme poverty. The Zimbabwean government has made multiple attempts to rally anti-sanctions sentiment, but sanctions have largely been maintained. The Zimbabwe African National Union – Patriotic Front (ZANU–PF) government’s first anti-sanctions campaign took place in 2011 when then-President Mugabe and his leadership launched the National Anti-Sanctions Petition Campaign rally in Harare on March 1, 2011. The main Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) party led by then-Prime Minister Morgan Tsvangirai
{"title":"Zimbabwe’s Economic Meltdown: Are Sanctions Really to Blame?","authors":"Musiwaro Ndakaripa","doi":"10.1080/0163660X.2021.1934997","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/0163660X.2021.1934997","url":null,"abstract":"Since the early 2000s, Zimbabwe has been under sanctions imposed by the United States and the European Union that have shaped Zimbabwe’s domestic politics as well as the country’s relations withWestern nations. The Zimbabwean government under President Emmerson Mnangagwa, who was inaugurated on November 24, 2017, blames the sanctions for the country’s economic meltdown—Zimbabwe is currently facing foreign currency and cash shortages, an inflation rate of 288.5 percent from October 2018 to October 2019, and excessive utility costs and low wages resulting in drastically decreased demand for goods and services. Most citizens are now subjected to extreme poverty. The Zimbabwean government has made multiple attempts to rally anti-sanctions sentiment, but sanctions have largely been maintained. The Zimbabwe African National Union – Patriotic Front (ZANU–PF) government’s first anti-sanctions campaign took place in 2011 when then-President Mugabe and his leadership launched the National Anti-Sanctions Petition Campaign rally in Harare on March 1, 2011. The main Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) party led by then-Prime Minister Morgan Tsvangirai","PeriodicalId":46957,"journal":{"name":"Washington Quarterly","volume":"44 1","pages":"95 - 120"},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2021-04-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/0163660X.2021.1934997","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42880524","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-04-03DOI: 10.1080/0163660X.2021.1934250
Eric Brewer
The Biden administration has a full plate when it comes to nuclear challenges. As of this writing, Iran’s nuclear program is expanding, and the amount of time Tehran would need to produce enough material for a bomb is shrinking. Even if a diplomatic solution can be found, Iran is likely to retain a latent capability to build nuclear weapons for the foreseeable future. North Korea’s qualitative and quantitative improvements to its nuclear arsenal— including missiles that can reach the United States—mean that it can no longer be considered a minor nuclear nuisance. Evidence suggests that the administration will focus closely on these threats. And it would be right to do so. But President Biden and his team should also look beyond the immediate horizon. If future proliferation threats look like the past 30 years—that is, socalled “rogue” states such as Iraq, Libya, North Korea, Syria, and Iran—then the United States should feel reasonably confident about its ability to keep the spread of nuclear weapons contained. Aside from Iran, there are few true US adversaries that are likely to mount a new proliferation challenge. The regimes in Libya and Iraq that pursued nuclear weapons are gone, and those two countries as well as Syria are consumed with internal strife that makes reconstitution of a nuclear weapons program unlikely. Moreover, Washington has a wealth of experience and a refined and tested toolkit for managing such threats.
{"title":"The Nuclear Proliferation Landscape: Is Past Prologue?","authors":"Eric Brewer","doi":"10.1080/0163660X.2021.1934250","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/0163660X.2021.1934250","url":null,"abstract":"The Biden administration has a full plate when it comes to nuclear challenges. As of this writing, Iran’s nuclear program is expanding, and the amount of time Tehran would need to produce enough material for a bomb is shrinking. Even if a diplomatic solution can be found, Iran is likely to retain a latent capability to build nuclear weapons for the foreseeable future. North Korea’s qualitative and quantitative improvements to its nuclear arsenal— including missiles that can reach the United States—mean that it can no longer be considered a minor nuclear nuisance. Evidence suggests that the administration will focus closely on these threats. And it would be right to do so. But President Biden and his team should also look beyond the immediate horizon. If future proliferation threats look like the past 30 years—that is, socalled “rogue” states such as Iraq, Libya, North Korea, Syria, and Iran—then the United States should feel reasonably confident about its ability to keep the spread of nuclear weapons contained. Aside from Iran, there are few true US adversaries that are likely to mount a new proliferation challenge. The regimes in Libya and Iraq that pursued nuclear weapons are gone, and those two countries as well as Syria are consumed with internal strife that makes reconstitution of a nuclear weapons program unlikely. Moreover, Washington has a wealth of experience and a refined and tested toolkit for managing such threats.","PeriodicalId":46957,"journal":{"name":"Washington Quarterly","volume":"44 1","pages":"181 - 197"},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2021-04-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/0163660X.2021.1934250","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46742899","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-04-03DOI: 10.1080/0163660X.2021.1934999
D. Waxman, J. Pressman
After four harmonious years of US-Israeli relations, during which the Trump administration was closely aligned with the Israeli government led by Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, the US-Israeli relationship is bound to come under strain during the next four years of Joe Biden’s presidency. Although President Biden himself has always been a strong supporter of Israel since his early days in the US Senate, his administration’s policies and preferences will almost certainly differ substantially from those favored by the Israeli government— whether it is led by Netanyahu or Naftali Bennett (who is farther to the right than Netanyahu). On the hot-button issues of Iran’s nuclear program and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, it is already clear that the Biden administration is trying to reverse several of the policies of its predecessor—policies that the Israeli government enthusiastically supported. President Biden wants the United States to rejoin the 2015 nuclear agreement and get Iran to fully comply with it again. To do that, he will need to lift crippling US sanctions on Iran, which will be widely viewed in Israel as a dangerous concession to Tehran. By ending the
{"title":"The Rocky Future of the US-Israeli Special Relationship","authors":"D. Waxman, J. Pressman","doi":"10.1080/0163660X.2021.1934999","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/0163660X.2021.1934999","url":null,"abstract":"After four harmonious years of US-Israeli relations, during which the Trump administration was closely aligned with the Israeli government led by Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, the US-Israeli relationship is bound to come under strain during the next four years of Joe Biden’s presidency. Although President Biden himself has always been a strong supporter of Israel since his early days in the US Senate, his administration’s policies and preferences will almost certainly differ substantially from those favored by the Israeli government— whether it is led by Netanyahu or Naftali Bennett (who is farther to the right than Netanyahu). On the hot-button issues of Iran’s nuclear program and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, it is already clear that the Biden administration is trying to reverse several of the policies of its predecessor—policies that the Israeli government enthusiastically supported. President Biden wants the United States to rejoin the 2015 nuclear agreement and get Iran to fully comply with it again. To do that, he will need to lift crippling US sanctions on Iran, which will be widely viewed in Israel as a dangerous concession to Tehran. By ending the","PeriodicalId":46957,"journal":{"name":"Washington Quarterly","volume":"44 1","pages":"75 - 93"},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2021-04-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/0163660X.2021.1934999","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43586654","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-01-02DOI: 10.1080/0163660X.2021.1893003
H. Brands, C. Edel
On March 12, 1947, Harry Truman addressed a joint session of Congress with a very specific proposal: emergency aid for Greece and Turkey, which were menaced by a communist insurgency and facing Soviet intimidation, respectively. But Truman, speaking at the dawn of the Cold War, framed the matter far more expansively. Allowing the countries of the world to “work out a way of life free from coercion,” he explained, had been a “fundamental issue in the war with Germany and Japan.” At a time when “nearly every nation must choose between alternative ways of life,” the United States must once again “support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities by outside pressures.” Some of Truman’s own advisers were uneasy at this sweeping language. Truman himself admitted that the Turkish and Greek governments were, at best, quasi-democracies. Yet he nonetheless presented matters starkly in order to rally Americans to the banner of containment and capture what was ultimately at stake in the Cold War. The fundamental question, Truman understood, was not simply about Greece and Turkey. It was whether the postwar world would be shaped by liberal principles of self-determination and freedom of choice—or would instead be molded by coercion, predation, and authoritarian aggression. Truman would recognize the situation America and its allies confront today. Democracies are again threatened by illiberal influences within their borders
{"title":"A Grand Strategy of Democratic Solidarity","authors":"H. Brands, C. Edel","doi":"10.1080/0163660X.2021.1893003","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/0163660X.2021.1893003","url":null,"abstract":"On March 12, 1947, Harry Truman addressed a joint session of Congress with a very specific proposal: emergency aid for Greece and Turkey, which were menaced by a communist insurgency and facing Soviet intimidation, respectively. But Truman, speaking at the dawn of the Cold War, framed the matter far more expansively. Allowing the countries of the world to “work out a way of life free from coercion,” he explained, had been a “fundamental issue in the war with Germany and Japan.” At a time when “nearly every nation must choose between alternative ways of life,” the United States must once again “support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities by outside pressures.” Some of Truman’s own advisers were uneasy at this sweeping language. Truman himself admitted that the Turkish and Greek governments were, at best, quasi-democracies. Yet he nonetheless presented matters starkly in order to rally Americans to the banner of containment and capture what was ultimately at stake in the Cold War. The fundamental question, Truman understood, was not simply about Greece and Turkey. It was whether the postwar world would be shaped by liberal principles of self-determination and freedom of choice—or would instead be molded by coercion, predation, and authoritarian aggression. Truman would recognize the situation America and its allies confront today. Democracies are again threatened by illiberal influences within their borders","PeriodicalId":46957,"journal":{"name":"Washington Quarterly","volume":" ","pages":"29 - 47"},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2021-01-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/0163660X.2021.1893003","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49216084","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-01-02DOI: 10.1080/0163660X.2021.1893019
Jessica Cox, Heather Williams
Artificial intelligence (AI) is developing at a rapid pace—both the technology itself and its applications. It is becoming unavoidable in both the civilian and military domains and will soon impact numerous areas of civilian and military life. In July 2020, for example, countries such as Colombia and Russia applied facial recognition technology, a form of artificial intelligence, to combat the coronavirus by detecting whether someone was not wearing a mask or had a high temperature through the use of thermal cameras and sounding an alarm. That same month, Open AI, a California company leading in AI technology, released the software GPT-3, a text generator that can mimic human creativity to write convincing essays, emails, or tweets. Global AI-generated revenue is projected to climb from US$643.7 million in 2016 to US$36.8 billion in 2025, a factor of almost 60 times greater. Both the United States and its NATO allies have placed new emphasis on understanding the civilian and military applications of technological
{"title":"The Unavoidable Technology: How Artificial Intelligence Can Strengthen Nuclear Stability","authors":"Jessica Cox, Heather Williams","doi":"10.1080/0163660X.2021.1893019","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/0163660X.2021.1893019","url":null,"abstract":"Artificial intelligence (AI) is developing at a rapid pace—both the technology itself and its applications. It is becoming unavoidable in both the civilian and military domains and will soon impact numerous areas of civilian and military life. In July 2020, for example, countries such as Colombia and Russia applied facial recognition technology, a form of artificial intelligence, to combat the coronavirus by detecting whether someone was not wearing a mask or had a high temperature through the use of thermal cameras and sounding an alarm. That same month, Open AI, a California company leading in AI technology, released the software GPT-3, a text generator that can mimic human creativity to write convincing essays, emails, or tweets. Global AI-generated revenue is projected to climb from US$643.7 million in 2016 to US$36.8 billion in 2025, a factor of almost 60 times greater. Both the United States and its NATO allies have placed new emphasis on understanding the civilian and military applications of technological","PeriodicalId":46957,"journal":{"name":"Washington Quarterly","volume":"44 1","pages":"69 - 85"},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2021-01-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/0163660X.2021.1893019","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44693150","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-01-02DOI: 10.1080/0163660X.2021.1896136
Erik Brattberg
Over the past four years, while the Trump administration doubled down on its "America First" foreign policy and Sino-American tensions continued to sharpen, another trend has been equally pertinent: the growing relevance of middle power diplomacy A loose collection of like-minded, mid-sized players who also are traditional US democratic allies--including Europe (i e , Germany, France, the United Kingdom, and the EU itself), Canada, Japan, and Australia--have reinforced partnerships with one another and increasingly taken it upon themselves to press forward with multilateral solutions to various regional and global challenges in the absence of leadership from Washington Underpinning their efforts is a shared concern about the unraveling of international order as the United States abdicated its traditional leadership role under President Trump and China's assertiveness has grown, especially in the wake of the COVID-19 pandemic Reluctant to pick sides in the increasingly zero-sum competition between Washington and Beijing, they therefore had a stronger rationale to band together more closely--though this is far from straightforward in practice
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