Pub Date : 2020-07-02DOI: 10.1080/13546783.2019.1634151
Ralph E. Viator, Nancy L. Harp, S. Rinaldo, Blair B. Marquardt
Abstract We investigate whether non-miserly cognitive styles mediate the effects of cognitive ability and thinking dispositions on rational thought. Specifically, we review relevant literature on two dimensions that define non-miserly cognitive style: reflection-impulsivity and analytic-intuitive. We use these two dimensions to identify a continuum of cognitive styles that vary from miserly (impulsive-intuitive) to non-miserly (reflective-analytic) and are congruent with tendencies to commit specific rational thinking errors. Further, we argue that this continuum, which we label reflective-analytic cognitive style, mediates the effect of cognitive ability and thinking dispositions on rational thought. We conduct an experiment testing our predictions and find evidence, via structural equation modelling, that reflective-analytic cognitive style does mediate the effect of cognitive ability (as measured by working memory capacity) and thinking dispositions (as measured by need for cognition and actively open-minded thinking) on responses to traditional rational thinking tasks.
{"title":"The mediating effect of reflective-analytic cognitive style on rational thought","authors":"Ralph E. Viator, Nancy L. Harp, S. Rinaldo, Blair B. Marquardt","doi":"10.1080/13546783.2019.1634151","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/13546783.2019.1634151","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract We investigate whether non-miserly cognitive styles mediate the effects of cognitive ability and thinking dispositions on rational thought. Specifically, we review relevant literature on two dimensions that define non-miserly cognitive style: reflection-impulsivity and analytic-intuitive. We use these two dimensions to identify a continuum of cognitive styles that vary from miserly (impulsive-intuitive) to non-miserly (reflective-analytic) and are congruent with tendencies to commit specific rational thinking errors. Further, we argue that this continuum, which we label reflective-analytic cognitive style, mediates the effect of cognitive ability and thinking dispositions on rational thought. We conduct an experiment testing our predictions and find evidence, via structural equation modelling, that reflective-analytic cognitive style does mediate the effect of cognitive ability (as measured by working memory capacity) and thinking dispositions (as measured by need for cognition and actively open-minded thinking) on responses to traditional rational thinking tasks.","PeriodicalId":47270,"journal":{"name":"Thinking & Reasoning","volume":"49 1","pages":"381 - 413"},"PeriodicalIF":2.6,"publicationDate":"2020-07-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"89978874","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-07-02DOI: 10.1080/13546783.2019.1653371
Toby Prike, Michelle M. Arnold, Paul Williamson
Abstract A poor understanding of probability may lead people to misinterpret every day coincidences and form anomalistic (e.g., paranormal) beliefs. We investigated the relationship between anomalistic belief (including type of belief) and misperception of chance and the base rate fallacy across both anomalistic and control (i.e., neutral) contexts. Greater anomalistic belief was associated with poorer performance for both types of items; however there were no significant interactions between belief and context. For misperception of chance items, only experiential (vs. theoretical) anomalistic beliefs predicted more errors. In contrast, overall anomalistic belief was positively related to the base rate fallacy but no specific subtype of anomalistic belief was a significant predictor. The results indicate misperception of chance may lead people to interpret coincidental events as having an anomalistic cause, and a poor understanding of base rates may make people more prone to forming anomalistic beliefs.
{"title":"The relationship between anomalistic belief, misperception of chance and the base rate fallacy","authors":"Toby Prike, Michelle M. Arnold, Paul Williamson","doi":"10.1080/13546783.2019.1653371","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/13546783.2019.1653371","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract A poor understanding of probability may lead people to misinterpret every day coincidences and form anomalistic (e.g., paranormal) beliefs. We investigated the relationship between anomalistic belief (including type of belief) and misperception of chance and the base rate fallacy across both anomalistic and control (i.e., neutral) contexts. Greater anomalistic belief was associated with poorer performance for both types of items; however there were no significant interactions between belief and context. For misperception of chance items, only experiential (vs. theoretical) anomalistic beliefs predicted more errors. In contrast, overall anomalistic belief was positively related to the base rate fallacy but no specific subtype of anomalistic belief was a significant predictor. The results indicate misperception of chance may lead people to interpret coincidental events as having an anomalistic cause, and a poor understanding of base rates may make people more prone to forming anomalistic beliefs.","PeriodicalId":47270,"journal":{"name":"Thinking & Reasoning","volume":"20 1","pages":"447 - 477"},"PeriodicalIF":2.6,"publicationDate":"2020-07-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"77616150","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-06-24DOI: 10.1080/13546783.2020.1783362
Yingying Yang, Wei He
Abstract Recent research has suggested that young children may have primitive knowledge of ratio and proportions. However, it is unclear how precisely young children represent ratio magnitudes and how well they apply their ratio knowledge across different contexts. The current study examined 4- to 6-year-olds’ reasoning of ratio magnitudes. In the baseline task, children judged ratio relations between 2 D lengths. In the 3 D depth task, children judged ratio relations of two pictorial depths. In the 3 D cube task, children judged ratio relations of the volumes of two pictorially presented cubes. Linear regression models of estimated ratios on expected ratios were significant across all three tasks for all children groups. Children demonstrated a remarkable ability in understanding and expressing ratio magnitudes. However, relative to the baseline condition, the 3 D depth and cube tasks were associated with smaller explained variance and, hence, more noise. Children, particularly 4-year-olds, were unable to distinguish ratios of slightly different magnitudes in the 3 D cube task. Our study reveals both the potential and the limits of young children’s ratio reasoning abilities.
{"title":"Four- to six-year-olds’ ratio reasoning-from 2D to 3D quantities","authors":"Yingying Yang, Wei He","doi":"10.1080/13546783.2020.1783362","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/13546783.2020.1783362","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Recent research has suggested that young children may have primitive knowledge of ratio and proportions. However, it is unclear how precisely young children represent ratio magnitudes and how well they apply their ratio knowledge across different contexts. The current study examined 4- to 6-year-olds’ reasoning of ratio magnitudes. In the baseline task, children judged ratio relations between 2 D lengths. In the 3 D depth task, children judged ratio relations of two pictorial depths. In the 3 D cube task, children judged ratio relations of the volumes of two pictorially presented cubes. Linear regression models of estimated ratios on expected ratios were significant across all three tasks for all children groups. Children demonstrated a remarkable ability in understanding and expressing ratio magnitudes. However, relative to the baseline condition, the 3 D depth and cube tasks were associated with smaller explained variance and, hence, more noise. Children, particularly 4-year-olds, were unable to distinguish ratios of slightly different magnitudes in the 3 D cube task. Our study reveals both the potential and the limits of young children’s ratio reasoning abilities.","PeriodicalId":47270,"journal":{"name":"Thinking & Reasoning","volume":"15 1","pages":"212 - 238"},"PeriodicalIF":2.6,"publicationDate":"2020-06-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"88330872","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-06-19DOI: 10.1080/13546783.2020.1781691
Jonas Ludwig, Fabian K. Ahrens, A. Achtziger
Abstract Based on the Dual-Process Diffusion Model, we tested three hypotheses about response times of errors and correct responses in probability judgments. We predicted that correct responses were (1) slower than errors in the case of conflicting decision processes but (2) faster than errors in the case of alignment; and that they were (3) slower in the case of conflict than in the case of alignment. A binary-choice experiment was conducted in which three types of decision problems elicited conflict or alignment of a deliberative decision process and a heuristic decision process. Consistent with the traditional dual-process architecture, the former captured computational-normative decision strategies and the latter described intuitive-affective aspects of decision making. The hypotheses (1) and (3) were supported, while no statistically significant evidence was found for (2). Implications for the generalisability of the Dual-Process Diffusion Model to slow probability judgments are discussed.
{"title":"Errors, fast and slow: an analysis of response times in probability judgments","authors":"Jonas Ludwig, Fabian K. Ahrens, A. Achtziger","doi":"10.1080/13546783.2020.1781691","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/13546783.2020.1781691","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Based on the Dual-Process Diffusion Model, we tested three hypotheses about response times of errors and correct responses in probability judgments. We predicted that correct responses were (1) slower than errors in the case of conflicting decision processes but (2) faster than errors in the case of alignment; and that they were (3) slower in the case of conflict than in the case of alignment. A binary-choice experiment was conducted in which three types of decision problems elicited conflict or alignment of a deliberative decision process and a heuristic decision process. Consistent with the traditional dual-process architecture, the former captured computational-normative decision strategies and the latter described intuitive-affective aspects of decision making. The hypotheses (1) and (3) were supported, while no statistically significant evidence was found for (2). Implications for the generalisability of the Dual-Process Diffusion Model to slow probability judgments are discussed.","PeriodicalId":47270,"journal":{"name":"Thinking & Reasoning","volume":"90 1","pages":"627 - 639"},"PeriodicalIF":2.6,"publicationDate":"2020-06-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"77908498","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-05-05DOI: 10.1080/13546783.2020.1759688
Jala Rizeq, D. Flora, M. Toplak
Abstract The concept of contaminated mindware provides one conceptualization for measuring beliefs and attitudes about three domains that have evaluation-disabling properties in the context of reasoning: paranormal beliefs, conspiracy beliefs, and anti-science attitudes. We tested the underlying structure of individual differences in these three domains of contaminated mindware and their predictors in a sample of 321 Canadian undergraduate students. The predictors included cognitive ability, cognitive reflection, the dispositional tendency of actively open-minded thinking, and ontological confusions. A hierarchical model with three correlated general factors of paranormal, conspiracy, and anti-science beliefs and attitudes and four specific paranormal factors (i.e., psi, superstition, spiritualism, and precognition) was optimal. While all predictors were significantly correlated with the contaminated mindware domains, structural equation modeling results supported the unique effects of ontological confusions and actively open-minded thinking. The current results support the multidimensional nature of contaminated mindware domains and highlight some of its correlates and unique predictors. Providing a structure and theoretical framework for unwarranted beliefs and attitudes will be useful for measuring their potential impact on the processes of human reasoning.
{"title":"An examination of the underlying dimensional structure of three domains of contaminated mindware: paranormal beliefs, conspiracy beliefs, and anti-science attitudes","authors":"Jala Rizeq, D. Flora, M. Toplak","doi":"10.1080/13546783.2020.1759688","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/13546783.2020.1759688","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract The concept of contaminated mindware provides one conceptualization for measuring beliefs and attitudes about three domains that have evaluation-disabling properties in the context of reasoning: paranormal beliefs, conspiracy beliefs, and anti-science attitudes. We tested the underlying structure of individual differences in these three domains of contaminated mindware and their predictors in a sample of 321 Canadian undergraduate students. The predictors included cognitive ability, cognitive reflection, the dispositional tendency of actively open-minded thinking, and ontological confusions. A hierarchical model with three correlated general factors of paranormal, conspiracy, and anti-science beliefs and attitudes and four specific paranormal factors (i.e., psi, superstition, spiritualism, and precognition) was optimal. While all predictors were significantly correlated with the contaminated mindware domains, structural equation modeling results supported the unique effects of ontological confusions and actively open-minded thinking. The current results support the multidimensional nature of contaminated mindware domains and highlight some of its correlates and unique predictors. Providing a structure and theoretical framework for unwarranted beliefs and attitudes will be useful for measuring their potential impact on the processes of human reasoning.","PeriodicalId":47270,"journal":{"name":"Thinking & Reasoning","volume":"8 1","pages":"187 - 211"},"PeriodicalIF":2.6,"publicationDate":"2020-05-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"86043887","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-05-02DOI: 10.1080/13546783.2020.1759689
M. Sirota, Andriana Theodoropoulou, Marie Juanchich
Abstract Prior research has suggested that perceptual disfluency activates analytical processing and increases the solution rate of mathematical problems with appealing but incorrect answers (i.e., the Cognitive Reflection Test, hereafter CRT). However, a recent meta-analysis does not support such a conclusion. We tested here whether insufficient numerical ability can account for this discrepancy. We found strong evidence against the disfluency effect on the problem-solving rate for the Numerical CRT problems regardless of participants’ numeracy and for the Verbal CRT non-math problems (n = 310, Exp. 1) even though simple instructions to pay attention to and reflect upon the Verbal CRT problems substantially increased their solution rate (n = 311, Exp. 2). The updated meta-analysis (k = 18) yielded close-to-zero effect, Hedge’s g = −0.01, 95% CI[-0.05, 0.03] and decisive evidence against the disfluency effect on math problems, BF0+ = 151.6. Thus, perceptual disfluency does not activate analytical processing.
先前的研究表明，知觉不流畅激活了分析加工，并增加了具有吸引人但答案错误的数学问题(即认知反射测试，以下简称CRT)的解题率。然而，最近的一项荟萃分析并不支持这样的结论。我们在这里测试了计算能力不足是否可以解释这种差异。我们发现了强有力的证据，证明无论参与者的计算能力如何，在数值CRT问题和口头CRT非数学问题(n = 310，实验1)中，尽管注意和反思口头CRT问题的简单指示大大提高了他们的解决率(n = 311，实验2)。更新的元分析(k = 18)产生了接近于零的影响，Hedge ' s g = - 0.01, 95% CI[-0.05]。0.03]对数学问题的不流畅效应有决定性的证据，BF0+ = 151.6。因此，知觉不流畅并不会激活分析加工。
{"title":"Disfluent fonts do not help people to solve math and non-math problems regardless of their numeracy","authors":"M. Sirota, Andriana Theodoropoulou, Marie Juanchich","doi":"10.1080/13546783.2020.1759689","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/13546783.2020.1759689","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Prior research has suggested that perceptual disfluency activates analytical processing and increases the solution rate of mathematical problems with appealing but incorrect answers (i.e., the Cognitive Reflection Test, hereafter CRT). However, a recent meta-analysis does not support such a conclusion. We tested here whether insufficient numerical ability can account for this discrepancy. We found strong evidence against the disfluency effect on the problem-solving rate for the Numerical CRT problems regardless of participants’ numeracy and for the Verbal CRT non-math problems (n = 310, Exp. 1) even though simple instructions to pay attention to and reflect upon the Verbal CRT problems substantially increased their solution rate (n = 311, Exp. 2). The updated meta-analysis (k = 18) yielded close-to-zero effect, Hedge’s g = −0.01, 95% CI[-0.05, 0.03] and decisive evidence against the disfluency effect on math problems, BF0+ = 151.6. Thus, perceptual disfluency does not activate analytical processing.","PeriodicalId":47270,"journal":{"name":"Thinking & Reasoning","volume":"67 1","pages":"142 - 159"},"PeriodicalIF":2.6,"publicationDate":"2020-05-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"79206998","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-04-03DOI: 10.1080/13546783.2021.1934899
Michał J. Białek, A. Domurat, M. Paruzel-Czachura, Rafał Muda
Abstract Intertemporal choice requires one to decide between smaller sooner and larger later payoffs and is captured by discount rates. Across two preregistered experiments testing three language pairs (Polish vs. English, Spanish, and German; Experiment 1) and with incentivized participants (Experiment 2), we found no evidence that using a foreign language decreased the strength or increased the consistency of intertemporal choices. On the contrary, there was some evidence of stronger discounting when a foreign language was used. We confirmed prior findings that more reflective individuals discount less strongly but observed that they were just as (un)affected by using foreign language as less reflective individuals. Thus, we provide preliminary evidence that the foreign language effect is robust to individual differences in cognitive reflection.
{"title":"Limits of the foreign language effect: intertemporal choice","authors":"Michał J. Białek, A. Domurat, M. Paruzel-Czachura, Rafał Muda","doi":"10.1080/13546783.2021.1934899","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/13546783.2021.1934899","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Intertemporal choice requires one to decide between smaller sooner and larger later payoffs and is captured by discount rates. Across two preregistered experiments testing three language pairs (Polish vs. English, Spanish, and German; Experiment 1) and with incentivized participants (Experiment 2), we found no evidence that using a foreign language decreased the strength or increased the consistency of intertemporal choices. On the contrary, there was some evidence of stronger discounting when a foreign language was used. We confirmed prior findings that more reflective individuals discount less strongly but observed that they were just as (un)affected by using foreign language as less reflective individuals. Thus, we provide preliminary evidence that the foreign language effect is robust to individual differences in cognitive reflection.","PeriodicalId":47270,"journal":{"name":"Thinking & Reasoning","volume":"8 1","pages":"97 - 124"},"PeriodicalIF":2.6,"publicationDate":"2020-04-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"84232982","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-04-02DOI: 10.1080/13546783.2019.1590233
Anastasia Ejova, K. Ohtsuka
Abstract Erroneous gambling-related beliefs (EGRBs) can be defined as beliefs that imply a failure to recognise how commercial gambling activities are designed to generate a guaranteed loss to players. In theorising about how EGRBs develop, previous reviews have proposed that EGRBs are extensions of decision-making heuristics and associated biases. We propose an alternative generative mechanism: one in which gambling games make substantial wins seem possible through problem-solving and eventual correct strategic action. EGRBs are then beliefs in the possibility of correct strategic action (illusions of control) that develop as players trial candidate strategies—strategies selected based on various broader beliefs. We further propose that EGRBs can be classified based on what is theorised in cognitive science about categories of general human beliefs about the world. For example, it has been theorised that human beliefs about supernatural forces and randomness have certain similarities across cultures, and so we propose that there exists a category of supernatural EGRBs, as well as a category of EGRBs based on broader beliefs about the nature of randomness. We review evidence for this classification scheme and discuss how it can be applied in researching and treating gambling disorder.
{"title":"Erroneous gambling-related beliefs emerge from broader beliefs during problem-solving: a critical review and classification scheme","authors":"Anastasia Ejova, K. Ohtsuka","doi":"10.1080/13546783.2019.1590233","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/13546783.2019.1590233","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Erroneous gambling-related beliefs (EGRBs) can be defined as beliefs that imply a failure to recognise how commercial gambling activities are designed to generate a guaranteed loss to players. In theorising about how EGRBs develop, previous reviews have proposed that EGRBs are extensions of decision-making heuristics and associated biases. We propose an alternative generative mechanism: one in which gambling games make substantial wins seem possible through problem-solving and eventual correct strategic action. EGRBs are then beliefs in the possibility of correct strategic action (illusions of control) that develop as players trial candidate strategies—strategies selected based on various broader beliefs. We further propose that EGRBs can be classified based on what is theorised in cognitive science about categories of general human beliefs about the world. For example, it has been theorised that human beliefs about supernatural forces and randomness have certain similarities across cultures, and so we propose that there exists a category of supernatural EGRBs, as well as a category of EGRBs based on broader beliefs about the nature of randomness. We review evidence for this classification scheme and discuss how it can be applied in researching and treating gambling disorder.","PeriodicalId":47270,"journal":{"name":"Thinking & Reasoning","volume":"12 1","pages":"159 - 187"},"PeriodicalIF":2.6,"publicationDate":"2020-04-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"78435108","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-04-02DOI: 10.1080/13546783.2019.1688188
D. Calvillo, Alexander B. Swan, Abraham M. Rutchick
Abstract The belief bias in reasoning occurs when individuals are more willing to accept conclusions that are consistent with their beliefs than conclusions that are inconsistent. The present study examined a belief bias in syllogisms containing political content. In two experiments, participants judged whether conclusions were valid, completed political ideology measures, and completed a cognitive reflection test. The conclusions varied in validity and in their political ideology (conservative or liberal). Participants were sensitive to syllogisms’ validity and conservatism. Overall, they showed a liberal bias, accepting more liberal than conservative conclusions. Furthermore, conservative participants accepted more conservative conclusions than liberal conclusions, whereas liberal participants showed the opposite pattern. Cognitive reflection did not magnify this effect as predicted by a motivated system 2 reasoning account of motivated ideological reasoning. These results suggest that people with different ideologies may accept different conclusions from the same evidence.
{"title":"Ideological belief bias with political syllogisms","authors":"D. Calvillo, Alexander B. Swan, Abraham M. Rutchick","doi":"10.1080/13546783.2019.1688188","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/13546783.2019.1688188","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract The belief bias in reasoning occurs when individuals are more willing to accept conclusions that are consistent with their beliefs than conclusions that are inconsistent. The present study examined a belief bias in syllogisms containing political content. In two experiments, participants judged whether conclusions were valid, completed political ideology measures, and completed a cognitive reflection test. The conclusions varied in validity and in their political ideology (conservative or liberal). Participants were sensitive to syllogisms’ validity and conservatism. Overall, they showed a liberal bias, accepting more liberal than conservative conclusions. Furthermore, conservative participants accepted more conservative conclusions than liberal conclusions, whereas liberal participants showed the opposite pattern. Cognitive reflection did not magnify this effect as predicted by a motivated system 2 reasoning account of motivated ideological reasoning. These results suggest that people with different ideologies may accept different conclusions from the same evidence.","PeriodicalId":47270,"journal":{"name":"Thinking & Reasoning","volume":"34 1","pages":"291 - 310"},"PeriodicalIF":2.6,"publicationDate":"2020-04-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"81054277","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-04-02DOI: 10.1080/13546783.2019.1605930
Stephen K. Reed, Robin R. Vallacher
Abstract This article compares the information processing and dynamical systems perspectives on problem solving. Key theoretical constructs of the information-processing perspective include “searching” a “problem space” by using “heuristics” that produce “incremental” changes such as reaching a “subgoal” to solve a puzzle. Key theoretical constructs of the dynamical-systems perspective include “positive attractors”, “negative attractors”, and “latent attractors” that can cause large “nonincremental” changes in the possibility of a solution through the “emergence” of new ideas and beliefs that can resolve a conflict. The proposed alignment maps dynamical-system constructs to information-processing constructs: state space to problem space, negative attractor to impasse, positive attractor to productive subgoal, latent attractor to implicit cognition, and nonincremental change to insight. The purpose of the mapping is to explore similarities and differences between these constructs. Research from cognitive and social psychology illustrates how using constructs from both perspectives is helpful. The concluding section on Future Directions recommends an agenda based on three objectives: (1) create ontologies to organise current knowledge, (2) conduct research to obtain new knowledge, and (3) provide education to inform students about this knowledge.
{"title":"A comparison of information processing and dynamical systems perspectives on problem solving","authors":"Stephen K. Reed, Robin R. Vallacher","doi":"10.1080/13546783.2019.1605930","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/13546783.2019.1605930","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract This article compares the information processing and dynamical systems perspectives on problem solving. Key theoretical constructs of the information-processing perspective include “searching” a “problem space” by using “heuristics” that produce “incremental” changes such as reaching a “subgoal” to solve a puzzle. Key theoretical constructs of the dynamical-systems perspective include “positive attractors”, “negative attractors”, and “latent attractors” that can cause large “nonincremental” changes in the possibility of a solution through the “emergence” of new ideas and beliefs that can resolve a conflict. The proposed alignment maps dynamical-system constructs to information-processing constructs: state space to problem space, negative attractor to impasse, positive attractor to productive subgoal, latent attractor to implicit cognition, and nonincremental change to insight. The purpose of the mapping is to explore similarities and differences between these constructs. Research from cognitive and social psychology illustrates how using constructs from both perspectives is helpful. The concluding section on Future Directions recommends an agenda based on three objectives: (1) create ontologies to organise current knowledge, (2) conduct research to obtain new knowledge, and (3) provide education to inform students about this knowledge.","PeriodicalId":47270,"journal":{"name":"Thinking & Reasoning","volume":"8 1","pages":"254 - 290"},"PeriodicalIF":2.6,"publicationDate":"2020-04-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"82971158","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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