Pub Date : 2022-05-27DOI: 10.1080/09636412.2022.2086818
Kai M. Thaler
Abstract In civil wars, unpopular and violent rebel organizations sometimes gain support from politically motivated constituencies who should, by outside appearances, logically oppose such groups. I explain this through a logic in which self-interested, insincere rebel leaders pander to aggrieved civilian populations to mobilize them, presenting the rebel organization as empathizing with and offering solutions to popular grievances. Leaders exploit an information asymmetry about their true preferences to gain allegiance using cheap sociopolitical appeals, rather than more costly material incentives or coercion. I inductively develop the theory through a case study of Renamo in Mozambique and then probe the generalizability of the logic through case studies of the Nicaraguan Fuerza Democrática Nicaragüense and the National Patriotic Front of Liberia, drawing on interviews and archival materials. This article explicates a previously undertheorized phenomenon in the study of rebel mobilization and demonstrates how apparent popular, voluntary support for rebels can be more tenuous than it appears.
{"title":"Rebel Mobilization through Pandering: Insincere Leaders, Framing, and Exploitation of Popular Grievances","authors":"Kai M. Thaler","doi":"10.1080/09636412.2022.2086818","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/09636412.2022.2086818","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract In civil wars, unpopular and violent rebel organizations sometimes gain support from politically motivated constituencies who should, by outside appearances, logically oppose such groups. I explain this through a logic in which self-interested, insincere rebel leaders pander to aggrieved civilian populations to mobilize them, presenting the rebel organization as empathizing with and offering solutions to popular grievances. Leaders exploit an information asymmetry about their true preferences to gain allegiance using cheap sociopolitical appeals, rather than more costly material incentives or coercion. I inductively develop the theory through a case study of Renamo in Mozambique and then probe the generalizability of the logic through case studies of the Nicaraguan Fuerza Democrática Nicaragüense and the National Patriotic Front of Liberia, drawing on interviews and archival materials. This article explicates a previously undertheorized phenomenon in the study of rebel mobilization and demonstrates how apparent popular, voluntary support for rebels can be more tenuous than it appears.","PeriodicalId":47478,"journal":{"name":"Security Studies","volume":"31 1","pages":"351 - 380"},"PeriodicalIF":1.8,"publicationDate":"2022-05-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48767999","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-05-27DOI: 10.1080/09636412.2022.2097889
Çağlayan Başer
Abstract How do women insurgents affect rebel organizations’ structure and survivability? Scholars acknowledge the importance of organization-level dynamics and unit composition for conflict outcomes. However, our understanding of how gender-diverse cadres influence rebel survivability remains limited. I examine the mechanisms through which women sustain armed conflict. I analyze micro-organizational dynamics of rebellion through a qualitative case study of the Kurdish armed movement in Turkey between 1982 and 2015 based on the official archives of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party. I show that women insurgents enable tactical diversity, aid the organization’s coup-proofing strategy against factions, and mobilize domestic and international audiences. Women contribute most to their organization during crises and due to exploitation of gender inequalities. Analyzing the relationship between gender dynamics, group structure, and evolving rebel strategies, this study shows that the gender composition of the membership is an important factor influencing rebel survivability.
{"title":"Women Insurgents, Rebel Organization Structure, and Sustaining the Rebellion: The Case of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party","authors":"Çağlayan Başer","doi":"10.1080/09636412.2022.2097889","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/09636412.2022.2097889","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract How do women insurgents affect rebel organizations’ structure and survivability? Scholars acknowledge the importance of organization-level dynamics and unit composition for conflict outcomes. However, our understanding of how gender-diverse cadres influence rebel survivability remains limited. I examine the mechanisms through which women sustain armed conflict. I analyze micro-organizational dynamics of rebellion through a qualitative case study of the Kurdish armed movement in Turkey between 1982 and 2015 based on the official archives of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party. I show that women insurgents enable tactical diversity, aid the organization’s coup-proofing strategy against factions, and mobilize domestic and international audiences. Women contribute most to their organization during crises and due to exploitation of gender inequalities. Analyzing the relationship between gender dynamics, group structure, and evolving rebel strategies, this study shows that the gender composition of the membership is an important factor influencing rebel survivability.","PeriodicalId":47478,"journal":{"name":"Security Studies","volume":"31 1","pages":"381 - 416"},"PeriodicalIF":1.8,"publicationDate":"2022-05-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43627473","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-05-27DOI: 10.1080/09636412.2022.2112275
Pellumb Kelmendi
Abstract When do rebel groups transform into successful political parties? I argue that rebel successor party electoral performance is strongly shaped by rebel social bases and organizational cohesion. When rebels recruit more from the civilian population and control more territory, they are more likely to have a postwar base of party members and attract nonrebel elites to join their party. I also argue, however, that cohesive rebel organizations adapt more easily to the challenges of party building. Two key mechanisms link cohesion to success. First, cohesive rebel organizations are more likely to preserve their wartime social bases and avoid rebel leader splits and defections to other parties. Second, cohesive groups are better suited to incorporate nonrebel elites and pursue electoral strategies that appeal to noncombatant voters. This article examines the validity of this theory in a comparative study of the party-building efforts of ethnic Albanian rebel organizations in the Balkans.
{"title":"Rebel Successor Parties and Their Electoral Performance in the Balkans","authors":"Pellumb Kelmendi","doi":"10.1080/09636412.2022.2112275","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/09636412.2022.2112275","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract When do rebel groups transform into successful political parties? I argue that rebel successor party electoral performance is strongly shaped by rebel social bases and organizational cohesion. When rebels recruit more from the civilian population and control more territory, they are more likely to have a postwar base of party members and attract nonrebel elites to join their party. I also argue, however, that cohesive rebel organizations adapt more easily to the challenges of party building. Two key mechanisms link cohesion to success. First, cohesive rebel organizations are more likely to preserve their wartime social bases and avoid rebel leader splits and defections to other parties. Second, cohesive groups are better suited to incorporate nonrebel elites and pursue electoral strategies that appeal to noncombatant voters. This article examines the validity of this theory in a comparative study of the party-building efforts of ethnic Albanian rebel organizations in the Balkans.","PeriodicalId":47478,"journal":{"name":"Security Studies","volume":"31 1","pages":"446 - 482"},"PeriodicalIF":1.8,"publicationDate":"2022-05-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46643718","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-03-15DOI: 10.1080/09636412.2022.2065925
Sharan Grewal
Abstract Proponents claim that US military training diffuses norms of democracy and civilian control into foreign militaries. I argue that foreign trainees are likely to absorb the United States’ entire pattern of civil-military relations, including the more political trends that have emerged in recent decades, such as military personnel identifying with and voting for political parties, and serving in senior positions in government upon retirement. Through interviews and two surveys of Tunisian military personnel, I show that US trainees are more supportive than French trainees of active-duty personnel voting and of retired officers serving as president and defense minister. The diffusion of these more political attitudes to foreign trainees may help explain why US military training does not uniformly correlate with apolitical behavior.
{"title":"Norm Diffusion through US Military Training in Tunisia","authors":"Sharan Grewal","doi":"10.1080/09636412.2022.2065925","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/09636412.2022.2065925","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Proponents claim that US military training diffuses norms of democracy and civilian control into foreign militaries. I argue that foreign trainees are likely to absorb the United States’ entire pattern of civil-military relations, including the more political trends that have emerged in recent decades, such as military personnel identifying with and voting for political parties, and serving in senior positions in government upon retirement. Through interviews and two surveys of Tunisian military personnel, I show that US trainees are more supportive than French trainees of active-duty personnel voting and of retired officers serving as president and defense minister. The diffusion of these more political attitudes to foreign trainees may help explain why US military training does not uniformly correlate with apolitical behavior.","PeriodicalId":47478,"journal":{"name":"Security Studies","volume":"31 1","pages":"291 - 317"},"PeriodicalIF":1.8,"publicationDate":"2022-03-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42484625","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-03-15DOI: 10.1080/09636412.2022.2072235
S. Piccolo
Abstract This article contends that civilian leaders can adversely affect military capacity in the realm of technology. I argue that if civilian leaders have personal biases that blind them to military effectiveness, and if they have the power to make unilateral procurement decisions, then military capacity will be hampered. With a main plausibility probe of Canada’s disastrous World War I Ross rifle, I suggest that Minister of Militia Sam Hughes ensured that Canadians fought with the gun 18 months after its first wartime failures, failures so egregious that one officer said it was “nothing short of murder” to send soldiers into battle with it. I assess two shadow cases on rifle development and procurement involving Union war secretary Simon Cameron and British war secretary Hugh Arnold-Foster, both of which support my theory. I suggest that civilian control over specific military technologies is not desirable, and that civilian control of militaries in general may be strengthened by limiting control of these means of war.
{"title":"“Nothing Short of Murder”: How Leaders Can Diminish Military Capacities","authors":"S. Piccolo","doi":"10.1080/09636412.2022.2072235","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/09636412.2022.2072235","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract This article contends that civilian leaders can adversely affect military capacity in the realm of technology. I argue that if civilian leaders have personal biases that blind them to military effectiveness, and if they have the power to make unilateral procurement decisions, then military capacity will be hampered. With a main plausibility probe of Canada’s disastrous World War I Ross rifle, I suggest that Minister of Militia Sam Hughes ensured that Canadians fought with the gun 18 months after its first wartime failures, failures so egregious that one officer said it was “nothing short of murder” to send soldiers into battle with it. I assess two shadow cases on rifle development and procurement involving Union war secretary Simon Cameron and British war secretary Hugh Arnold-Foster, both of which support my theory. I suggest that civilian control over specific military technologies is not desirable, and that civilian control of militaries in general may be strengthened by limiting control of these means of war.","PeriodicalId":47478,"journal":{"name":"Security Studies","volume":"31 1","pages":"318 - 350"},"PeriodicalIF":1.8,"publicationDate":"2022-03-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46523120","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-03-15DOI: 10.1080/09636412.2022.2072234
S. Plapinger
Abstract Why are some insurgent groups more effective in combat than others? The existing scholarship on insurgent behavior tells us little about the diverse performances of nonstate armed actors in conflict. In this article, I develop a framework to measure and explain insurgent combat effectiveness during civil war centered around the relative rigor of recruitment practices. Groups whose recruitment practices are consistent and comprehensive (what I call robust, as opposed to deficient) generate the uniform shared purpose, discipline, and interpersonal trust needed to fight effectively in combat. Drawing on 105 interviews with ex-combatants and archival research in Jordan, Lebanon, and the United States, I show how different recruitment practices account for variation in insurgent combat effectiveness during the Black September period of the Jordanian Civil War (1968–1971). The article’s theory and findings add to scholarship on civil wars, insurgent behavior, and military effectiveness, and inform operations and intelligence analysis, counterinsurgency, and conflict management and peacebuilding efforts.
{"title":"Insurgent Recruitment Practices and Combat Effectiveness in Civil War: The Black September Conflict in Jordan","authors":"S. Plapinger","doi":"10.1080/09636412.2022.2072234","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/09636412.2022.2072234","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Why are some insurgent groups more effective in combat than others? The existing scholarship on insurgent behavior tells us little about the diverse performances of nonstate armed actors in conflict. In this article, I develop a framework to measure and explain insurgent combat effectiveness during civil war centered around the relative rigor of recruitment practices. Groups whose recruitment practices are consistent and comprehensive (what I call robust, as opposed to deficient) generate the uniform shared purpose, discipline, and interpersonal trust needed to fight effectively in combat. Drawing on 105 interviews with ex-combatants and archival research in Jordan, Lebanon, and the United States, I show how different recruitment practices account for variation in insurgent combat effectiveness during the Black September period of the Jordanian Civil War (1968–1971). The article’s theory and findings add to scholarship on civil wars, insurgent behavior, and military effectiveness, and inform operations and intelligence analysis, counterinsurgency, and conflict management and peacebuilding efforts.","PeriodicalId":47478,"journal":{"name":"Security Studies","volume":"31 1","pages":"251 - 290"},"PeriodicalIF":1.8,"publicationDate":"2022-03-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49534341","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-03-15DOI: 10.1080/09636412.2022.2065926
Christopher Newton, Colin Tucker
Abstract Since 2001, the United States has relied upon air strikes in its global counterterrorism campaign against insurgencies throughout the world. With advances in air strike technology, public opinion growing increasingly intolerant of deployments of ground forces abroad, and the proliferation of terrorist groups around the world, the use of air strikes appears to be the future of US counterterrorism policy. This study tests the efficacy of air strikes as a counterinsurgency tool by geocoordinating US air strike data and merging it with three major databases on conflict events to assess whether air strikes influence the rate of insurgent attacks. Our analysis reveals that air strikes reduce insurgents’ capacity to carry out attacks over the long term. At the same time, air strikes carry a short-term, provocative effect on insurgent attacks when they result in civilian fatalities. Finally, there is some evidence that air strikes increase attack attempts, but these attempts are not always successful, nor directed toward government forces.
{"title":"The Efficacy of Airpower in Counterinsurgency","authors":"Christopher Newton, Colin Tucker","doi":"10.1080/09636412.2022.2065926","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/09636412.2022.2065926","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Since 2001, the United States has relied upon air strikes in its global counterterrorism campaign against insurgencies throughout the world. With advances in air strike technology, public opinion growing increasingly intolerant of deployments of ground forces abroad, and the proliferation of terrorist groups around the world, the use of air strikes appears to be the future of US counterterrorism policy. This study tests the efficacy of air strikes as a counterinsurgency tool by geocoordinating US air strike data and merging it with three major databases on conflict events to assess whether air strikes influence the rate of insurgent attacks. Our analysis reveals that air strikes reduce insurgents’ capacity to carry out attacks over the long term. At the same time, air strikes carry a short-term, provocative effect on insurgent attacks when they result in civilian fatalities. Finally, there is some evidence that air strikes increase attack attempts, but these attempts are not always successful, nor directed toward government forces.","PeriodicalId":47478,"journal":{"name":"Security Studies","volume":"31 1","pages":"218 - 250"},"PeriodicalIF":1.8,"publicationDate":"2022-03-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45233322","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-03-15DOI: 10.1080/09636412.2022.2079997
E. Souleimanov, David S. Siroky, Peter Krause
Abstract Drawing on original interviews with ex-insurgents and eyewitnesses of the Second Chechen War (1999–2009), this article develops a theory of “kin killing,” defined as the use of lethal violence against insurgents’ relatives as a deliberate counterinsurgency tactic. Family-based targeting works by coercing insurgents to surrender or defect, deterring insurgents’ relatives from retaliation, and discouraging prospective recruits from joining or supporting insurgents. Because it targets a small number of individuals who have strong ties to insurgents, kin killing is the most selective form of collective violence. The tactic is most likely to be used by illiberal regimes that know the identity of the insurgents, but not their location, and operate in traditional societies with large, tightly knit families. Most would consider kin killing—and its nonlethal counterpart, kin targeting—ethically reprehensible, but numerous countries have employed it with varying degrees of success, including Russia, the United Kingdom, and China. Militarily dominant regimes who employ kin killing can turn family members from force multipliers into pressure points for insurgents, as regimes “flip the network” and make restraint, rather than revenge, the best way to protect one’s family.
{"title":"Kin Killing: Why Governments Target Family Members in Insurgency, and When It Works","authors":"E. Souleimanov, David S. Siroky, Peter Krause","doi":"10.1080/09636412.2022.2079997","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/09636412.2022.2079997","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Drawing on original interviews with ex-insurgents and eyewitnesses of the Second Chechen War (1999–2009), this article develops a theory of “kin killing,” defined as the use of lethal violence against insurgents’ relatives as a deliberate counterinsurgency tactic. Family-based targeting works by coercing insurgents to surrender or defect, deterring insurgents’ relatives from retaliation, and discouraging prospective recruits from joining or supporting insurgents. Because it targets a small number of individuals who have strong ties to insurgents, kin killing is the most selective form of collective violence. The tactic is most likely to be used by illiberal regimes that know the identity of the insurgents, but not their location, and operate in traditional societies with large, tightly knit families. Most would consider kin killing—and its nonlethal counterpart, kin targeting—ethically reprehensible, but numerous countries have employed it with varying degrees of success, including Russia, the United Kingdom, and China. Militarily dominant regimes who employ kin killing can turn family members from force multipliers into pressure points for insurgents, as regimes “flip the network” and make restraint, rather than revenge, the best way to protect one’s family.","PeriodicalId":47478,"journal":{"name":"Security Studies","volume":"31 1","pages":"183 - 217"},"PeriodicalIF":1.8,"publicationDate":"2022-03-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44261388","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-03-13DOI: 10.26735/978-603-8235-65-2
Adeel Alsharman
This study aims to find out the role played by Arab police and security agencies in using security-related media to develop security awareness among Arab citizens. It also aims to clarify the ways and methods through which this awareness is developed and to define the difficulties that hamper efforts to develop it. The study also aims to define the relationship between the media and security agencies and the effect of this relationship on the required role played by the security-related media in developing security awareness. The study uses the exploratory descriptive approach, through several questions that it sought to answer. The results of the study are as follows: The ability of the Arab media to keep pace with rapidly increasing security challenges and face them is weak, and it mostly relies on traditional media-based means and messages to increase awareness and develop security awareness among citizens. Besides, the relationship between Arab police and security agencies and the media is still weak, despite improvements in recent years. The study also revealed that these agencies have not benefitted from employing digital media when carrying out their required role. The study recommends that new media should be given its due importance by Arab security-related media. It also recommended that personnel working in this field be given professional and specialist training and that specialist departments, divisions, and branches should be opened for this type of media, in the relevant media administrations. It also recommends that personnel working in Arab security-related media should be directed to search for new and innovative ways and means to convey the message of the media in fields related to raising and developing awareness about security. The study recommends that there should be cooperation and coordination with academic research establishments to carry out further in-depth academic studies in different areas of work.
{"title":"Arab security media and its role in developing the security sense","authors":"Adeel Alsharman","doi":"10.26735/978-603-8235-65-2","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.26735/978-603-8235-65-2","url":null,"abstract":"This study aims to find out the role played by Arab police and security agencies in using security-related media to develop security awareness among Arab citizens. It also aims to clarify the ways and methods through which this awareness is developed and to define the difficulties that hamper efforts to develop it. The study also aims to define the relationship between the media and security agencies and the effect of this relationship on the required role played by the security-related media in developing security awareness. The study uses the exploratory descriptive approach, through several questions that it sought to answer. The results of the study are as follows: The ability of the Arab media to keep pace with rapidly increasing security challenges and face them is weak, and it mostly relies on traditional media-based means and messages to increase awareness and develop security awareness among citizens. Besides, the relationship between Arab police and security agencies and the media is still weak, despite improvements in recent years. The study also revealed that these agencies have not benefitted from employing digital media when carrying out their required role. The study recommends that new media should be given its due importance by Arab security-related media. It also recommended that personnel working in this field be given professional and specialist training and that specialist departments, divisions, and branches should be opened for this type of media, in the relevant media administrations. It also recommends that personnel working in Arab security-related media should be directed to search for new and innovative ways and means to convey the message of the media in fields related to raising and developing awareness about security. The study recommends that there should be cooperation and coordination with academic research establishments to carry out further in-depth academic studies in different areas of work.","PeriodicalId":47478,"journal":{"name":"Security Studies","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.8,"publicationDate":"2022-03-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43015847","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-01-01DOI: 10.1080/09636412.2022.2038664
Ariel Zellman, Davis Brown
Abstract Although often argued that religion should significantly influence international conflict, the empirical record is mixed. For every recurrent interreligious conflict, there are numerous examples of sustained interreligious cooperation. Conflict also frequently mars the oft-assumed peaceful relations between shared-religion states. We argue that religion is an important intervening factor in interstate dispute militarization, especially between internally threatened rivals. In mixed-religion dyads, conflict often follows oppression of cross-border coreligionists, whereas in shared-religion dyads, conflict occurs as one side disproportionately increases its official support for that religion. In both instances, dispute militarization is primarily an effort to undercut domestic competitors, whose challenge is augmented by external threats to leaders’ religious legitimacy. We test these propositions using new, long-term data on religious demography and state-religion policy, identifying rivalries via antecedent interstate territorial disputes. The findings largely confirm our hypotheses, substantially clarifying the conditions under which religion contributes to international militarized conflict.
{"title":"Uneasy Lies the Crown: External Threats to Religious Legitimacy and Interstate Dispute Militarization","authors":"Ariel Zellman, Davis Brown","doi":"10.1080/09636412.2022.2038664","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/09636412.2022.2038664","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Although often argued that religion should significantly influence international conflict, the empirical record is mixed. For every recurrent interreligious conflict, there are numerous examples of sustained interreligious cooperation. Conflict also frequently mars the oft-assumed peaceful relations between shared-religion states. We argue that religion is an important intervening factor in interstate dispute militarization, especially between internally threatened rivals. In mixed-religion dyads, conflict often follows oppression of cross-border coreligionists, whereas in shared-religion dyads, conflict occurs as one side disproportionately increases its official support for that religion. In both instances, dispute militarization is primarily an effort to undercut domestic competitors, whose challenge is augmented by external threats to leaders’ religious legitimacy. We test these propositions using new, long-term data on religious demography and state-religion policy, identifying rivalries via antecedent interstate territorial disputes. The findings largely confirm our hypotheses, substantially clarifying the conditions under which religion contributes to international militarized conflict.","PeriodicalId":47478,"journal":{"name":"Security Studies","volume":"31 1","pages":"152 - 182"},"PeriodicalIF":1.8,"publicationDate":"2022-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46921417","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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