Resource and Energy Economics最新文献

In this paper, we examine the optimal structure of an environmental tax to pollution, a production subsidy to a domestic eco-industry, and an import tariff on environmental goods (EGs) in a two-country model where the home country imports EGs from the foreign country. Home and foreign firms that produce EGs engage in Cournot competition. We then assume that the number of the home local firms which produce EGs is constant, but that of the foreign firms is variable. Our main findings are as follows: (I) The optimal environmental tax level may be lower than the Pigouvian level even if the tax has a positive impact on the output of EGs produced by a domestic firm. (II) The optimal tariff level may be positive when the country implements the first best policy combination in a closed economy regarding the environmental tax and the subsidy. (III) The optimal subsidy level may be positive, and then the subsidy may be substitutive for the import tariff on EGs.

In this paper, we develop an empirical framework that allows us to trace out a time path of metal prices. This framework shows that unpredictable shifts in demand, extraction costs and discovery of reserves, make estimation of the slope of this underlying trend an empirical question. Further, the low elasticity of demand and supply cause large volatility in the prices, which makes estimation of the trend difficult. We estimate the trend in metal prices employing econometric procedures that are robust to the underlying order of integration of the data and allow for nonstationary volatility, which we note is a characteristic feature of metal prices. We further analyse whether metal prices are characterised by stochastic trends by conducting unit root tests that allow for nonstationary volatility. Applying these procedures on metal prices for over a century, we draw conclusions that relate to policy.

There is growing concern that failure to acknowledge the risk and uncertainty surrounding ecosystem services (ES) delivery could have adverse effects on support for ES policy intervention in the long run. However, acknowledging risk may reduce support for policy interventions in the short term. In this paper, we sought to determine whether willingness-to-pay (WTP) for urban forest ES in Southampton, UK is affected by objective and subjective uncertainty surrounding ES delivery. We conducted a discrete choice experiment with a split sample design: one with a scenario specifying risky ES outcomes and one where zero risk was implied. Respondents’ subjective certainty surrounding the provision of ES was determined before and after the choice questions. Despite respondents’ risk aversion, introducing an objective likelihood attribute did not reduce WTP compared to the scenario with implied certain ES outcomes. Furthermore, whilst WTP for the overall scheme was found to be adversely affected by the presence of risk around ES outcomes, subjective uncertainty seemed to reduce WTP more than objective probabilities. Our results therefore support the idea that both objective probabilities and subjective uncertainty should be explicitly incorporated in the design of stated preference studies for ES valuation.

We examine the pattern of allowance trades in the European Union Emissions Trading System (EU ETS) using highly disaggregated trading data and identify a significant and robust home market bias. Our results point to informational transactions costs that increase when trading across national borders. The existing trade pattern in goods and services explains two thirds of the home bias, with the remainder due to other causes. Our finding suggests that firms make use of existing trade networks to overcome search costs in bilateral allowance trade. Since the home bias differs across firms, it follows that marginal abatement costs are not equalized across market participants of the EU ETS.

Cost of renewable energies have dropped, approaching wholesale power price levels. As a result, the role of renewable energy policy design is shifting – from covering incremental costs towards facilitating risk-hedging. An analytical model of the financing structure of renewable investment projects is developed to assess this effect und used to compare different policy design choices: contracts for differences, sliding premia, fixed premia and a setting without dedicated remuneration mechanism. The expected benefit for electricity consumers from reduced risk and financing costs is approximated at the example of a 2030 scenario for Germany. Policies like sliding premia, previously evaluated as providing low-risk investment environments, provide for less risks hedging, when technology costs approach wholesale power prices. Contracts for differences provide in all scenarios the most effective hedge for investors against power prices uncertainty, enabling low-cost financing and reducing costs for consumers, while also hedging electricity consumers against high power prices.

Carbon taxes are generally well accepted in countries with significant experience thereof but there is still public resistance to raising them. We study attitudes toward carbon taxation and other environmental policy instruments in Sweden. We survey a national sample of the population as well as members of a large political movement that protests fuel taxes. Our results show that the motivations in both groups are alike: educational level, rural versus urban domicile, political orientation, and especially trust in government correlate with opinions on carbon taxes; household income does not appear to matter. Lack of trust in government and lack of belief in the Pigouvian mechanism appear as especially important motivations for protesters’ opposition. We find support for revenue refunding, but greater support, in both groups, for earmarking for climate use.

Using electrification to decarbonize the energy sector potentially alters the pattern of electricity demand. This paper leverages a unique RTO-level, hourly dataset to identify the impact of exogenous changes in load on electricity supply costs. An increase in load variation of 5 % is associated with a 7.35 % increase in the cost of electricity supply. Higher solar and wind generation in a region is found to lower the cost of load variation, with solar having a more significant effect. (JEL Q41, Q49, L94).

We derive an optimal emission tax under imperfect competition among polluters, while taking into account the significance of the spatial dimension for non-uniformly mixed pollutants. This setup reflects a large number of pollution scenarios across developed and developing countries. We build a partial equilibrium model that is based on Hotelling’s location model, and that is further generalized to include the polluters’ abatement levels. First, the firms’ locations are considered to be exogenous, but later we relax this assumption. Our results shed light on a trade-off between the environmental externality and the distortions resulting from the Bertrand competition. This trade-off is modulated by the locations of the two producers as well as preferences for a clean environment. Our results also indicate that, in the presence of more than one market failure, the principle of maximal differentiation is not always guaranteed. We further stress that designing a spatial emission tax is not too demanding in terms of regulator information. Lastly, we reveal that when environmental awareness is well-promoted, the green preference would be a cheaper anti-pollution instrument than emission taxes.