Games and Economic Behavior最新文献

英文中文

Axiomatic analysis of approval-based scoring rules 基于批准的评分规则的公理化分析

IF 1 3区经济学 Q3 ECONOMICS

Games and Economic Behavior

Pub Date : 2025-07-24 DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2025.07.004

Tuva Bardal , Ulle Endriss

Approval-based scoring rules require participants to submit ballots that correspond to the candidates they approve of, and each candidate then receives some score from each ballot it appears on. One particularly natural class of approval-based scoring rules is the class of size-approval rules. For rules in this class, each ballot is weighted based on the number of candidates it contains. We provide a deep axiomatic analysis of the class of size-approval rules and related classes of approval-based scoring rules. We organise existing work by shedding light on the exact role played by core axioms involved in previous characterisations of size-approval rules, while also providing multiple new characterisations of the same class and its closest relatives. We furthermore provide an original characterisation of even-and-equal cumulative voting, the most paradigmatic representative of the size-approval voting rules, where each ballot's weight is inversely proportional to its size.

基于批准的评分规则要求参与者提交与他们批准的候选人相对应的选票，然后每个候选人从出现在其上的每张选票中获得一些分数。基于审批的评分规则的一个特别自然的类别是大小审批规则。对于该类中的规则，每张选票根据其包含的候选人数量进行加权。我们对大小批准规则类和相关的基于批准的评分规则类进行了深入的公理化分析。我们通过揭示先前尺寸批准规则特征中涉及的核心公理所起的确切作用来组织现有工作，同时还提供了同一类及其最接近的亲属的多个新特征。此外，我们还提供了均等累积投票的原始特征，这是大小批准投票规则的最典型代表，其中每张选票的权重与其大小成反比。

引用次数: 0

Dual communication in a social network: Contributing and dedicating attention 社交网络中的双重沟通：贡献和奉献注意力

IF 1 3区经济学 Q3 ECONOMICS

Games and Economic Behavior

Pub Date : 2025-07-23 DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2025.07.003

Gabrielle Demange

Communication between individuals often involves two types of dual activities. On social media such as Facebook, for example, users produce content (posts) and pay attention to their friends' posts. These activities are dual as a user is more inclined to produce posts the more friends react to them and is more inclined to dedicate attention to a friend's posts the more numerous these posts are. This paper builds and analyzes a simple game with dual activities and dedicated attention when agents communicate through a follower-influencer network (say, X-Twitter). Equilibria can be multiple, each characterized by its attention network, which describes who pays attention to whom, resulting in a partition of cohesive subgroups who pay and receive attention from each other and do not communicate with agents in other subgroups. The stars-equilibria, where attention in each subgroup is focused on a single influencer, stand apart: activities and payoffs are high on average but unequal. Furthermore, they are the only equilibria stable to perturbations or to self-enforcing deviations from coalitions (coalition-proofness).

个体之间的交流通常涉及两种类型的双重活动。例如，在Facebook等社交媒体上，用户制作内容（帖子）并关注朋友的帖子。这些活动是双重的，因为用户更倾向于发布帖子，越多的朋友对他们做出反应，并且更倾向于关注朋友的帖子，这些帖子越多。本文构建并分析了一个简单的游戏，当代理通过追随者-影响者网络（例如X-Twitter）进行交流时，该游戏具有双重活动和专注力。均衡可以是多重的，每个均衡都有自己的注意网络，它描述了谁关注谁，从而导致有凝聚力的子群体的分裂，这些子群体相互关注和接受关注，不与其他子群体中的代理交流。明星均衡是指每个子群体的注意力都集中在一个影响者身上，这种均衡是不同的：活动和回报平均很高，但不平等。此外，它们是唯一对扰动或对联盟的自我执行偏差稳定的平衡（抗联盟性）。

引用次数: 0

Pay it forward: Theory and experiment 传递：理论与实验

IF 1 3区经济学 Q3 ECONOMICS

Games and Economic Behavior

Pub Date : 2025-07-16 DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2025.07.002

Amanda Chuan , Hanzhe Zhang

We theoretically and experimentally investigate psychological motivations behind pay-it-forward behavior. We construct a psychological game-theoretic model that incorporates altruism, inequity aversion, and indirect reciprocity following Rabin (1993), Fehr and Schmidt (1999), and Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (2004). We test this model using games in which players choose to give to strangers, potentially after receiving a gift from an unrelated benefactor. Our experiment reveals that altruism and indirect reciprocity spur people to pay kind actions forward, informing how kindness begets further kindness. However, inequity aversion hinders giving even when giving will allow one's kindness to be paid forward. Our paper informs how kind behaviors get passed on among parties that never directly interact, which has implications for the formation of social norms and behavioral conduct within workplaces, neighborhoods, and communities.

我们从理论上和实验上研究了“传递回报”行为背后的心理动机。继Rabin（1993）、Fehr和Schmidt（1999）、Dufwenberg和Kirchsteiger（2004）之后，我们构建了一个包含利他主义、不公平厌恶和间接互惠的心理博弈论模型。我们使用一些游戏来测试这个模型，在这些游戏中，玩家可能会在从一个不相关的捐助者那里收到礼物后选择给陌生人。我们的实验表明，利他主义和间接互惠会刺激人们做出善意的行为，告诉我们善意是如何产生更多的善意的。然而，不公平厌恶阻碍了给予，即使给予会让一个人的善意得到回报。我们的论文揭示了友善的行为是如何在从未直接互动的各方之间传递的，这对工作场所、社区和社区中社会规范和行为行为的形成有影响。

引用次数: 0

From monopoly to competition: When do optimal contests prevail? 从垄断到竞争：最优竞争何时盛行？

IF 1 3区经济学 Q3 ECONOMICS

Games and Economic Behavior

Pub Date : 2025-07-11 DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2025.07.001

Xiaotie Deng , Yotam Gafni , Ron Lavi , Tao Lin , Hongyi Ling

We study competition among multiple contest designers in a general model. The goal of each contest designer is to maximize the sum of efforts of the contestants participating in their contest. Assuming symmetric contestants, our main result shows that the optimal contests in the monopolistic setting (i.e., those that maximize the sum of efforts in a model with a single contest designer) form an equilibrium in the model with competition. Under a very natural assumption, these contests are dominant, and the equilibrium that they form is unique. Moreover, the equilibria with the optimal contests are Pareto-optimal even when other equilibria emerge. In many natural cases, they also maximize the social welfare. Additional examples show that, with further generalizations of our model, optimal contests no longer prevail. Our results therefore highlight and clarify the borderline between settings in which optimal contests prevail and do not prevail.

我们在一个一般模型中研究多个竞赛设计者之间的竞争。每个比赛设计者的目标都是最大化参赛者在比赛中的努力总和。假设竞争对手是对称的，我们的主要结果表明，在垄断环境下的最优竞争（即那些在具有单个竞赛设计者的模型中最大限度地提高努力总和的竞争）在具有竞争的模型中形成均衡。在一个非常自然的假设下，这些竞争占主导地位，它们形成的平衡是独一无二的。此外，即使存在其他均衡，具有最优竞争的均衡也是帕累托最优的。在许多自然情况下，它们也最大化了社会福利。其他的例子表明，随着我们模型的进一步推广，最优竞争不再盛行。因此，我们的结果强调并澄清了最优竞争盛行和不盛行的设置之间的界限。

引用次数: 0

Working with AI: An analysis for rational integration 与人工智能一起工作：对合理集成的分析

IF 1 3区经济学 Q3 ECONOMICS

Games and Economic Behavior

Pub Date : 2025-07-09 DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2025.06.009

David Lagziel, Yevgeny Tsodikovich

A decision maker (DM) uses an AI agent to estimate an unknown state, for which both possess informative private signals. Conditional on the state and the DM's final assessment, he prefers the AI's recommendations to be incorrect, thus affirming his own superiority or sharing the blame. Our analysis indicates that the correctness of the process is not a monotone function of participants' expertise levels: (i) a less accurate AI may lead to improved outcomes by reducing the DM's reliance on it, and (ii) a less accurate DM can enhance information aggregation leading to a superior result.

决策者（DM）使用人工智能代理来估计未知状态，两者都具有信息私有信号。在国家和DM最终评估的条件下，他宁愿人工智能的建议是不正确的，从而肯定自己的优势或分担责任。我们的分析表明，该过程的正确性不是参与者专业水平的单调函数：(i)不太准确的人工智能可能通过减少决策制定者对它的依赖而改善结果，（ii）不太准确的决策制定者可以增强信息聚合，从而获得更好的结果。

引用次数: 0

Self-serving biases in beliefs about collective outcomes 对集体结果的自我服务偏见

IF 1 3区经济学 Q3 ECONOMICS

Games and Economic Behavior

Pub Date : 2025-07-06 DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2025.06.008

Shimon Kogan , Florian H. Schneider , Roberto A. Weber

Beliefs about collective outcomes play an important role in many contexts. We study biases in the formation of such beliefs. Specifically, we investigate whether self-serving biases in information processing—documented for beliefs about individual outcomes—affect beliefs about collective outcomes. In a first study, we find that people indeed exhibit self-serving biases for collective outcomes, and that such biases are similar to biases for individual outcomes. We also observe that the presence of a market institution for aggregating private information produces, if anything, slightly greater collective self-delusion. In a second study, we investigate the mechanisms driving collective self-delusion and find that anticipatory utility plays a large role, rather than ego-utility considerations.

关于集体结果的信念在许多情况下发挥着重要作用。我们研究这种信念形成过程中的偏见。具体地说，我们调查了信息处理中的自我服务偏见——对个人结果的信念——是否会影响对集体结果的信念。在第一项研究中，我们发现人们确实对集体结果表现出自私的偏见，这种偏见与对个人结果的偏见相似。我们还观察到，汇集私人信息的市场机构的存在，如果说有什么区别的话，那就是更大程度的集体自欺欺人。在第二项研究中，我们调查了驱动集体自我欺骗的机制，发现预期效用比自我效用考虑起着更大的作用。

引用次数: 0

Watchdog versus yes man: News source and media competition 看门狗与唯唯诺诺者：新闻来源与媒体竞争

IF 1 3区经济学 Q3 ECONOMICS

Games and Economic Behavior

Pub Date : 2025-07-02 DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2025.06.007

Daiki Kishishita , Susumu Sato

Watchdog journalism, the idea that independent media outlets monitor people in power, can be undermined when the people in power serve as news sources on which the media rely. By developing a model of media competition with a strategic news source, we show that the presence of a news source creates pro-source biases; the coexistence of neutral watchdogs and biased yes men arises as an outcome of mixed strategy equilibrium. This bias can make the presence of a news source harmful to consumers.

如果权力人士成为媒体所依赖的新闻来源，独立媒体监督权力人士的“监督新闻”就会遭到破坏。通过开发具有战略新闻来源的媒体竞争模型，我们表明新闻来源的存在会产生亲源偏见；中立的监督者和有偏见的应声者共存是混合战略均衡的结果。这种偏见会使新闻来源的存在对消费者有害。

引用次数: 0

Measuring tastes for equity and aggregate wealth behind the veil of ignorance 在无知的面纱背后衡量公平和总财富的品味

IF 1 3区经济学 Q3 ECONOMICS

Games and Economic Behavior

Pub Date : 2025-06-19 DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2025.06.005

Jan Heufer , Jason Shachat , Yan Xu

We propose an instrument to measure individuals' social preferences regarding equity and efficiency behind a veil of ignorance while controlling for idiosyncratic risk preferences. We construct a battery of portfolio and wealth distribution choice problems sharing a common budget set. A given bundle induces the same distribution over an individual's wealth in both problems. The portfolio choice solely reflects an individual's risk attitude, providing a benchmark to evaluate whether their wealth distribution choice exhibits equity or efficiency preferring tastes. Our experiments show clusters of social preference types, which are unexpectedly independent of risk preferences.

我们提出了一种工具来衡量个人在无知之幕背后对公平和效率的社会偏好，同时控制特殊的风险偏好。我们构造了一组投资组合和财富分配选择问题，这些问题共享一个公共预算集。在这两个问题中，一个给定的捆绑会导致对个人财富的相同分配。投资组合选择仅仅反映了个人的风险态度，提供了一个基准来评估他们的财富分配选择是表现出公平偏好还是效率偏好。我们的实验显示了社会偏好类型的集群，它们出乎意料地独立于风险偏好。

引用次数: 0

Pricing and information acquisition in networks 网络中的定价与信息获取

IF 1 3区经济学 Q3 ECONOMICS

Games and Economic Behavior

Pub Date : 2025-06-19 DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2025.06.006

Yifan Xiong , Guopeng Li , Youze Lang

This paper investigates how a monopolist strategically acquires information from networked consumers with correlated preferences using discriminatory or uniform pricing schemes. Under uniform pricing, the optimal information acquisition problem can be efficiently solved in polynomial time by iteratively selecting consumers with the highest Katz-Bonacich centrality. By contrast, under discriminatory pricing, the problem is generally NP-hard. However, in typical networks, such as complete bipartite, core-periphery, and nested-split networks, the optimal targeted group can be characterized in a straightforward manner: the monopolist simply prioritizes consumers with higher degrees. A comparative analysis shows that the size of the optimal targeted group decreases with information cost but follows an inverted U-shape with respect to preference correlation. Allowing the monopolist to acquire information always reduces welfare under discriminatory pricing, whereas under uniform pricing, the impact is not necessarily negative.

本文研究了垄断者如何利用歧视性或统一定价方案从具有相关偏好的网络消费者那里战略性地获取信息。在统一定价条件下，通过迭代选择Katz-Bonacich中心性最高的消费者，可以在多项式时间内有效地解决最优信息获取问题。相比之下，在歧视性定价下，问题通常是NP-hard。然而，在典型的网络中，如完全二部网络、核心-外围网络和嵌套-分裂网络，最优目标群体可以用一种简单的方式来表征：垄断者只是优先考虑程度较高的消费者。对比分析表明，最优目标群体的规模随着信息成本的增加而减小，但在偏好相关性方面呈倒u型关系。允许垄断者获取信息在歧视性定价下总是会减少福利，而在统一定价下，这种影响并不一定是负面的。

引用次数: 0

Gradual matching with affirmative action 逐步与平权行动相匹配

IF 1 3区经济学 Q3 ECONOMICS

Games and Economic Behavior

Pub Date : 2025-06-18 DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2025.06.004

Kriti Manocha , Bertan Turhan

This paper studies a multi-period college admissions problem where schools' choice rules incorporate affirmative action constraints. Students have the option to either finalize their assignments at the end of each period or participate in subsequent periods with the possibility of updating their rank-ordered lists (ROLs). We show that a gradual matching mechanism makes active students weakly better off (i.e. satisfies monotonicity) if and only if their ROL update rule meets a mild regularity condition. We introduce the notion of gradual stability adapted for multi-period matching mechanisms that account for affirmative action constraints. Furthermore, we show that the gradual stability of a gradual matching mechanism is equivalent to monotonicity in conjunction with the stability of the stage mechanism. Finally, we use our results to analyze the multi-stage mechanism currently used for engineering college admissions in India.

本文研究了一个包含平权法案约束的多时期大学录取问题。学生可以选择在每个学期结束时完成他们的作业，或者参加后续的学期，并有可能更新他们的顺序列表（ROLs）。我们证明了渐进式匹配机制当且仅当他们的ROL更新规则满足温和的正则性条件时，会使主动学生弱更好（即满足单调性）。我们引入了渐进稳定性的概念，适用于考虑平权行动约束的多时期匹配机制。进一步，结合阶段机构的稳定性，证明了逐步匹配机构的逐步稳定性等价于单调性。最后，我们用我们的结果来分析目前印度工程学院录取采用的多阶段机制。

引用次数: 0

首页上一页

下一页尾页

类型

全部化学•材料生命科学医学物理工程技术环境•农林材料科学地球科学法学管理学化学环境科学与生态学计算机科学教育学经济学农林科学人文科学生物学数学物理与天体物理心理学综合性期刊其他工业工程理学历史学农学文学信息工程

数据库

全部 ACS Publications Elsevier ieeexplore Springer The Royal Society of Chemistry Wiley

期刊

Games and Economic Behavior

全部 Acc. Chem. Res. ACS Applied Bio Materials ACS Appl. Electron. Mater. ACS Appl. Energy Mater. ACS Appl. Mater. Interfaces ACS Appl. Nano Mater. ACS Appl. Polym. Mater. ACS BIOMATER-SCI ENG ACS Catal. ACS Cent. Sci. ACS Chem. Biol. ACS Chemical Health & Safety ACS Chem. Neurosci. ACS Comb. Sci. ACS Earth Space Chem. ACS Energy Lett. ACS Infect. Dis. ACS Macro Lett. ACS Mater. Lett. ACS Med. Chem. Lett. ACS Nano ACS Omega ACS Photonics ACS Sens. ACS Sustainable Chem. Eng. ACS Synth. Biol. Anal. Chem. BIOCHEMISTRY-US Bioconjugate Chem. BIOMACROMOLECULES Chem. Res. Toxicol. Chem. Rev. Chem. Mater. CRYST GROWTH DES ENERG FUEL Environ. Sci. Technol. Environ. Sci. Technol. Lett. Eur. J. Inorg. Chem. IND ENG CHEM RES Inorg. Chem. J. Agric. Food. Chem. J. Chem. Eng. Data J. Chem. Educ. J. Chem. Inf. Model. J. Chem. Theory Comput. J. Med. Chem. J. Nat. Prod. J PROTEOME RES J. Am. Chem. Soc. LANGMUIR MACROMOLECULES Mol. Pharmaceutics Nano Lett. Org. Lett. ORG PROCESS RES DEV ORGANOMETALLICS J. Org. Chem. J. Phys. Chem. J. Phys. Chem. A J. Phys. Chem. B J. Phys. Chem. C J. Phys. Chem. Lett. Analyst Anal. Methods Biomater. Sci. Catal. Sci. Technol. Chem. Commun. Chem. Soc. Rev. CHEM EDUC RES PRACT CRYSTENGCOMM Dalton Trans. Energy Environ. Sci. ENVIRON SCI-NANO ENVIRON SCI-PROC IMP ENVIRON SCI-WAT RES Faraday Discuss. Food Funct. Green Chem. Inorg. Chem. Front. Integr. Biol. J. Anal. At. Spectrom. J. Mater. Chem. A J. Mater. Chem. B J. Mater. Chem. C Lab Chip Mater. Chem. Front. Mater. Horiz. MEDCHEMCOMM Metallomics Mol. Biosyst. Mol. Syst. Des. Eng. Nanoscale Nanoscale Horiz. Nat. Prod. Rep. New J. Chem. Org. Biomol. Chem. Org. Chem. Front. PHOTOCH PHOTOBIO SCI PCCP Polym. Chem.

﹀