Games and Economic Behavior最新文献

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“Equilibrium play in voluntary ultimatum games: Beneficence cannot be extorted” - Comment “自愿最后通牒博弈中的均衡博弈：仁慈不能被勒索”-评论

IF 1 3区经济学 Q3 ECONOMICS

Games and Economic Behavior

Pub Date : 2025-10-01 Epub Date: 2025-05-30 DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2025.05.009

Austin Brooksby , Jacob Meyer , Lucas Rentschler , Vernon Smith , Robbie Spofford

Smith and Wilson (2018) argue that behavior in the ultimatum game may be due to the typical implementation, in which players are not given the opportunity to opt out of the game. Using insights from Smith (1759), they suggest that making play voluntary would increase rates of equilibrium play. They conducted an augmented ultimatum game where the responder first decides whether to participate, and compare their experimental data to stylized facts from the literature, reporting “far higher rates of equilibrium play...than heretofore reported”. However, they do not run standard versions of the ultimatum game as a control. To ensure their interpretation is warranted, we conducted experiments of both their augmented game and an analogous standard ultimatum game. In our data, rates of equilibrium play were not higher in the augmented game. Thus, we find no support for the primary conclusion of Smith and Wilson (2018).

Smith和Wilson（2018）认为，最后通牒博弈中的行为可能是由于典型的实施，其中参与者没有机会选择退出游戏。根据Smith（1759）的见解，他们认为让游戏变得自愿性会增加平衡游戏的比率。他们进行了一个增强的最后通牒游戏，在这个游戏中，响应者首先决定是否参与，并将他们的实验数据与文献中的程式化事实进行比较，报告称“均衡游戏的比例要高得多……比之前报道的要多”。然而，他们没有运行标准版本的最后通牒游戏作为对照。为了确保他们的解释是合理的，我们对他们的增强游戏和类似的标准最后通牒游戏进行了实验。在我们的数据中，均衡游戏的比率在增强游戏中并不高。因此，我们发现没有证据支持Smith和Wilson（2018）的主要结论。

引用次数: 0

Propaganda and conflict 宣传与冲突

IF 1 3区经济学 Q3 ECONOMICS

Games and Economic Behavior

Pub Date : 2025-10-01 Epub Date: 2025-08-18 DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2025.08.006

Petros G. Sekeris

In this article we explore how propaganda relates to conflict initiation. In the presence of propaganda, if conflict is highly destructive, parties invest in armaments to improve their share of the pie at the negotiation table. If conflict is lowly destructive, peace is never reached and arming is implemented to boost the troops' morale and fighting efficiency. For intermediate destruction levels, the game only admits mixed strategy equilibria where peace and conflict occur probabilistically. A world without propaganda Pareto-dominates one where information can be manipulated. Although lowly destructive conflicts are conducive to war, arming can pacify the situation by giving rise to mixed strategy equilibria where peace is played with strictly positive probability. Countries are shown to have incentives to invest in propaganda despite the fact that war will then occur with strictly positive probability.

在这篇文章中，我们探讨了宣传与冲突引发的关系。在宣传的存在下，如果冲突具有高度破坏性，各方就会投资军备，以提高他们在谈判桌上的份额。如果冲突是低破坏性的，和平永远不会达成，武装是为了提高军队的士气和战斗效率。对于中间破坏关卡，游戏只允许出现混合策略平衡，即和平与冲突的概率。一个没有宣传的世界，帕累托主导着一个信息可以被操纵的世界。虽然低破坏性的冲突有利于战争，但武装可以通过产生混合战略平衡来缓和局势，在这种平衡中，和平是在严格的正概率下进行的。研究显示，尽管战争极有可能发生，但各国仍有动机投资于宣传。

引用次数: 0

Working with AI: An analysis for rational integration 与人工智能一起工作：对合理集成的分析

IF 1 3区经济学 Q3 ECONOMICS

Games and Economic Behavior

Pub Date : 2025-10-01 Epub Date: 2025-07-09 DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2025.06.009

David Lagziel, Yevgeny Tsodikovich

A decision maker (DM) uses an AI agent to estimate an unknown state, for which both possess informative private signals. Conditional on the state and the DM's final assessment, he prefers the AI's recommendations to be incorrect, thus affirming his own superiority or sharing the blame. Our analysis indicates that the correctness of the process is not a monotone function of participants' expertise levels: (i) a less accurate AI may lead to improved outcomes by reducing the DM's reliance on it, and (ii) a less accurate DM can enhance information aggregation leading to a superior result.

决策者（DM）使用人工智能代理来估计未知状态，两者都具有信息私有信号。在国家和DM最终评估的条件下，他宁愿人工智能的建议是不正确的，从而肯定自己的优势或分担责任。我们的分析表明，该过程的正确性不是参与者专业水平的单调函数：(i)不太准确的人工智能可能通过减少决策制定者对它的依赖而改善结果，（ii）不太准确的决策制定者可以增强信息聚合，从而获得更好的结果。

引用次数: 0

Contract breach with overconfident expectations: Experimental evidence on reference-dependent preferences 过度自信预期下的契约违约：参考依赖偏好的实验证据

IF 1 3区经济学 Q3 ECONOMICS

Games and Economic Behavior

Pub Date : 2025-10-01 Epub Date: 2025-06-11 DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2025.05.012

Sabine Fischer , Kerstin Grosch

This study examines the effect of agents' overconfident expectations in their production on their contract breach. Drawing on a reference-dependent framework, we theoretically deduce propositions for compliance to agreements where an agent exhibits overconfidence and loss aversion. We further conduct a lab experiment with a multiple-stage design and find that overconfident agents are more likely to breach the contract than non-overconfident agents. Moreover, overconfident agents breach more often and to a greater extent with increasing loss aversion. We also test the impact of a non-deterministic environment (“shock condition”) where payoff misestimation can be masked compared to a deterministic environment (“no-shock condition”). Agents breach more often in the shock condition, but breach extent remains unaffected. Results are mostly in line with the theoretical framework. In a treatment, we manipulate agents' overconfidence exogenously and use it as an instrument to establish causality.

本研究考察了代理人对其生产的过度自信预期对其违约行为的影响。利用参考依赖框架，我们从理论上推导出代理表现出过度自信和损失厌恶的协议遵守命题。我们进一步进行了多阶段设计的实验室实验，发现过度自信的代理人比非过度自信的代理人更容易违约。此外，过度自信的代理人违约的频率更高，违约程度也更大，损失厌恶情绪也在增加。我们还测试了非确定性环境（“冲击条件”）的影响，其中与确定性环境（“无冲击条件”）相比，收益错误估计可以被掩盖。在冲击条件下，特工更容易破坏，但破坏程度不受影响。结果基本符合理论框架。在治疗中，我们外源性地操纵主体的过度自信，并将其作为建立因果关系的工具。

引用次数: 0

From monopoly to competition: When do optimal contests prevail? 从垄断到竞争：最优竞争何时盛行？

IF 1 3区经济学 Q3 ECONOMICS

Games and Economic Behavior

Pub Date : 2025-10-01 Epub Date: 2025-07-11 DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2025.07.001

Xiaotie Deng , Yotam Gafni , Ron Lavi , Tao Lin , Hongyi Ling

We study competition among multiple contest designers in a general model. The goal of each contest designer is to maximize the sum of efforts of the contestants participating in their contest. Assuming symmetric contestants, our main result shows that the optimal contests in the monopolistic setting (i.e., those that maximize the sum of efforts in a model with a single contest designer) form an equilibrium in the model with competition. Under a very natural assumption, these contests are dominant, and the equilibrium that they form is unique. Moreover, the equilibria with the optimal contests are Pareto-optimal even when other equilibria emerge. In many natural cases, they also maximize the social welfare. Additional examples show that, with further generalizations of our model, optimal contests no longer prevail. Our results therefore highlight and clarify the borderline between settings in which optimal contests prevail and do not prevail.

我们在一个一般模型中研究多个竞赛设计者之间的竞争。每个比赛设计者的目标都是最大化参赛者在比赛中的努力总和。假设竞争对手是对称的，我们的主要结果表明，在垄断环境下的最优竞争（即那些在具有单个竞赛设计者的模型中最大限度地提高努力总和的竞争）在具有竞争的模型中形成均衡。在一个非常自然的假设下，这些竞争占主导地位，它们形成的平衡是独一无二的。此外，即使存在其他均衡，具有最优竞争的均衡也是帕累托最优的。在许多自然情况下，它们也最大化了社会福利。其他的例子表明，随着我们模型的进一步推广，最优竞争不再盛行。因此，我们的结果强调并澄清了最优竞争盛行和不盛行的设置之间的界限。

引用次数: 0

Self-serving biases in beliefs about collective outcomes 对集体结果的自我服务偏见

IF 1 3区经济学 Q3 ECONOMICS

Games and Economic Behavior

Pub Date : 2025-10-01 Epub Date: 2025-07-06 DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2025.06.008

Shimon Kogan , Florian H. Schneider , Roberto A. Weber

Beliefs about collective outcomes play an important role in many contexts. We study biases in the formation of such beliefs. Specifically, we investigate whether self-serving biases in information processing—documented for beliefs about individual outcomes—affect beliefs about collective outcomes. In a first study, we find that people indeed exhibit self-serving biases for collective outcomes, and that such biases are similar to biases for individual outcomes. We also observe that the presence of a market institution for aggregating private information produces, if anything, slightly greater collective self-delusion. In a second study, we investigate the mechanisms driving collective self-delusion and find that anticipatory utility plays a large role, rather than ego-utility considerations.

关于集体结果的信念在许多情况下发挥着重要作用。我们研究这种信念形成过程中的偏见。具体地说，我们调查了信息处理中的自我服务偏见——对个人结果的信念——是否会影响对集体结果的信念。在第一项研究中，我们发现人们确实对集体结果表现出自私的偏见，这种偏见与对个人结果的偏见相似。我们还观察到，汇集私人信息的市场机构的存在，如果说有什么区别的话，那就是更大程度的集体自欺欺人。在第二项研究中，我们调查了驱动集体自我欺骗的机制，发现预期效用比自我效用考虑起着更大的作用。

引用次数: 0

Incentivizing variety in innovation contests with specialized suppliers 在与专业供应商的创新竞赛中鼓励多样化

IF 1 3区经济学 Q3 ECONOMICS

Games and Economic Behavior

Pub Date : 2025-10-01 Epub Date: 2025-08-19 DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2025.08.003

Konstantinos Protopappas , David Rietzke

We study the optimal design of an innovation contest where a buyer seeks product variety and faces a moral hazard problem. The suppliers are specialized and may differ in their flexibility to adopt approaches outside their areas of expertise. If the specializations are sufficiently different and suppliers are otherwise symmetric, the buyer attains the first-best with a fixed-prize contest (FPC). If one supplier is inherently advantaged or the specializations are sufficiently close, the first-best is unattainable with an FPC. In all cases, an auction is an optimal contest and implements the first-best, provided the buyer can discriminate within the contest; if not, the buyer may prefer an FPC.

我们研究了一个创新竞赛的最优设计问题，其中购买者寻求产品的多样性并面临道德风险问题。供应商是专业化的，在采用其专业领域以外的方法的灵活性方面可能有所不同。如果专业化足够不同，供应商在其他方面是对称的，则买方通过固定奖金竞赛（FPC）获得第一名。如果一个供应商具有固有的优势，或者专业化程度足够接近，那么通过FPC是无法达到最佳的。在所有情况下，拍卖都是一种最优竞争，只要买家能够在竞争中有所区别；如果没有，买方可能更喜欢FPC。

引用次数: 0

Gradual matching with affirmative action 逐步与平权行动相匹配

IF 1 3区经济学 Q3 ECONOMICS

Games and Economic Behavior

Pub Date : 2025-10-01 Epub Date: 2025-06-18 DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2025.06.004

Kriti Manocha , Bertan Turhan

This paper studies a multi-period college admissions problem where schools' choice rules incorporate affirmative action constraints. Students have the option to either finalize their assignments at the end of each period or participate in subsequent periods with the possibility of updating their rank-ordered lists (ROLs). We show that a gradual matching mechanism makes active students weakly better off (i.e. satisfies monotonicity) if and only if their ROL update rule meets a mild regularity condition. We introduce the notion of gradual stability adapted for multi-period matching mechanisms that account for affirmative action constraints. Furthermore, we show that the gradual stability of a gradual matching mechanism is equivalent to monotonicity in conjunction with the stability of the stage mechanism. Finally, we use our results to analyze the multi-stage mechanism currently used for engineering college admissions in India.

本文研究了一个包含平权法案约束的多时期大学录取问题。学生可以选择在每个学期结束时完成他们的作业，或者参加后续的学期，并有可能更新他们的顺序列表（ROLs）。我们证明了渐进式匹配机制当且仅当他们的ROL更新规则满足温和的正则性条件时，会使主动学生弱更好（即满足单调性）。我们引入了渐进稳定性的概念，适用于考虑平权行动约束的多时期匹配机制。进一步，结合阶段机构的稳定性，证明了逐步匹配机构的逐步稳定性等价于单调性。最后，我们用我们的结果来分析目前印度工程学院录取采用的多阶段机制。

引用次数: 0

Strategy-proofness, efficiency, and the core in matching problems with transfers 无策略性、效率和转移匹配问题的核心

IF 1 3区经济学 Q3 ECONOMICS

Games and Economic Behavior

Pub Date : 2025-10-01 Epub Date: 2025-06-06 DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2025.06.001

Shuhei Morimoto

We study a class of matching problems in which monetary transfers are possible. In this paper, we establish a close connection between the core and the existence of desirable rules that satisfy strategy-proofness or one-sided strategy-proofness. In our main result, we show that the optimal core is a unified lower bound of welfare for the existence of rules that satisfy strategy-proofness (or one-sided strategy-proofness), efficiency, individual rationality, and no subsidy. Applying this result, we also obtain impossibility and characterization results in our environment.

我们研究了一类可能存在货币转移的匹配问题。在本文中，我们建立了核心与满足策略证明或片面策略证明的理想规则的存在之间的紧密联系。在我们的主要结果中，我们证明了最优核心是一个统一的福利下界，因为存在满足策略抗性（或单边策略抗性）、效率、个体理性和无补贴的规则。应用这一结果，我们也得到了我们环境中的不可能性和表征结果。

引用次数: 0

Maxmin, coalitions and evolution Maxmin，联盟和进化

IF 1 3区经济学 Q3 ECONOMICS

Games and Economic Behavior

Pub Date : 2025-10-01 Epub Date: 2025-08-12 DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2025.08.002

Jonathan Newton, Miharu Naono

Maxmin decision making can take place at an individual or a coalitional level. We allow evolution to choose between the two, determining the relative shares of individual and coalitional decision making. We consider factors that favor or disfavor the evolution of coalitionality and apply our framework to social dilemmas, oligopolistic price competition and voting on committees.

最大限度的决策可以在个人或联盟层面进行。我们允许进化在两者之间做出选择，决定个人和联盟决策的相对份额。我们考虑了有利于或不利于联盟性演变的因素，并将我们的框架应用于社会困境、寡头垄断价格竞争和委员会投票。

引用次数: 0

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