PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES最新文献

This paper proposes a new account of gender identity on which for A to have gender G as part of their gender identity is for A to not take G not to fit them (or to positively take G to fit them). It argues that this subjective fit account of gender identity fits well with trans people’s testimony and both trans and cis people’s experiences of their genders. The subjective fit account also avoids the problems that existing accounts of gender identity face. Existing accounts face broadly two types of problems. First, they seem to imply that trans people have gender identities different from those that they in fact have. For instance, they seem to imply that some trans women do not have a female gender identity or have not always had that gender identity, contrary to their testimony and experiences. I argue that the subjective fit account avoids this problem. Second, many existing accounts of gender identity seem to conflict with the idea that our gender identities merit respect. I argue that the subjective fit account avoids this problem because it understands gender identities to consist in normative experiences and judgments and normative experiences and judgments merit respect.

Most people don’t want their teachers, scientists, or journalists to be too ideological. Calling someone an “ideologue” isn’t a compliment. But what is ideology and why exactly is it a threat? I propose that ideology is fruitfully understood in terms of three ingredients: a basic moral claim, a worldview built on top of that claim, and the attempt to politicize this worldview by injecting it into social institutions. I further argue that the central danger of ideology is that activating these three ingredients tends to undermine liberal social institutions. And yet a certain amount of ideology is both unavoidable and desirable, as I show, since it supplies us with important goods like social cohesion and mobilization. This means the best we can do is to try and set boundaries on ideology.

Building off the recent work on the semantics of problem, we suggest a more general account that encompasses problems of all agents, human or nonhuman, individual or communal. Situation X is a problem for agent A, iff situation X is at odds with the agent’s goal G and removing the discrepancy between X and G presents some difficulty for agent A. In addition, for agent A to actually have a problem, they must also be in such situation X. In contrast, agent A recognizes that situation X is a problem for them iff agent A represents, correctly or incorrectly, that situation X is at odds with their goal G, agent A represents, correctly or incorrectly, that removing the discrepancy between X and G presents some difficulty, and agent A represents, correctly or incorrectly, that they are in situation X. Several conclusions follow from these definitions. (1) Not every problem involves questions. (2) Not all problems involve undesirable states. (3) For an agent to consider a situation problematic, they should be aware of the situation; yet awareness of the situation is not necessary for an agent to have a problem or for a situation to be a problem for an agent. (4) Contexts need not be part of the problem: the context of a specific problem need not also be part of a more general problem. (5) The complete elimination of the discrepancy between a situation and a goal eliminates the problem, while the problem continues to exist when it receives a partial solution. (6) For something to be a problem, it does not have to be solvable, and the agent does not have to accept that something needs to be done about it, nor should they use the language of ameliorable/solvable.

According to Act Consequentialism, an act is right if and only if its outcome is not worse than the outcome of any alternative to that act. This view, however, leads to deontic paradoxes if the alternatives to an act are all other acts that can be done in the situation. A typical response is to only apply this rightness criterion to maximally specific acts and to take the alternatives to a maximally specific act to be the other maximally specific acts that can be done in the situation. (This view can then be supplanted by a separate account for the rightness of acts that are not maximally specific.) This paper defends a rival view, Binary Act Consequentialism, where, for any voluntary act, that act is right if and only if its outcome is not worse than the outcome of not doing that act. Binary Act Consequentialism, which dates back to Jeremy Bentham, has few supporters. A number of seemingly powerful objections have been considered fatal. In this paper, I rebut these objections and put forward a positive argument for the view.

King’s Felicitous Underspecification (FU) is a rich, thought-provoking book, which draws on a wide range of novel and largely unappreciated linguistic examples to argue that we should take the idea of a felicitously underspecified use of context-sensitive language very seriously. If felicitous underspecification is as prevalent as King argues, understanding the mechanisms involved in its interpretation is crucial for our overall understanding of linguistic communication. FU further offers a sophisticated account of these mechanisms. In this piece, I critically examine some of the main themes in FU. In doing so, I raise some worries for the interpretive mechanisms King posits. Specifically, I pose some challenges for his intentionalist GCA meta-semantics, and raise worries about the central interpretive role he assigns to his proposed contextual update rule, FUU.

According to the mainstream view in the philosophy of music, the only way to authentically perform works of past centuries is according to the ideal of Historically Authentic Performance (HAP). This paper aims to show that, despite recent defences of the mainstream view, it lacks motivation, and hence should be abandoned or revised. As we shall see, first, there is no plausible account of HAP as a final and intrinsic value consistent with the work-focused teleology of work-performance. Second, a plausible account of the value of HAP in work-performance regards HAP as a way of performing works of past centuries convincingly. However, this approach does not support the mainstream view because this only leaves HAP as an interpretive option. Finally, an alternative defence of the value of HAP in the form of an indispensability argument is considered: HAP is indispensable to accurately comply with a work’s score, and thus to perform it faithfully. This strategy supports the demands of the mainstream view, but we will see that, if we take this option seriously, HAP must be understood in a substantively different manner than the mainstream view does, such that it ultimately amounts to the second option analysed above.

The debate on final value has been so far understood as a debate over what sort of properties final value depends on. The debate’s reliance on mere dependence has, I argue, made it very difficult for conditionalists to put forward a coherent positive alternative to intrinsicalism. Talk of dependence is too coarse-grained and fails to distinguish between different ways in which value can metaphysically depend on other properties of the value bearer. To remedy this, I propose that we bring back a ‘forgotten’ distinction between two ways in which value can depend on other properties. We should distinguish those properties in virtue of which a value is had—the grounds of the value—from those on condition of which it is had—which following Dancy I call the enablers of the value. With this distinction in hand, I offer a clear re-statement of the two main conditionalist accounts of final value: non-instrumentalism and non-derivatism. When understood not as making claims about the properties on which final value depends but rather as making more specific ones about the properties that ground final value, these accounts are perfectly coherent.

We introduce the overall topic of the S.I. Difference-Making and Explanatory Relevance and provide brief summaries of the twelve contributed articles.

Many philosophers have thought that our folk, or pre-reflective, view of persistence is one on which objects endure. This assumption not only plays a role in disputes about the nature of persistence itself, but is also put to use in several other areas of metaphysics, including debates about the nature of change and temporal passage. In this paper, we empirically test three broad claims. First, that most people (i.e. most non-philosophers) believe that, and it seems to them as though, objects persist by enduring rather than perduring. Second, that most people have a view of change on which enduring but not perduring objects count as changing. Third, that one reason why the folk represent time as dynamical is because it seems to them, and they believe that, they endure through time. We found no evidence to support these claims. While there are certainly plenty of ‘folk’ endurantists in the population we tested, there are also plenty of ‘folk’ perdurantists. We did not find robust evidence that a majority of people believed that, or it seemed to them as though, objects endure rather than perdure. We conclude that many arguments in favour of endurantism that appeal to folk beliefs about, or experiences of, persisting objects and change rest on views about those beliefs and experiences that are empirically unsupported. There is no evidence to suggest that endurantism is the folk friendly view of persistence, and so we should stop treating it as such without argument.

Moore and Russell thought that perceptual knowledge of the external world is based on abductive inference from information about our experience. Sosa maintains that this ‘indirect realist’ strategy has no prospects of working. Vogel disagrees and thinks it can and does work perfectly well, and his reasoning (and variations on that reasoning) seem initially promising, moreso than other approaches. My aim, however, will be to adjudicate this dispute in favor of Sosa’s pessimistic answer, and in doing so, to better uncover the important role abductive inference does have in a wider theory of perceptual knowledge, even if it doesn’t feature in any promising vindication of (anti-skeptical) indirect realism.