European Journal of Social Psychology最新文献

Political leaders often justify war with conspiracy theories. How effective are such conspiracy theories in gathering public support for war? The present research has investigated the effects of conspiracy theories on people's war-related attitudes. Studies 1 and 2 were two-wave panel studies showing that conspiracy theories about Ukraine and its allies (e.g., the United States) predicted increased support for the Russian invasion over time, as well as a range of other war-related attitudes (e.g., increased identification with Russia; less favourable attitudes towards Ukraine; decreased military and humanitarian support for Ukraine; decreased support for sanctions). Study 3 replicated these findings among citizens of four different nations in the context of the war in Gaza (e.g., conspiracy beliefs about the Israeli government predicted increased support for the 7 October Hamas attacks over time). Study 4, then, showed that experimentally exposing participants to a conspiracy theory about Ukraine increased their support for the Russian invasion. Study 5 replicated these experimental findings in a fictitious setting uncontaminated by participants’ prior beliefs. Study 5 also provided evidence for a mediating role of perceived outgroup threat. We conclude that conspiracy theories can shape people's attitudes to war.

Although separate research programs examine how emotional reactions to the past, present and future predict collective action, research has yet to compare them simultaneously. Across three studies (N = 2764) and two social issues (plastic pollution and abortion), we examined whether reflecting on a positive or negative past, present or future elicits distinct emotions which indirectly predict collective action. Results revealed multiple countervailing indirect effects. For supporters of progressive causes, positive futures indirectly predicted higher action via increased hope, whereas negative futures indirectly predicted lower action via decreased hope. Positively valenced events also indirectly predicted lower action by decreasing anger and fear, regardless of time-referent. Conversely, negatively valenced events were more influential for proponents of conservative causes and indirectly predicted action via diverse emotions. We discuss the potential for, and limitations of, temporal comparisons to influence emotions implicated in collective action, and how the salience of these frames varies by context.

This research replicated, refined and extended the Reconciliation Orientation Model (ROM). While the original ROM treated ingroup identity as unidimensional, we adopted a multidimensional model, distinguishing self-investment and self-definition, and examined their links to intergroup forgiveness. Data from four real-life conflict settings – Israeli–Palestinian, Kosovar–Serbian, US racial and UK gender conflict (N = 860) – showed good fit for the refined ROM. Competitive victimhood predicted lower outgroup forgiveness, mediated by both identity dimensions. Specifically, while competitive victimhood positively predicted both self-investment and self-definition, only self-definition positively predicted forgiveness; self-investment predicted it negatively. Importantly, self-investment suppressed the positive association between self-definition and forgiveness, highlighting the value of distinguishing these dimensions. Conflict type moderated these effects, with stronger associations in direct than in structural conflicts. Overall, the findings underscore the importance of a multidimensional identity framework and differentiating conflict types to advance understanding of intergroup reconciliation.

In two studies conducted in Spain, we identified asymmetries in moral judgements, showing that leftist political topics and individuals were perceived as more moral than their rightist counterparts. Study 1 assessed the participants’ perceived moral obligation to defend topics traditionally associated with leftist or rightist ideologies. Both leftist and rightist participants reported stronger moral obligations towards leftist than rightist topics. Study 2 investigated moral, meta- and self-stereotypes within leftist and rightist political topics. Rightists viewed leftists more positively in moral terms than leftists viewed rightists, particularly in the context of leftist topics. Rightists also anticipated harsher moral judgements from leftists (meta-stereotypes), whereas leftists did not reciprocate. Moral self-stereotypes were similar across groups. These findings reveal moral asymmetry favouring leftist topics and individuals. We discuss the implications for political polarization, intergroup relations and contextual factors that shape these perceptions.

Evidence shows that meaningful social connections and social identities following trauma can support positive post-trauma appraisals because they provide psychosocial resources needed for recovery. However, access to these resources is influenced by a process of social identity revitalisation—a change in the value and meaningfulness of these relationships and social identities. This study used a qualitative methodology to explore these social processes, particularly social identity revitalisation, in shaping survivors’ responses to trauma. We examined 33 lived experience accounts of Australian and New Zealand disaster survivors. Reflexive thematic analysis identified four themes, showing how social connections and revitalised social relationships helped survivors (re-)construct post-trauma identities in meaningful ways that supported recovery. These findings contribute knowledge that may help with interventions developed to harness social identity revitalisation, drawing resources from within their communities to help with recovery.

Prosocial risky behaviour (PRB) combines risk and prosociality, defined as risk-taking for the benefit of others or society. Its differences across subjective social classes and underlying mechanisms are unclear. Study 1 (n = 590) used a questionnaire to explore the relationship between subjective social class and PRB. Study 2 (n = 120) manipulated subjective social class and set risk levels in prosocial risky dilemmas to examine causal relationships and boundary conditions. Study 3 (n = 120) used cognitive computational modelling to clarify effects and explore cognitive mechanisms. Results showed the following: (1) subjective social class negatively predicts PRB, especially in the 30%–50% risk range; (2) low social class individuals have lower loss aversion, higher guilt aversion and value PRB more; (3) two decision preferences parallel mediate the relationship between subjective social class and PRB. These findings offer insights for mitigating social class differences’ negative impacts and enhancing prosocial levels in risky situations.