European Journal of Social Psychology最新文献

Public sentiment on collateral civilian killings during wartime may crucially impact critical governmental decisions and the trajectory of the conflict itself. Across six studies in Israel and the United States, we examined (1) left-right ideological differences in acceptance of collateral civilian killings across diverse war scenarios and (2) the role of moral values and ideological ingroup norms in underlying them. Conservatives/rightists consistently showed higher acceptance of collateral civilian killings than liberals/leftists, regardless of whether the civilians killed are members of a current rival group or a strategic partner, whether the war involves real-life or fictitious groups, or whether participants are members of the group conducting the killings or mere observers. These ideological differences were mediated by conservatives'/rightists' lower endorsement of individualizing moral foundations but not by their higher endorsement of binding moral foundations. Finally, results suggest that ideological ingroup norms may play an indirect role in shaping these ideological differences.

Perceiving income disparities has a limited impact on attitudes towards reducing economic inequality. In this research, we proposed a novel and alternative strategy by focusing on other aspects intrinsically related to economic inequality, such as unequal access to health and education resources. We investigated whether recognizing inequality in health and education, beyond income disparities, could motivate people to reduce economic inequality. In four preregistered studies (N_Study1 = 513, N_Study2 = 1536, N_Study3 = 443, N_Study4 = 400), we showed that perceived economic inequality in health and education, over and above perceived income disparities, leads to greater intolerance towards inequality and increased support for redistributive policies and collective actions. Our findings suggest that heightened awareness of economic inequality in aspects meaningful for individuals’ lives, such as health or education, may foster support for redistributive policies and engagement in collective actions to mitigate such disparities.

Inequalities and discrimination against Indigenous minorities are pervasive in post-colonial societies. Collective action is critical for Indigenous minorities to redress these injustices. Integrating research on collective action, macro-level norms and multiculturalism, we argue that macro-level climates characterized by non-Indigenous endorsement of Indigenous multiculturalism policies are likely associated with Indigenous minorities’ collective action. Two multilevel studies in Chile (non-Indigenous majorities N = 1132; Indigenous minorities N = 1160; 26 communities) and New Zealand (NZ) (non-Indigenous majorities N = 12,136; Indigenous minorities N = 3484; 108 communities) reveal that non-Indigenous macro-level (i.e., aggregated) endorsement of resource-based policies was related to increased Indigenous minorities’ reaction to injustices and collective action. Non-Indigenous macro-level endorsement of symbolic policies showed similar (albeit weaker) results in NZ, but not in Chile. Thus, macro-level climates that endorse concrete measures to address power asymmetries are particularly effective at fostering Indigenous minorities’ collective action. Theoretical and practical implications are discussed.

The 17 October 2019 uprising in Lebanon marked a pivotal period of economic crisis and discontent with the ruling elite. We examined social cohesion post-uprising by exploring political polarization between “anti-ruling parties” citizens and “partisan/unaligned” citizens, in two surveys with a community sample (Study 1, N = 357) and a nationally representative sample (Study 2, N = 1200). Across both studies, “anti-ruling parties” respondents exhibited lower institutional trust, lower sectarianism, and greater support for a secular system compared to “partisan/unaligned” citizens. Conversely, no differences emerged surrounding economic discontent. Importantly, disenchantment with the status quo emerged across political lines. (De)mobilization tendencies varied. In Study 1 (2020), with lingering revolutionary hope, “anti-ruling parties” respondents showed stronger system-challenging collective action orientations. In Study 2 (2022), amid counter-revolutionary gains, disenchantment with October 17 groups emerged, with “anti-ruling parties” respondents showing lower voting intention, greater migration tendencies, and less readiness to use arms.

Corruption often involves collective actions rather than clandestine individual efforts. It is also socially facilitated via tacit complicity influenced by norms and beliefs. Five studies examine the delegation of decisions about corrupt behaviour as a social form of corruption and the role of attributing outcomes of delegated corrupt decisions to fate. In three correlational studies, belief in fate (i.e., perceiving events as ‘meant to be’ and predetermined) were positively associated with the delegation of decisions between non-corrupt, ethical and corrupt, self-serving behaviours to equally interested others in workplace scenarios. This effect was distinct from religious belief. In two experimental studies, participants attributed others’ corrupt decisions to fate more strongly when they served (vs. harmed) their self-interest. Fate beliefs were positively associated with fate attributions. Collectively, these studies illuminate interindividual differences associated with delegating decisions and how beliefs may be strategically used to justify corrupt outcomes, emphasising the social aspects of corruption.

Reactionary movements—movements that effectively increase inequality by advancing the rights of structurally advantaged groups—are of increasing concern in contemporary politics. Yet few studies assess support for these movements over time. We address this oversight in two studies examining reactionary collective action intentions over 9 years in a nationwide sample of New Zealand Europeans (N_total = 54,561). Random intercept cross-lagged panel modelling (Study 1) and latent class growth analysis (Study 2) reveal that high ethnic identification, social dominance orientation and conservatism, but low system justification, predict both within-person increases in, and class trajectories of, reactionary collective action intentions over time. Although most Europeans (86.62%) reported low and declining reactionary collective action intentions, a subgroup of Reactionaries (13.38%) emerged whose intentions increased over time. Collectively, these results highlight how and when reactionary collective action intentions emerge over time and illustrate the need to monitor social movements seeking to promote inequality.

We would like to bring to your attention an error in Figure 1 of our published article titled “Victim Empowerment and Satisfaction: The Potential of Imagery Rescripting” in the European Journal of Social Psychology (https://doi.org/10.1002/ejsp.3073).

Importantly, this error solely pertains to the labelling of the horizontal axes in Figure 1 and does not affect the validity of the data, analyses, or interpretations presented in the article. The means and standard deviations for all dependent variables across experimental conditions are reported correctly in Table 2 of the published article.

To address this oversight, we conducted a thorough re-evaluation of our R code and analytical processes. We can confirm that the results as well as the interpretations discussed in the article remain consistent and unaffected by this labelling error.

The corrected figure below accurately represents the experimental conditions on the horizontal axes. We sincerely apologize for any confusion or inconvenience caused by this oversight.

This study investigates how people who believe in conspiracy theory (CT) hold those beliefs. It considers whether believing a conspiracist explanation of an issue or event permits or precludes also believing a non-conspiracist explanation—that is, the degree to which endorsing CTs can be dialogical. Dialogicality involves the coexistence of conspiracist and non-conspiracist beliefs in advancing claims and contrasts with the view that all conspiracist belief endorsement is monological or ‘closed’ from other explanations. Thematic analysis of 39 semi-structured interviews revealed five modalities of belief coexistence: cognitive dissonance between beliefs, analogical beliefs, target-dependent beliefs, synthetic beliefs, and integrative beliefs. This spanned beliefs about the self, ingroup, outgroup, reality, action and the future, on topics concerning science, religion, and politics and society. These findings challenge the view that all CTs are monological belief systems: CT believers recruit both conspiracist and non-conspiracist explanations in building their worldview. Several hypotheses for further research emerge from this challenge to the basic assumption of much research on CTs.