European Journal of Social Psychology最新文献

How do tensions between moral values predict how likely we are to receive Covid-19 vaccination? Previous work suggests that moral foundations, particularly purity and liberty, relate to decisions to vaccinate. In addition, research on the moral trade-off hypothesis suggests value in exploring trade-offs between foundations. We conducted three studies across the pandemic: at the start of the vaccine rollout (Study 1, N = 170); during delivery (Study 2, N = 328) and 2 years later (Study 3, N = 388). We find that trade-offs between purity and care and between liberty and care are predictive of higher levels of vaccine reluctance—individuals who endorse purity or liberty more, relative to care, were more reluctant towards Covid-19 vaccination, less likely to have received a vaccine and have lower intention to get future Covid-19 vaccines. This research highlights the relevance of moral values, and trade-offs between them, in vaccine attitudes and decisions.

The present research focuses on the secondary transfer effect of contact, a relatively less researched dimension of intergroup contact, on reconciliation in the context of one of the most intractable and longest surviving interethnic conflicts in Europe, the Cyprus conflict. Currently, Cyprus is home to three groups with differential social, economic and political statuses: (1) disadvantaged low-status Turkish immigrants, (2) simultaneously advantaged (relative to Turkish immigrants) and disadvantaged (relative to Greek Cypriots) Turkish Cypriots and (3) historically advantaged high-status Greek Cypriots. Across two studies (Study 1 N = 270 and Study 2 N = 501), we test whether and how Turkish immigrants’ contact with Turkish Cypriots shapes Turkish immigrants' support for reconciliation and willingness to live with Greek Cypriots via attitude generalisation. We also investigate whether Turkish immigrants’ perceived ingroup reputation qualifies this process. Controlling for the effects of direct contact with Greek Cypriots, our results show that both quantity and quality of contact with proximal Turkish Cypriots were indirectly associated with greater support for reconciliation with them and more willingness to live with Greek Cypriots via positive attitudes towards the primary (Turkish Cypriots) and positive attitudes towards the secondary (Greek Cypriots), sequentially. Moreover, we found that the perceived higher ingroup reputation across the island positively moderated the indirect effects of primary group contact on support for reconciliation and willingness to live with Greek Cypriots. That is, more contact with the primary outgroup was positively linked to greater support for reconciliation with the distal secondary outgroup Greek Cypriots when perceptions of ingroup reputation were higher.

Postulating a negative bias towards social ambiguity, we conducted cross-cultural online research to assess whether categorical discrepancies in the perception of androgynous faces were associated with the uncanny feeling and inferences of different morality. Across four studies, we found that androgynous faces were harder to classify into a binary sex category than sex-typical faces, but this difficulty did not influence social judgements of androgynous targets in a negative fashion. In Study 1 (Spanish-speaking sample, N = 76), we found that androgynous faces were rated as more trustworthy, less creepy, and less morally different than sex-typical faces. Study 2 replicated most of the findings from Study 1 in an Italian sample (N = 45). Positive bias towards androgyny was not replicated with a different set of stimuli featuring faces of diverse ethnic backgrounds (Study 3, Spanish-speaking sample, N = 140). However, results revealed a main effect of ethnicity in participants’ responses. When controlling for the effect of morphing procedures in stimuli selection, an overall positive bias towards androgynous targets arose, especially when compared to masculine targets (Study 4, Spanish-speaking sample, N = 85). These findings suggest that, at least in certain conditions, a positive social bias towards androgynous faces may emerge that does not depend on categorical uncertainty and facial attractiveness.

This research examines the endorsement of the nationality stereotype Dutch = White among children and associations with citizenship representations of their mothers (Study 1). Additionally, Study 2 explores how mothers include the concept of Dutch citizenship in the upbringing of their children. Study 1 shows that children (n = 197, 57% girls, 7–13 years old) from different ethnic-racial backgrounds (White Dutch, Turkish-Dutch, Black Dutch, Chinese-Dutch) all endorsed the nationality stereotype and did so to a similar extent. Most mothers rated civic citizenship as more important than ethnic citizenship, but maternal citizenship representations were unrelated to child nationality stereotype. Study 2 shows that mothers often do not actively and consciously include the topic of Dutch citizenship in their upbringing, but might confirm the nationality stereotype in more implicit ways. Future studies are needed to examine how to work towards a more inclusive view of nationality among children in the Dutch context.

In spite of the safety and efficiency of the COVID-19 vaccines and the many promotion efforts of political and expert authorities, a fair portion of the population remained hesitant if not opposed to vaccination. Public debate and the available literature point to the possible role of people's attitudes towards medical institutions as well as their preference for complementary and alternative medicine (CAM) on their motivations and intentions to be vaccinated. Other potential ideological factors are beliefs about environmental laissez-faire and divine providence insofar as they encourage people to let the pandemic unfold without human interference. In three cross-sectional samples (total N = 8214), collected at successive moments during the Belgian vaccination campaign, the present research examines the distal role of these psychological and ideological factors on vaccination intentions via motivational processes. Study 1 gauges the relation between trust in medical institutions and preference for CAM on intentions to get vaccinated via motivations. Study 2 examined the role of beliefs in the desirability of letting nature take its course (‘environmental laissez-faire beliefs’) on vaccination intention via motivations. Study 3 tests whether people's adherence to environmental laissez-faire and beliefs about divine providence are linked to their motivations for vaccination via trust in the medical institutions and CAM. Results show that adherence to CAM has a deleterious effect on vaccination intentions, whereas trust in medical institutions has a positive effect. Both ideological factors pertaining to external control are only moderately related, with environmental laissez-faire beliefs having stronger effects on CAM, medical trust and vaccination motivations. We discuss the importance of this set of results in light of the growing interest in CAM and the increasing presence of messages appealing to the environment.

Stanley et al. (2018) found that the consideration of reasons rarely induced people to change their moral decisions. We challenged this article by assuming what caused such a null or weak effect was that the persuasiveness of reasons provided to oppose the initial decisions was not strong enough. To verify our assumption, this study used Stanley et al.’s (2018) experimental paradigm and manipulated the levels of persuasiveness of reasons. The results revealed (1) that not only strong opposing reasons but also weak affirming reasons could induce changes in moral decision-making and increase decision confidence after altering the decisions; (2) that people with a weak decision confidence tended to change their initial decisions after evaluation of reasons; and (3) that people who maintained their decisions after considering weak opposing reasons enhanced rather than reduced their decision confidence. Overall, these findings demonstrated that moral decision change was a composite outcome of the interaction among reason type, reason persuasiveness and initial decision confidence and that low-quality argumentation had a boomerang effect on moral persuasion. This study re-lifted the role of rational reasoning in moral decision-making and revising, thus posing important amendments to Stanley et al.’s (2018) findings.

Anecdotally, people often report feeling despair about the political status quo. We conceptualise these feelings as political despair. But what is political despair, and what are its effects? We adapt intergroup emotion theory to analyse political despair in the context of racial inequality (Studies 1 and 2) and climate change (Study 3). Three cross-sectional studies (total N = 866) tested the measurement of political despair (relative to anger and hope), its pattern of appraisals and outcomes for conventional and radical actions along with well-being (stress, burnout and optimism). Structural equation modelling differentiated political despair from anger and hope and found that despair is associated with evaluations that the situation is both illegitimate and intractable (unchangeable). Moreover, political despair consistently had a negative relationship with well-being and positive relationships with conventional and radical collective action. The results suggest political despair is negatively associated with well-being and impact people's engagement in action for social change.

In 2016, the Colombian government signed a historic peace accord with the FARC-EP after 50 years of armed conflict. Still, widespread obstacles to forgiveness and reconciliation remained. The current study explores the potential of reconciliation centres (RC) in Medellin to help counteract a return to violence. These seven RCs included three branches of programming about forgiveness and reconciliation to support community well-being and social capital. A between-group analysis, as part of a quasi-experimental design, demonstrated no significant growth in participants’ understanding that restoration is different from reparation or awareness that reconciliation involves approaching the other to rebuild. There was enhanced acceptance that forgiveness is not forgetting and is a personal decision. While social capital increased, the perception that the community likes to help others and that community work benefits others decreased. The findings demonstrate the complicated relationships between reconciliation, community well-being and social capital, especially for community-level interventions in violent contexts.

Collective punishment (CP) is deemed unfair because it sanctions group members who are not responsible for the wrongdoing. However, CP may be driven by utilitarian motives, aiming to deter other group members from committing offenses. This research investigated whether individuals’ inclination to support CP for utilitarian reasons is influenced by their belief in the malleability of groups (their belief that groups can change; a growth mindset). In Studies 1 and 2, we assessed utilitarian motives and manipulated participants’ perception of group malleability. In Study 3, we assessed perceived group malleability and manipulated motives for justice (utilitarianism vs. retribution). Across these studies, the dependent variable was participants’ support for CP. Results consistently showed that utilitarian (more than retributive) motives increased support for CP, specifically among participants who believed in the growth mindset of groups. We discuss the relevance of these findings for social justice and growth mindset literature.

The blurred distinction between freedom of expression and hate speech in ever more polarised public debates across Europe and beyond has prompted research on hate speech, particularly focusing on right-wing populist politicians. Little is known, however, about how this distinction is construed by ordinary citizens. Deploying the concept of retrogressive mobilisation, this study examines how cases of (potential) political hate speech – one targeting racialised minorities, the other the LGBTQ+ community – are interpreted and negotiated by ordinary citizens through their comments on online news in Finland. Deploying a critical discursive psychological approach, we analyse the vernacular meanings that ordinary citizens attach to the notions of political hate speech, thereby highlighting the dynamic relationship between political and everyday discourse. We evidence three discursive constructions of the relationship between freedom of expression and (potential) hate speech. In these constructions, the same rhetorical resources, especially the liberal arguments of equality and freedom of expression, were deployed to service the opposite discursive functions – that is, for both ‘liberal’ and ‘illiberal’ ends – to condemn and justify discrimination against minoritised groups. Our study contributes to the social psychological understanding of contemporary hate speech and builds a bridge between social psychology and the more recent field of anti-gender research.