European Journal of Social Psychology最新文献

This work focuses on migrants’ ‘other-cultures’ intergroup contact – contact with individuals belonging to neither their heritage ingroup nor the mainstream outgroup. We test the overarching hypothesis that other-cultures contact is positively associated with mainstream acculturation, especially when contact in the mainstream group is scarce. Study 1 results show that frequent other-cultures contact is positively associated with mainstream identification among Maghrebi migrants to Quebec. This effect is stronger for participants with infrequent, versus frequent, mainstream contact. In Study 2, conducted among Russian migrants to Canada, having more other-cultures friends is positively related to mainstream acculturation only for participants with few mainstream friends. Further, the entry of other-cultures friends into migrants’ network takes place later than heritage friends but earlier than mainstream friends. The current work expands the traditional mainstream–heritage acculturation framework by moving away from binary conceptualizations of intergroup relations and considering other-cultures contact in superdiverse contexts.

Given the exponential increase in the number of refugees and displaced people worldwide, it has become critical to examine the experiences of refugees; particularly their identity, since it is an important marker of their adjustment to the new context. Besides other factors impacting their identity and adjustment, the role of the leader is important as it can impact the construction of refugee identities. This paper explores the construction and negotiation of Tibetan refugee identities through the identity entrepreneurship of the Dalai Lama, the spiritual and erstwhile political leader of the Tibetans. It is postulated that leaders are entrepreneurs of identity who shape identity construction and negotiation. With an emphasis on the social, political, and historical context, three kinds of sources are analysed using a discourse-historical approach to understand how leaders function as entrepreneurs of identity across the various contexts and negotiate identity construction across the shifting contexts. First, 12 speeches by the Dalai Lama on 10 critical events in Tibetan history since 1959; second, six speeches by the Dalai Lama for Tibetan Uprising Day (1961–2009); and third, two international interviews (CNN, 2009; BBC, 2012). The analysis demonstrates that the identity entrepreneurship of the Dalai Lama has strong elements of protection towards the ingroup, that is, the Tibetan refugees, through the crafting of a collective sense of identity for Tibetans. The study sheds new light on the nature of refugee leadership, acknowledging the impact of the shifting nature of identity, from a native citizen to refugee; and the leader's identity entrepreneurship in these evolving and often malleable contexts.

The effects of political violence are felt across generations; for example, extent of parental competitive victimhood (feeling that one's ingroup was relatively more victimised during the conflict) predicts adolescent's intergroup discrimination. We extend that research to children, born a generation after the height of violence. Participants were 223 family dyads with children aged 7–11 (M = 9.05, SD = 1.30; 52.4% female): Croatia (n = 82) and Republic of North Macedonia (RNM: n = 141), equally split by group status (i.e., Croatia: Croats/Serbs; RNM: Macedonian/Albanian). Parents reported on competitive victimhood while children reported on intergroup contact intentions (e.g., shared education initiatives). Moderation analysis across sites found a significant status by competitive victimhood interaction; increased parental competitive victimhood was associated with decreased contact intentions among minority, but not majority, children. We review site-specific findings in relation to their historical context, concluding with the implications for shared education, reconciliation and peacebuilding.

In previous research on advice taking, researchers have mainly focused on certain types of advice. However, in practice, when people give advice to others, there is often a degree of uncertainty (e.g. I think that the distance between Beijing and Shanghai is between 800 and 1200 km). To date, only a few studies have examined the impact of uncertain advice on advice taking. Through two studies, the present research explores the influence of advice uncertainty and individuals’ regulatory mode predominance on advice taking and the mediating mechanism. In Study 1, the participants' chronic regulatory mode was measured by a questionnaire, and in Study 2, we induced the predominance of the participants’ situational regulatory mode using a recall task. We found that people are more likely to adopt advice with low uncertainty. The moderating effect of participants' regulatory mode on the impact of advice uncertainty on advice taking occurs only when the regulatory mode is induced by the situation. For the assessment-predominant group, there was a significant difference between the no-uncertainty group and the high-uncertainty group, while for the locomotion-predominant group, this difference was not significant. Additionally, our study revealed the mediating role of advice reliability, which existed only when the participants were able to compare low- and no-uncertainty advice in a within-participant design. That is, when decision makers adopt uncertainty advice within ranges, they not only consider reliability but also weigh multiple factors. Our findings contribute to understanding the mechanisms underlying individuals' preferences for uncertain advice and reasoning about individual differences.

Perceiving partner emotions accurately is relevant for relationship functioning and may relate to perceivers’ attachment orientations. Here we tested whether attachment anxiety and avoidance affect the perception of a hard and a flat partner emotion which can signal a relationship threat, that is, irritation and indifference towards the partner, and of general affective valence. We assessed whether individuals (1) over- or underestimate (directional bias) and (2) track changes (tracking accuracy) in their partner's emotions. Ninety-four couples reported on their own emotions and their perception of their partner's emotions multiple times per day during 1 week. Results revealed that more avoidantly attached men less accurately tracked changes in partner irritation and more anxiously attached men less accurately tracked changes in partner affective valence. No other significant associations of attachment with tracking accuracy nor with directional bias were found. Overall, the findings suggest no robust relation between attachment insecurity and perception of partner irritation, indifference and affective valence in everyday life.

We examined if being ostracized (excluded and ignored) changes working self-perception of personality ─ a core aspect of the self ─ which may contribute to understanding post-ostracism behaviour. Across three studies (N = 943), using a virtual ball-toss game (i.e., Cyberball), participants were either ostracized, included or mentally visualized playing the game. Subsequently, participants reported working self-perceptions of their personality (using two measures of Big Five personality), ostracism's immediate effects (e.g., basic needs) and post-ostracism behavioural intentions: aggressive temptations and solitude seeking. Across the studies, ostracism in Cyberball negatively impacted working self-perception of personality: ostracized participants were less conscientious, agreeable, open and extraverted, and more neurotic (negative emotionality), compared to controls. Illustrating that altered working self-perceptions are important to consider, ostracism's increase of aggressive temptations was mediated by agreeableness, even when accounting for ostracism's immediate (reflexive) effects. Additionally, ostracism's increase in solitude seeking was mediated by extraversion. Ultimately, these aversive self-perceptions may create difficulties in socially connecting with others.

Objectification theory predicts that women's self-objectification should lead to sexual dysfunction, yet previous studies failed to provide consistent support for this prediction. The present research—which used two sufficiently powered samples and a self-objectification measurement (SOBBS) with improved psychometric qualities and content validity than previous measurements—found support for the expected association between self-objectification and sexual dysfunction among heterosexual women in Israel and the United States (N = 404 and 366, M_age = 30.59 and 36.93, respectively). We also examined two novel potential mediators of this association, entitlement for pleasure and sexual agency (i.e., the capability to express sexual desires and boundaries), and found that the latter mediated the link between self-objectification and sexual dysfunction. The mediators originally proposed by objectification theory (i.e. appearance anxiety, body shame, awareness of internal body states and flow) failed to mediate this link. Theoretical and methodological implications are discussed.

In the present research, we propose that perceptions of social mobility (PSM) are beneficial for oneself but costly to others. Supporting this idea, people who were led to think that social mobility in society is probable (vs. improbable) (Study 1a/b, N = 754; Study 3a/b, N = 938) or held this belief at a dispositional level (Study 2a/b, N = 877) showed greater endorsement of system justifying beliefs, which was related to greater happiness and life satisfaction. However, the more people perceived social mobility and justified the system, the less willing they were to help others in need, and this was especially true for those who thought the current economic system was fair and legitimate. Thus, while greater perceived social mobility is related to increased personal well-being through justification of the sociopolitical system, it predicts less desire to help others due to increased support of the economic status quo.

In this research, we focused on women's perception of men as allies depending on the type of confrontation. We conducted four experimental scenario studies (Study 1 and 2 in a bar setting; Study 3 and 4 in a workplace setting) where a man confronted a sexist comment using either an egalitarian or paternalistic argument. Results showed that women are more likely to perceive egalitarian (vs. paternalistic) confronters as allies (Studies 1–4). This is explained by the fact that they contribute to reducing power asymmetries (decreasing perceived interpersonal power differences: Studies 2 and 4; or increasing women's empowerment: Studies 3 and 4). Furthermore, the egalitarian (vs. paternalistic) confrontation positively impacts interpersonal and intergroup relations, and this is explained by the perception of the confronter as an ally (Studies 1, 2 and 4). We discuss the role of disadvantaged group members’ perception of advantaged group members to disentangle the complexity of alliances.

Does political partisanship extend to childhood? To what degree are children, a largely non-political population, impacted by parents’ and communities’ political orientations? We examined children's behaviours and attitudes during a politically divisive event – the COVID-19 pandemic. Children (4- to 12-year-olds; N = 313) of liberal (vs. conservative) parents reported greater preventive COVID-19 behaviours, such as mask wearing and physical distancing, and responded more positively to these health behaviours. At the community level, children living in Democratic-voting (vs. Republican-voting) U.S. counties more strongly endorsed preventive COVID-19 behaviours. Political orientation was a better predictor than education, income, religiosity, population-density, and infection rates. Mediation and moderation analyses revealed that the parent–child political link was driven by children's perceptions of their parents' guidance, behaviours, and concern about COVID-19, and that this link was attenuated in Democratic- versus Republican-voting counties. Political orientation appears to play an unexpectedly prominent role, both at the intimate family and broader community level, in determining children's behaviours and attitudes.