Pub Date : 2025-10-17DOI: 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2025.105152
Matthias Kaldorf , Joost Röttger
How does convenience yield interact with sovereign risk and the supply of government bonds? We propose a model of sovereign debt and default in which convenience yield arises because investors are able to pledge government bonds as collateral on financial markets. Consistent with euro area data, convenience yield is large if government bonds are (i) scarce due to investors’ high collateral valuation or (ii) safe due to a small collateral haircut being applied to them. Calibrating the model to the data, we demonstrate that convenience yield improves the fit of sovereign default models to developed economy bond market data, contributes substantially to the public debt-to-GDP ratio, and rationalizes prolonged periods of negative bond spreads – even in the presence of default risk. A large debt elasticity of investors’ collateral valuation is key to these results. In this setting, highly debt-elastic collateral haircuts exacerbate collateral scarcity in crisis times, raising government bond prices and eroding fiscal discipline.
{"title":"Convenient but risky government bonds","authors":"Matthias Kaldorf , Joost Röttger","doi":"10.1016/j.euroecorev.2025.105152","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.euroecorev.2025.105152","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>How does convenience yield interact with sovereign risk and the supply of government bonds? We propose a model of sovereign debt and default in which convenience yield arises because investors are able to pledge government bonds as collateral on financial markets. Consistent with euro area data, convenience yield is large if government bonds are <em>(i)</em> scarce due to investors’ high <em>collateral valuation</em> or <em>(ii)</em> safe due to a small <em>collateral haircut</em> being applied to them. Calibrating the model to the data, we demonstrate that convenience yield improves the fit of sovereign default models to developed economy bond market data, contributes substantially to the public debt-to-GDP ratio, and rationalizes prolonged periods of negative bond spreads – even in the presence of default risk. A large debt elasticity of investors’ collateral valuation is key to these results. In this setting, highly debt-elastic collateral haircuts exacerbate collateral scarcity in crisis times, raising government bond prices and eroding fiscal discipline.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48389,"journal":{"name":"European Economic Review","volume":"180 ","pages":"Article 105152"},"PeriodicalIF":2.4,"publicationDate":"2025-10-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145364200","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-10-17DOI: 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2025.105183
Giovanni Andreottola , Barton E. Lee
Legislative hostage-taking — whereby the minority party refuses to pass a bipartisan policy unless another divisive or contentious policy also passes — has become a frequent occurrence, especially in American politics. We develop a dynamic model of legislative bargaining and electoral politics to provide insights into why hostage-taking occurs, which policies are held hostage, and which policies are demanded as ransom. Our key insight is that (credible) hostage-taking can only occur if the divisive policy benefits the voter. Furthermore, when hostage-taking occurs, it benefits the voter. However, these benefits are potentially tempered if parties can engage in policy design. In particular, hostage-taking can generate a perverse incentive for the majority party to engage in money burning to shield themself from the minority party’s hostage-taking.
{"title":"Legislative hostage-taking","authors":"Giovanni Andreottola , Barton E. Lee","doi":"10.1016/j.euroecorev.2025.105183","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.euroecorev.2025.105183","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Legislative hostage-taking — whereby the minority party refuses to pass a bipartisan policy unless another divisive or contentious policy also passes — has become a frequent occurrence, especially in American politics. We develop a dynamic model of legislative bargaining and electoral politics to provide insights into why hostage-taking occurs, which policies are held hostage, and which policies are demanded as ransom. Our key insight is that (credible) hostage-taking can only occur if the divisive policy benefits the voter. Furthermore, when hostage-taking occurs, it benefits the voter. However, these benefits are potentially tempered if parties can engage in policy design. In particular, hostage-taking can generate a perverse incentive for the majority party to engage in money burning to shield themself from the minority party’s hostage-taking.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48389,"journal":{"name":"European Economic Review","volume":"180 ","pages":"Article 105183"},"PeriodicalIF":2.4,"publicationDate":"2025-10-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145364198","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-10-17DOI: 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2025.105183
Giovanni Andreottola , Barton E. Lee
Legislative hostage-taking — whereby the minority party refuses to pass a bipartisan policy unless another divisive or contentious policy also passes — has become a frequent occurrence, especially in American politics. We develop a dynamic model of legislative bargaining and electoral politics to provide insights into why hostage-taking occurs, which policies are held hostage, and which policies are demanded as ransom. Our key insight is that (credible) hostage-taking can only occur if the divisive policy benefits the voter. Furthermore, when hostage-taking occurs, it benefits the voter. However, these benefits are potentially tempered if parties can engage in policy design. In particular, hostage-taking can generate a perverse incentive for the majority party to engage in money burning to shield themself from the minority party’s hostage-taking.
{"title":"Legislative hostage-taking","authors":"Giovanni Andreottola , Barton E. Lee","doi":"10.1016/j.euroecorev.2025.105183","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.euroecorev.2025.105183","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Legislative hostage-taking — whereby the minority party refuses to pass a bipartisan policy unless another divisive or contentious policy also passes — has become a frequent occurrence, especially in American politics. We develop a dynamic model of legislative bargaining and electoral politics to provide insights into why hostage-taking occurs, which policies are held hostage, and which policies are demanded as ransom. Our key insight is that (credible) hostage-taking can only occur if the divisive policy benefits the voter. Furthermore, when hostage-taking occurs, it benefits the voter. However, these benefits are potentially tempered if parties can engage in policy design. In particular, hostage-taking can generate a perverse incentive for the majority party to engage in money burning to shield themself from the minority party’s hostage-taking.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48389,"journal":{"name":"European Economic Review","volume":"180 ","pages":"Article 105183"},"PeriodicalIF":2.4,"publicationDate":"2025-10-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145364123","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-10-17DOI: 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2025.105152
Matthias Kaldorf , Joost Röttger
How does convenience yield interact with sovereign risk and the supply of government bonds? We propose a model of sovereign debt and default in which convenience yield arises because investors are able to pledge government bonds as collateral on financial markets. Consistent with euro area data, convenience yield is large if government bonds are (i) scarce due to investors’ high collateral valuation or (ii) safe due to a small collateral haircut being applied to them. Calibrating the model to the data, we demonstrate that convenience yield improves the fit of sovereign default models to developed economy bond market data, contributes substantially to the public debt-to-GDP ratio, and rationalizes prolonged periods of negative bond spreads – even in the presence of default risk. A large debt elasticity of investors’ collateral valuation is key to these results. In this setting, highly debt-elastic collateral haircuts exacerbate collateral scarcity in crisis times, raising government bond prices and eroding fiscal discipline.
{"title":"Convenient but risky government bonds","authors":"Matthias Kaldorf , Joost Röttger","doi":"10.1016/j.euroecorev.2025.105152","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.euroecorev.2025.105152","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>How does convenience yield interact with sovereign risk and the supply of government bonds? We propose a model of sovereign debt and default in which convenience yield arises because investors are able to pledge government bonds as collateral on financial markets. Consistent with euro area data, convenience yield is large if government bonds are <em>(i)</em> scarce due to investors’ high <em>collateral valuation</em> or <em>(ii)</em> safe due to a small <em>collateral haircut</em> being applied to them. Calibrating the model to the data, we demonstrate that convenience yield improves the fit of sovereign default models to developed economy bond market data, contributes substantially to the public debt-to-GDP ratio, and rationalizes prolonged periods of negative bond spreads – even in the presence of default risk. A large debt elasticity of investors’ collateral valuation is key to these results. In this setting, highly debt-elastic collateral haircuts exacerbate collateral scarcity in crisis times, raising government bond prices and eroding fiscal discipline.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48389,"journal":{"name":"European Economic Review","volume":"180 ","pages":"Article 105152"},"PeriodicalIF":2.4,"publicationDate":"2025-10-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145364194","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-10-17DOI: 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2025.105178
Jagjit S. Chadha , Germana Corrado , Luisa Corrado , Ivan De Lorenzo Buratta
We investigate whether macroprudential policies support broader economic stability, particularly the welfare of households. For this purpose, we develop a New Keynesian business cycle model with agents subject to credit constraints and asset price fluctuations. The model differentiates between savers, who own firms and banks, and borrowers. The commercial bank sets the loan rate as a function of risk, specifically the value of housing collateral. We use occasionally binding constraints to capture non-linearities arising from the zero lower bound (ZLB) on the policy interest rate and the borrowing constraint faced by borrower households. We examine two macroprudential tools: a countercyclical loan-to-value (LTV) ratio and a bank reserve requirement. We find that macroprudential tools significantly reduce the volatility of consumption and lending cycles, and decrease both the expected frequency and severity of ZLB episodes. More generally, by attenuating the variance of the business cycle, particularly for borrower households, macroprudential tools reduce the need for monetary policy interventions.
{"title":"The role of macroprudential policy in times of trouble","authors":"Jagjit S. Chadha , Germana Corrado , Luisa Corrado , Ivan De Lorenzo Buratta","doi":"10.1016/j.euroecorev.2025.105178","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.euroecorev.2025.105178","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We investigate whether macroprudential policies support broader economic stability, particularly the welfare of households. For this purpose, we develop a New Keynesian business cycle model with agents subject to credit constraints and asset price fluctuations. The model differentiates between savers, who own firms and banks, and borrowers. The commercial bank sets the loan rate as a function of risk, specifically the value of housing collateral. We use occasionally binding constraints to capture non-linearities arising from the zero lower bound (ZLB) on the policy interest rate and the borrowing constraint faced by borrower households. We examine two macroprudential tools: a countercyclical loan-to-value (LTV) ratio and a bank reserve requirement. We find that macroprudential tools significantly reduce the volatility of consumption and lending cycles, and decrease both the expected frequency and severity of ZLB episodes. More generally, by attenuating the variance of the business cycle, particularly for borrower households, macroprudential tools reduce the need for monetary policy interventions.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48389,"journal":{"name":"European Economic Review","volume":"181 ","pages":"Article 105178"},"PeriodicalIF":2.4,"publicationDate":"2025-10-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145475370","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-10-16DOI: 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2025.105154
Štěpán Mikula , Mariola Pytliková
This paper examines how improvements in air quality affect migration behavior. We exploit a natural experiment in the Czech Republic, where rapid desulfurization of coal-fired power plants in the 1990s led to a sharp reduction in SO2 pollution—from extremely high levels to below EU/WHO limits—without directly impacting economic activity. Using a difference-in-differences approach, we find that cleaner air reduced emigration from previously heavily polluted municipalities by 24% and increased net migration by 78%, with effects strongest in the most formerly polluted areas. The impact was particularly pronounced among highly educated individuals. Migration responses were strongest in municipalities with weaker social capital and fewer public amenities, suggesting that environmental improvements matter most where other local advantages are limited. In contrast, anti-emigration monetary subsidies—such as those offered during the socialist period in polluted areas—had no effect. Overall, our findings highlight the potential of environmental policies to support re-population and regional revitalization—especially when combined with investments in infrastructure and public services.
{"title":"Migratory responses to air pollution reduction: Evidence from large-scale desulfurization programme","authors":"Štěpán Mikula , Mariola Pytliková","doi":"10.1016/j.euroecorev.2025.105154","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.euroecorev.2025.105154","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>This paper examines how improvements in air quality affect migration behavior. We exploit a natural experiment in the Czech Republic, where rapid desulfurization of coal-fired power plants in the 1990s led to a sharp reduction in SO<sub>2</sub> pollution—from extremely high levels to below EU/WHO limits—without directly impacting economic activity. Using a difference-in-differences approach, we find that cleaner air reduced emigration from previously heavily polluted municipalities by 24% and increased net migration by 78%, with effects strongest in the most formerly polluted areas. The impact was particularly pronounced among highly educated individuals. Migration responses were strongest in municipalities with weaker social capital and fewer public amenities, suggesting that environmental improvements matter most where other local advantages are limited. In contrast, anti-emigration monetary subsidies—such as those offered during the socialist period in polluted areas—had no effect. Overall, our findings highlight the potential of environmental policies to support re-population and regional revitalization—especially when combined with investments in infrastructure and public services.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48389,"journal":{"name":"European Economic Review","volume":"181 ","pages":"Article 105154"},"PeriodicalIF":2.4,"publicationDate":"2025-10-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145340945","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-10-16DOI: 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2025.105180
Armando Holzknecht , Jürgen Huber , Michael Kirchler , Tibor Neugebauer
In a pre-registered laboratory asset market study, we investigate dynamics of asset markets with zero (or close to zero) fundamental values. We introduce the “greater fool asset market game” with a zero-value token, whose price doubles in each period. We design several treatments, which differ in terms of whether the fundamental value is zero for sure (Baseline), and whether the very low probability of non-zero fundamentals is known (Risk) or not (Ambiguity). We find that prices in markets with zero fundamental value are clearly above zero. Furthermore, we report that prices in treatment Ambiguity are substantially higher than those in treatments Baseline and Risk. Finally, we show that beliefs regarding the asset’s value and others’ participation explain individual market participation.
{"title":"Speculating in zero-value assets: The greater fool game experiment","authors":"Armando Holzknecht , Jürgen Huber , Michael Kirchler , Tibor Neugebauer","doi":"10.1016/j.euroecorev.2025.105180","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.euroecorev.2025.105180","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>In a pre-registered laboratory asset market study, we investigate dynamics of asset markets with zero (or close to zero) fundamental values. We introduce the “greater fool asset market game” with a zero-value token, whose price doubles in each period. We design several treatments, which differ in terms of whether the fundamental value is zero for sure (<span>Baseline</span>), and whether the very low probability of non-zero fundamentals is known (<span>Risk</span>) or not (<span>Ambiguity</span>). We find that prices in markets with zero fundamental value are clearly above zero. Furthermore, we report that prices in treatment <span>Ambiguity</span> are substantially higher than those in treatments <span>Baseline</span> and <span>Risk</span>. Finally, we show that beliefs regarding the asset’s value and others’ participation explain individual market participation.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48389,"journal":{"name":"European Economic Review","volume":"180 ","pages":"Article 105180"},"PeriodicalIF":2.4,"publicationDate":"2025-10-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145364100","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-10-16DOI: 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2025.105180
Armando Holzknecht , Jürgen Huber , Michael Kirchler , Tibor Neugebauer
In a pre-registered laboratory asset market study, we investigate dynamics of asset markets with zero (or close to zero) fundamental values. We introduce the “greater fool asset market game” with a zero-value token, whose price doubles in each period. We design several treatments, which differ in terms of whether the fundamental value is zero for sure (Baseline), and whether the very low probability of non-zero fundamentals is known (Risk) or not (Ambiguity). We find that prices in markets with zero fundamental value are clearly above zero. Furthermore, we report that prices in treatment Ambiguity are substantially higher than those in treatments Baseline and Risk. Finally, we show that beliefs regarding the asset’s value and others’ participation explain individual market participation.
{"title":"Speculating in zero-value assets: The greater fool game experiment","authors":"Armando Holzknecht , Jürgen Huber , Michael Kirchler , Tibor Neugebauer","doi":"10.1016/j.euroecorev.2025.105180","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.euroecorev.2025.105180","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>In a pre-registered laboratory asset market study, we investigate dynamics of asset markets with zero (or close to zero) fundamental values. We introduce the “greater fool asset market game” with a zero-value token, whose price doubles in each period. We design several treatments, which differ in terms of whether the fundamental value is zero for sure (<span>Baseline</span>), and whether the very low probability of non-zero fundamentals is known (<span>Risk</span>) or not (<span>Ambiguity</span>). We find that prices in markets with zero fundamental value are clearly above zero. Furthermore, we report that prices in treatment <span>Ambiguity</span> are substantially higher than those in treatments <span>Baseline</span> and <span>Risk</span>. Finally, we show that beliefs regarding the asset’s value and others’ participation explain individual market participation.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48389,"journal":{"name":"European Economic Review","volume":"180 ","pages":"Article 105180"},"PeriodicalIF":2.4,"publicationDate":"2025-10-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145364193","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-10-15DOI: 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2025.105177
Laura Pagani , Giovanni Pica
Thanks to data allowing us to observe children’s peers multiple times, we investigate whether exposure during primary school to same- and opposite-gender high achievers affects children’s outcomes after termination of the exposure. Exploiting the as-good-as random allocation of children across classes within Italian primary schools, we find that exposure to a higher share of same-gender math high achievers is related to better academic performance, for both boys and girls, three years after termination of the exposure. Negative effects are observed in case of exposure to a higher share of opposite-gender high achievers. Results are consistent with a role model channel.
{"title":"A peer like me? Early exposure to high achievers in math and later educational outcomes","authors":"Laura Pagani , Giovanni Pica","doi":"10.1016/j.euroecorev.2025.105177","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.euroecorev.2025.105177","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Thanks to data allowing us to observe children’s peers multiple times, we investigate whether exposure during primary school to same- and opposite-gender high achievers affects children’s outcomes after termination of the exposure. Exploiting the as-good-as random allocation of children across classes within Italian primary schools, we find that exposure to a higher share of same-gender math high achievers is related to better academic performance, for both boys and girls, three years after termination of the exposure. Negative effects are observed in case of exposure to a higher share of opposite-gender high achievers. Results are consistent with a role model channel.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48389,"journal":{"name":"European Economic Review","volume":"181 ","pages":"Article 105177"},"PeriodicalIF":2.4,"publicationDate":"2025-10-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145475375","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-10-15DOI: 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2025.105175
Fangzhi Wang , Hua Liao , Richard S.J. Tol
We investigate optimal carbon abatement in a dynamic general equilibrium climate-economy model with endogenous structural change. By differentiating the production of investment from consumption, we show that social cost of carbon can be conceived as a reduction in physical capital. In addition, we distinguish two final sectors in terms of productivity growth and climate vulnerability. We theoretically show that heterogeneous climate vulnerability results in a climate-induced version of Baumol’s cost disease. Further, if climate-vulnerable sectors have high (low) productivity growth, climate impact can ameliorate (aggravate) the Baumol’s cost disease, call for less (more) stringent climate policy. We conclude that carbon abatement should not only factor in unpriced climate capital, but also be tailored to Baumol’s cost and climate diseases.
{"title":"Baumol’s climate disease","authors":"Fangzhi Wang , Hua Liao , Richard S.J. Tol","doi":"10.1016/j.euroecorev.2025.105175","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.euroecorev.2025.105175","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We investigate optimal carbon abatement in a dynamic general equilibrium climate-economy model with endogenous structural change. By differentiating the production of investment from consumption, we show that social cost of carbon can be conceived as a reduction in physical capital. In addition, we distinguish two final sectors in terms of productivity growth and climate vulnerability. We theoretically show that heterogeneous climate vulnerability results in a climate-induced version of Baumol’s cost disease. Further, if climate-vulnerable sectors have high (low) productivity growth, climate impact can ameliorate (aggravate) the Baumol’s cost disease, call for less (more) stringent climate policy. We conclude that carbon abatement should not only factor in unpriced climate capital, but also be tailored to Baumol’s cost and climate diseases.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48389,"journal":{"name":"European Economic Review","volume":"180 ","pages":"Article 105175"},"PeriodicalIF":2.4,"publicationDate":"2025-10-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145364124","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}