European Economic Review最新文献_第7页

The role of macroprudential policy in times of trouble 宏观审慎政策在困难时期的作用

IF 2.4 2区经济学 Q1 ECONOMICS

European Economic Review

Pub Date : 2026-01-01 Epub Date: 2025-10-17 DOI: 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2025.105178

Jagjit S. Chadha , Germana Corrado , Luisa Corrado , Ivan De Lorenzo Buratta

We investigate whether macroprudential policies support broader economic stability, particularly the welfare of households. For this purpose, we develop a New Keynesian business cycle model with agents subject to credit constraints and asset price fluctuations. The model differentiates between savers, who own firms and banks, and borrowers. The commercial bank sets the loan rate as a function of risk, specifically the value of housing collateral. We use occasionally binding constraints to capture non-linearities arising from the zero lower bound (ZLB) on the policy interest rate and the borrowing constraint faced by borrower households. We examine two macroprudential tools: a countercyclical loan-to-value (LTV) ratio and a bank reserve requirement. We find that macroprudential tools significantly reduce the volatility of consumption and lending cycles, and decrease both the expected frequency and severity of ZLB episodes. More generally, by attenuating the variance of the business cycle, particularly for borrower households, macroprudential tools reduce the need for monetary policy interventions.

我们调查宏观审慎政策是否支持更广泛的经济稳定，特别是家庭福利。为此，我们开发了一个新凯恩斯商业周期模型，其中代理人受信贷约束和资产价格波动的影响。该模型区分了拥有公司和银行的储户和借款人。商业银行将贷款利率设定为风险的函数，特别是住房抵押品的价值。我们偶尔使用约束来捕捉政策利率的零下限（ZLB）和借款人家庭所面临的借款约束所产生的非线性。我们研究了两种宏观审慎工具：逆周期贷款价值比（LTV）和银行准备金要求。我们发现，宏观审慎工具显著降低了消费和贷款周期的波动性，降低了ZLB事件的预期频率和严重程度。更一般地说，通过减弱商业周期的差异，特别是对借款人家庭而言，宏观审慎工具减少了对货币政策干预的需求。

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引用次数: 0

Spatial consumption risk sharing 空间消费风险分担

IF 2.4 2区经济学 Q1 ECONOMICS

European Economic Review

Pub Date : 2025-11-01 Epub Date: 2025-10-10 DOI: 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2025.105163

Prateek Arora , Dongwan Choo , Chenyue Hu

This paper investigates how bilateral economic linkages influence consumption synchronization across economies in response to idiosyncratic shocks. Using the US state-level data, we find the degree of bilateral consumption smoothing to decrease with geographic distance. To explain this fact, we develop an open economy DSGE model that incorporates trade, migration, and finance as channels of risk sharing subject to bilateral frictions that potentially covary with distance. Calibrated to the US data, this structural model enables us to examine interactions of different channels in general equilibrium and quantify their impacts on states’ consumption. Through counterfactual exercises, we find that turning off the three channels weakens consumption correlations across states in general, while trade is more effective than migration and financial channels in stabilizing consumption fluctuations.

本文研究了双边经济联系如何影响各经济体在应对特殊冲击时的消费同步。利用美国州级数据，我们发现双边消费平滑程度随着地理距离的增加而降低。为了解释这一事实，我们开发了一个开放经济DSGE模型，该模型将贸易、移民和金融作为风险分担的渠道，受双边摩擦的影响，这些摩擦可能随距离而变化。根据美国的数据，这个结构模型使我们能够检查一般均衡中不同渠道的相互作用，并量化它们对各州消费的影响。通过反事实练习，我们发现关闭这三个渠道一般会削弱各州之间的消费相关性，而在稳定消费波动方面，贸易比移民和金融渠道更有效。

引用次数: 0

Women in economics: The role of gendered references at entry in the profession 经济学中的女性：职业入门时性别参考的作用

IF 2.4 2区经济学 Q1 ECONOMICS

European Economic Review

Pub Date : 2025-11-01 Epub Date: 2025-10-11 DOI: 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2025.105155

Audinga Baltrunaite , Alessandra Casarico , Lucia Rizzica

We study the presence and the extent of gender differences in reference letters for graduate students in economics and finance, and how they relate to early labor market outcomes. To these ends, we build a novel rich dataset and combine Natural Language Processing techniques with standard regression analysis. We find that men are described more often as standout and women as grindstone, i.e., hardworking and diligent; these differences are mainly driven by male letter writers, especially more senior ones. We then show that the former (latter) characteristics relate positively (negatively) with various subsequent career outcomes and that women obtain lower positive (marginally larger negative) returns from being described as standout (grindstone). We argue that, taken together, this evidence is consistent with the presence of implicit gender stereotypes as driving the observed differences in the way candidates are described.

我们研究了经济学和金融学研究生推荐信中性别差异的存在和程度，以及它们与早期劳动力市场结果的关系。为此，我们建立了一个新的丰富数据集，并将自然语言处理技术与标准回归分析相结合。我们发现，男性更常被描述为“出类拔萃”，而女性更常被描述为“磨刀石”，即勤奋、勤奋；这些差异主要是由男性写信人造成的，尤其是级别更高的男性。然后我们表明，前（后）特征与随后的各种职业结果呈正（负）相关，并且女性从被描述为突出（磨刀石）中获得较低的正（略大的负）回报。我们认为，综合来看，这一证据与隐性性别刻板印象的存在是一致的，因为它驱动了候选人描述方式的观察差异。

引用次数: 0

Speculating in zero-value assets: The greater fool game experiment 零价值资产投机：大傻瓜游戏实验

IF 2.4 2区经济学 Q1 ECONOMICS

European Economic Review

Pub Date : 2025-11-01 Epub Date: 2025-10-16 DOI: 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2025.105180

Armando Holzknecht , Jürgen Huber , Michael Kirchler , Tibor Neugebauer

In a pre-registered laboratory asset market study, we investigate dynamics of asset markets with zero (or close to zero) fundamental values. We introduce the “greater fool asset market game” with a zero-value token, whose price doubles in each period. We design several treatments, which differ in terms of whether the fundamental value is zero for sure (Baseline), and whether the very low probability of non-zero fundamentals is known (Risk) or not (Ambiguity). We find that prices in markets with zero fundamental value are clearly above zero. Furthermore, we report that prices in treatment Ambiguity are substantially higher than those in treatments Baseline and Risk. Finally, we show that beliefs regarding the asset’s value and others’ participation explain individual market participation.

在一项预先注册的实验室资产市场研究中，我们研究了零（或接近零）基本价值的资产市场的动态。我们引入了一个零价值代币的“大傻瓜资产市场游戏”，其价格在每个时期翻一番。我们设计了几种处理方法，它们的不同之处在于基本值是否肯定为零（基线），以及是否知道非零基本值的极低概率（风险）（歧义）。我们发现，在基本价值为零的市场中，价格明显高于零。此外，我们报告模糊性治疗的价格大大高于基线和风险治疗的价格。最后，我们证明了关于资产价值和他人参与的信念解释了个人市场参与。

引用次数: 0

Leadership and cooperation in a sequential Prisoner’s Dilemma 顺序囚徒困境中的领导与合作

IF 2.4 2区经济学 Q1 ECONOMICS

European Economic Review

Pub Date : 2025-11-01 Epub Date: 2025-10-11 DOI: 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2025.105160

Eberhard Feess , Steffen Lippert , Jamie Martini-Tibbs , James Tremewan

In a sequential Prisoner’s Dilemma, conditional cooperation creates an incentive to move second. However, choosing to move first can signal strong social preferences, potentially increasing cooperation when players care not only about actions but also about what those actions reveal about their partners’ social preferences. To examine this, we use the psychological game framework to disentangle the effects of observed actions from those of beliefs about partner preferences. The model yields a separating equilibrium in which players with strong social preferences move first. It predicts that endogenous sorting outperforms exogenous sorting when self-selection is hidden. Full transparency about endogenous sorting may backfire if players forced to move first infer selfish motives and defect. Yet, our experimental data show that transparency is optimal: it boosts incentives to move first and raises cooperation among second movers, without reducing cooperation among those compelled to move first. We also find a notable gender difference, as female subjects are more attuned to the signaling value of moving first.

在连续囚徒困境中，有条件的合作创造了第二步行动的动机。然而，选择先行动可以显示出强烈的社交偏好，当玩家不仅关心行动，还关心这些行动所揭示的同伴的社交偏好时，就有可能增加合作。为了检验这一点，我们使用心理游戏框架将观察到的行为的影响与对伴侣偏好的信念的影响分开。该模型产生了一种分离均衡，在这种均衡中，具有强烈社会偏好的玩家会先行动。它预测当自我选择隐藏时，内生排序优于外生排序。完全透明的内生排序可能会适得其反，如果玩家被迫先行动，推断出自私的动机和背叛。然而，我们的实验数据表明，透明度是最优的：它会激发先动者的动机，提高后动者之间的合作，而不会减少被迫先动者之间的合作。我们还发现了一个显著的性别差异，因为女性受试者更习惯于先行动的信号价值。

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引用次数: 0

Parental love is not blind: Identifying selection into early school start 父母的爱不是盲目的：识别选择进入早期学校开始

IF 2.4 2区经济学 Q1 ECONOMICS

European Economic Review

Pub Date : 2025-11-01 Epub Date: 2025-09-20 DOI: 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2025.105145

Ainoa Aparicio Fenoll , Nadia Campaniello , Ignacio Monzón

Do parents take into account their children’s ability when deciding on their education? If so, are parents’ perceptions accurate? We study this by analyzing a key educational decision. Parents choose whether their children start elementary school one year early. Do they select high-ability children to start early? We propose a novel methodology to identify the sign and strength of selection into early starting. We find robust evidence of positive selection. Had they started regularly, early starters would have obtained test scores 0.2 standard deviations higher than the average student. We also estimate the effect of early starting on test scores and find that the effect is heterogeneous.

父母在决定孩子的教育时考虑到孩子的能力了吗？如果是这样，父母的看法准确吗？我们通过分析一个关键的教育决策来研究这个问题。父母决定是否让孩子提前一年上小学。他们会选择高能力的孩子早点开始吗？我们提出了一种新的方法来识别早期开始的选择的标志和强度。我们找到了积极选择的有力证据。如果他们有规律地开始学习，那么早开始学习的学生的考试成绩将比普通学生高出0.2个标准差。我们还估计了早开始对考试成绩的影响，并发现这种影响是异质性的。

引用次数: 0

Efficient forward trade fosters innovation, investment, and resiliency 高效的远期贸易促进创新、投资和弹性

IF 2.4 2区经济学 Q1 ECONOMICS

European Economic Review

Pub Date : 2025-11-01 Epub Date: 2025-10-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2025.105158

Peter Cramton , Axel Ockenfels

We propose a forward energy market design for Germany's electricity sector as an alternative to traditional capacity mechanisms. Drawing on two decades of U.S. experience, we point out the disadvantages of centralized capacity auctions and decentralized capacity obligations. Our forward energy market design enables transparent trading of granular energy products up to 48 months in advance through hourly batch auctions. In this design, load-serving entities have purchase obligations that increase from 0% to 100% of the realized load as the delivery date approaches. Unlike traditional capacity markets, which perpetuate spot market inefficiencies, our mechanism strengthens price signals, improves risk management, and enhances system resilience by providing efficient price discovery and clear investment signals. It also offers a robust, no-regret pathway to fostering innovation and demand flexibility, which are crucial for the energy transition.

我们提出了德国电力部门的前瞻性能源市场设计，作为传统容量机制的替代方案。根据美国20年的经验，我们指出了集中容量拍卖和分散容量义务的缺点。我们的远期能源市场设计使颗粒能源产品通过小时批量拍卖提前48个月进行透明交易。在此设计中，随着交付日期的临近，负载服务实体的购买义务从已实现负载的0%增加到100%。与传统的产能市场不同，我们的机制通过提供有效的价格发现和明确的投资信号，加强了价格信号，改善了风险管理，增强了系统的弹性。它还为促进创新和需求灵活性提供了一条强有力的、无悔的途径，这对能源转型至关重要。

引用次数: 0

Multidimensional equality of opportunity in the United States 美国多方面的机会平等

IF 2.4 2区经济学 Q1 ECONOMICS

European Economic Review

Pub Date : 2025-11-01 Epub Date: 2025-10-03 DOI: 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2025.105162

Paul Hufe , Martyna Kobus , Andreas Peichl , Paul Schüle

Is the United States still a land of opportunity? We provide new insights on this question by leveraging a novel approach that allows us to measure inequality of opportunity in the joint distribution of income and wealth. We show that inequality of opportunity in the US has increased by 58% from the cohort born in 1935 to the cohort of 1980. Increases are driven by a less opportunity-egalitarian income distribution for birth cohorts after 1950 and a less opportunity-egalitarian wealth distribution after 1960. Our findings suggest that the United States has consistently moved further away from a level playing field in recent decades.

美国仍然是一片充满机遇的土地吗？我们利用一种新颖的方法，对这个问题提供了新的见解，这种方法使我们能够衡量收入和财富共同分配中的机会不平等。我们发现，从1935年出生的人到1980年出生的人，美国的机会不平等增加了58%。1950年以后出生人群的收入分配机会不那么平等，1960年以后的财富分配机会不那么平等，这些因素推动了人口增长。我们的研究结果表明，近几十年来，美国一直在远离公平竞争的环境。

引用次数: 0

The role of diagnostic ability in markets for expert services 诊断能力在专家服务市场中的作用

IF 2.4 2区经济学 Q1 ECONOMICS

European Economic Review

Pub Date : 2025-11-01 Epub Date: 2025-09-18 DOI: 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2025.105126

Fang Liu , Alexander Rasch , Marco A. Schwarz , Christian Waibel

In credence goods markets, experts have better information about the appropriate quality of treatment than their customers. They may then exploit their informational advantage by defrauding customers. Market institutions have been shown theoretically to be effective in mitigating fraudulent expert behavior. We analyze whether this positive result carries over to a situation in which experts are heterogeneous in their diagnostic abilities. We find that efficient market outcomes are always possible. Inefficient equilibria, however, can also exist. If, in equilibrium, experts provide diagnosis-independent treatments, an increase in the experts’ ability or in the probability of high-ability experts might not improve market efficiency.

在信用商品市场，专家比他们的顾客更了解适当的治疗质量。然后，他们可能利用自己的信息优势欺骗客户。从理论上讲，市场制度在减轻欺诈专家行为方面是有效的。我们分析这种积极的结果是否延续到专家在他们的诊断能力是异质的情况。我们发现，有效的市场结果总是可能的。然而，低效均衡也可能存在。如果在均衡状态下，专家提供独立于诊断的治疗，那么专家能力的提高或高能力专家出现的概率的增加可能不会提高市场效率。

引用次数: 0

Speculating in zero-value assets: The greater fool game experiment 零价值资产投机：大傻瓜游戏实验

IF 2.4 2区经济学 Q1 ECONOMICS

European Economic Review

Pub Date : 2025-11-01 Epub Date: 2025-10-16 DOI: 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2025.105180

Armando Holzknecht , Jürgen Huber , Michael Kirchler , Tibor Neugebauer

In a pre-registered laboratory asset market study, we investigate dynamics of asset markets with zero (or close to zero) fundamental values. We introduce the “greater fool asset market game” with a zero-value token, whose price doubles in each period. We design several treatments, which differ in terms of whether the fundamental value is zero for sure (Baseline), and whether the very low probability of non-zero fundamentals is known (Risk) or not (Ambiguity). We find that prices in markets with zero fundamental value are clearly above zero. Furthermore, we report that prices in treatment Ambiguity are substantially higher than those in treatments Baseline and Risk. Finally, we show that beliefs regarding the asset’s value and others’ participation explain individual market participation.

在一项预先注册的实验室资产市场研究中，我们研究了零（或接近零）基本价值的资产市场的动态。我们引入了一个零价值代币的“大傻瓜资产市场游戏”，其价格在每个时期翻一番。我们设计了几种处理方法，它们的不同之处在于基本值是否肯定为零（基线），以及是否知道非零基本值的极低概率（风险）（歧义）。我们发现，在基本价值为零的市场中，价格明显高于零。此外，我们报告模糊性治疗的价格大大高于基线和风险治疗的价格。最后，我们证明了关于资产价值和他人参与的信念解释了个人市场参与。

引用次数: 0