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Convenient but risky government bonds 方便但有风险的政府债券
IF 2.4 2区 经济学 Q1 ECONOMICS Pub Date : 2025-10-17 DOI: 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2025.105152
Matthias Kaldorf , Joost Röttger
How does convenience yield interact with sovereign risk and the supply of government bonds? We propose a model of sovereign debt and default in which convenience yield arises because investors are able to pledge government bonds as collateral on financial markets. Consistent with euro area data, convenience yield is large if government bonds are (i) scarce due to investors’ high collateral valuation or (ii) safe due to a small collateral haircut being applied to them. Calibrating the model to the data, we demonstrate that convenience yield improves the fit of sovereign default models to developed economy bond market data, contributes substantially to the public debt-to-GDP ratio, and rationalizes prolonged periods of negative bond spreads – even in the presence of default risk. A large debt elasticity of investors’ collateral valuation is key to these results. In this setting, highly debt-elastic collateral haircuts exacerbate collateral scarcity in crisis times, raising government bond prices and eroding fiscal discipline.
便利收益率是如何与主权风险和政府债券供应相互作用的?我们提出了一个主权债务和违约的模型,在这个模型中,由于投资者能够在金融市场上以政府债券作为抵押品,便利收益率就会上升。与欧元区的数据一致,如果政府债券(i)由于投资者对抵押品的高估值而稀缺,或者(ii)由于对其进行小额抵押品减值而安全,那么便利收益率就会很高。通过将模型与数据进行校准,我们证明便利收益率提高了主权违约模型与发达经济体债券市场数据的拟合性,对公共债务与gdp的比率做出了重大贡献,并使长期的负债券利差合理化——即使存在违约风险。投资者抵押品估值的巨大债务弹性是这些结果的关键。在这种情况下,高度债务弹性的抵押品折价加剧了危机时期抵押品的稀缺性,推高了政府债券价格,侵蚀了财政纪律。
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引用次数: 0
Legislative hostage-taking 立法劫持人质
IF 2.4 2区 经济学 Q1 ECONOMICS Pub Date : 2025-10-17 DOI: 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2025.105183
Giovanni Andreottola , Barton E. Lee
Legislative hostage-taking — whereby the minority party refuses to pass a bipartisan policy unless another divisive or contentious policy also passes — has become a frequent occurrence, especially in American politics. We develop a dynamic model of legislative bargaining and electoral politics to provide insights into why hostage-taking occurs, which policies are held hostage, and which policies are demanded as ransom. Our key insight is that (credible) hostage-taking can only occur if the divisive policy benefits the voter. Furthermore, when hostage-taking occurs, it benefits the voter. However, these benefits are potentially tempered if parties can engage in policy design. In particular, hostage-taking can generate a perverse incentive for the majority party to engage in money burning to shield themself from the minority party’s hostage-taking.
立法人质劫持——即少数党拒绝通过一项两党合作的政策,除非另一项分裂或有争议的政策也获得通过——已经成为经常发生的事情,尤其是在美国政治中。我们开发了一个立法议价和选举政治的动态模型,以深入了解劫持人质的原因,哪些政策被劫持为人质,哪些政策被要求作为赎金。我们的关键见解是,(可信的)劫持人质事件只有在分裂政策有利于选民的情况下才会发生。此外,当人质劫持发生时,它对选民有利。然而,如果各方能够参与政策设计,这些好处可能会打折扣。特别是,劫持人质会产生一种反常的动机,促使多数党通过烧钱来保护自己免受少数党劫持人质的伤害。
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引用次数: 0
Legislative hostage-taking 立法劫持人质
IF 2.4 2区 经济学 Q1 ECONOMICS Pub Date : 2025-10-17 DOI: 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2025.105183
Giovanni Andreottola , Barton E. Lee
Legislative hostage-taking — whereby the minority party refuses to pass a bipartisan policy unless another divisive or contentious policy also passes — has become a frequent occurrence, especially in American politics. We develop a dynamic model of legislative bargaining and electoral politics to provide insights into why hostage-taking occurs, which policies are held hostage, and which policies are demanded as ransom. Our key insight is that (credible) hostage-taking can only occur if the divisive policy benefits the voter. Furthermore, when hostage-taking occurs, it benefits the voter. However, these benefits are potentially tempered if parties can engage in policy design. In particular, hostage-taking can generate a perverse incentive for the majority party to engage in money burning to shield themself from the minority party’s hostage-taking.
立法人质劫持——即少数党拒绝通过一项两党合作的政策,除非另一项分裂或有争议的政策也获得通过——已经成为经常发生的事情,尤其是在美国政治中。我们开发了一个立法议价和选举政治的动态模型,以深入了解劫持人质的原因,哪些政策被劫持为人质,哪些政策被要求作为赎金。我们的关键见解是,(可信的)劫持人质事件只有在分裂政策有利于选民的情况下才会发生。此外,当人质劫持发生时,它对选民有利。然而,如果各方能够参与政策设计,这些好处可能会打折扣。特别是,劫持人质会产生一种反常的动机,促使多数党通过烧钱来保护自己免受少数党劫持人质的伤害。
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引用次数: 0
Convenient but risky government bonds 方便但有风险的政府债券
IF 2.4 2区 经济学 Q1 ECONOMICS Pub Date : 2025-10-17 DOI: 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2025.105152
Matthias Kaldorf , Joost Röttger
How does convenience yield interact with sovereign risk and the supply of government bonds? We propose a model of sovereign debt and default in which convenience yield arises because investors are able to pledge government bonds as collateral on financial markets. Consistent with euro area data, convenience yield is large if government bonds are (i) scarce due to investors’ high collateral valuation or (ii) safe due to a small collateral haircut being applied to them. Calibrating the model to the data, we demonstrate that convenience yield improves the fit of sovereign default models to developed economy bond market data, contributes substantially to the public debt-to-GDP ratio, and rationalizes prolonged periods of negative bond spreads – even in the presence of default risk. A large debt elasticity of investors’ collateral valuation is key to these results. In this setting, highly debt-elastic collateral haircuts exacerbate collateral scarcity in crisis times, raising government bond prices and eroding fiscal discipline.
便利收益率是如何与主权风险和政府债券供应相互作用的?我们提出了一个主权债务和违约的模型,在这个模型中,由于投资者能够在金融市场上以政府债券作为抵押品,便利收益率就会上升。与欧元区的数据一致,如果政府债券(i)由于投资者对抵押品的高估值而稀缺,或者(ii)由于对其进行小额抵押品减值而安全,那么便利收益率就会很高。通过将模型与数据进行校准,我们证明便利收益率提高了主权违约模型与发达经济体债券市场数据的拟合性,对公共债务与gdp的比率做出了重大贡献,并使长期的负债券利差合理化——即使存在违约风险。投资者抵押品估值的巨大债务弹性是这些结果的关键。在这种情况下,高度债务弹性的抵押品折价加剧了危机时期抵押品的稀缺性,推高了政府债券价格,侵蚀了财政纪律。
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引用次数: 0
The role of macroprudential policy in times of trouble 宏观审慎政策在困难时期的作用
IF 2.4 2区 经济学 Q1 ECONOMICS Pub Date : 2025-10-17 DOI: 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2025.105178
Jagjit S. Chadha , Germana Corrado , Luisa Corrado , Ivan De Lorenzo Buratta
We investigate whether macroprudential policies support broader economic stability, particularly the welfare of households. For this purpose, we develop a New Keynesian business cycle model with agents subject to credit constraints and asset price fluctuations. The model differentiates between savers, who own firms and banks, and borrowers. The commercial bank sets the loan rate as a function of risk, specifically the value of housing collateral. We use occasionally binding constraints to capture non-linearities arising from the zero lower bound (ZLB) on the policy interest rate and the borrowing constraint faced by borrower households. We examine two macroprudential tools: a countercyclical loan-to-value (LTV) ratio and a bank reserve requirement. We find that macroprudential tools significantly reduce the volatility of consumption and lending cycles, and decrease both the expected frequency and severity of ZLB episodes. More generally, by attenuating the variance of the business cycle, particularly for borrower households, macroprudential tools reduce the need for monetary policy interventions.
我们调查宏观审慎政策是否支持更广泛的经济稳定,特别是家庭福利。为此,我们开发了一个新凯恩斯商业周期模型,其中代理人受信贷约束和资产价格波动的影响。该模型区分了拥有公司和银行的储户和借款人。商业银行将贷款利率设定为风险的函数,特别是住房抵押品的价值。我们偶尔使用约束来捕捉政策利率的零下限(ZLB)和借款人家庭所面临的借款约束所产生的非线性。我们研究了两种宏观审慎工具:逆周期贷款价值比(LTV)和银行准备金要求。我们发现,宏观审慎工具显著降低了消费和贷款周期的波动性,降低了ZLB事件的预期频率和严重程度。更一般地说,通过减弱商业周期的差异,特别是对借款人家庭而言,宏观审慎工具减少了对货币政策干预的需求。
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引用次数: 0
Migratory responses to air pollution reduction: Evidence from large-scale desulfurization programme 减少空气污染的迁移响应:来自大规模脱硫计划的证据
IF 2.4 2区 经济学 Q1 ECONOMICS Pub Date : 2025-10-16 DOI: 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2025.105154
Štěpán Mikula , Mariola Pytliková
This paper examines how improvements in air quality affect migration behavior. We exploit a natural experiment in the Czech Republic, where rapid desulfurization of coal-fired power plants in the 1990s led to a sharp reduction in SO2 pollution—from extremely high levels to below EU/WHO limits—without directly impacting economic activity. Using a difference-in-differences approach, we find that cleaner air reduced emigration from previously heavily polluted municipalities by 24% and increased net migration by 78%, with effects strongest in the most formerly polluted areas. The impact was particularly pronounced among highly educated individuals. Migration responses were strongest in municipalities with weaker social capital and fewer public amenities, suggesting that environmental improvements matter most where other local advantages are limited. In contrast, anti-emigration monetary subsidies—such as those offered during the socialist period in polluted areas—had no effect. Overall, our findings highlight the potential of environmental policies to support re-population and regional revitalization—especially when combined with investments in infrastructure and public services.
本文探讨了空气质量的改善如何影响迁移行为。我们利用了捷克共和国的一个自然实验,在20世纪90年代,捷克燃煤电厂的快速脱硫导致了二氧化硫污染的急剧减少——从极高的水平降至低于欧盟/世界卫生组织的限制——而没有直接影响经济活动。使用差异中的差异方法,我们发现,更清洁的空气使以前污染严重的城市的移民减少了24%,使净移民增加了78%,在以前污染最严重的地区影响最大。这种影响在受过高等教育的人群中尤为明显。在社会资本较弱、公共设施较少的城市,移民反应最为强烈,这表明在其他地方优势有限的地方,环境改善最为重要。相比之下,反移民的货币补贴——比如社会主义时期在污染地区提供的补贴——没有效果。总的来说,我们的研究结果强调了环境政策在支持人口重新增长和区域振兴方面的潜力,特别是在与基础设施和公共服务投资相结合的情况下。
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引用次数: 0
Speculating in zero-value assets: The greater fool game experiment 零价值资产投机:大傻瓜游戏实验
IF 2.4 2区 经济学 Q1 ECONOMICS Pub Date : 2025-10-16 DOI: 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2025.105180
Armando Holzknecht , Jürgen Huber , Michael Kirchler , Tibor Neugebauer
In a pre-registered laboratory asset market study, we investigate dynamics of asset markets with zero (or close to zero) fundamental values. We introduce the “greater fool asset market game” with a zero-value token, whose price doubles in each period. We design several treatments, which differ in terms of whether the fundamental value is zero for sure (Baseline), and whether the very low probability of non-zero fundamentals is known (Risk) or not (Ambiguity). We find that prices in markets with zero fundamental value are clearly above zero. Furthermore, we report that prices in treatment Ambiguity are substantially higher than those in treatments Baseline and Risk. Finally, we show that beliefs regarding the asset’s value and others’ participation explain individual market participation.
在一项预先注册的实验室资产市场研究中,我们研究了零(或接近零)基本价值的资产市场的动态。我们引入了一个零价值代币的“大傻瓜资产市场游戏”,其价格在每个时期翻一番。我们设计了几种处理方法,它们的不同之处在于基本值是否肯定为零(基线),以及是否知道非零基本值的极低概率(风险)(歧义)。我们发现,在基本价值为零的市场中,价格明显高于零。此外,我们报告模糊性治疗的价格大大高于基线和风险治疗的价格。最后,我们证明了关于资产价值和他人参与的信念解释了个人市场参与。
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引用次数: 0
Speculating in zero-value assets: The greater fool game experiment 零价值资产投机:大傻瓜游戏实验
IF 2.4 2区 经济学 Q1 ECONOMICS Pub Date : 2025-10-16 DOI: 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2025.105180
Armando Holzknecht , Jürgen Huber , Michael Kirchler , Tibor Neugebauer
In a pre-registered laboratory asset market study, we investigate dynamics of asset markets with zero (or close to zero) fundamental values. We introduce the “greater fool asset market game” with a zero-value token, whose price doubles in each period. We design several treatments, which differ in terms of whether the fundamental value is zero for sure (Baseline), and whether the very low probability of non-zero fundamentals is known (Risk) or not (Ambiguity). We find that prices in markets with zero fundamental value are clearly above zero. Furthermore, we report that prices in treatment Ambiguity are substantially higher than those in treatments Baseline and Risk. Finally, we show that beliefs regarding the asset’s value and others’ participation explain individual market participation.
在一项预先注册的实验室资产市场研究中,我们研究了零(或接近零)基本价值的资产市场的动态。我们引入了一个零价值代币的“大傻瓜资产市场游戏”,其价格在每个时期翻一番。我们设计了几种处理方法,它们的不同之处在于基本值是否肯定为零(基线),以及是否知道非零基本值的极低概率(风险)(歧义)。我们发现,在基本价值为零的市场中,价格明显高于零。此外,我们报告模糊性治疗的价格大大高于基线和风险治疗的价格。最后,我们证明了关于资产价值和他人参与的信念解释了个人市场参与。
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引用次数: 0
A peer like me? Early exposure to high achievers in math and later educational outcomes 像我这样的同辈?早期接触数学成绩优异的学生,以及后来的教育成果
IF 2.4 2区 经济学 Q1 ECONOMICS Pub Date : 2025-10-15 DOI: 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2025.105177
Laura Pagani , Giovanni Pica
Thanks to data allowing us to observe children’s peers multiple times, we investigate whether exposure during primary school to same- and opposite-gender high achievers affects children’s outcomes after termination of the exposure. Exploiting the as-good-as random allocation of children across classes within Italian primary schools, we find that exposure to a higher share of same-gender math high achievers is related to better academic performance, for both boys and girls, three years after termination of the exposure. Negative effects are observed in case of exposure to a higher share of opposite-gender high achievers. Results are consistent with a role model channel.
由于数据允许我们多次观察儿童的同龄人,我们调查了小学期间接触同性和异性高成就者是否会影响儿童在接触结束后的表现。通过对意大利小学各个班级的孩子进行随机分配,我们发现,接触到更高比例的同性数学优等生,在接触结束三年后,无论是男孩还是女孩,都能获得更好的学习成绩。如果接触到较高比例的异性高成就者,则会观察到负面影响。结果与榜样渠道一致。
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引用次数: 0
Baumol’s climate disease 鲍莫尔气候病
IF 2.4 2区 经济学 Q1 ECONOMICS Pub Date : 2025-10-15 DOI: 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2025.105175
Fangzhi Wang , Hua Liao , Richard S.J. Tol
We investigate optimal carbon abatement in a dynamic general equilibrium climate-economy model with endogenous structural change. By differentiating the production of investment from consumption, we show that social cost of carbon can be conceived as a reduction in physical capital. In addition, we distinguish two final sectors in terms of productivity growth and climate vulnerability. We theoretically show that heterogeneous climate vulnerability results in a climate-induced version of Baumol’s cost disease. Further, if climate-vulnerable sectors have high (low) productivity growth, climate impact can ameliorate (aggravate) the Baumol’s cost disease, call for less (more) stringent climate policy. We conclude that carbon abatement should not only factor in unpriced climate capital, but also be tailored to Baumol’s cost and climate diseases.
本文研究了具有内生结构变化的动态一般平衡气候经济模型中的最优碳减排。通过区分投资生产和消费,我们表明碳的社会成本可以被认为是物质资本的减少。此外,我们在生产率增长和气候脆弱性方面区分了最后两个部门。我们从理论上表明,异质性气候脆弱性导致气候诱发的鲍莫尔成本病。此外,如果易受气候变化影响的部门具有高(低)生产率增长,气候影响可以改善(加剧)鲍莫尔成本病,呼吁采取不那么(更)严格的气候政策。我们的结论是,碳减排不仅要考虑未定价的气候资本,而且要根据鲍莫尔成本和气候疾病进行调整。
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引用次数: 0
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European Economic Review
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