Pub Date : 2023-08-11DOI: 10.1177/00220027231195066
Ryan C. Briggs, Omer Solodoch
Security concerns about immigration are on the rise. Many countries respond by fortifying their borders. Yet little is known about the influence of border security measures on perceived threat from immigration. Borders might facilitate group identities and spread fear of outsiders. In contrast, they might enhance citizens’ sense of security and control over immigration. We test these claims using survey experiments run on a quota sample of over 1000 Americans. The findings show that allocating more government resources to border security increases desired levels of immigration. This effect is likely driven by a sense of control over immigration, induced by border security measures even when the number or characteristics of immigrants remain unchanged. Our findings suggest that border controls, which are widely considered as symbols of closure and isolation, can increase public support for immigration.
{"title":"Changes in Perceptions of Border Security Influence Desired Levels of Immigration","authors":"Ryan C. Briggs, Omer Solodoch","doi":"10.1177/00220027231195066","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/00220027231195066","url":null,"abstract":"Security concerns about immigration are on the rise. Many countries respond by fortifying their borders. Yet little is known about the influence of border security measures on perceived threat from immigration. Borders might facilitate group identities and spread fear of outsiders. In contrast, they might enhance citizens’ sense of security and control over immigration. We test these claims using survey experiments run on a quota sample of over 1000 Americans. The findings show that allocating more government resources to border security increases desired levels of immigration. This effect is likely driven by a sense of control over immigration, induced by border security measures even when the number or characteristics of immigrants remain unchanged. Our findings suggest that border controls, which are widely considered as symbols of closure and isolation, can increase public support for immigration.","PeriodicalId":51363,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Conflict Resolution","volume":"36 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-08-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135396966","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-08-07DOI: 10.1177/00220027231190099
Sergi Martínez
Wartime violence and authoritarian repression against civilians take various forms. Past research has explored the causes and consequences of violence, but no previous work simultaneously assessed the long-term effects of different types of violence on political identities. This paper contends that indiscriminate attacks can reinforce ingroup identity, whereas the role of civilian agency in selective violence may have a detrimental impact. Equipped with original data capturing municipality-level exposure to both selective and indiscriminate violence during the Spanish civil war (1936–1939) in Biscay (Basque Country), this study examines its legacy on voting behavior (1983–2015). Results indicate that fascist airstrikes increased Basque nationalism while selective violence diminished the popularity of Basque parties. Individual and community-level evidence suggests that airstrikes fostered the intergenerational transmission of political attitudes. Violence can boost national identities, but it can also erode them: it depends on the type.
{"title":"Type of Violence and Ingroup Identity: Evidence From the Spanish Civil War","authors":"Sergi Martínez","doi":"10.1177/00220027231190099","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/00220027231190099","url":null,"abstract":"Wartime violence and authoritarian repression against civilians take various forms. Past research has explored the causes and consequences of violence, but no previous work simultaneously assessed the long-term effects of different types of violence on political identities. This paper contends that indiscriminate attacks can reinforce ingroup identity, whereas the role of civilian agency in selective violence may have a detrimental impact. Equipped with original data capturing municipality-level exposure to both selective and indiscriminate violence during the Spanish civil war (1936–1939) in Biscay (Basque Country), this study examines its legacy on voting behavior (1983–2015). Results indicate that fascist airstrikes increased Basque nationalism while selective violence diminished the popularity of Basque parties. Individual and community-level evidence suggests that airstrikes fostered the intergenerational transmission of political attitudes. Violence can boost national identities, but it can also erode them: it depends on the type.","PeriodicalId":51363,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Conflict Resolution","volume":"11 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-08-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135904262","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-07-28DOI: 10.1177/00220027231191530
Michael-David Mangini
States often use market access as a bargaining chip in international politics. A state that requires simultaneous compliance in multiple issue areas before granting market access maximizes incentives to comply but also makes them brittle – any targeted states that cannot comply in one issue area have no incentive to comply in any. More generally, programs of economic coercion can achieve at most two of the following three objectives: 1) secure a broad coalition of domestic political support, 2) the association of meaningful trade value with each policy issue, and 3) assurance that enforcing one political issue will not reduce the target’s incentives to comply with conditionality on others. Characteristics of the program’s domestic constituency, of the issues themselves, and of the international economy are key determinants of how the state prioritizes the three objectives. The trilemma explains the number and types of issues that can be linked to economic value.
{"title":"The Economic Coercion Trilemma","authors":"Michael-David Mangini","doi":"10.1177/00220027231191530","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/00220027231191530","url":null,"abstract":"States often use market access as a bargaining chip in international politics. A state that requires simultaneous compliance in multiple issue areas before granting market access maximizes incentives to comply but also makes them brittle – any targeted states that cannot comply in one issue area have no incentive to comply in any. More generally, programs of economic coercion can achieve at most two of the following three objectives: 1) secure a broad coalition of domestic political support, 2) the association of meaningful trade value with each policy issue, and 3) assurance that enforcing one political issue will not reduce the target’s incentives to comply with conditionality on others. Characteristics of the program’s domestic constituency, of the issues themselves, and of the international economy are key determinants of how the state prioritizes the three objectives. The trilemma explains the number and types of issues that can be linked to economic value.","PeriodicalId":51363,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Conflict Resolution","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.1,"publicationDate":"2023-07-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41589592","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-07-26DOI: 10.1177/00220027231190915
R. Dudley
When do negotiations occur in civil war? How does military intervention alter this process? While the existing literature presents models of the onset of negotiations – both mediated and unassisted – they are incomplete if they do not consider third-party states involved in the conflict prior to negotiations. I argue that military intervention impacts negotiation onset by adjusting barriers to negotiation through three pathways: the likelihood of military victory, the risk of signaling weakness, and the presence of additional veto players. I examine these mechanisms using logistic random effects models on a dataset of African civil wars. An extension of the argument addresses how expectations of intervention shape conflict behavior. Rebel-supporting interventions, interventions with independent interests, and asymmetric interventions lead to an increase in the likelihood of negotiations occurring. Models controlling for expectations of intervention also suggest that third parties can impact belligerents’ behavior through both expectations and follow-through.
{"title":"Turning the Tables: Military Intervention and the Onset of Negotiations in Civil War","authors":"R. Dudley","doi":"10.1177/00220027231190915","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/00220027231190915","url":null,"abstract":"When do negotiations occur in civil war? How does military intervention alter this process? While the existing literature presents models of the onset of negotiations – both mediated and unassisted – they are incomplete if they do not consider third-party states involved in the conflict prior to negotiations. I argue that military intervention impacts negotiation onset by adjusting barriers to negotiation through three pathways: the likelihood of military victory, the risk of signaling weakness, and the presence of additional veto players. I examine these mechanisms using logistic random effects models on a dataset of African civil wars. An extension of the argument addresses how expectations of intervention shape conflict behavior. Rebel-supporting interventions, interventions with independent interests, and asymmetric interventions lead to an increase in the likelihood of negotiations occurring. Models controlling for expectations of intervention also suggest that third parties can impact belligerents’ behavior through both expectations and follow-through.","PeriodicalId":51363,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Conflict Resolution","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.1,"publicationDate":"2023-07-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45386670","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-07-24DOI: 10.1177/00220027231190914
Jared F. Edgerton
Researchers and policymakers have increasingly recognized foreign fighter mobilization as a national security threat to foreign states and domestic populations. Yet, scholars remain divided on the motivations of foreign combatants, arguing that fighters may be motivated by grievances, opportunity, or material incentives. The motivations of foreign fighters may be especially complex, as they are engaging in a conflict outside of their state. I analyze how historical and present-day group exclusionary policies and opportunity shape mobilization. To do so, I leverage novel data consisting of individual fighter data of Islamic State volunteers fighting in Iraq and Syria. Consistent with my theoretical framework, I find that a higher rate of Islamic State fighters come from areas where Sunni Muslims were denied access to political power and have greater state capacity.
{"title":"Past and Present Group Exclusion and Conflict: Group Marginalization, Opportunity, and Islamic State Foreign Fighter Mobilization","authors":"Jared F. Edgerton","doi":"10.1177/00220027231190914","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/00220027231190914","url":null,"abstract":"Researchers and policymakers have increasingly recognized foreign fighter mobilization as a national security threat to foreign states and domestic populations. Yet, scholars remain divided on the motivations of foreign combatants, arguing that fighters may be motivated by grievances, opportunity, or material incentives. The motivations of foreign fighters may be especially complex, as they are engaging in a conflict outside of their state. I analyze how historical and present-day group exclusionary policies and opportunity shape mobilization. To do so, I leverage novel data consisting of individual fighter data of Islamic State volunteers fighting in Iraq and Syria. Consistent with my theoretical framework, I find that a higher rate of Islamic State fighters come from areas where Sunni Muslims were denied access to political power and have greater state capacity.","PeriodicalId":51363,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Conflict Resolution","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.1,"publicationDate":"2023-07-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46749101","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-07-20DOI: 10.1177/00220027231188909
Danny Klinenberg
Social media has become an outlet for extremists to fundraise and organize. While governments deliberate on how to regulate, some social media companies have removed creators of offensive content —deplatforming. I estimate the effects of deplatforming on revenue and viewership, using variation in the timing of removals across two video-streaming companies — YouTube, and its far-right competitor, Bitchute. Being deplatformed on Youtube results in a 30% increase in weekly Bitcoin revenue and a 50% increase in viewership on Bitchute. This increase in Bitchute activity is less than that on YouTube, meaning that deplatforming works in decreasing a content creator’s overall views and revenue.
{"title":"Does Deplatforming Work?","authors":"Danny Klinenberg","doi":"10.1177/00220027231188909","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/00220027231188909","url":null,"abstract":"Social media has become an outlet for extremists to fundraise and organize. While governments deliberate on how to regulate, some social media companies have removed creators of offensive content —deplatforming. I estimate the effects of deplatforming on revenue and viewership, using variation in the timing of removals across two video-streaming companies — YouTube, and its far-right competitor, Bitchute. Being deplatformed on Youtube results in a 30% increase in weekly Bitcoin revenue and a 50% increase in viewership on Bitchute. This increase in Bitchute activity is less than that on YouTube, meaning that deplatforming works in decreasing a content creator’s overall views and revenue.","PeriodicalId":51363,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Conflict Resolution","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.1,"publicationDate":"2023-07-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46238175","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-07-19DOI: 10.1177/00220027231190917
Christophe Lesschaeve, Josip Glaurdić
We use a large quota-sampled online survey and data on Facebook connections among survey respondents in six successor states of former Yugoslavia to demonstrate that, even more than two decades after the violence had ended, online social connections in this region are substantially related to people’s war experiences of combat, victimhood, and forced migration, as well as to their views of the wars’ causes, conduct, and consequences. What is particularly important, the sizes of the effects of these war-related factors on respondents’ online social networks are substantively large and comparable to those of gender, ethnicity, education, or political ideology. Our findings are an important contribution to the understanding of the deeply pervasive and long-lasting effects of wars on societies. They also highlight the enduring relevance of wartime violence in postwar social networks that is likely to affect efforts at enduring conflict resolution and reconciliation.
{"title":"The Ties that Bind: War Histories and Online Social Networks in Postwar Societies","authors":"Christophe Lesschaeve, Josip Glaurdić","doi":"10.1177/00220027231190917","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/00220027231190917","url":null,"abstract":"We use a large quota-sampled online survey and data on Facebook connections among survey respondents in six successor states of former Yugoslavia to demonstrate that, even more than two decades after the violence had ended, online social connections in this region are substantially related to people’s war experiences of combat, victimhood, and forced migration, as well as to their views of the wars’ causes, conduct, and consequences. What is particularly important, the sizes of the effects of these war-related factors on respondents’ online social networks are substantively large and comparable to those of gender, ethnicity, education, or political ideology. Our findings are an important contribution to the understanding of the deeply pervasive and long-lasting effects of wars on societies. They also highlight the enduring relevance of wartime violence in postwar social networks that is likely to affect efforts at enduring conflict resolution and reconciliation.","PeriodicalId":51363,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Conflict Resolution","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.1,"publicationDate":"2023-07-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41745143","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-07-18DOI: 10.1177/00220027231188901
Nilay Saiya, Stuti Manchanda, Rahmat Wadidi
Several studies have found restrictions on minority faith-based communities to be related to the onset of violent religious hostilities. Absent from this work, though, is a consideration of the fact that minority religious discrimination can take different forms, and, consequently, may encourage violence in different ways. This paper seeks to fill this void by examining different forms of minority religious restrictions and their relationship to religious violence. Specifically, we analyze the comparative strength of three basic types of religious discrimination—restrictions on minority religious practices, restrictions on minority religious institutions, and restrictions on conversion and proselytizing—on violence carried out by both religious majority groups and religious minority groups. Interestingly, our analysis shows all three forms of restrictions encourage violence from religious majorities, but not from minorities. We supplement the statistical analysis with a case study of faith-based discrimination and violent religious hostilities in India.
{"title":"Faith-Based Discrimination and Violent Religious Hostilities: A Global Analysis","authors":"Nilay Saiya, Stuti Manchanda, Rahmat Wadidi","doi":"10.1177/00220027231188901","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/00220027231188901","url":null,"abstract":"Several studies have found restrictions on minority faith-based communities to be related to the onset of violent religious hostilities. Absent from this work, though, is a consideration of the fact that minority religious discrimination can take different forms, and, consequently, may encourage violence in different ways. This paper seeks to fill this void by examining different forms of minority religious restrictions and their relationship to religious violence. Specifically, we analyze the comparative strength of three basic types of religious discrimination—restrictions on minority religious practices, restrictions on minority religious institutions, and restrictions on conversion and proselytizing—on violence carried out by both religious majority groups and religious minority groups. Interestingly, our analysis shows all three forms of restrictions encourage violence from religious majorities, but not from minorities. We supplement the statistical analysis with a case study of faith-based discrimination and violent religious hostilities in India.","PeriodicalId":51363,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Conflict Resolution","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.1,"publicationDate":"2023-07-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49158537","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-07-13DOI: 10.1177/00220027231188896
Alexander Dukalskis, Saipira Furstenberg, S. Hellmeier, Redmond Scales
The emerging literature dealing with transnational repression has identified several strategies used by authoritarian states to control and coerce their populations abroad. This article builds on existing research by investigating the domestic determinants of transnational repression. It argues that an increase in domestic repression is likely to lead to a subsequent increase in transnational repression because crackdowns at home drive dissent abroad and incentivize the state to extend its repressive gaze beyond its borders. To evaluate its arguments, the article draws on a database of approximately 1200 cases in which authoritarian states around the world threatened, attacked, extradited, abducted, or assassinated their own citizens abroad between 1991 and 2019. Offering a first quantitative test of domestic drivers of transnational repression, using multivariate regression analysis, the paper finds that as repression intensifies domestically, the likelihood of that state subsequently escalating its transnational repression also increases substantively.
{"title":"The Long Arm and the Iron Fist: Authoritarian Crackdowns and Transnational Repression","authors":"Alexander Dukalskis, Saipira Furstenberg, S. Hellmeier, Redmond Scales","doi":"10.1177/00220027231188896","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/00220027231188896","url":null,"abstract":"The emerging literature dealing with transnational repression has identified several strategies used by authoritarian states to control and coerce their populations abroad. This article builds on existing research by investigating the domestic determinants of transnational repression. It argues that an increase in domestic repression is likely to lead to a subsequent increase in transnational repression because crackdowns at home drive dissent abroad and incentivize the state to extend its repressive gaze beyond its borders. To evaluate its arguments, the article draws on a database of approximately 1200 cases in which authoritarian states around the world threatened, attacked, extradited, abducted, or assassinated their own citizens abroad between 1991 and 2019. Offering a first quantitative test of domestic drivers of transnational repression, using multivariate regression analysis, the paper finds that as repression intensifies domestically, the likelihood of that state subsequently escalating its transnational repression also increases substantively.","PeriodicalId":51363,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Conflict Resolution","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.1,"publicationDate":"2023-07-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47056430","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-07-10DOI: 10.1177/00220027231188895
Marius Mehrl, Ioannis Choulis
Secret police are generally viewed as key institutions in autocrats’ repression apparatus. However, we lack clear empirical evidence on the link between secret police and repression. Instead, recent studies indicate that the surveillance provided by secret police reduces physical human rights abuses. This paper re-examines the relationship between secret police and physical state repression. We identify four mechanisms linking these variables, deterrence, targeting, organizational practices, and institutional self-preservation. These mechanisms provide contrasting expectations for the overall relationship but also contextual expectations on when secret police may (not) increase repression. To test these expectations, we collect data on the global existence of secret police. Results indicate that secret police are associated with increased physical repression, particularly when they must develop a reputation to deter dissidents or when multiple rival security organizations exist. In contrast, older, more established secret police or ones without institutional rivals are not associated with physical repression.
{"title":"Secret Police Organizations and State Repression","authors":"Marius Mehrl, Ioannis Choulis","doi":"10.1177/00220027231188895","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/00220027231188895","url":null,"abstract":"Secret police are generally viewed as key institutions in autocrats’ repression apparatus. However, we lack clear empirical evidence on the link between secret police and repression. Instead, recent studies indicate that the surveillance provided by secret police reduces physical human rights abuses. This paper re-examines the relationship between secret police and physical state repression. We identify four mechanisms linking these variables, deterrence, targeting, organizational practices, and institutional self-preservation. These mechanisms provide contrasting expectations for the overall relationship but also contextual expectations on when secret police may (not) increase repression. To test these expectations, we collect data on the global existence of secret police. Results indicate that secret police are associated with increased physical repression, particularly when they must develop a reputation to deter dissidents or when multiple rival security organizations exist. In contrast, older, more established secret police or ones without institutional rivals are not associated with physical repression.","PeriodicalId":51363,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Conflict Resolution","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.1,"publicationDate":"2023-07-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48230525","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}