Pub Date : 2023-06-21DOI: 10.1177/00220027231180114
Valentina Duque
This paper exploits the sharp escalation of violence in Colombia in the 1980s associated with the emergence of drug cartels to provide novel evidence on the long-run effects of violence exposure throughout the life-course, on children’s educational attainment and academic achievement using administrative data. I find that, a higher homicide rate in early-childhood is associated with a higher probability of school dropout and conditional on completing high school, lower scores on a national end-of-high school exam. Results are robust to several falsification tests, and analyses of potential sources of selection bias. I provide supportive evidence that changes in fetal, child, and adolescent health outcomes are important potential mechanisms.
{"title":"Violence and Children’s Education: Evidence From Administrative Data","authors":"Valentina Duque","doi":"10.1177/00220027231180114","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/00220027231180114","url":null,"abstract":"This paper exploits the sharp escalation of violence in Colombia in the 1980s associated with the emergence of drug cartels to provide novel evidence on the long-run effects of violence exposure throughout the life-course, on children’s educational attainment and academic achievement using administrative data. I find that, a higher homicide rate in early-childhood is associated with a higher probability of school dropout and conditional on completing high school, lower scores on a national end-of-high school exam. Results are robust to several falsification tests, and analyses of potential sources of selection bias. I provide supportive evidence that changes in fetal, child, and adolescent health outcomes are important potential mechanisms.","PeriodicalId":51363,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Conflict Resolution","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-06-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"136296187","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-06-13DOI: 10.1177/00220027231183939
Khusrav Gaibulloev, James A. Piazza, T. Sandler
Employing two alternative measures of state failure, we investigate how state weakness influences resident terrorist groups’ survival. Theoretically, state failure favors resident terrorist groups’ survival, while state territorial control fosters resident groups’ termination until some control threshold. Empirically, we uncover a robust negative relationship between a country’s weakness and its control of terrorism through the lens of the resident terrorist groups’ survival prospects. The discovered relationship withstands a host of robustness tests – e.g., alternative estimates and samples. We apply an instrument designed to address endogeneity concerns. In particular, our novel instrument for failed states consists of the interaction between natural disasters and ethnic fractionalization. As a state’s percentage of territorial control increases, resident terrorist groups are more prone to ending until some threshold control percent. Our analysis can guide counterterrorism policy by exploiting the nuanced theoretical determinants identified here that foster resident groups’ termination in failing states.
{"title":"Do Failed or Weak States Favor Resident Terrorist Groups’ Survival?","authors":"Khusrav Gaibulloev, James A. Piazza, T. Sandler","doi":"10.1177/00220027231183939","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/00220027231183939","url":null,"abstract":"Employing two alternative measures of state failure, we investigate how state weakness influences resident terrorist groups’ survival. Theoretically, state failure favors resident terrorist groups’ survival, while state territorial control fosters resident groups’ termination until some control threshold. Empirically, we uncover a robust negative relationship between a country’s weakness and its control of terrorism through the lens of the resident terrorist groups’ survival prospects. The discovered relationship withstands a host of robustness tests – e.g., alternative estimates and samples. We apply an instrument designed to address endogeneity concerns. In particular, our novel instrument for failed states consists of the interaction between natural disasters and ethnic fractionalization. As a state’s percentage of territorial control increases, resident terrorist groups are more prone to ending until some threshold control percent. Our analysis can guide counterterrorism policy by exploiting the nuanced theoretical determinants identified here that foster resident groups’ termination in failing states.","PeriodicalId":51363,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Conflict Resolution","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":3.1,"publicationDate":"2023-06-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44362535","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-06-13DOI: 10.1177/00220027231183945
Qi Zhang
While many scholars find that security cooperation increases the foreign aid that allies receive from a major power, other studies show that an alliance also has negative effect and its terms can change over time. This article argues that a donor’s security environment impacts its participation in security cooperation and, subsequently, foreign aid allocation to allies. When the security environment is competitive, a donor will concentrate its resources on strengthening its ties with allies. In contrast, when the environment is favorable to a donor, it can use security cooperation as leverage to obtain policy concessions from allies, thus reducing its own foreign aid expenditures. This paper analyzes the aid allocation of three major power donors as well as 72 formal defense pacts and 70 bilateral defense cooperation agreements, and it finds that a favorable security environment allows a donor to reduce its economic contribution to its allies by 19 percent.
{"title":"When Does Security Cooperation Increase Foreign Aid Allocation?","authors":"Qi Zhang","doi":"10.1177/00220027231183945","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/00220027231183945","url":null,"abstract":"While many scholars find that security cooperation increases the foreign aid that allies receive from a major power, other studies show that an alliance also has negative effect and its terms can change over time. This article argues that a donor’s security environment impacts its participation in security cooperation and, subsequently, foreign aid allocation to allies. When the security environment is competitive, a donor will concentrate its resources on strengthening its ties with allies. In contrast, when the environment is favorable to a donor, it can use security cooperation as leverage to obtain policy concessions from allies, thus reducing its own foreign aid expenditures. This paper analyzes the aid allocation of three major power donors as well as 72 formal defense pacts and 70 bilateral defense cooperation agreements, and it finds that a favorable security environment allows a donor to reduce its economic contribution to its allies by 19 percent.","PeriodicalId":51363,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Conflict Resolution","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":3.1,"publicationDate":"2023-06-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43828075","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-06-06DOI: 10.1177/00220027231180101
Robert A. Pape, C. Price
Despite alarming predications about the Covid 19 pandemic that appear to fit the literature on the impact of natural disasters on civil wars, there are reasons to be suspicious that a rise in militant violence would likely occur quickly or uniformly. Although the COVID-19 pandemic is most definitely a disaster that caught the world by surprise, this “slow-rolling” shock differs in important ways from the more commonly studied acute onset natural disasters such as earthquakes, hurricanes, and tsunamis that often increase violent competition among groups for scarce resources. Instead, the effects of slow-rolling disasters unfold in phases that, at least in the short run, are likely to encourage a period of relative decline in violence, as actors try and assess the effects of COVID-19 on their organization and their opponents. Both statistical and qualitative evidence from the initial months of the COVID-19 pandemic supports the initial phases of our theory.
{"title":"A Slow-Rolling Disaster: Assessing the Impact of the Covid-19 Pandemic on Militant Violence","authors":"Robert A. Pape, C. Price","doi":"10.1177/00220027231180101","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/00220027231180101","url":null,"abstract":"Despite alarming predications about the Covid 19 pandemic that appear to fit the literature on the impact of natural disasters on civil wars, there are reasons to be suspicious that a rise in militant violence would likely occur quickly or uniformly. Although the COVID-19 pandemic is most definitely a disaster that caught the world by surprise, this “slow-rolling” shock differs in important ways from the more commonly studied acute onset natural disasters such as earthquakes, hurricanes, and tsunamis that often increase violent competition among groups for scarce resources. Instead, the effects of slow-rolling disasters unfold in phases that, at least in the short run, are likely to encourage a period of relative decline in violence, as actors try and assess the effects of COVID-19 on their organization and their opponents. Both statistical and qualitative evidence from the initial months of the COVID-19 pandemic supports the initial phases of our theory.","PeriodicalId":51363,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Conflict Resolution","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":3.1,"publicationDate":"2023-06-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47919925","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-06-06DOI: 10.1177/00220027231180098
Lindsay Branham
This present research explores a progressive repurposing of Virtual Reality technology, Virtual Immersive Contact (VIC), in a real-world setting to; explore viability to reduce prejudice and investigate the role of empathy in motivating prosocial behavior. The study employed a between-subjects repeated-measures experimental design of a randomized sample ( n = 113) split into two conditions to reduce prejudice and discrimination in the active conflict area of the Central African Republic (CAR). In line with the study’s hypotheses, VIC produced a significant increase in empathic concern for the Muslim outgroup and intentions to donate to a Muslim family, while also showing that the relationship between empathy and helping behaviours was mostly explained by confounding variables. This research provides both the first evidence of its kind that VIC could be a new form of fostering positive intergroup contact in an active conflict setting, crating a new facet of intergroup contact theory, and further evolving the literature on the empathy, prosocial behaviour relationship.
{"title":"Virtual Immersive Contact: A Field Experiment to Reduce Prejudice and Discrimination in Central African Republic","authors":"Lindsay Branham","doi":"10.1177/00220027231180098","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/00220027231180098","url":null,"abstract":"This present research explores a progressive repurposing of Virtual Reality technology, Virtual Immersive Contact (VIC), in a real-world setting to; explore viability to reduce prejudice and investigate the role of empathy in motivating prosocial behavior. The study employed a between-subjects repeated-measures experimental design of a randomized sample ( n = 113) split into two conditions to reduce prejudice and discrimination in the active conflict area of the Central African Republic (CAR). In line with the study’s hypotheses, VIC produced a significant increase in empathic concern for the Muslim outgroup and intentions to donate to a Muslim family, while also showing that the relationship between empathy and helping behaviours was mostly explained by confounding variables. This research provides both the first evidence of its kind that VIC could be a new form of fostering positive intergroup contact in an active conflict setting, crating a new facet of intergroup contact theory, and further evolving the literature on the empathy, prosocial behaviour relationship.","PeriodicalId":51363,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Conflict Resolution","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":3.1,"publicationDate":"2023-06-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45771213","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-06-04DOI: 10.1177/00220027231177591
Andrés F. Aponte González, Danny Hirschel-Burns, Andres D Uribe
What explains civilian victimization during civil war? Existing scholarship claims that violence against civilians is driven primarily by competition between armed actors. We argue that this explanation neglects a crucial cause of civilian victimization: in communities they rule, armed groups employ systematic violence against civilians to establish and sustain social order. Drawing on original microlevel quantitative data from Colombia, we show that areas controlled by a sole armed actor experience high levels of victimization, while places where multiple actors jointly govern exhibit significantly less violence. To explain this pattern, we draw on evidence from original interviews, focus groups, and secondary sources. We show that armed groups employ violence to govern areas they control and enact social order. But this violence is checked when multiple groups rule jointly: the factors that sustain pacted rule disincentivize victimization. These results have implications for theories of political order, violence, and governance by non-state actors.
{"title":"Contestation, Governance, and the Production of Violence Against Civilians: Coercive Political Order in Rural Colombia","authors":"Andrés F. Aponte González, Danny Hirschel-Burns, Andres D Uribe","doi":"10.1177/00220027231177591","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/00220027231177591","url":null,"abstract":"What explains civilian victimization during civil war? Existing scholarship claims that violence against civilians is driven primarily by competition between armed actors. We argue that this explanation neglects a crucial cause of civilian victimization: in communities they rule, armed groups employ systematic violence against civilians to establish and sustain social order. Drawing on original microlevel quantitative data from Colombia, we show that areas controlled by a sole armed actor experience high levels of victimization, while places where multiple actors jointly govern exhibit significantly less violence. To explain this pattern, we draw on evidence from original interviews, focus groups, and secondary sources. We show that armed groups employ violence to govern areas they control and enact social order. But this violence is checked when multiple groups rule jointly: the factors that sustain pacted rule disincentivize victimization. These results have implications for theories of political order, violence, and governance by non-state actors.","PeriodicalId":51363,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Conflict Resolution","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":3.1,"publicationDate":"2023-06-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42448404","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-05-29DOI: 10.1177/00220027231179100
Andrew C. McWard, Hohyun Yoon
Prevailing accounts of alliance formation emphasize either external threats or domestic politics, without an explicit consideration of how the two factors might interact. Instead, this paper theorizes about a specific type of interaction: coup-prevention strategies in nondemocratic regimes and external threats. Through quantitative analyses using the Alliance Treaty Obligations and Provisions (ATOP) and the State Security Forces (SSF) data, we find that “coup-proofing” reduces the probability of alliance formation when potential allies are under high external threat and that this effect is driven by the coup-proofing regime’s reduced capability to defend their allies, rather than the regime’s increased vulnerability to aggression. Furthermore, we find evidence for the interactive relationship at the negotiation stage of alliance formation. Upon entering an alliance, a coup-proofing regime facing a higher level of external threat offers more policy concessions to the ally, whereas an ally under higher threat could make fewer concessions to the coup-proofing regime. Our study highlights the way nondemocratic domestic political institutions can interact with external threat to shape states’ alliance behavior.
{"title":"Preventing Coups and Seeking Allies: The Demand and Supply of Alliances for Coup-Proofing Regimes","authors":"Andrew C. McWard, Hohyun Yoon","doi":"10.1177/00220027231179100","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/00220027231179100","url":null,"abstract":"Prevailing accounts of alliance formation emphasize either external threats or domestic politics, without an explicit consideration of how the two factors might interact. Instead, this paper theorizes about a specific type of interaction: coup-prevention strategies in nondemocratic regimes and external threats. Through quantitative analyses using the Alliance Treaty Obligations and Provisions (ATOP) and the State Security Forces (SSF) data, we find that “coup-proofing” reduces the probability of alliance formation when potential allies are under high external threat and that this effect is driven by the coup-proofing regime’s reduced capability to defend their allies, rather than the regime’s increased vulnerability to aggression. Furthermore, we find evidence for the interactive relationship at the negotiation stage of alliance formation. Upon entering an alliance, a coup-proofing regime facing a higher level of external threat offers more policy concessions to the ally, whereas an ally under higher threat could make fewer concessions to the coup-proofing regime. Our study highlights the way nondemocratic domestic political institutions can interact with external threat to shape states’ alliance behavior.","PeriodicalId":51363,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Conflict Resolution","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":3.1,"publicationDate":"2023-05-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48902305","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-05-28DOI: 10.1177/00220027231176232
Gary Uzonyi, B. W. Reeder
Rebels that fight near or capture cities gain more concessions from the government than those that remain in the periphery. Yet, not all groups challenge urban centers. Previous scholarship expects rebel strength to explain this strategic decision. However, weak rebel groups challenge cities, too. Our approach focuses on the conflict process more broadly. We argue that as the network of rebels challenging the government increases, opposition groups become more likely to attack cities as either they become emboldened, given the government’s disadvantage in multi-front wars, or they are propelled to strategic and resource centers in competition with the other groups. Statistical analysis of all African conflicts from 1989-2009 strongly supports this logic, while an exploration of most typical cases highlights each of these mechanisms in practice. This project thus links literature on civil war tactics and conflict contagion.
{"title":"Capture the Fort: Explaining the Timing of Rebel Assaults on Cities During Wartime","authors":"Gary Uzonyi, B. W. Reeder","doi":"10.1177/00220027231176232","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/00220027231176232","url":null,"abstract":"Rebels that fight near or capture cities gain more concessions from the government than those that remain in the periphery. Yet, not all groups challenge urban centers. Previous scholarship expects rebel strength to explain this strategic decision. However, weak rebel groups challenge cities, too. Our approach focuses on the conflict process more broadly. We argue that as the network of rebels challenging the government increases, opposition groups become more likely to attack cities as either they become emboldened, given the government’s disadvantage in multi-front wars, or they are propelled to strategic and resource centers in competition with the other groups. Statistical analysis of all African conflicts from 1989-2009 strongly supports this logic, while an exploration of most typical cases highlights each of these mechanisms in practice. This project thus links literature on civil war tactics and conflict contagion.","PeriodicalId":51363,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Conflict Resolution","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":3.1,"publicationDate":"2023-05-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42359327","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-05-27DOI: 10.1177/00220027231179102
Stephanie Dornschneider-Elkink, N. Henderson
Much research examines the state-dissident nexus by large-n studies and rational choice theories. This article contributes an analysis of dissident reasoning through a computational evaluation of ethnographic interviews. The analysis shows that dissident decision-making is based on tit-for-tat deliberations: Dissidents choose violent means primarily in response to violent repression, and nonviolent means in response to nonviolent repression. Ordinary citizens not participating in dissent consider positive state behavior or safety concerns instead. Consistent with arguments that state-dissident interactions are reciprocal, these findings reveal unexpected cognitive similarities between political dissent and cooperation, which is often associated with tit-for-tat deliberations. They also show the importance of state repression compared with other motivators of dissent, including perceived relative deprivation and social contagion. The findings identify heuristic patterns of reasoning which suggest that dissidents may be more open to change and, ultimately, cooperation with state authorities than what is argued by repressive states.
{"title":"Repression and Dissent: How Tit-for-Tat Leads to Violent and Nonviolent Resistance","authors":"Stephanie Dornschneider-Elkink, N. Henderson","doi":"10.1177/00220027231179102","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/00220027231179102","url":null,"abstract":"Much research examines the state-dissident nexus by large-n studies and rational choice theories. This article contributes an analysis of dissident reasoning through a computational evaluation of ethnographic interviews. The analysis shows that dissident decision-making is based on tit-for-tat deliberations: Dissidents choose violent means primarily in response to violent repression, and nonviolent means in response to nonviolent repression. Ordinary citizens not participating in dissent consider positive state behavior or safety concerns instead. Consistent with arguments that state-dissident interactions are reciprocal, these findings reveal unexpected cognitive similarities between political dissent and cooperation, which is often associated with tit-for-tat deliberations. They also show the importance of state repression compared with other motivators of dissent, including perceived relative deprivation and social contagion. The findings identify heuristic patterns of reasoning which suggest that dissidents may be more open to change and, ultimately, cooperation with state authorities than what is argued by repressive states.","PeriodicalId":51363,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Conflict Resolution","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":3.1,"publicationDate":"2023-05-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45508128","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-05-24DOI: 10.1177/00220027231177592
Rachel Myrick
Many international agreements, from routine trade deals to high-stakes nuclear agreements, are negotiated in secret. However, we have a limited understanding of how secrecy in a negotiation shapes attitudes towards the agreement. Public opinion matters because it informs government decisions about when to conceal or reveal information during a negotiation. In a survey experiment of U.S. adults, I first examine overall attitudes towards secrecy in security and economic agreements. I then randomize government justifications for negotiating in secret: improved success, protection of sensitive information, and anticipation of criticism from domestic and international opponents. I find that respondents are generally averse to secrecy in international negotiations, but there are justifications for its use that they perceive as more legitimate. Secrecy is more permissible when negotiations contain sensitive information or when it improves the likelihood that agreements are reached. It is less permissible when governments negotiate in secret to avoid domestic criticism.
{"title":"Public Reactions to Secret Negotiations in International Politics","authors":"Rachel Myrick","doi":"10.1177/00220027231177592","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/00220027231177592","url":null,"abstract":"Many international agreements, from routine trade deals to high-stakes nuclear agreements, are negotiated in secret. However, we have a limited understanding of how secrecy in a negotiation shapes attitudes towards the agreement. Public opinion matters because it informs government decisions about when to conceal or reveal information during a negotiation. In a survey experiment of U.S. adults, I first examine overall attitudes towards secrecy in security and economic agreements. I then randomize government justifications for negotiating in secret: improved success, protection of sensitive information, and anticipation of criticism from domestic and international opponents. I find that respondents are generally averse to secrecy in international negotiations, but there are justifications for its use that they perceive as more legitimate. Secrecy is more permissible when negotiations contain sensitive information or when it improves the likelihood that agreements are reached. It is less permissible when governments negotiate in secret to avoid domestic criticism.","PeriodicalId":51363,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Conflict Resolution","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":3.1,"publicationDate":"2023-05-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47873300","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
京公网安备 11010802042870号
京ICP备2023020795号-1
扫码关注我们
求助内容：
应助结果提醒方式：