Jcms-Journal of Common Market Studies最新文献

The global financial crisis in 2007 and, more recently, the Covid-19 pandemic renewed interest in capitalist divergence and the evolution of growth models in the Eurozone. The varieties of capitalism (VoC) approach and more recently post-Keynesian research, especially the growth model (GM) perspective, have made important contributions to comparative political economy. However, the focus on either the ‘supply-side’ or ‘demand-side’ aspects of modern models of capitalism has offered a limited framework to explain capitalist diversity in the global economy. This article brings insights from both the VoC and GM perspectives and provides a more comprehensive understanding of the evolution of the growth models in Greece and Portugal. The argument is that although both countries implemented internal devaluation and contractionary policies to curtail domestic demand and transform their economies into export-led ones, they have been stuck in a suppressed demand-led growth model since the global financial crisis.

The European Union's (EU) regulatory power is an increasing focus of scholarly attention, but the lack of a consistent definition leaves room for refinement. Studies investigating the EU's role as a global regulatory actor yield different interpretations, some viewing the EU as a global market regulator, some as a power residing in the trade–regulatory nexus and others as a law-making entity that creates widely emulated rules. This article refines the definition of the EU's regulatory power by presenting a conceptual framework for better understanding the EU's regulatory actorness, encompassing its ends and means as a general regulator and/or a regulatory power. Using the proposed framework to analyse the transfer of EU geographical indication (GI) rules to Japan, this study finds that the EU's regulatory power is particularly conditioned on the interest constellation between the EU and a third country. Regarding the EU's goal of exercising regulatory power, interest promotion seems to take priority over rule exporting or norm sharing.

The project of European integration has been battered by repeated crises since the turn of the second millennium. However, in contrast to earlier periods in its history, when it responded to difficulties by adding new competencies to its repertoire of powers, since 2000, the deepening of integration has stalled. This article addresses why this is happening – and why this is happening now, 70 years after the foundation of the European Communities – using the paradigm of collective memory. More specifically, I argue that generational dynamics are crucial for understanding development of European integration. I identify and analyse the memories of three cohorts of leaders: the ‘founders’ of the 1950s, the ‘deepeners’ of the 1980s and 1990s and the current generation of ‘sceptics’. Based on this analysis, I conclude that debates about the European Union's (EU's) finalité politique should be set aside until a younger, more pro-European cohort of leaders has come to power.

Sanctions are increasingly prominent foreign policy tools, but research on the policy process that leads to specific sanction design is limited. Sanctions can have unintended effects on the provision of humanitarian aid in sanctioned countries, which has led to calls for humanitarian exceptions in sanction design. This study focuses on non-governmental organizations' (NGOs) advocacy for a humanitarian perspective on European Union (EU) sanctions in the period 2020–2021. Building on the Advocacy Coalition Framework and the triangulation of qualitative data sources including interviews and document analysis, this study describes an advocacy coalition of humanitarian NGOs in Brussels, their advocacy strategies and the effectiveness of these strategies. The analysis highlights the coalition's common policy beliefs and documents three advocacy strategies: coalition building, knowledge leadership and lobbying. The analysis then traces the link between these strategies and recent policy changes, namely, clearer European Commission guidelines on the implementation of humanitarian derogations. This policy change was further facilitated by policy brokers and an external shock, the Covid-19 pandemic. The findings shed light on an understudied design feature of sanctions, i.e., humanitarian exceptions, and on the role of non-governmental actors in shaping sanction designs.

European regulatory co-operation has become essential for the smooth operation of the single market, and this in turn requires trust. In the case of the European Union (EU) ‘Undertakings for Collective Investment in Transferable Securities’ (UCITS) Directive, for example, the member states' financial supervisory authorities rely on each other to provide a harmonised regime for the sale of investment funds across the EU. Funds authorised in one member state can be sold freely in another member state without further authorisation. The national authorities need to trust each other to ensure a consistent application of EU law. Yet we know very little about how trust matters from the perspective of member state regulators. In this article, we provide a better understanding of the relevant components of trust in the single market in financial services through an in-depth case study of an EU network of national financial market supervisory authorities.

Against the backdrop of intensifying United States–China strategic competition, the European Union (EU) has recently changed course and moved closer to mirroring US rhetoric and action on China. Why has this happened, and how can it be best explained? In this article, it is argued that current role dynamics between the EU and the two rival great powers can help us understand the growing, albeit not full, EU–United States alignment on China. Role theory assumes that co-operation between actors intensifies when their roles become more compatible. Accordingly, it is shown that the EU has recently adjusted its role to be more closely aligned with the United States' position. That is to say, the EU has reshaped its own role conception, whilst the bloc has likewise become more open to meeting US role expectations after EU–United States role-playing turned positive once again under President Joe Biden.

This contribution to the symposium explores one aspect of the arrival of planetary politics under the broad label of the third democratic transformation, a transformation unfolding now at all levels of governance, from the local to the global through the regional, in spite of the anti-democratic forces at play around the world. This article starts by exploring the new frontier of normative power Europe in a post-colonial key, arguing that the European Union can serve as a laboratory for such a democratic transformation, around four interrogations related to claims of decentring, doubting, experimenting and decolonising. It then offers a descriptive-normative typology of the core attributes of the third democratic transformation observable in numerous signs and practices both in Europe and around the world through a sixfold evolution, namely, trans-temporal, transnational, trans-modal, trans-local, trans-scalar and, across all these, translational. It concludes on the conditions of possibility for this transformation.

Spendzharova, A. (2023) Gouvernement Économique, but Not Like in the 1990s: The Commission and the ECB's Policies Advancing the ‘Green Transition’. JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies, 61: 136–146. https://doi.org/10.1111/jcms.13541

[… and NGEU accounts for €806.9 million to supplement the regular EU budget. Furthermore, NGEU funding has been earmarked to top up the following MFF budgetary headings (in order of magnitude of the contribution): ‘Cohesion, Resilience and Values’ – €426.7 million (+ €776.5 from NGEU); ‘Natural Resources and Environment’ – €401 million (+ 18.9 from NGEU); and ‘Single Market, Innovation and Digital’ – €149.5 (+ €11.5 from NGEU).]

In the two sentences above ‘million’ should be ‘billion’, and the sentences should read:

‘… and NGEU accounts for €806.9 billion to supplement the regular EU budget. Furthermore, NGEU funding has been earmarked to top up the following MFF budgetary headings (in order of magnitude of the contribution): ‘Cohesion, Resilience and Values' – €426.7 billion (+ €776.5 billion from NGEU); ‘Natural Resources and Environment’ – €401 billion (+ 18.9 billion from NGEU); and ‘Single Market, Innovation and Digital’ – €149.5 billion (+ €11.5 billion from NGEU).’

We apologize for this error.

This article, drawing on Third World Approaches to International Law (TWAIL) and embracing the decentring agenda in European Union (EU) external relations, discusses the substance of human rights promotion in the negotiations of the Samoa Agreement. It documents how the EU has concentrated on civil and political rights, whereas Africa has advanced an innovative approach to economic, social and cultural rights underpinned by the right to development. More importantly, going beyond the ‘heaven–hell binary’, which draws neat lines between the good North and the bad South, and the ‘one-way traffic paradigm’, which claims that human rights flow from the North to the South, it shows that the human rights corpus may be slowly evolving from its paradigmatic western orientation towards a truly universal project: the EU and Africa have started recognising each other as being holders of diverse yet legitimate perspectives on human rights.

European Union (EU) policies were long enforced according to a well-established framework in which member state governments made legislative, administrative and operational arrangements for realizing policies made in Brussels. EU legislators, however, are increasingly creating EU agencies to help enforce EU policies. This article attempts to explain this puzzling development, as it examines how the establishment of EU enforcement agencies by EU legislators relates to the well-established role of member states. This article relies on case studies of the European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) and the European Medicines Agency (EMA). These case studies show that, during the establishment of those agencies, the member state enforcement framework provided institutional stability on the one hand yet facilitated institutional change on the other. This institutionalist account of EU agency establishment supplements functional and political ones that have so far prevailed in the academic discourse.