In this article, we bring together a variety of studies, both old and new, to examine continuity and change in population dynamics in Italy during the medieval millennium (476–1492 AD). Though the available data are often sporadic and should be interpreted with great caution, it is possible to clarify certain dynamics, which can be useful for guiding future research. First, population fluctuations were not impacted by migration into or out of Italy. Second, medieval Italy was characterized by a high‐pressure demographic regime: e0 was around 20 years, with high adult mortality, and the birth rate was around 50 per mill. Third, despite high mortality, the Italian population grew (+50 percent) from the ninth century to 1347, mainly—but not exclusively—due to the absence of plague. Fourth, the stagnant population of the periods between the sixth and the eighth centuries and the 14th and 16th centuries was determined by the recurrent outbreaks of plague. Fifth, the population stagnation during the first and the last medieval centuries is also partly related to the increase in age at first marriage, while the demographic growth between the ninth and mid‐14th century is possibly connected to the decrease in age at first marriage among women. Sixth, the vitality of the medieval Italian population was partly ensured by a high rate of remarriage among widows. Seventh, data on statures show that mortality levels were determined by epidemic factors, rather than living standards. Finally, when the plague ceased in Europe in the middle of the Early Modern Age, adult survival was significantly higher than in the ancient and medieval centuries, despite the fact that neither hygienic‐sanitary nor epidemiological conditions, and certainly not nutrition, were better than in the centuries preceding the Black Death.
{"title":"Demographic Systems of Medieval Italy (6th–15th century AD)","authors":"Irene Barbiera, Gianpiero Dalla‐Zuanna","doi":"10.1111/padr.12611","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/padr.12611","url":null,"abstract":"In this article, we bring together a variety of studies, both old and new, to examine continuity and change in population dynamics in Italy during the medieval millennium (476–1492 AD). Though the available data are often sporadic and should be interpreted with great caution, it is possible to clarify certain dynamics, which can be useful for guiding future research. First, population fluctuations were not impacted by migration into or out of Italy. Second, medieval Italy was characterized by a high‐pressure demographic regime: <jats:italic>e</jats:italic><jats:sub>0</jats:sub> was around 20 years, with high adult mortality, and the birth rate was around 50 per mill. Third, despite high mortality, the Italian population grew (+50 percent) from the ninth century to 1347, mainly—but not exclusively—due to the absence of plague. Fourth, the stagnant population of the periods between the sixth and the eighth centuries and the 14th and 16th centuries was determined by the recurrent outbreaks of plague. Fifth, the population stagnation during the first and the last medieval centuries is also partly related to the increase in age at first marriage, while the demographic growth between the ninth and mid‐14th century is possibly connected to the decrease in age at first marriage among women. Sixth, the vitality of the medieval Italian population was partly ensured by a high rate of remarriage among widows. Seventh, data on statures show that mortality levels were determined by epidemic factors, rather than living standards. Finally, when the plague ceased in Europe in the middle of the Early Modern Age, adult survival was significantly higher than in the ancient and medieval centuries, despite the fact that neither hygienic‐sanitary nor epidemiological conditions, and certainly not nutrition, were better than in the centuries preceding the Black Death.","PeriodicalId":51372,"journal":{"name":"Population and Development Review","volume":"82 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.5,"publicationDate":"2024-03-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140069835","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"ACKNOWLEDGMENTS","authors":"","doi":"10.1111/padr.12617","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/padr.12617","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":51372,"journal":{"name":"Population and Development Review","volume":"21 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.5,"publicationDate":"2024-03-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140053627","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Reconciling Family Aspirations and Paid Work in the European Union","authors":"","doi":"10.1111/padr.12615","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/padr.12615","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":51372,"journal":{"name":"Population and Development Review","volume":"21 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.5,"publicationDate":"2024-02-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140015606","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In low- and middle-income countries, significant differences in fertility beliefs between rural and urban areas arise from the differential timing and pace of fertility declines. Demographers have long hypothesized about the diffusion of these beliefs and behaviors from urban to rural areas, potentially via temporary rural–urban labor migration. In this paper, we investigate the association between temporary internal migration from rural Senegal to the capital city, Dakar, and differences in the fertility and contraceptive beliefs and preferences of migrants and nonmigrants. We test socialization, selection, and adaptation hypotheses by comparing the fertility ideation of current and returning migrants with that of nonmigrants and future migrants from their place of origin. Our results support selection effects, explaining half of the differences between nonmigrants and migrants. Once selection effects are removed, significant differences remain between nonmigrants and current or returning migrants. These differences are largely explained by two complementary measures of adaptation: years lived in Dakar and the number of ties to residents of that city. The results indicate that adaptation is as important, if not more so than selection in explaining differences between migrants and nonmigrants. This holds true even for returned migrants five years after their last migration spell. Of the two potential adaptation mechanisms explored, the time spent in Dakar generally explained adaptation better than ties to nonmigrants in Dakar. However, our complementary analyses do not rule out the importance of urban networks on fertility, as they contribute to migrant selection.
{"title":"Rural–Urban Migration and Fertility Ideation in Senegal: Comparing Returned, Current, and Future Migrants to Dakar to Rural Nonmigrants","authors":"Yacine Boujija, Simona Bignami, John Sandberg","doi":"10.1111/padr.12609","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/padr.12609","url":null,"abstract":"In low- and middle-income countries, significant differences in fertility beliefs between rural and urban areas arise from the differential timing and pace of fertility declines. Demographers have long hypothesized about the diffusion of these beliefs and behaviors from urban to rural areas, potentially via temporary rural–urban labor migration. In this paper, we investigate the association between temporary internal migration from rural Senegal to the capital city, Dakar, and differences in the fertility and contraceptive beliefs and preferences of migrants and nonmigrants. We test socialization, selection, and adaptation hypotheses by comparing the fertility ideation of current and returning migrants with that of nonmigrants and future migrants from their place of origin. Our results support selection effects, explaining half of the differences between nonmigrants and migrants. Once selection effects are removed, significant differences remain between nonmigrants and current or returning migrants. These differences are largely explained by two complementary measures of adaptation: years lived in Dakar and the number of ties to residents of that city. The results indicate that adaptation is as important, if not more so than selection in explaining differences between migrants and nonmigrants. This holds true even for returned migrants five years after their last migration spell. Of the two potential adaptation mechanisms explored, the time spent in Dakar generally explained adaptation better than ties to nonmigrants in Dakar. However, our complementary analyses do not rule out the importance of urban networks on fertility, as they contribute to migrant selection.","PeriodicalId":51372,"journal":{"name":"Population and Development Review","volume":"83 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.5,"publicationDate":"2024-02-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139988562","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
<p>When I picked up <i>Demographic Deception</i> by Dustin Whitney, I had a sense of unease. The title led me to expect a book in the “popular demography” genre; a genre to which unfortunately few trained demographers contribute and which has frequently been a platform for authors proffering “simple” demographic solutions to global ills, with sometimes far-reaching appeal and dangerous consequences.</p> <p>However, it would be a mistake to judge this book by its title. Whitney (“a curious businessman with a particular interest in the future”) may be writing from outside of academic demography and in a popular style but his reading of the field is well-referenced and carefully navigated. He explores big demographic issues and their intersections with other global forces in an even-handed, restrained, and thoughtful way. The general argument of the book is that rather than being concerned about population growth (the eponymous “deception” in the title), we should rather focus more on depopulation and aging as we move further into the twenty-first century. The first few chapters consider population growth and its associated panic, then discuss how the population is modeled followed by the story of how the “population bomb” was diffused. Then follows a balanced comparison between the “good and bad news” about population decline and the typical responses which are proposed, namely raising fertility, engaging older persons, and immigration.</p> <p>Unlike many other protagonists writing in the field, Whitney does not seem to be grounded in any strong political or cultural ideology but rather takes a fairly centrist view. This, in itself, is quite encouraging. The chapter on raising fertility is excellent on the downsides of pronatalism and ultimately lands on a rights-based approach. The approach is epitomized by the quote by Shepherd and Li that “While having a child should be everyone's right, it isn't anyone's responsibility.” The chapter on enabling work in older ages is a wide-ranging consideration of the barriers to work as part of older age and what can be done to remove them such as tackling agism head-on, embracing gerontechnology, adapting work systems, and so on. While many writers with more nationalistic tendencies bristle at the idea of immigration as potentially mitigating some of the effects of population aging, Whitney is more open to maximizing the potential role of immigration in offsetting some of the economic and social challenges of population aging and decline, embracing the idea of a kind of global HR firm which ‘recruits, prepares, places, protects’ migrant workers. I really appreciated the chapter on the role of business, too; this is an often-overlooked aspect in popular discussions of falling birth rates which usually lay all of the blame (and responsibility for change) on either governments or families. Business, Whitney argues, has to get better at accommodating older workers, supporting working parents, making better use of
{"title":"Dustin Whitney Demographic Deception: Exposing the Overpopulation Myth and Building a Resilient Future Advantage Books, 2023, 148 p., $29.99.","authors":"STUART GIETEL-BASTEN","doi":"10.1111/padr.12616","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/padr.12616","url":null,"abstract":"<p>When I picked up <i>Demographic Deception</i> by Dustin Whitney, I had a sense of unease. The title led me to expect a book in the “popular demography” genre; a genre to which unfortunately few trained demographers contribute and which has frequently been a platform for authors proffering “simple” demographic solutions to global ills, with sometimes far-reaching appeal and dangerous consequences.</p>\u0000<p>However, it would be a mistake to judge this book by its title. Whitney (“a curious businessman with a particular interest in the future”) may be writing from outside of academic demography and in a popular style but his reading of the field is well-referenced and carefully navigated. He explores big demographic issues and their intersections with other global forces in an even-handed, restrained, and thoughtful way. The general argument of the book is that rather than being concerned about population growth (the eponymous “deception” in the title), we should rather focus more on depopulation and aging as we move further into the twenty-first century. The first few chapters consider population growth and its associated panic, then discuss how the population is modeled followed by the story of how the “population bomb” was diffused. Then follows a balanced comparison between the “good and bad news” about population decline and the typical responses which are proposed, namely raising fertility, engaging older persons, and immigration.</p>\u0000<p>Unlike many other protagonists writing in the field, Whitney does not seem to be grounded in any strong political or cultural ideology but rather takes a fairly centrist view. This, in itself, is quite encouraging. The chapter on raising fertility is excellent on the downsides of pronatalism and ultimately lands on a rights-based approach. The approach is epitomized by the quote by Shepherd and Li that “While having a child should be everyone's right, it isn't anyone's responsibility.” The chapter on enabling work in older ages is a wide-ranging consideration of the barriers to work as part of older age and what can be done to remove them such as tackling agism head-on, embracing gerontechnology, adapting work systems, and so on. While many writers with more nationalistic tendencies bristle at the idea of immigration as potentially mitigating some of the effects of population aging, Whitney is more open to maximizing the potential role of immigration in offsetting some of the economic and social challenges of population aging and decline, embracing the idea of a kind of global HR firm which ‘recruits, prepares, places, protects’ migrant workers. I really appreciated the chapter on the role of business, too; this is an often-overlooked aspect in popular discussions of falling birth rates which usually lay all of the blame (and responsibility for change) on either governments or families. Business, Whitney argues, has to get better at accommodating older workers, supporting working parents, making better use of","PeriodicalId":51372,"journal":{"name":"Population and Development Review","volume":"466 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.5,"publicationDate":"2024-02-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139988567","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Stalls in fertility decline have been found in many sub‐Saharan African countries. Our objective is to unravel the relationship between education and stalled fertility by analyzing the extent to which fertility stalls reflect a lack of changes in the educational composition of the population or are related to reversals and halts in the fertility decline within educational groups. Using the Demographic and Health Surveys and Multiple Indicator Cluster Surveys, we first estimate total fertility rates by educational level and examine how they have varied over time, especially during periods of stagnation. Then, we use the Kitagawa decomposition method to analyze changes in country‐level fertility rates. We show that fertility stalls tend to be a collective experience with fertility stalls found among all educational groups in most countries that have experienced a fertility stall. In contrast, composition effects either have no or a limited impact on fertility stalls. However, slow educational progress made some countries more vulnerable to stalls.
{"title":"Disruptions in Educational Progress and Fertility Dynamics by Educational Level: Unraveling the Link between Education and Fertility Stalls in Sub‐Saharan Africa","authors":"Bruno D. Schoumaker, David A. Sánchez‐Páez","doi":"10.1111/padr.12610","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/padr.12610","url":null,"abstract":"Stalls in fertility decline have been found in many sub‐Saharan African countries. Our objective is to unravel the relationship between education and stalled fertility by analyzing the extent to which fertility stalls reflect a lack of changes in the educational composition of the population or are related to reversals and halts in the fertility decline within educational groups. Using the Demographic and Health Surveys and Multiple Indicator Cluster Surveys, we first estimate total fertility rates by educational level and examine how they have varied over time, especially during periods of stagnation. Then, we use the Kitagawa decomposition method to analyze changes in country‐level fertility rates. We show that fertility stalls tend to be a collective experience with fertility stalls found among all educational groups in most countries that have experienced a fertility stall. In contrast, composition effects either have no or a limited impact on fertility stalls. However, slow educational progress made some countries more vulnerable to stalls.","PeriodicalId":51372,"journal":{"name":"Population and Development Review","volume":"48 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.5,"publicationDate":"2024-02-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139939033","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Expansion in access to public infrastructure can have varied, microlevel impacts. In this paper, we use a discrete and quasi-random change in the access to paved roads through a large-scale rural road construction program in India to study how road access impacts fertility decisions and investments in child health. We find that increased access to paved roads at the district level decreases fertility, improves investments in children, and lowers infant mortality. We also provide evidence that highlights the mechanisms that drive this effect. First, we show that local roads improve access to health care facilities and raise immunization rates, which reduces infant mortality. Then, we demonstrate that last-mile road connectivity has contrasting effects on employment across gender. Overall, the evidence suggests that rural roads can help accelerate demographic transition through their effects on fertility and infant mortality.
{"title":"Road Access, Fertility, and Child Health in Rural India","authors":"Aparajita Dasgupta, Anahita Karandikar, Devvrat Raghav","doi":"10.1111/padr.12604","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/padr.12604","url":null,"abstract":"Expansion in access to public infrastructure can have varied, microlevel impacts. In this paper, we use a discrete and quasi-random change in the access to paved roads through a large-scale rural road construction program in India to study how road access impacts fertility decisions and investments in child health. We find that increased access to paved roads at the district level decreases fertility, improves investments in children, and lowers infant mortality. We also provide evidence that highlights the mechanisms that drive this effect. First, we show that local roads improve access to health care facilities and raise immunization rates, which reduces infant mortality. Then, we demonstrate that last-mile road connectivity has contrasting effects on employment across gender. Overall, the evidence suggests that rural roads can help accelerate demographic transition through their effects on fertility and infant mortality.","PeriodicalId":51372,"journal":{"name":"Population and Development Review","volume":"254 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.5,"publicationDate":"2024-02-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139750373","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Most people coreside with other kin in private households while others live alone. The incidence of coresidence with kin and solo living varies noticeably across societies. Scholars have long theorized about the role of modernization and cultural change for living arrangements, suggesting a trend toward the nuclearization of households (coresidence only with primary kin) or solo living as societies attain higher levels of development. There is little empirical evidence about global variations in living arrangements and about how such variations unfold at different levels of development. Here we address these fundamental questions. Using IPUMS census microdata for 279 samples and 90 countries, we develop a new metric for assessing the part of the lifetime a person can expect to reside with primary kin, nonprimary kin, or alone assuming exposure rates, from birth to death, to the living arrangements observed in a given year. Results show that coresidence patterns differ substantially across societies, with exposure to primary kin alone and to solo living substantially higher at higher levels of development (as measured with Human Development Index [HDI]). They also reveal a sustained decline in coresidence with nonprimary kin and/or with others nearly everywhere, supporting the idea of an increasing importance of nuclear living arrangements. This trend is most pronounced at medium levels of HDI. At very high levels of development, nuclear family coresidence tends to be stalling or is in decline in favor of more time spent living alone and, rather unexpectedly, to a modest increase in exposure to nonprimary kin within the household. We suggest different interpretations for these results.
{"title":"Trends in Living Arrangements Around the World","authors":"Albert Esteve, David S. Reher","doi":"10.1111/padr.12603","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/padr.12603","url":null,"abstract":"Most people coreside with other kin in private households while others live alone. The incidence of coresidence with kin and solo living varies noticeably across societies. Scholars have long theorized about the role of modernization and cultural change for living arrangements, suggesting a trend toward the nuclearization of households (coresidence only with primary kin) or solo living as societies attain higher levels of development. There is little empirical evidence about global variations in living arrangements and about how such variations unfold at different levels of development. Here we address these fundamental questions. Using IPUMS census microdata for 279 samples and 90 countries, we develop a new metric for assessing the part of the lifetime a person can expect to reside with primary kin, nonprimary kin, or alone assuming exposure rates, from birth to death, to the living arrangements observed in a given year. Results show that coresidence patterns differ substantially across societies, with exposure to primary kin alone and to solo living substantially higher at higher levels of development (as measured with Human Development Index [HDI]). They also reveal a sustained decline in coresidence with nonprimary kin and/or with others nearly everywhere, supporting the idea of an increasing importance of nuclear living arrangements. This trend is most pronounced at medium levels of HDI. At very high levels of development, nuclear family coresidence tends to be stalling or is in decline in favor of more time spent living alone and, rather unexpectedly, to a modest increase in exposure to nonprimary kin within the household. We suggest different interpretations for these results.","PeriodicalId":51372,"journal":{"name":"Population and Development Review","volume":"16 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.5,"publicationDate":"2024-02-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139696317","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Although considerable gains in survival have been observed in developed countries, particularly in the last stretch of life, part of these additional years of life are lived in bad health. In this context, a number of actions/inactions that limit or may limit life span are becoming increasingly common. Demography and quantitative sociology are well-positioned to make a significant contribution to the measurement of the consistency of different end-of-life interventions, to the examination of differences over time, space and among different social groups, and to the analysis of the behaviors and attitudes of different stakeholders (the sufferers, their relatives, health care personnel, public opinion). We focus here on euthanasia and assisted suicide (EAS). First, we discuss changes in public opinion on EAS in developed countries. Second, we analyze the diffusion and temporal trends of EAS, with a particular focus on Switzerland, the Netherlands, and Belgium; three countries for which it is also possible to consider the connections between the diffusion of EAS and palliative care. Third, we consider several differential aspects of the spread of EAS (mainly by sex, age, and cause of death).
{"title":"Data and Trends in Assisted Suicide and Euthanasia, and Some Related Demographic Issues","authors":"Asher D. Colombo, Gianpiero Dalla-Zuanna","doi":"10.1111/padr.12605","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/padr.12605","url":null,"abstract":"Although considerable gains in survival have been observed in developed countries, particularly in the last stretch of life, part of these additional years of life are lived in bad health. In this context, a number of actions/inactions that limit or may limit life span are becoming increasingly common. Demography and quantitative sociology are well-positioned to make a significant contribution to the measurement of the consistency of different end-of-life interventions, to the examination of differences over time, space and among different social groups, and to the analysis of the behaviors and attitudes of different stakeholders (the sufferers, their relatives, health care personnel, public opinion). We focus here on euthanasia and assisted suicide (EAS). First, we discuss changes in public opinion on EAS in developed countries. Second, we analyze the diffusion and temporal trends of EAS, with a particular focus on Switzerland, the Netherlands, and Belgium; three countries for which it is also possible to consider the connections between the diffusion of EAS and palliative care. Third, we consider several differential aspects of the spread of EAS (mainly by sex, age, and cause of death).","PeriodicalId":51372,"journal":{"name":"Population and Development Review","volume":"104 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.5,"publicationDate":"2024-01-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139568381","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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