Pub Date : 2022-01-27DOI: 10.1080/15298868.2022.2030400
V. Talwar, Melisa Castellanos, S. Bosacki
ABSTRACT The current study examined the longitudinal association of social cognition (Theory of Mind, empathy) and self-affect (self-conscious emotions) with 99 adolescents’ positive and negative dimensions of self-compassion over two years (T1: 10.75 years, T2: 12.08 years). For the total sample, analysis showed no relations among variables, but separate gender analysis revealed differences in correlational patterns. For boys only, self-coldness negatively predicted affective Theory of Mind or the ability to recognize emotions in others. For girls only, affective Theory of Mind predicted an increase in blaming others for transgressions. Higher levels of the ability to recognize emotions in others failed to foster self-kindness and compassion. Decoding others’ emotions may protect adolescent girls from self-judgement, and boys from self-coldness.
{"title":"Self-compassion, social cognition, and self-affect in adolescence: A longitudinal study","authors":"V. Talwar, Melisa Castellanos, S. Bosacki","doi":"10.1080/15298868.2022.2030400","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/15298868.2022.2030400","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT The current study examined the longitudinal association of social cognition (Theory of Mind, empathy) and self-affect (self-conscious emotions) with 99 adolescents’ positive and negative dimensions of self-compassion over two years (T1: 10.75 years, T2: 12.08 years). For the total sample, analysis showed no relations among variables, but separate gender analysis revealed differences in correlational patterns. For boys only, self-coldness negatively predicted affective Theory of Mind or the ability to recognize emotions in others. For girls only, affective Theory of Mind predicted an increase in blaming others for transgressions. Higher levels of the ability to recognize emotions in others failed to foster self-kindness and compassion. Decoding others’ emotions may protect adolescent girls from self-judgement, and boys from self-coldness.","PeriodicalId":51426,"journal":{"name":"Self and Identity","volume":"22 1","pages":"58 - 76"},"PeriodicalIF":2.0,"publicationDate":"2022-01-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44715057","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-01-22DOI: 10.1080/15298868.2022.2033309
Gulnaz Kiper, M. Atari, Veronica X. Yan, D. Oyserman
ABSTRACT We used IBM theory and the COVID-19 pandemic to test the prediction that how people respond to all-encompassing life difficulties requiring novel difficult tasks/goals is a function of what they infer about their identities from these experiences of difficulty (N = 698 U.S. adults, three datasets). People were more likely to see silver linings if they experienced difficulties with a task/goal as implying its importance and life difficulties as opportunities for self-improvement. People who endorsed difficulty-as-importance were more likely to mask, distance, and wash hands in part because they saw silver linings for themselves in the pandemic; for difficulty-as-improvement, silver linings fully mediated these effects. People apply their difficulty-as-importance and difficulty-as-improvement mindsets to cope with novel life difficulties.
{"title":"The upside: How people make sense of difficulty matters during a crisis","authors":"Gulnaz Kiper, M. Atari, Veronica X. Yan, D. Oyserman","doi":"10.1080/15298868.2022.2033309","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/15298868.2022.2033309","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT We used IBM theory and the COVID-19 pandemic to test the prediction that how people respond to all-encompassing life difficulties requiring novel difficult tasks/goals is a function of what they infer about their identities from these experiences of difficulty (N = 698 U.S. adults, three datasets). People were more likely to see silver linings if they experienced difficulties with a task/goal as implying its importance and life difficulties as opportunities for self-improvement. People who endorsed difficulty-as-importance were more likely to mask, distance, and wash hands in part because they saw silver linings for themselves in the pandemic; for difficulty-as-improvement, silver linings fully mediated these effects. People apply their difficulty-as-importance and difficulty-as-improvement mindsets to cope with novel life difficulties.","PeriodicalId":51426,"journal":{"name":"Self and Identity","volume":"22 1","pages":"19 - 41"},"PeriodicalIF":2.0,"publicationDate":"2022-01-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46819006","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-01-20DOI: 10.1080/15298868.2022.2029553
Abby S. Boytos, Kristi A. Costabile, Tessa R. Logan
ABSTRACT The current investigation examined how experiencing a shared reality during the social reconstruction of the past might relate to communicators’ perceived authenticity and self-esteem. In two experiments, participants were randomly assigned to describe an autobiographical memory to an audience who had either a positive or negative attitude toward the memory topic. Participants then reported perceptions of shared reality, authenticity, and self-esteem. Across both experiments, experiencing a shared reality with an audience who held a positive attitude was associated with greater self-perceived authenticity and self-esteem, whereas experiencing a shared reality with an audience who held a negative attitude was associated with lower ratings of authenticity and lower self-esteem. The effect of shared reality on self-esteem was mediated by perceptions of authenticity.
{"title":"Describing autobiographical memories: Effects of shared reality and audience attitude valence on perceived authenticity and self-esteem","authors":"Abby S. Boytos, Kristi A. Costabile, Tessa R. Logan","doi":"10.1080/15298868.2022.2029553","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/15298868.2022.2029553","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT The current investigation examined how experiencing a shared reality during the social reconstruction of the past might relate to communicators’ perceived authenticity and self-esteem. In two experiments, participants were randomly assigned to describe an autobiographical memory to an audience who had either a positive or negative attitude toward the memory topic. Participants then reported perceptions of shared reality, authenticity, and self-esteem. Across both experiments, experiencing a shared reality with an audience who held a positive attitude was associated with greater self-perceived authenticity and self-esteem, whereas experiencing a shared reality with an audience who held a negative attitude was associated with lower ratings of authenticity and lower self-esteem. The effect of shared reality on self-esteem was mediated by perceptions of authenticity.","PeriodicalId":51426,"journal":{"name":"Self and Identity","volume":"22 1","pages":"77 - 101"},"PeriodicalIF":2.0,"publicationDate":"2022-01-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42656142","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-01-13DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780192843432.003.0001
T. Merricks
This chapter describes the overall line of argument of Self and Identity. It also introduces the two questions around which Self and Identity revolves. These are The What Question: What is it for a person at a future time to have (at that time) what matters in survival for you? And The Why Question: What way of being related to a (conscious) person at a future time explains why that person will have (at that time) what matters in survival for you? This chapter also argues that the What Question is distinct from the Why Question, and that these questions have different answers.
{"title":"Introduction","authors":"T. Merricks","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780192843432.003.0001","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780192843432.003.0001","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter describes the overall line of argument of Self and Identity. It also introduces the two questions around which Self and Identity revolves. These are The What Question: What is it for a person at a future time to have (at that time) what matters in survival for you? And The Why Question: What way of being related to a (conscious) person at a future time explains why that person will have (at that time) what matters in survival for you? This chapter also argues that the What Question is distinct from the Why Question, and that these questions have different answers.","PeriodicalId":51426,"journal":{"name":"Self and Identity","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.0,"publicationDate":"2022-01-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49363088","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-01-13DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780192843432.003.0002
T. Merricks
Consider: The What Question: What is it for a person at a future time to have (at that time) what matters in survival for you? This chapter begins by clarifying the ideas that are invoked in my answer to the What Question. Then I motivate my answer, which is: its being appropriate for you to first-personally anticipate the experiences that that person will have at that future time; and if that person will have good (or bad) experiences at that future time, its being appropriate for you to have future-directed self-interested concern with regard to those experiences. This chapter also distinguishes the What Question from other questions with which it might be conflated.
{"title":"What Matters in Survival","authors":"T. Merricks","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780192843432.003.0002","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780192843432.003.0002","url":null,"abstract":"Consider: The What Question: What is it for a person at a future time to have (at that time) what matters in survival for you? This chapter begins by clarifying the ideas that are invoked in my answer to the What Question. Then I motivate my answer, which is: its being appropriate for you to first-personally anticipate the experiences that that person will have at that future time; and if that person will have good (or bad) experiences at that future time, its being appropriate for you to have future-directed self-interested concern with regard to those experiences. This chapter also distinguishes the What Question from other questions with which it might be conflated.","PeriodicalId":51426,"journal":{"name":"Self and Identity","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.0,"publicationDate":"2022-01-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49448937","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-01-13DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780192843432.003.0004
T. Merricks
This chapter defends the claim that every good answer to the following question implies being numerically identical with: The Why Question: What way of being related to a (conscious) person at a future time explains why that person will have (at that time) what matters in survival for you? So this chapter defends the claim that personal identity is necessary for what matters in survival. This chapter also shows that Derek Parfit’s famous argument to the contrary fails. But there is no single way in which Parfit’s argument uncontroversially goes wrong. Rather, the way in which that argument fails depends on this or that controversial metaphysics of persistence. So that argument fails in one way given endurance, and it fails in a different way given (for example) stage theory. Most importantly, there is no metaphysics of persistence on which that argument succeeds.
{"title":"On the Necessity of Personal Identity","authors":"T. Merricks","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780192843432.003.0004","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780192843432.003.0004","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter defends the claim that every good answer to the following question implies being numerically identical with: The Why Question: What way of being related to a (conscious) person at a future time explains why that person will have (at that time) what matters in survival for you? So this chapter defends the claim that personal identity is necessary for what matters in survival. This chapter also shows that Derek Parfit’s famous argument to the contrary fails. But there is no single way in which Parfit’s argument uncontroversially goes wrong. Rather, the way in which that argument fails depends on this or that controversial metaphysics of persistence. So that argument fails in one way given endurance, and it fails in a different way given (for example) stage theory. Most importantly, there is no metaphysics of persistence on which that argument succeeds.","PeriodicalId":51426,"journal":{"name":"Self and Identity","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.0,"publicationDate":"2022-01-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43561507","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-01-13DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780192843432.003.0003
T. Merricks
This chapter defends my answer to: The Why Question: What way of being related to a (conscious) person at a future time explains why that person will have (at that time) what matters in survival for you? My answer is numerical identity. That is, I say that your being numerically identical with a (conscious) person at a future time explains why that person will have (at that time) what matters in survival for you. This answer is controversial. For this answer implies that your being numerically identical with a person at a future time explains why it is appropriate for you to first-personally anticipate, and have future-directed self-interested concern with regard to, the experiences that that person will have at that time.
{"title":"On the Sufficiency of Personal Identity","authors":"T. Merricks","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780192843432.003.0003","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780192843432.003.0003","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter defends my answer to: The Why Question: What way of being related to a (conscious) person at a future time explains why that person will have (at that time) what matters in survival for you? My answer is numerical identity. That is, I say that your being numerically identical with a (conscious) person at a future time explains why that person will have (at that time) what matters in survival for you. This answer is controversial. For this answer implies that your being numerically identical with a person at a future time explains why it is appropriate for you to first-personally anticipate, and have future-directed self-interested concern with regard to, the experiences that that person will have at that time.","PeriodicalId":51426,"journal":{"name":"Self and Identity","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.0,"publicationDate":"2022-01-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46201089","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-01-13DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780192843432.003.0007
T. Merricks
Consider: The Why Question: What way of being related to a (conscious) person at a future time explains why that person will have (at that time) what matters in survival for you? Chapter 5 focused on an answer to the Why Question in terms of a specific sort of psychological connectedness, namely, having the same self-narrative. This chapter considers two more answers to the Why Question, one of which—like the answer considered in Chapter 5—involves narrative. But the answers considered in this chapter are in terms of specific sorts of psychological continuity, as opposed to psychological connectedness. This chapter also defends the conclusion that it is false that any good answer to the Why Question must be in terms of some sort of psychological connectedness or psychological continuity.
{"title":"Agential Continuity and Narrative Continuity","authors":"T. Merricks","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780192843432.003.0007","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780192843432.003.0007","url":null,"abstract":"Consider: The Why Question: What way of being related to a (conscious) person at a future time explains why that person will have (at that time) what matters in survival for you? Chapter 5 focused on an answer to the Why Question in terms of a specific sort of psychological connectedness, namely, having the same self-narrative. This chapter considers two more answers to the Why Question, one of which—like the answer considered in Chapter 5—involves narrative. But the answers considered in this chapter are in terms of specific sorts of psychological continuity, as opposed to psychological connectedness. This chapter also defends the conclusion that it is false that any good answer to the Why Question must be in terms of some sort of psychological connectedness or psychological continuity.","PeriodicalId":51426,"journal":{"name":"Self and Identity","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.0,"publicationDate":"2022-01-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48792538","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-01-13DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780192843432.003.0008
T. Merricks
Previous chapters defend a variety of claims about what matters in survival. This chapter puts those claims through their paces by applying them to a new topic: personal immortality. I begin by using the distinction between persistence and survival to clarify the idea of personal immortality. I then show how claims defended in earlier chapters allow us to block familiar objections to the desirability and to the possibility of immortality. Here are two examples. Chapter 4’s conclusion that the Selfer view is false plays an important role in my reply to the Tedium Objection. And my answer to the Why Question in terms of numerical identity provides the resources to argue that what matters in survival will not slowly ‘fade out’ over time and change.
{"title":"The Hope of Glory","authors":"T. Merricks","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780192843432.003.0008","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780192843432.003.0008","url":null,"abstract":"Previous chapters defend a variety of claims about what matters in survival. This chapter puts those claims through their paces by applying them to a new topic: personal immortality. I begin by using the distinction between persistence and survival to clarify the idea of personal immortality. I then show how claims defended in earlier chapters allow us to block familiar objections to the desirability and to the possibility of immortality. Here are two examples. Chapter 4’s conclusion that the Selfer view is false plays an important role in my reply to the Tedium Objection. And my answer to the Why Question in terms of numerical identity provides the resources to argue that what matters in survival will not slowly ‘fade out’ over time and change.","PeriodicalId":51426,"journal":{"name":"Self and Identity","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.0,"publicationDate":"2022-01-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43324018","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-01-13DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780192843432.003.0005
T. Merricks
According to the Selfer view, your first-personally anticipating, or having future-directed self-interested concern with regard to, a person’s experiences at a future time is appropriate only if the way you are now is relevantly psychologically connected to the way that person will be at that time. The relevant sort of psychological connectedness is being substantively alike with regard to values, desires, and projects. So to be Selfer is to be committed to the view that a person will have, at a future time, what matters in survival for you only if that person will have, at that time, (enough of) your current values, desires, and projects. This chapter opposes the Selfer view.
{"title":"The Same Self","authors":"T. Merricks","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780192843432.003.0005","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780192843432.003.0005","url":null,"abstract":"According to the Selfer view, your first-personally anticipating, or having future-directed self-interested concern with regard to, a person’s experiences at a future time is appropriate only if the way you are now is relevantly psychologically connected to the way that person will be at that time. The relevant sort of psychological connectedness is being substantively alike with regard to values, desires, and projects. So to be Selfer is to be committed to the view that a person will have, at a future time, what matters in survival for you only if that person will have, at that time, (enough of) your current values, desires, and projects. This chapter opposes the Selfer view.","PeriodicalId":51426,"journal":{"name":"Self and Identity","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.0,"publicationDate":"2022-01-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41314123","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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