Pub Date : 2018-10-12DOI: 10.1515/cogsem-2018-2003
S. Aurora
Abstract The aim of this paper is to show that Edmund Husserl’s Logical Investigations should be regarded as one of the fundamental sources of structuralism. Husserl’s version of structuralism is, however, quite original in many respects. Indeed, what Husserl advocates in his works can be defined, following and expanding a line of research inaugurated by scholars like Elmar Holenstein and Giovanni Piana (see Holenstein, E. 1975. Roman Jakobsons phänomenologischer Strukturalismus. Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, Holenstein, E. 1976. Linguistik, Semiotik, Hermeneutik: Plädoyers für eine strukturale Phänomenologie. Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, Holenstein, E. In publication. Phenomenological Phenomenology of Language: Scattered Papers. Geneva: sdvig, Piana, G. 2013a. L'idea di uno strutturalismo fenomenologico. In G. Piana (ed.), Strutturalismo fenomenologico e psicologia della forma, 5–17. http://www.lulu.com/shop/giovanni-piana/strutturalismo-fenomenologico-e-psicologia-della-forma/paperback/product-21332317.html (accessed 20 February 2018), Piana, G. 2013b. Momento figurale e qualità ghestaltica. In G. Piana (ed.), Strutturalismo fenomenologico e psicologia della forma, 101–119. http://www.lulu.com/shop/giovanni-piana/strutturalismo-fenomenologico-e-psicologia-della-forma/paperback/product-21332317.html accessed 20 February 2018), in terms of phenomenological structuralism or of structural phenomenology.
摘要本文旨在说明胡塞尔的《逻辑研究》是结构主义理论的基本来源之一。然而，胡塞尔的结构主义版本在许多方面都是相当新颖的。的确，胡塞尔在他的著作中所倡导的东西是可以定义的，它遵循并扩展了Elmar Holenstein和Giovanni Piana等学者开创的研究路线(见Holenstein, E. 1975)。罗曼·雅各布森phänomenologischer结构主义。法兰克福:苏坎普，霍伦斯坦，E. 1976。语言学、符号学、解释学:Plädoyers f r eine struckturale Phänomenologie。法兰克福:Suhrkamp, Holenstein, E.出版中。语言现象学:零散的论文。日内瓦:sdvig, Piana, G. 2013a。结构主义现象学的概念。见G. Piana主编，《结构主义现象学与形式心理学》，第5-17页。http://www.lulu.com/shop/giovanni-piana/strutturalismo-fenomenologico-e-psicologia-della-forma/paperback/product-21332317.html(2018年2月20日访问)，Piana, G. 2013b。这是一种象征性的品质。见G. Piana主编，《结构主义现象学与形式心理学》，101-119页。http://www.lulu.com/shop/giovanni-piana/strutturalismo-fenomenologico-e-psicologia-della-forma/paperback/product-21332317.html访问2018年2月20日)，在现象学结构主义或结构现象学方面。
{"title":"Structural phenomenology: A reading of the early Husserl","authors":"S. Aurora","doi":"10.1515/cogsem-2018-2003","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/cogsem-2018-2003","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract The aim of this paper is to show that Edmund Husserl’s Logical Investigations should be regarded as one of the fundamental sources of structuralism. Husserl’s version of structuralism is, however, quite original in many respects. Indeed, what Husserl advocates in his works can be defined, following and expanding a line of research inaugurated by scholars like Elmar Holenstein and Giovanni Piana (see Holenstein, E. 1975. Roman Jakobsons phänomenologischer Strukturalismus. Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, Holenstein, E. 1976. Linguistik, Semiotik, Hermeneutik: Plädoyers für eine strukturale Phänomenologie. Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, Holenstein, E. In publication. Phenomenological Phenomenology of Language: Scattered Papers. Geneva: sdvig, Piana, G. 2013a. L'idea di uno strutturalismo fenomenologico. In G. Piana (ed.), Strutturalismo fenomenologico e psicologia della forma, 5–17. http://www.lulu.com/shop/giovanni-piana/strutturalismo-fenomenologico-e-psicologia-della-forma/paperback/product-21332317.html (accessed 20 February 2018), Piana, G. 2013b. Momento figurale e qualità ghestaltica. In G. Piana (ed.), Strutturalismo fenomenologico e psicologia della forma, 101–119. http://www.lulu.com/shop/giovanni-piana/strutturalismo-fenomenologico-e-psicologia-della-forma/paperback/product-21332317.html accessed 20 February 2018), in terms of phenomenological structuralism or of structural phenomenology.","PeriodicalId":52385,"journal":{"name":"Cognitive Semiotics","volume":"12 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-10-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"89942004","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2018-10-02DOI: 10.1515/cogsem-2018-2001
Chiao-I Tseng
Abstract This article aims to examine the narrative impacts and social influences of screen violence in audiovisual media. It suggests an integrative approach to synthesising the recent research findings in different disciplines such as cognitive science, media studies, neuroscience, and social semiotic theories. Based on the theoretical synthesis of narrative effects and persuasive functions, this paper establishes a method for analysing the contextualisation of violent events. In particular, the analytical method focuses on the two main narrative mechanisms for contextualising violent events, justifications of characters’ motivations for using violence and depictions of consequences. This article will apply the method to elucidate how different kinds of contextualisation yield different types of narrative impacts, persuasive potentials, and the ways in which social, political, and ideological issues can be learnt. Furthermore, a typology of characters’ motivations is also provided, which are often used for justifying the characters’ violent actions in audiovisual narratives. This paper also unravels how genre expectations are closely related to narrative functions of screen violence, particularly how genre shapes the viewers’ prediction and interpretation of violent events. Finally, the methods for motivation analysis of violent narrative events are extended to examine a particular genre of interactive audiovisual texts — empathy games.
{"title":"Contextualising screen violence: An integrative approach toward explaining of the functions of violent narrative events in audiovisual media","authors":"Chiao-I Tseng","doi":"10.1515/cogsem-2018-2001","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/cogsem-2018-2001","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract This article aims to examine the narrative impacts and social influences of screen violence in audiovisual media. It suggests an integrative approach to synthesising the recent research findings in different disciplines such as cognitive science, media studies, neuroscience, and social semiotic theories. Based on the theoretical synthesis of narrative effects and persuasive functions, this paper establishes a method for analysing the contextualisation of violent events. In particular, the analytical method focuses on the two main narrative mechanisms for contextualising violent events, justifications of characters’ motivations for using violence and depictions of consequences. This article will apply the method to elucidate how different kinds of contextualisation yield different types of narrative impacts, persuasive potentials, and the ways in which social, political, and ideological issues can be learnt. Furthermore, a typology of characters’ motivations is also provided, which are often used for justifying the characters’ violent actions in audiovisual narratives. This paper also unravels how genre expectations are closely related to narrative functions of screen violence, particularly how genre shapes the viewers’ prediction and interpretation of violent events. Finally, the methods for motivation analysis of violent narrative events are extended to examine a particular genre of interactive audiovisual texts — empathy games.","PeriodicalId":52385,"journal":{"name":"Cognitive Semiotics","volume":"74 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-10-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"86297438","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2018-05-01DOI: 10.1515/COGSEM-2018-0003
Jamin Pelkey
Abstract Cross-linguistic strategies for mapping lexical and spatial relations from body partonym systems to external object meronymies (as in English ‘table leg,’ ‘mountain face’) have attracted substantial research and debate over the past three decades. Due to the systematic mappings, lexical productivity, and geometric complexities of body-based meronymies found in many Mesoamerican languages, the region has become focal for these discussions, prominently including contrastive accounts of the phenomenon in Zapotec and Tzeltal, leading researchers to question whether such systems should be explained as global metaphorical mappings from bodily source to target holonym or as vector mappings of shape and axis generated “algorithmically.” I propose a synthesis of these accounts in this paper by drawing on the species-specific cognitive affordances of human upright posture grounded in the reorganization of the anatomical planes, with a special emphasis on antisymmetrical relations that emerge between arm-leg and face-groin antinomies cross-culturally. Whereas Levinson argues that the internal geometry of objects “stripped of their bodily associations” (1994: 821) is sufficient to account for Tzeltal meronymy, making metaphorical explanations entirely unnecessary, I propose a more powerful, elegant explanation of Tzeltal meronymic mapping that affirms both the geometric-analytic and the global-metaphorical nature of Tzeltal meaning construal. I do this by demonstrating that the “algorithm” in question arises from the phenomenology of movement and correlative body memories — an experiential ground that generates a culturally selected pair of inverse contrastive paradigm sets with marked and unmarked membership emerging antithetically relative to the transverse anatomical plane. These relations are then selected diagrammatically for the classification of object orientations according to systematic geometric iconicities. Results not only serve to clarify the case in question but also point to the relatively untapped potential that upright posture holds for theorizing the emergence of human cognition, highlighting in the process the nature, origins and theoretical validity of markedness and double scope conceptual integration.
{"title":"Upright posture and the meaning of meronymy: A synthesis of metaphoric and analytic accounts","authors":"Jamin Pelkey","doi":"10.1515/COGSEM-2018-0003","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/COGSEM-2018-0003","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Cross-linguistic strategies for mapping lexical and spatial relations from body partonym systems to external object meronymies (as in English ‘table leg,’ ‘mountain face’) have attracted substantial research and debate over the past three decades. Due to the systematic mappings, lexical productivity, and geometric complexities of body-based meronymies found in many Mesoamerican languages, the region has become focal for these discussions, prominently including contrastive accounts of the phenomenon in Zapotec and Tzeltal, leading researchers to question whether such systems should be explained as global metaphorical mappings from bodily source to target holonym or as vector mappings of shape and axis generated “algorithmically.” I propose a synthesis of these accounts in this paper by drawing on the species-specific cognitive affordances of human upright posture grounded in the reorganization of the anatomical planes, with a special emphasis on antisymmetrical relations that emerge between arm-leg and face-groin antinomies cross-culturally. Whereas Levinson argues that the internal geometry of objects “stripped of their bodily associations” (1994: 821) is sufficient to account for Tzeltal meronymy, making metaphorical explanations entirely unnecessary, I propose a more powerful, elegant explanation of Tzeltal meronymic mapping that affirms both the geometric-analytic and the global-metaphorical nature of Tzeltal meaning construal. I do this by demonstrating that the “algorithm” in question arises from the phenomenology of movement and correlative body memories — an experiential ground that generates a culturally selected pair of inverse contrastive paradigm sets with marked and unmarked membership emerging antithetically relative to the transverse anatomical plane. These relations are then selected diagrammatically for the classification of object orientations according to systematic geometric iconicities. Results not only serve to clarify the case in question but also point to the relatively untapped potential that upright posture holds for theorizing the emergence of human cognition, highlighting in the process the nature, origins and theoretical validity of markedness and double scope conceptual integration.","PeriodicalId":52385,"journal":{"name":"Cognitive Semiotics","volume":"99 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"84103811","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2018-05-01DOI: 10.1515/COGSEM-2018-0001
J. Zlatev
Abstract The paper rethinks a proposal for a unified cognitive semiotic framework, The Semiotic Hierarchy, in explicitly phenomenological terms, following above all the work of Merleau-Ponty. The main changes to the earlier formulation of the theory are the following. First, the claim that a general concept of meaning can be understood as the value-based relationship between the subject and the world is shown to correspond to the most fundamental concept of phenomenology: intentionality, understood as “openness to the world.” Second, the rather strict nature of the original hierarchy of meaning levels made the model rather static and one-directional, thus resembling an old-fashioned scala naturae. Reformulating the relationship between the levels in terms of the dynamical notion of Fundierung avoids this pitfall. Third, the phenomenological analysis allows, somewhat paradoxically, both a greater number of levels (life, subjectivity, intersubjectivity, sign function, language) and less discrete borders between these. Fourth, there is an intimate relation between (levels and kinds of) intentionality and normativity, making the normativity of language a special case. Fifth, to each level of meaning corresponds a dialectics of spontaneity and sedimentation, with corresponding normative structures (e.g., habits, emotions, conventions, signs and grammar) both emerging from and constraining, but not determining, subject-world interactions. Sixth and finally, the analysis follows the basic phenomenological principle to examine the phenomena without theoretical preconceptions, and without premature explanations. This implies a focus on human experience, even when dealing with the “biological” level of meaning, with the possibility of extending the analysis to non-human subjects through empathy. The intention is that this phenomenologically interpreted version of the Semiotic Hierarchy may serve as a useful tool against any kind of meaning reductionism, whether biological, mental, social or linguistic.
{"title":"Meaning making from life to language:The Semiotic Hierarchy and phenomenology","authors":"J. Zlatev","doi":"10.1515/COGSEM-2018-0001","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/COGSEM-2018-0001","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract The paper rethinks a proposal for a unified cognitive semiotic framework, The Semiotic Hierarchy, in explicitly phenomenological terms, following above all the work of Merleau-Ponty. The main changes to the earlier formulation of the theory are the following. First, the claim that a general concept of meaning can be understood as the value-based relationship between the subject and the world is shown to correspond to the most fundamental concept of phenomenology: intentionality, understood as “openness to the world.” Second, the rather strict nature of the original hierarchy of meaning levels made the model rather static and one-directional, thus resembling an old-fashioned scala naturae. Reformulating the relationship between the levels in terms of the dynamical notion of Fundierung avoids this pitfall. Third, the phenomenological analysis allows, somewhat paradoxically, both a greater number of levels (life, subjectivity, intersubjectivity, sign function, language) and less discrete borders between these. Fourth, there is an intimate relation between (levels and kinds of) intentionality and normativity, making the normativity of language a special case. Fifth, to each level of meaning corresponds a dialectics of spontaneity and sedimentation, with corresponding normative structures (e.g., habits, emotions, conventions, signs and grammar) both emerging from and constraining, but not determining, subject-world interactions. Sixth and finally, the analysis follows the basic phenomenological principle to examine the phenomena without theoretical preconceptions, and without premature explanations. This implies a focus on human experience, even when dealing with the “biological” level of meaning, with the possibility of extending the analysis to non-human subjects through empathy. The intention is that this phenomenologically interpreted version of the Semiotic Hierarchy may serve as a useful tool against any kind of meaning reductionism, whether biological, mental, social or linguistic.","PeriodicalId":52385,"journal":{"name":"Cognitive Semiotics","volume":"114 2 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"91022829","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2018-05-01DOI: 10.1515/COGSEM-2018-0002
I. Mittelberg
Abstract Embodied image schemas are central to experientialist accounts of meaning-making. Research from several disciplines has evidenced their pervasiveness in motivating form and meaning in both literal and figurative expressions across diverse semiotic systems and art forms (e.g., Gibbs and Colston; Hampe; Johnson; Lakoff; and Mandler). This paper aims to highlight structural similarities between, on the one hand, dynamic image schemas and force schemas and, on the other, hand shapes and gestural movements. Such flexible correspondences between conceptual and gestural schematicity are assumed to partly stem from experiential bases shared by incrementally internalized conceptual structures and the repeated gestural (re-) enacting of bodily actions as well as more abstract semantic primitives (Lakoff). Gestures typically consist of evanescent, metonymically reduced hand configurations, motion onsets, or movement traces that minimally suggest, for instance, a PATH, the idea of CONTAINMENT, an IN-OUT spatial relation, or the momentary loss of emotional BALANCE. So, while physical in nature, gestures often emerge as rather schematic gestalts that, as such, have the capacity to vividly convey essential semantic and pragmatic aspects of high relevance to the speaker. It is further argued that gesturally instantiated image schemas and force dynamics are inherently meaningful structures that typically underlie more complex semantic and pragmatic processes involving, for instance, metonymy, metaphor, and frames. First, I discuss previous work on how image schemas, force gestalts, and mimetic schemas may underpin hand gestures and body postures. Drawing on Gibbs’ dynamic systems account of image schemas, I then introduce an array of tendencies in gestural image schema enactments: body-inherent/self-oriented (body as image-schematic structure; forces acting upon the body); environment-oriented (material culture including spatial structures), and interlocutor-oriented (intersubjective understanding). Adopting a dynamic systems perspective (e.g.,Thompson and Varela) thus puts the focus on how image schemas and force gestalts that operate in gesture may function as cognitive-semiotic organizing principles that underpin a) the physical and cognitive self-regulation of speakers; b) how they interact with the (virtual) environment while talking; and c) intersubjective instances of resonance and understanding between interlocutors or between an artwork and its beholder. Examples of these patterns are enriched by video and motion-capture data, showing how numeric kinetic data allow one to measure the temporal and spatial dimensions of gestural articulations and to visualize movement traces.
{"title":"Gestures as image schemas and force gestalts: A dynamic systems approach augmented with motion-capture data analyses","authors":"I. Mittelberg","doi":"10.1515/COGSEM-2018-0002","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/COGSEM-2018-0002","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Embodied image schemas are central to experientialist accounts of meaning-making. Research from several disciplines has evidenced their pervasiveness in motivating form and meaning in both literal and figurative expressions across diverse semiotic systems and art forms (e.g., Gibbs and Colston; Hampe; Johnson; Lakoff; and Mandler). This paper aims to highlight structural similarities between, on the one hand, dynamic image schemas and force schemas and, on the other, hand shapes and gestural movements. Such flexible correspondences between conceptual and gestural schematicity are assumed to partly stem from experiential bases shared by incrementally internalized conceptual structures and the repeated gestural (re-) enacting of bodily actions as well as more abstract semantic primitives (Lakoff). Gestures typically consist of evanescent, metonymically reduced hand configurations, motion onsets, or movement traces that minimally suggest, for instance, a PATH, the idea of CONTAINMENT, an IN-OUT spatial relation, or the momentary loss of emotional BALANCE. So, while physical in nature, gestures often emerge as rather schematic gestalts that, as such, have the capacity to vividly convey essential semantic and pragmatic aspects of high relevance to the speaker. It is further argued that gesturally instantiated image schemas and force dynamics are inherently meaningful structures that typically underlie more complex semantic and pragmatic processes involving, for instance, metonymy, metaphor, and frames. First, I discuss previous work on how image schemas, force gestalts, and mimetic schemas may underpin hand gestures and body postures. Drawing on Gibbs’ dynamic systems account of image schemas, I then introduce an array of tendencies in gestural image schema enactments: body-inherent/self-oriented (body as image-schematic structure; forces acting upon the body); environment-oriented (material culture including spatial structures), and interlocutor-oriented (intersubjective understanding). Adopting a dynamic systems perspective (e.g.,Thompson and Varela) thus puts the focus on how image schemas and force gestalts that operate in gesture may function as cognitive-semiotic organizing principles that underpin a) the physical and cognitive self-regulation of speakers; b) how they interact with the (virtual) environment while talking; and c) intersubjective instances of resonance and understanding between interlocutors or between an artwork and its beholder. Examples of these patterns are enriched by video and motion-capture data, showing how numeric kinetic data allow one to measure the temporal and spatial dimensions of gestural articulations and to visualize movement traces.","PeriodicalId":52385,"journal":{"name":"Cognitive Semiotics","volume":"47 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"90638366","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2018-05-01DOI: 10.1515/COGSEM-2018-0007
Yanna Popova, E. Cuffari
Abstract Human experience is inherently temporal and involves placing events, symbols, and actions in a temporal scheme. This article deals with a specific aspect of temporal experience as it relates to reading and experiencing narrative fiction. Within an enactive understanding of human cognition, we propose a view of literary reading as a process of participatory sense-making between a reader and a storyteller. The enactive theory of participatory sense-making maintains that agents, by enacting their own sense-making, directly and partially constitute the sense-making of other agents. Sense-makers in interaction navigate two orders of normativity: their own and that of the interaction itself. Linguistic sense-making (languaging) opens up further possibilities for understanding complex spatially and temporally distributed forms of social interactions such as narrative interactions. Reading a narrative is one such example of mutually constituted navigation between an interaction dynamic and interactors’ sense-making. The reader completes and co-authors emergent textual meaning and a textually emerging storyteller guides and anticipates the multiple temporal displacements, realized linguistically, that a reader has to experience in the process of reading. We explore the participatory structure of a narrative through its temporal unfolding and the specific, non-linear nature of the temporal dynamics of interacting with a storytelling agency. In particular, narrative interactions are seen as modulations in the pacing of a given narrative’s unfolding. It is suggested that the reader’s enactment of such temporally realized pacings constitutes a better description of narrative immersion than its traditional understanding as a simulation of spatial situatedness.
{"title":"Temporality of sense-making in narrative interactions","authors":"Yanna Popova, E. Cuffari","doi":"10.1515/COGSEM-2018-0007","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/COGSEM-2018-0007","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Human experience is inherently temporal and involves placing events, symbols, and actions in a temporal scheme. This article deals with a specific aspect of temporal experience as it relates to reading and experiencing narrative fiction. Within an enactive understanding of human cognition, we propose a view of literary reading as a process of participatory sense-making between a reader and a storyteller. The enactive theory of participatory sense-making maintains that agents, by enacting their own sense-making, directly and partially constitute the sense-making of other agents. Sense-makers in interaction navigate two orders of normativity: their own and that of the interaction itself. Linguistic sense-making (languaging) opens up further possibilities for understanding complex spatially and temporally distributed forms of social interactions such as narrative interactions. Reading a narrative is one such example of mutually constituted navigation between an interaction dynamic and interactors’ sense-making. The reader completes and co-authors emergent textual meaning and a textually emerging storyteller guides and anticipates the multiple temporal displacements, realized linguistically, that a reader has to experience in the process of reading. We explore the participatory structure of a narrative through its temporal unfolding and the specific, non-linear nature of the temporal dynamics of interacting with a storytelling agency. In particular, narrative interactions are seen as modulations in the pacing of a given narrative’s unfolding. It is suggested that the reader’s enactment of such temporally realized pacings constitutes a better description of narrative immersion than its traditional understanding as a simulation of spatial situatedness.","PeriodicalId":52385,"journal":{"name":"Cognitive Semiotics","volume":"34 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"87302221","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2018-05-01DOI: 10.1515/COGSEM-2018-0008
Line Brandt
Retraction of: Brandt, Line. November 2016. The rhetorics of fictive interaction in advertising: The case for imagined direct speech in argumentation. Volume 9(2), pages 149–182. (DOI: https://doi.org/10.1515/cogsem-20160006). This article has been withdrawn due to copyright infringement of the article Brandt, Line & Esther Pascual. 2016. “Say hello to this ad” – The persuasive rhetoric of fictive interaction in marketing”. In Esther Pascual and Sergeiy Sandler (eds.), The Conversation Frame. Forms and functions of fictive interaction, 303–322. Amsterdam: John Benjamins.
收回:勃兰特，莱恩。2016年11月。广告中有效互动的修辞学:论证中想象直接引语的案例。第9卷(2)，149-182页。(DOI: https://doi.org/10.1515/cogsem - 20160006)。由于侵犯了Brandt, Line & Esther Pascual. 2016这篇文章的版权，本文已被撤回。“向这个广告问好”——营销中有效互动的有说服力的修辞。见埃斯特·帕斯卡尔和谢尔盖·桑德勒主编的《对话框架》。有效互动的形式和功能，303-322。阿姆斯特丹:约翰·本杰明。
{"title":"Retraction of: The rhetorics of fictiveinteraction in advertising: The case for imagined direct speech in argumentation","authors":"Line Brandt","doi":"10.1515/COGSEM-2018-0008","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/COGSEM-2018-0008","url":null,"abstract":"Retraction of: Brandt, Line. November 2016. The rhetorics of fictive interaction in advertising: The case for imagined direct speech in argumentation. Volume 9(2), pages 149–182. (DOI: https://doi.org/10.1515/cogsem-20160006). This article has been withdrawn due to copyright infringement of the article Brandt, Line & Esther Pascual. 2016. “Say hello to this ad” – The persuasive rhetoric of fictive interaction in marketing”. In Esther Pascual and Sergeiy Sandler (eds.), The Conversation Frame. Forms and functions of fictive interaction, 303–322. Amsterdam: John Benjamins.","PeriodicalId":52385,"journal":{"name":"Cognitive Semiotics","volume":"74 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"74161823","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2018-05-01DOI: 10.1515/COGSEM-2018-0004
E. Danziger
Abstract Classroom training for attention to utterance recipients’ likely states of knowledge is useful in order to compensate for the situations of reduced co-presence that characterize literate communication at a distance. But many aspects of the Mopan (Mayan) philosophy of language resonate instead with non-schooled practices of Mopan socialization that support oral and not literate transmission of knowledge. In Mopan, everyday speech and action are evaluated with reference to a more-than-human moral order in which what counts is fidelity to ancestral prescriptions rather than to one’s own or others’ momentary mental states. Such cultural differences in beliefs about the (non-)importance of mental states are known to enter into institutionalized moralities such as those governing legal decisions or religious obligations. At the same time, many unconscious and embodied aspects of meaning-making in interaction are clearly conducted without apparent input from differing cultural beliefs. The present study shows how cultural attitudes about meaning-making play out at a level intermediate between these two apparently contradictory extremes. Mopan farmers and US English university students engaged with an interactional matching task in which visual common ground is occluded and speakers must describe a photograph in such a way that the listener succeeds in picking out that very photograph from among a set of similar ones. Schooled US English participants rarely describe any attributes of the photos other than their minimum distinguishing features, and they almost always mention those features. In contrast, Mopan participants often construe the interactional task as one that requires accurate and complete description of single items one at a time, rather than requiring identification of key attributes that will uniquely identify the target referent in its current context to a particular listener. Significant differences in strategic approaches to real-time construction of conversational reference is thus shown to correspond to contrasting cultural belief systems about the making of meaning, themselves related to literate versus oral modes of knowledge transmission.
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Pub Date : 2018-04-21DOI: 10.1515/COGSEM-2018-0005
S. Steffensen, M. Harvey
Abstract Human language is extraordinarily meaningful. Well-spoken or well-written passages can evoke our deepest emotions and elicit all manner of conscious and subconscious reactions. This is usually taken to be an insurmountable explanatory challenge for ecological approaches to cognitive science, the primary tools of which concern coordination dynamics in organism-environment systems. Recent work (Pattee, H. H. & J. Rączaszek-Leonardi 2012. Laws, Language, and Life. Dordrecht: Springer) has made headway in describing the meaningfulness of linguistic units — the kind of meaning that we perceive as mediated by specific symbols — within an ecological framework, by building an account based on Howard Pattee’s conceptualization of symbols as physical, replicable, historically-selected constraints on the dynamics of self-organizing systems (Pattee, H. H. 1969. How does a molecule become a message?. Developmental Biology 3(supplemental). 1016; Pattee, H. H. 1972. Laws and constraints, symbols and languages. In C. H. Waddington (ed.), Towards a Theoretical Biology, 248–258. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press). In order to propose an “interactivity-based” approach to linguistic meaning, this paper takes the following steps: first, it rejects the view of linguistic meaning as fully independent from organism-environment interactions, as exemplified by formal approaches in philosophical semantics. Second, it presents a cutting-edge example of an ecological approach to symbols, namely Joanna Rączaszek-Leonardi’s (Rączaszek-Leonardi, J. 2009. Symbols as constraints: The structuring role of dynamics and self-organization in natural language. Pragmatics and Cognition 17(3). 653–676. DOI:10.1075/pandc.17.3.09ras; Rączaszek-Leonardi, J. 2016. How does a word become a message? An illustration on a developmental time-scale. New Ideas in Psychology 42, Supplement C: 46–55. DOI:10.1016/j.newideapsych.2015.08.001) version of Pattee’s symbols-as-constraints model. Third, it reviews and critiques a recent attempt (Rączaszek-Leonardi, J., I. Nomikou, K. J. Rohlfing & T. W. Deacon. 2018. Language development from an ecological perspective: Ecologically valid ways to abstract symbols. Ecological Psychology 30(1). 39–73) to integrate the symbols-as-constraints model with Terrence Deacon, T. W. 1997. The Symbolic Species. New York: W. W. Norton and Company; Deacon, T. W. 2011. The symbol concept. In M. Tallerman & K. R. Gibson (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Language Evolution, 393–405. Oxford: Oxford University Press) semiotic view of symbols, arguing that the properties ascribed to linguistic symbols, both by Deacon and very widely throughout the cognitive sciences, are not properties of individual instances of linguistic action. Rather, they belong to a particular mode of description that draws generalizations across the phenomenological experience of many language users. Finally, it lays out the core components of a novel “interactivity-based” approach to linguistic
人类的语言是非常有意义的。说得好或写得好的文章可以唤起我们最深的情感，并引起各种有意识和潜意识的反应。这通常被认为是认知科学的生态方法无法克服的解释挑战，认知科学的主要工具是关注生物-环境系统中的协调动力学。近期作品(Pattee, h.h. & J. Rączaszek-Leonardi 2012。法律、语言和生活。Dordrecht: Springer)在描述语言单位的意义方面取得了进展——我们认为这种意义是由特定的符号调解的——在生态框架内，通过建立一个基于霍华德·帕蒂(Howard Pattee)的符号概念的解释，作为自组织系统动态的物理的、可复制的、历史选择的约束(帕蒂，h.h. 1969)。一个分子是如何变成信息的?发育生物学3(补编)。1016;帕蒂，h.h. 1972。法律和约束，符号和语言。在c.h.沃丁顿(编)，走向理论生物学，248-258。爱丁堡:爱丁堡大学出版社)。为了提出一种“基于互动性”的语言意义研究方法，本文采取了以下步骤:首先，它拒绝了语言意义完全独立于有机体-环境相互作用的观点，例如哲学语义学中的形式方法。其次，它提出了一个前沿的生态方法符号的例子，即乔安娜Rączaszek-Leonardi (Rączaszek-Leonardi, J. 2009)。符号作为约束:动态和自组织在自然语言中的结构作用。语用学与认知17(3)。653 - 676。DOI: 10.1075 / pandc.17.3.09ras;Rączaszek-Leonardi, J. 2016。一个词是如何变成信息的?一个关于发展时间尺度的插图。心理学新思想[j]，增刊C: 46-55。DOI:10.1016/j.newideapsych.2015.08.001) Pattee的符号即约束模型的版本。第三，它回顾和批评了最近的尝试(Rączaszek-Leonardi, J.， I. Nomikou, K. J. Rohlfing & T. W. Deacon. 2018)。生态视角下的语言发展:抽象符号的生态有效方式。生态心理学30(1)。(39-73)与Terrence Deacon, t.w. 1997整合符号作为约束模型。象征物种。纽约:w.w.诺顿出版社;迪肯，t.w. 2011。符号概念。在M.塔勒曼和k.r.吉布森(编)，语言进化的牛津手册，393-405。(牛津:牛津大学出版社)符号的符号学观点，认为Deacon和整个认知科学赋予语言符号的属性，并不是语言行为的个别实例的属性。相反，它们属于一种特殊的描述模式，这种模式可以概括许多语言使用者的现象学经验。最后，它列出了一种新颖的“基于交互性”的语言意义研究方法的核心组成部分。根据这种观点，人类参与了持续的、超灵活的娱乐和训练，对声音和声音模式产生了巨大的感知敏感性。这种敏感性使我们能够在更大的人群中协调我们当下的行为与大规模的行为模式，并将我们自己的行为与那些大规模的模式进行比较。因此，基于互动性的方法所做出的最重要贡献是，它充分说明了人口水平的行为模式在控制短期尺度、此时此地的语言行为中所起的作用。在这样做的过程中，它为丰富的语言意义的生态解释提供了依据。
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Pub Date : 2018-03-26DOI: 10.1515/cogsem-2016-0008
A. Steensen, M. W. Johansen
Abstract Based on semiotic analyses of examples from the history of mathematics, we claim that the influence of the material aspects of diagram tokens is anything but trivial. We offer an interpretation of examples of diagrammatic reasoning processes in mathematics according to which the mathematical ideas, arguments, and concepts in question are shaped by the physical features of the chosen diagram tokens.
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