Pub Date : 2021-11-20DOI: 10.1080/23745118.2021.2002662
Vasiliki Karamerou
ABSTRACT Almost five years have passed since the United Kingdom’s decision to leave the European Union was considered to be definite. Now, in 2021, we finally see the Brexiting process start and some more practical problems arise. Although the implementation of the Withdrawal Agreement as of 1 January 2021 clarifies what is due to happen in certain areas of policy, the language issue still remains unsolved. All these years English has not only been an official and a working language, but also the most commonly used for institutional communication and the one that the majority of the European citizens speak as a second language. Moreover, it is tied to the language regime of the Union, its citizens’ rights and its language policy, and has a special status worldwide. The fact that the United Kingdom left the European Union, but English remains an official language up to this day without the unanimous decision of the Member States is the purpose of this contribution. Furthermore, the position of English in the European Union and the citizens’ rights are analysed, and its future in this context is investigated through the presentation of some scenarios and their results.
{"title":"The status of English in the European Union after Brexit. Is there a way to fit English in the EU context?","authors":"Vasiliki Karamerou","doi":"10.1080/23745118.2021.2002662","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/23745118.2021.2002662","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT Almost five years have passed since the United Kingdom’s decision to leave the European Union was considered to be definite. Now, in 2021, we finally see the Brexiting process start and some more practical problems arise. Although the implementation of the Withdrawal Agreement as of 1 January 2021 clarifies what is due to happen in certain areas of policy, the language issue still remains unsolved. All these years English has not only been an official and a working language, but also the most commonly used for institutional communication and the one that the majority of the European citizens speak as a second language. Moreover, it is tied to the language regime of the Union, its citizens’ rights and its language policy, and has a special status worldwide. The fact that the United Kingdom left the European Union, but English remains an official language up to this day without the unanimous decision of the Member States is the purpose of this contribution. Furthermore, the position of English in the European Union and the citizens’ rights are analysed, and its future in this context is investigated through the presentation of some scenarios and their results.","PeriodicalId":53479,"journal":{"name":"European Politics and Society","volume":"24 1","pages":"303 - 316"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-11-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47000243","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-11-17DOI: 10.1080/23745118.2021.2003068
John A. Scherpereel
ABSTRACT Numerous European leaders have formed cabinets that contain equal numbers of women and men. But forming a gender-equal team at the center of the European Union remains a particularly difficult undertaking. This article analyses the case of Ursula von der Leyen, who, in 2019, set out to form a gender-equal college of commissioners. It analyses why von der Leyen’s first leadership project did not initially succeed and assesses the longer-term prospects of gender equality in the European Commission. Employing a framework drawn from studies of Commission leadership, commissioner selection, and gendered executives, it conceptualizes Commission presidents-elect as constrained selectors. Even with personal dispositions that support gender equality and access to powerful institutional resources, treaty-based rules and situational settings obstruct the ability of presidents-elect to achieve their representational goals. In the future, even presidents-elect who are strongly committed to gender equality will likely struggle to achieve fully balanced colleges.
许多欧洲领导人组成了男女人数相等的内阁。但在欧盟中心组建一个性别平等的团队仍然是一项特别困难的任务。本文分析了乌苏拉·冯德莱恩(Ursula von der Leyen)的案例，她在2019年着手组建一个性别平等的委员学院。它分析了为什么冯德莱恩的第一个领导力项目最初没有成功，并评估了欧盟委员会性别平等的长期前景。采用从委员会领导、委员选择和性别高管研究中得出的框架，将委员会当选主席概念化为受约束的选择者。即使个人倾向于支持性别平等和获得强大的制度资源，基于条约的规则和情境设置也阻碍了当选总统实现其代表性目标的能力。在未来，即使是坚定致力于性别平等的当选总统，也可能难以实现完全均衡的大学。
{"title":"Pursuing ‘full gender equality’ in the European Commission: the case of a constrained selector","authors":"John A. Scherpereel","doi":"10.1080/23745118.2021.2003068","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/23745118.2021.2003068","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT\u0000 Numerous European leaders have formed cabinets that contain equal numbers of women and men. But forming a gender-equal team at the center of the European Union remains a particularly difficult undertaking. This article analyses the case of Ursula von der Leyen, who, in 2019, set out to form a gender-equal college of commissioners. It analyses why von der Leyen’s first leadership project did not initially succeed and assesses the longer-term prospects of gender equality in the European Commission. Employing a framework drawn from studies of Commission leadership, commissioner selection, and gendered executives, it conceptualizes Commission presidents-elect as constrained selectors. Even with personal dispositions that support gender equality and access to powerful institutional resources, treaty-based rules and situational settings obstruct the ability of presidents-elect to achieve their representational goals. In the future, even presidents-elect who are strongly committed to gender equality will likely struggle to achieve fully balanced colleges.","PeriodicalId":53479,"journal":{"name":"European Politics and Society","volume":"24 1","pages":"317 - 335"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-11-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48590423","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-10-28DOI: 10.1080/23745118.2021.1993056
Paul Carls
ABSTRACT What does right-wing populism look like in Luxembourg, a small European state whose economy heavily relies on strong European integration and foreign and cross-border labor? This article explores this question by looking at the Alternativ Demokratesh Reformpartei (ADR), Luxembourg’s version of a right-wing populist party. It studies the ADR’s discourse during three discursive events: the debate over a burka law (2014–2018), the 2015 Refugee Crisis, and Luxembourg’s 2015 constitutional referendum. Much of the ADR’s discourse is right-wing populist, but with two specificities: the ADR’s embrace of multiculturalism and its use of the issue of the national language to appeal to cultural and economic interests. Both of these specificities reflect into a distinctive concept of the Luxembourgish ‘people’. The Luxembourg case demonstrates the chameleonic nature or populism, or its ability to adapt to its local circumstances, in this instance even adopting features that contradict much of the thinking on right-wing populism.
{"title":"Approaching right-wing populism in the context of transnational economic integration: lessons from Luxembourg","authors":"Paul Carls","doi":"10.1080/23745118.2021.1993056","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/23745118.2021.1993056","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT What does right-wing populism look like in Luxembourg, a small European state whose economy heavily relies on strong European integration and foreign and cross-border labor? This article explores this question by looking at the Alternativ Demokratesh Reformpartei (ADR), Luxembourg’s version of a right-wing populist party. It studies the ADR’s discourse during three discursive events: the debate over a burka law (2014–2018), the 2015 Refugee Crisis, and Luxembourg’s 2015 constitutional referendum. Much of the ADR’s discourse is right-wing populist, but with two specificities: the ADR’s embrace of multiculturalism and its use of the issue of the national language to appeal to cultural and economic interests. Both of these specificities reflect into a distinctive concept of the Luxembourgish ‘people’. The Luxembourg case demonstrates the chameleonic nature or populism, or its ability to adapt to its local circumstances, in this instance even adopting features that contradict much of the thinking on right-wing populism.","PeriodicalId":53479,"journal":{"name":"European Politics and Society","volume":"24 1","pages":"265 - 283"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-10-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44131119","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-10-22DOI: 10.1080/23745118.2021.1990662
Matthew Crandall, M. Sulg
ABSTRACT Small states can never take their existence for granted. Due to their smallness and limited resources, they have to find innovative ways to be visible. For small states, one way to compensate is to increase their status. Little attention has been paid to European small states’ foreign policy in Africa. Estonia, a small country with only one embassy on the continent, has begun to build status as an innovative partner of several African countries. This article will look at three ways Estonia, as a small state, has increased its status in Africa despite its limited resources. It has done this by focusing on information and communication technology/e-governance, defence cooperation, and development cooperation. This article tries to answer the question of why Africa is becoming more important to Estonia. Why Estonia, a small state with limited resources, has built its status in an untraditional geographical destination, in Africa in addition to its traditional area of cooperation within Eastern Europe. It will also map out the status flows between Estonia and several African countries and highlight the key variables that enable the successful transfer of status. This article concludes by arguing that Estonian–African cooperation has become a source of mutual status building.
{"title":"Small states and new status opportunities: Estonia’s foreign policy towards Africa","authors":"Matthew Crandall, M. Sulg","doi":"10.1080/23745118.2021.1990662","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/23745118.2021.1990662","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT Small states can never take their existence for granted. Due to their smallness and limited resources, they have to find innovative ways to be visible. For small states, one way to compensate is to increase their status. Little attention has been paid to European small states’ foreign policy in Africa. Estonia, a small country with only one embassy on the continent, has begun to build status as an innovative partner of several African countries. This article will look at three ways Estonia, as a small state, has increased its status in Africa despite its limited resources. It has done this by focusing on information and communication technology/e-governance, defence cooperation, and development cooperation. This article tries to answer the question of why Africa is becoming more important to Estonia. Why Estonia, a small state with limited resources, has built its status in an untraditional geographical destination, in Africa in addition to its traditional area of cooperation within Eastern Europe. It will also map out the status flows between Estonia and several African countries and highlight the key variables that enable the successful transfer of status. This article concludes by arguing that Estonian–African cooperation has become a source of mutual status building.","PeriodicalId":53479,"journal":{"name":"European Politics and Society","volume":"24 1","pages":"250 - 264"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-10-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42613638","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-10-11DOI: 10.1080/23745118.2021.1986652
Elif Gençkal Eroler
ABSTRACT Taking religious education as an important indicator in evaluating religious freedom in a country, this paper focuses on the religion courses in Turkey in order to evaluate Europeanisation and religious freedom in the country. The EU Commission’s recent progress reports indicated that the conduct of religious courses in Turkey is incompatible with EU norms. Although important legal arrangements have been made in accordance with the adoption of minority rights in Turkey, it seems more difficult for change to happen in an ideological issue such as education. As religious freedom is an important value for the European Union, this paper aims to explore the impact of Europeanisation on the state of religious education in Turkey and the extent of Turkey’s compliance with the European norms in a highly debated area like religious education. It also aims, in a broader sense, to shed a light on the place of religion in the national identity of Turkey today.
{"title":"Religious education in Turkey in the mirror of Europeanization","authors":"Elif Gençkal Eroler","doi":"10.1080/23745118.2021.1986652","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/23745118.2021.1986652","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT Taking religious education as an important indicator in evaluating religious freedom in a country, this paper focuses on the religion courses in Turkey in order to evaluate Europeanisation and religious freedom in the country. The EU Commission’s recent progress reports indicated that the conduct of religious courses in Turkey is incompatible with EU norms. Although important legal arrangements have been made in accordance with the adoption of minority rights in Turkey, it seems more difficult for change to happen in an ideological issue such as education. As religious freedom is an important value for the European Union, this paper aims to explore the impact of Europeanisation on the state of religious education in Turkey and the extent of Turkey’s compliance with the European norms in a highly debated area like religious education. It also aims, in a broader sense, to shed a light on the place of religion in the national identity of Turkey today.","PeriodicalId":53479,"journal":{"name":"European Politics and Society","volume":"24 1","pages":"234 - 249"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-10-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43623592","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-09-23DOI: 10.1080/23745118.2021.1976577
R. Heinisch, Viktoria Jansesberger
ABSTRACT This article investigates to what extent citizens’ conceptions of nation-state identity and European identity contribute to the support for populist radical parties along the left-right and the national level and sub-state divide. Drawing on data European Social Survey data, it employs multinomial and logistical regression models to examine the connection between territorial identity and support for majority nationalist Populist Radical Right Parties (PRRP) (9 cases), national-level Populist Radical Left Parties (PRLP) (4 cases), sub-national PRRP (3 cases), and sub-national PRLP (3 cases). The overall findings confirm that nation-state identity and European identity have independent and significant effects. In several of the cases, a strong nation-state identity is positively related to support for (a) majority nationalist PRRP. A (negative) European identity is a central characteristic throughout the sample of majority nationalist PRRP and present in every single case. Sub-state PRRP supporters reject nation-state identity and, interestingly, in one case also European identity more than do other partisans. Identity effects, especially a negative nation-state identity, were present among PRLP supporters too. However, the evidence points to significantly less coherence.
{"title":"Does ethno-territorial identity matter in populist party support? Evidence on the demand-side from 19 populist radical right and populist radical left national and regionalist parties","authors":"R. Heinisch, Viktoria Jansesberger","doi":"10.1080/23745118.2021.1976577","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/23745118.2021.1976577","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT This article investigates to what extent citizens’ conceptions of nation-state identity and European identity contribute to the support for populist radical parties along the left-right and the national level and sub-state divide. Drawing on data European Social Survey data, it employs multinomial and logistical regression models to examine the connection between territorial identity and support for majority nationalist Populist Radical Right Parties (PRRP) (9 cases), national-level Populist Radical Left Parties (PRLP) (4 cases), sub-national PRRP (3 cases), and sub-national PRLP (3 cases). The overall findings confirm that nation-state identity and European identity have independent and significant effects. In several of the cases, a strong nation-state identity is positively related to support for (a) majority nationalist PRRP. A (negative) European identity is a central characteristic throughout the sample of majority nationalist PRRP and present in every single case. Sub-state PRRP supporters reject nation-state identity and, interestingly, in one case also European identity more than do other partisans. Identity effects, especially a negative nation-state identity, were present among PRLP supporters too. However, the evidence points to significantly less coherence.","PeriodicalId":53479,"journal":{"name":"European Politics and Society","volume":"24 1","pages":"213 - 233"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-09-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"60110206","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-09-06DOI: 10.1080/23745118.2021.1973213
Dalibor Rohac
ABSTRACT Although both Hungary and the Czech Republic have seen populists arrive in power over the past decade, only Hungary has experienced a measurable deterioration in the quality of its democratic institutions and rule of law. The different circumstances of the transition after 1989, particularly the differences in constitutional choices and transitional justice measures, help explain the cleavages, polarization, and erosion of trust that characterized Hungarian politics in the run up to the 2010 election. Jointly with a highly disproportionate electoral system, these structural factors made Hungary more prone to the de-democratization observed under Viktor Orbán than the Czech Republic.
{"title":"Transitions, populism, and democratic decline: evidence from Hungary and the Czech Republic","authors":"Dalibor Rohac","doi":"10.1080/23745118.2021.1973213","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/23745118.2021.1973213","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT\u0000 Although both Hungary and the Czech Republic have seen populists arrive in power over the past decade, only Hungary has experienced a measurable deterioration in the quality of its democratic institutions and rule of law. The different circumstances of the transition after 1989, particularly the differences in constitutional choices and transitional justice measures, help explain the cleavages, polarization, and erosion of trust that characterized Hungarian politics in the run up to the 2010 election. Jointly with a highly disproportionate electoral system, these structural factors made Hungary more prone to the de-democratization observed under Viktor Orbán than the Czech Republic.","PeriodicalId":53479,"journal":{"name":"European Politics and Society","volume":"24 1","pages":"169 - 187"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-09-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48107459","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-09-01DOI: 10.1080/23745118.2021.1973214
K. Han, Eric Graig Castater
ABSTRACT We utilize the literature on social pacts to argue that governments can reduce manual worker support for the radical right by engaging in an inclusive process of decision-making with unions. Our analysis examines 11 Western European countries between 1999 and 2017 and employs a Heckman selection model. We find that when left or mainstream right governments complete social pact agreements, manual workers become less likely to support radical right-wing parties (RRPs); but when such governments fail to convert social pact proposals into social pact agreements, manual workers become more likely to support RRPs. We also find that social pact agreements have a greater effect on manual worker support for the radical right when they occur under mainstream right governments, but that failed social pact proposals have a greater effect on manual worker support for the radical right when they occur under left governments; and that the social pact formation process matters more for the RRP support of manual workers who belong to a union than those who do not. Our results suggest that manual worker support for the radical right is not only a function of issue voting or socioeconomic and policy outcomes, but also features of the policymaking process.
{"title":"It’s not just where you stand, it’s how you got there: social pacts and manual worker support for radical right-wing parties","authors":"K. Han, Eric Graig Castater","doi":"10.1080/23745118.2021.1973214","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/23745118.2021.1973214","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT\u0000 We utilize the literature on social pacts to argue that governments can reduce manual worker support for the radical right by engaging in an inclusive process of decision-making with unions. Our analysis examines 11 Western European countries between 1999 and 2017 and employs a Heckman selection model. We find that when left or mainstream right governments complete social pact agreements, manual workers become less likely to support radical right-wing parties (RRPs); but when such governments fail to convert social pact proposals into social pact agreements, manual workers become more likely to support RRPs. We also find that social pact agreements have a greater effect on manual worker support for the radical right when they occur under mainstream right governments, but that failed social pact proposals have a greater effect on manual worker support for the radical right when they occur under left governments; and that the social pact formation process matters more for the RRP support of manual workers who belong to a union than those who do not. Our results suggest that manual worker support for the radical right is not only a function of issue voting or socioeconomic and policy outcomes, but also features of the policymaking process.","PeriodicalId":53479,"journal":{"name":"European Politics and Society","volume":"24 1","pages":"188 - 212"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47711043","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-08-20DOI: 10.1080/23745118.2021.1956239
J. Rone
ABSTRACT The paper explores how the leaders of parliamentary represented parties in Bulgaria discussed Fidesz's policies in the period 2010-2019. Furthermore, it attempts to explain why Orbán's brand of conservative illiberalism has emerged as a normative ideal for a number of Bulgarian political parties, including the Bulgarian socialists after 2016. The paper argues that so-called ‘democratic backsliding' in CEE, and Bulgaria more specifically, cannot be understood without acknowledging the role of decommunization for the rehabilitation and rise of far-right nationalist discourses. Within a common framework of capitalist free markets and decommunization, a series of ideological ‘slippages' from 1990s liberalism to post-2008 conservatism has taken place. It is the consistent backsliding of left-wing thought in Bulgaria that has made a critique of liberalism possible mainly from a conservative point of view, even for the socialists. Third, the paper argues that while Bulgarian politicians praise Orbán and his conservative illiberalism on the domestic scene, they pay lip service to liberal values in their international discourse, pre-empting in this way criticism from the EU. It is precisely Orbán's open normative ideological challenge that has made Hungary the ‘poster child’ of illiberalism distracting attention away from his political followers in countries such as Bulgaria.
{"title":"Backsliding of the left: or how Viktor Orbán’s right-wing conservative illiberalism emerged as a normative ideal in Bulgarian political discourse","authors":"J. Rone","doi":"10.1080/23745118.2021.1956239","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/23745118.2021.1956239","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT The paper explores how the leaders of parliamentary represented parties in Bulgaria discussed Fidesz's policies in the period 2010-2019. Furthermore, it attempts to explain why Orbán's brand of conservative illiberalism has emerged as a normative ideal for a number of Bulgarian political parties, including the Bulgarian socialists after 2016. The paper argues that so-called ‘democratic backsliding' in CEE, and Bulgaria more specifically, cannot be understood without acknowledging the role of decommunization for the rehabilitation and rise of far-right nationalist discourses. Within a common framework of capitalist free markets and decommunization, a series of ideological ‘slippages' from 1990s liberalism to post-2008 conservatism has taken place. It is the consistent backsliding of left-wing thought in Bulgaria that has made a critique of liberalism possible mainly from a conservative point of view, even for the socialists. Third, the paper argues that while Bulgarian politicians praise Orbán and his conservative illiberalism on the domestic scene, they pay lip service to liberal values in their international discourse, pre-empting in this way criticism from the EU. It is precisely Orbán's open normative ideological challenge that has made Hungary the ‘poster child’ of illiberalism distracting attention away from his political followers in countries such as Bulgaria.","PeriodicalId":53479,"journal":{"name":"European Politics and Society","volume":"24 1","pages":"59 - 76"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-08-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45485503","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-08-14DOI: 10.1080/23745118.2021.1965405
Katrin Praprotnik, Flooh Perlot
ABSTRACT Understanding public opinion on the EU remains a pressing issue. In contrast to previous studies on EU attitudes in general, we pose the following question: Which factors help us to understand public support for five specific scenarios for the EU’s future? We promote the still undertheorized identity approach that has developed alongside the utilitarian and the cue-taking perspectives. We argue that a European Social Capital – composed of trust, norms and networks with other Europeans – is related to support for further integration scenarios. The multivariate analyses are based upon a mass survey conducted in Austria. Our results show a significant correlation between higher levels of European Social Capital and positive attitudes towards scenarios for more integration. This adds to the identity approach in the literature on EU attitudes. Our study has important implications for the EU’s reform debate. If people feel emotionally connected with other Europeans, they are willing to accept deeper integration processes. Pure economic arguments seem insufficient.
{"title":"More or less integration? Examining support for different EU future scenarios in Austria","authors":"Katrin Praprotnik, Flooh Perlot","doi":"10.1080/23745118.2021.1965405","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/23745118.2021.1965405","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT\u0000 Understanding public opinion on the EU remains a pressing issue. In contrast to previous studies on EU attitudes in general, we pose the following question: Which factors help us to understand public support for five specific scenarios for the EU’s future? We promote the still undertheorized identity approach that has developed alongside the utilitarian and the cue-taking perspectives. We argue that a European Social Capital – composed of trust, norms and networks with other Europeans – is related to support for further integration scenarios. The multivariate analyses are based upon a mass survey conducted in Austria. Our results show a significant correlation between higher levels of European Social Capital and positive attitudes towards scenarios for more integration. This adds to the identity approach in the literature on EU attitudes. Our study has important implications for the EU’s reform debate. If people feel emotionally connected with other Europeans, they are willing to accept deeper integration processes. Pure economic arguments seem insufficient.","PeriodicalId":53479,"journal":{"name":"European Politics and Society","volume":"24 1","pages":"151 - 168"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-08-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46315775","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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