Pub Date : 2023-01-01DOI: 10.21638/spbu24.2023.308
I. A. Anfertiev
Using the methods of interpreting historical sources, the article analyzes the memorandum of one of the leaders of the “Workers’ Opposition” G. I. Myasnikov, sent to the Central Committee of the RCP(b) on the eve of the X Party Congress. The novelty of the study lies in the fact that referring to the source analysis of the memorandum allows us to expand the chronological framework of the initial stage of the formation of the workers’ opposition movement within the RCP(b), to attribute its origin to the middle of 1920, about six months before the end of the X Party Congress, at which, As you know, factional activity in the RCP(b) was officially banned. In the memorandum of G. I. Myasnikov, according to the researcher, various aspects of the intra-party struggle for power between a group of emigrants led by V. I. Lenin and those members of the RCP(b) with pre-revolutionary experience who were subjected to repression for revolutionary activities in the Russian Empire are reflected, served their sentences in prisons and hard labor. The study reveals the desire of the opposition leader to enlist support not only within the ruling RCP(b), but also outside it, among the “deprived” of power working class. In the memorandum of G. I. Myasnikov, according to the researcher, various aspects of the intra-party struggle for power between a group of emigrants led by V. I. Lenin and those members of the RCP(b) with pre-revolutionary experience who were subjected to repression for revolutionary activities in the Russian Empire are reflected, served their sentences in prisons and hard labor.
{"title":"Memorandum of the Leader of the “Workers’ Opposition” Gavriil Myasnikov to the Central Committee of the RCP(b): Source Study Potential","authors":"I. A. Anfertiev","doi":"10.21638/spbu24.2023.308","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21638/spbu24.2023.308","url":null,"abstract":"Using the methods of interpreting historical sources, the article analyzes the memorandum of one of the leaders of the “Workers’ Opposition” G. I. Myasnikov, sent to the Central Committee of the RCP(b) on the eve of the X Party Congress. The novelty of the study lies in the fact that referring to the source analysis of the memorandum allows us to expand the chronological framework of the initial stage of the formation of the workers’ opposition movement within the RCP(b), to attribute its origin to the middle of 1920, about six months before the end of the X Party Congress, at which, As you know, factional activity in the RCP(b) was officially banned. In the memorandum of G. I. Myasnikov, according to the researcher, various aspects of the intra-party struggle for power between a group of emigrants led by V. I. Lenin and those members of the RCP(b) with pre-revolutionary experience who were subjected to repression for revolutionary activities in the Russian Empire are reflected, served their sentences in prisons and hard labor. The study reveals the desire of the opposition leader to enlist support not only within the ruling RCP(b), but also outside it, among the “deprived” of power working class. In the memorandum of G. I. Myasnikov, according to the researcher, various aspects of the intra-party struggle for power between a group of emigrants led by V. I. Lenin and those members of the RCP(b) with pre-revolutionary experience who were subjected to repression for revolutionary activities in the Russian Empire are reflected, served their sentences in prisons and hard labor.","PeriodicalId":53957,"journal":{"name":"Noveishaya Istoriya Rossii-Modern History of Russia","volume":"19 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"136003264","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-01-01DOI: 10.21638/spbu24.2023.301
A. I. Savin, V. V. Zhuravlev
The article analyses the history of the amnesty granted by the Bolsheviks in 1921–1923 to nine Kolchak ministers led by P. I. Preobrazhensky, G. A. Krasnov, A. A. Gratsianov and N. Ya. Novombergsky, prominent figures of the anti-Bolshevik governments, convicted by the Extraordinary Siberian Revolutionary Tribunal at the open trial in Omsk on 20–30 May, 1920. Based on a wide range of archival sources, the authors have reconstructed the entire pardon process, from the improvements in conditions of detention to the official decision of the VTsIK. Amnesty is considered as a political tool of the Soviet power, which allowed the communist leadership of the country to effectively correct the cruel punitive policy, play the card of restoration of social justice, and win the victims over to its side. It is concluded that the pardon of the Kolchak ministers was an individual but significant component of the process of restoring civil peace in Russia at the end of the internal military-political confrontation. What made this amnesty unusual among the many similar acts announced by the Bolsheviks in 1922–1923 was that not the rank-and-file members of the anti-Soviet struggle were pardoned, but its immediate leaders. The main reason for the rehumanization of former enemies were their personal ties and contacts in the upper echelon of the Soviet leadership in Siberia, which were formed primarily in the course of joint activities. The main criterion for applying the amnesty was the high quality work of the Kolchak ministers in the economic departments of the Siberian Revolutionary Committee under the conditions of severe labor shortage.
{"title":"An Occasional Amnesty. How the Siberian Bolsheviks Granted Amnesty to Kolchak Ministers","authors":"A. I. Savin, V. V. Zhuravlev","doi":"10.21638/spbu24.2023.301","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21638/spbu24.2023.301","url":null,"abstract":"The article analyses the history of the amnesty granted by the Bolsheviks in 1921–1923 to nine Kolchak ministers led by P. I. Preobrazhensky, G. A. Krasnov, A. A. Gratsianov and N. Ya. Novombergsky, prominent figures of the anti-Bolshevik governments, convicted by the Extraordinary Siberian Revolutionary Tribunal at the open trial in Omsk on 20–30 May, 1920. Based on a wide range of archival sources, the authors have reconstructed the entire pardon process, from the improvements in conditions of detention to the official decision of the VTsIK. Amnesty is considered as a political tool of the Soviet power, which allowed the communist leadership of the country to effectively correct the cruel punitive policy, play the card of restoration of social justice, and win the victims over to its side. It is concluded that the pardon of the Kolchak ministers was an individual but significant component of the process of restoring civil peace in Russia at the end of the internal military-political confrontation. What made this amnesty unusual among the many similar acts announced by the Bolsheviks in 1922–1923 was that not the rank-and-file members of the anti-Soviet struggle were pardoned, but its immediate leaders. The main reason for the rehumanization of former enemies were their personal ties and contacts in the upper echelon of the Soviet leadership in Siberia, which were formed primarily in the course of joint activities. The main criterion for applying the amnesty was the high quality work of the Kolchak ministers in the economic departments of the Siberian Revolutionary Committee under the conditions of severe labor shortage.","PeriodicalId":53957,"journal":{"name":"Noveishaya Istoriya Rossii-Modern History of Russia","volume":"140 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"136003737","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-01-01DOI: 10.21638/spbu24.2023.111
E. Prosolova
During the Cold War exporting films was not only a means of obtaining commercial benefits from distribution in foreign countries, but also an important instrument of ideological influence. In the USSR, the All- Union Association “Sovexportfilm” served these functions selling Soviet film products as well as purchasing foreign films. The purpose of the article is to study the methods and principles of propaganda of “Sovexportfilm” in its work with foreign states within the framework of the foreign policy pursued by the USSR. The article examines the main aspects of the organizational activities of “Sovexportfilm”, the history of the creation and reorganization of the association, the mechanisms and efficiency of its work. The specifics of the export of products to the countries of Western Europe, the USA, Latin America, the countries of Asia and Africa are determined. The article pays particular attention to a comparative analysis of the principles of conducting propaganda aimed at foreign countries employed by the USSR and the United States as far as a number of aspects are concerned, including organizational activity, production capacity, and repertoire policy. The analysis of the sources enables to trace the main stages of the development of “Sovexportfilm” as an agent of foreign policy influence, to identify the shortcomings in the system of export of film, and also to highlight the reasons for the failure of the association’s activities in the last stages of the Cold War. Based on the results of the study, the author comes to the conclusion that “Sovexportfilm”, initially possessing a powerful starting potential for promoting Soviet films abroad, due to a number of objective factors and mistakes in organization of its work by the 1980s, ceased to perform the function of spreading ideological influence through the Soviet cinema.
{"title":"‘“Sovexportfilm” as an Actor of Ideological Influence during the Cold War","authors":"E. Prosolova","doi":"10.21638/spbu24.2023.111","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21638/spbu24.2023.111","url":null,"abstract":"During the Cold War exporting films was not only a means of obtaining commercial benefits from distribution in foreign countries, but also an important instrument of ideological influence. In the USSR, the All- Union Association “Sovexportfilm” served these functions selling Soviet film products as well as purchasing foreign films. The purpose of the article is to study the methods and principles of propaganda of “Sovexportfilm” in its work with foreign states within the framework of the foreign policy pursued by the USSR. The article examines the main aspects of the organizational activities of “Sovexportfilm”, the history of the creation and reorganization of the association, the mechanisms and efficiency of its work. The specifics of the export of products to the countries of Western Europe, the USA, Latin America, the countries of Asia and Africa are determined. The article pays particular attention to a comparative analysis of the principles of conducting propaganda aimed at foreign countries employed by the USSR and the United States as far as a number of aspects are concerned, including organizational activity, production capacity, and repertoire policy. The analysis of the sources enables to trace the main stages of the development of “Sovexportfilm” as an agent of foreign policy influence, to identify the shortcomings in the system of export of film, and also to highlight the reasons for the failure of the association’s activities in the last stages of the Cold War. Based on the results of the study, the author comes to the conclusion that “Sovexportfilm”, initially possessing a powerful starting potential for promoting Soviet films abroad, due to a number of objective factors and mistakes in organization of its work by the 1980s, ceased to perform the function of spreading ideological influence through the Soviet cinema.","PeriodicalId":53957,"journal":{"name":"Noveishaya Istoriya Rossii-Modern History of Russia","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2023-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"67790167","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-01-01DOI: 10.21638/spbu24.2023.209
I. N. Strekalov
The article is devoted to the study of the thoughts of the Soviet citizens about the structure of the state and society in the 1960s–1970s. This subject of research is considered in connection with the constitutional reform, e. g., the process of creating the third Constitution of the USSR, officially held in 1962–1977. The research revises the established approach in the historiography usually adopted by modern researchers of the late Soviet era, according to which, the Soviet society was homogeneous in its moods and views or shared some clear doctrinal, theoretical concepts. This article examines a number of sources: citizens’ letters to the Constitutional Commission considered by employees of the apparatus of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR; some certificates, reports, reviews of citizens’ letters sent to the Central Committee of the CPSU containing information on proposals to the draft of the Constitution. It argues that there were different opinions among the Soviet citizens: on the basis of the analysis of letters in connection with the draft of the Constitution of the USSR, the paper highlights different attitudes towards the authorities, not only purely critical or, on the contrary, trusting. The society was comprised of both those who spoke out “for” or “against” the ruling regime, and — no less — of those who, to a certain degree, supported the authorities in their transformations or were critical of them, but who cannot be attributed to the “Soviet” or “anti-Soviet” camp of society with an absolute certainty.
{"title":"About the Difference of Opinion of the Soviet Citizens in Connection with the Drafting of the Soviet Union’s Third Constitution","authors":"I. N. Strekalov","doi":"10.21638/spbu24.2023.209","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21638/spbu24.2023.209","url":null,"abstract":"The article is devoted to the study of the thoughts of the Soviet citizens about the structure of the state and society in the 1960s–1970s. This subject of research is considered in connection with the constitutional reform, e. g., the process of creating the third Constitution of the USSR, officially held in 1962–1977. The research revises the established approach in the historiography usually adopted by modern researchers of the late Soviet era, according to which, the Soviet society was homogeneous in its moods and views or shared some clear doctrinal, theoretical concepts. This article examines a number of sources: citizens’ letters to the Constitutional Commission considered by employees of the apparatus of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR; some certificates, reports, reviews of citizens’ letters sent to the Central Committee of the CPSU containing information on proposals to the draft of the Constitution. It argues that there were different opinions among the Soviet citizens: on the basis of the analysis of letters in connection with the draft of the Constitution of the USSR, the paper highlights different attitudes towards the authorities, not only purely critical or, on the contrary, trusting. The society was comprised of both those who spoke out “for” or “against” the ruling regime, and — no less — of those who, to a certain degree, supported the authorities in their transformations or were critical of them, but who cannot be attributed to the “Soviet” or “anti-Soviet” camp of society with an absolute certainty.","PeriodicalId":53957,"journal":{"name":"Noveishaya Istoriya Rossii-Modern History of Russia","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2023-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"67790624","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-01-01DOI: 10.21638/spbu24.2023.210
J. Hass, N. Lomagin
The article examines the perestroika processes from the Leningrad point of view. Surprisingly, but events in Moscow and, eventually, in the media were initially more conservative and sluggish than the discussions behind closed doors in Leningrad — but before long, roles were reversed, and public discourse became increasingly more creative and even radical than those private discussions requested by Smolny. The other point is that local enterprise directors (and other organizational actors and elites, e. g. in the Komsomol) started to act on their own interests and opportunities. The growing acceptance of some form of Western market economies (even if adapted to some “Soviet” form) meant that directors could steal a step on Smolny and even Moscow. Gorbachev reforms offered the possibility of taking reforms beyond local Party and state headquarters — Smolny and the Councils — to economic actors themselves. This threatened to make the Councils redundant, if such reforms were serious. Authors suggest, this is what happened. Authors’ data suggest that the Councils in the initial phase of reform (and perhaps Gorbachev) underestimated how important and central the shadow economy had become by then. Gorbachev opened the economy, hoping that devolution and some liberalization would harness, not fight, the initiative in the shadows. However, shadow practices were so wrapped up in formal institutions, and so ingrained among economic (and other) actors, that unleashing the shadow economy risked unraveling institutions as actors used the brief open window to gain as much as they could. It ended up a wager both on the entrepreneur and the thief — leaving Smolny and the Councils, the first stage of reform, in history. What did survive, however, were those networks of younger reform-minded cadres, who in the new world would find their place driving the next stage of radical reforms.
{"title":"Unseen Roots of an Unexpected Revolution: Party Elites, Economic Reforms, and Expectations versus Outcomes in Late 1980s Leningrad","authors":"J. Hass, N. Lomagin","doi":"10.21638/spbu24.2023.210","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21638/spbu24.2023.210","url":null,"abstract":"The article examines the perestroika processes from the Leningrad point of view. Surprisingly, but events in Moscow and, eventually, in the media were initially more conservative and sluggish than the discussions behind closed doors in Leningrad — but before long, roles were reversed, and public discourse became increasingly more creative and even radical than those private discussions requested by Smolny. The other point is that local enterprise directors (and other organizational actors and elites, e. g. in the Komsomol) started to act on their own interests and opportunities. The growing acceptance of some form of Western market economies (even if adapted to some “Soviet” form) meant that directors could steal a step on Smolny and even Moscow. Gorbachev reforms offered the possibility of taking reforms beyond local Party and state headquarters — Smolny and the Councils — to economic actors themselves. This threatened to make the Councils redundant, if such reforms were serious. Authors suggest, this is what happened. Authors’ data suggest that the Councils in the initial phase of reform (and perhaps Gorbachev) underestimated how important and central the shadow economy had become by then. Gorbachev opened the economy, hoping that devolution and some liberalization would harness, not fight, the initiative in the shadows. However, shadow practices were so wrapped up in formal institutions, and so ingrained among economic (and other) actors, that unleashing the shadow economy risked unraveling institutions as actors used the brief open window to gain as much as they could. It ended up a wager both on the entrepreneur and the thief — leaving Smolny and the Councils, the first stage of reform, in history. What did survive, however, were those networks of younger reform-minded cadres, who in the new world would find their place driving the next stage of radical reforms.","PeriodicalId":53957,"journal":{"name":"Noveishaya Istoriya Rossii-Modern History of Russia","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2023-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"67790672","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-01-01DOI: 10.21638/spbu24.2023.312
O. P. Ilyukha
In 1936–1939, the Spanish Civil War was a hot topic used for military-patriotic upbringing and political socialization of children. This article shows has the events in Spain were portrayed in periodicals for preschoolers and primary schoolchildren, including texts and visualizations. While the official perspective of the Spanish events in the USSR was dictated by the Party, children’s optics was tuned using its own means and methods, customized to the psychology of this age group. The article discloses the goals of exploiting this topic in the Soviet child-targeting discourse, reveals the most common plotlines, pinpoints the specific emotion-inciting tricks. In propaganda work with children, the extreme polarization of good and evil was used, embodied in two political forces — fascists and republicans. The theme was adapted for children through the extensive use of peer images, central among which were child heroes and child martyrs. The image of the Spanish child-hero corresponded to the Soviet concept of a child walking in the forefront of society. At the same time, attention was focused on the difficulties experienced by the children of Spain, who experienced a “threat to childhood”, which fed the ideologeme of “happy Soviet childhood”, the exclusivity of Soviet children. The participation of powerful artistic forces in the information campaign resulted in the construction of a sublimely romantic image of Spain and the Spaniards with an aura of inflexibility and fortitude, corresponding to the ideal of a Soviet person. There was a feeling of connection between the Soviet and Spanish loci of heroism and people of heroic professions, among which pilots and border guards came to the fore. The figures selected to create the pantheon of Civil War heroes and the ways to fit the images of Franco and Stalin into the context are demonstrated.
{"title":"“A Threat to the Childhood”: Civil War in the Pyrenees in the Coverage of Soviet Periodicals for Children","authors":"O. P. Ilyukha","doi":"10.21638/spbu24.2023.312","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21638/spbu24.2023.312","url":null,"abstract":"In 1936–1939, the Spanish Civil War was a hot topic used for military-patriotic upbringing and political socialization of children. This article shows has the events in Spain were portrayed in periodicals for preschoolers and primary schoolchildren, including texts and visualizations. While the official perspective of the Spanish events in the USSR was dictated by the Party, children’s optics was tuned using its own means and methods, customized to the psychology of this age group. The article discloses the goals of exploiting this topic in the Soviet child-targeting discourse, reveals the most common plotlines, pinpoints the specific emotion-inciting tricks. In propaganda work with children, the extreme polarization of good and evil was used, embodied in two political forces — fascists and republicans. The theme was adapted for children through the extensive use of peer images, central among which were child heroes and child martyrs. The image of the Spanish child-hero corresponded to the Soviet concept of a child walking in the forefront of society. At the same time, attention was focused on the difficulties experienced by the children of Spain, who experienced a “threat to childhood”, which fed the ideologeme of “happy Soviet childhood”, the exclusivity of Soviet children. The participation of powerful artistic forces in the information campaign resulted in the construction of a sublimely romantic image of Spain and the Spaniards with an aura of inflexibility and fortitude, corresponding to the ideal of a Soviet person. There was a feeling of connection between the Soviet and Spanish loci of heroism and people of heroic professions, among which pilots and border guards came to the fore. The figures selected to create the pantheon of Civil War heroes and the ways to fit the images of Franco and Stalin into the context are demonstrated.","PeriodicalId":53957,"journal":{"name":"Noveishaya Istoriya Rossii-Modern History of Russia","volume":"241 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135958429","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-01-01DOI: 10.21638/11701/spbu24.2022.310
D. Shkarevsky
In modern historiography, much less attention has been paid to problems of the development of bodies of the camp (penitentiary) justice, than to activities of places of detention. Meanwhile, camp courts belonged to bodies of special justice along with military tribunals and were an important element of the state mechanism. This research identifies the main stages of the formation of the camp justice bodies and determines the features of their functioning. The article defines the structure and number of camp ships, as well as elements of mechanism of their organization. For the first time, the main stages in the development of bodies of camp justice are highlighted: 1944–1948 (the formation of this system), 1949–1952 (relatively stable existence), and 1953– 1959 (period of sharp reduction and elimination). Plans to reform the system of camp courts are discussed. The initiator of the creation of the system of camp courts was the leadership of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs. Among the organizational features of the functioning of these bodies, the asymmetric nature of the system of the bodies of the camp justice is named for the first time. Along with the camp (penitentiary) courts, military tribunals of the NKVD/MVD troops continued to operate, and special camp courts with wider jurisdiction operated in the structure of special buildings, which considered not only criminal, but also civil cases. The peculiarities of the functioning of these bodies include: a weak material and technical base, the struggle of clans in the leadership of justice, a high level of conflict in the system of camp justice, and the minor role of lawyers in the process and their dependence on the camp administration and the court.
{"title":"The Features of the Formation of the Camp Justice of the USSR (1944–1959)","authors":"D. Shkarevsky","doi":"10.21638/11701/spbu24.2022.310","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21638/11701/spbu24.2022.310","url":null,"abstract":"In modern historiography, much less attention has been paid to problems of the development of bodies of the camp (penitentiary) justice, than to activities of places of detention. Meanwhile, camp courts belonged to bodies of special justice along with military tribunals and were an important element of the state mechanism. This research identifies the main stages of the formation of the camp justice bodies and determines the features of their functioning. The article defines the structure and number of camp ships, as well as elements of mechanism of their organization. For the first time, the main stages in the development of bodies of camp justice are highlighted: 1944–1948 (the formation of this system), 1949–1952 (relatively stable existence), and 1953– 1959 (period of sharp reduction and elimination). Plans to reform the system of camp courts are discussed. The initiator of the creation of the system of camp courts was the leadership of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs. Among the organizational features of the functioning of these bodies, the asymmetric nature of the system of the bodies of the camp justice is named for the first time. Along with the camp (penitentiary) courts, military tribunals of the NKVD/MVD troops continued to operate, and special camp courts with wider jurisdiction operated in the structure of special buildings, which considered not only criminal, but also civil cases. The peculiarities of the functioning of these bodies include: a weak material and technical base, the struggle of clans in the leadership of justice, a high level of conflict in the system of camp justice, and the minor role of lawyers in the process and their dependence on the camp administration and the court.","PeriodicalId":53957,"journal":{"name":"Noveishaya Istoriya Rossii-Modern History of Russia","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2022-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"67780482","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-01-01DOI: 10.21638/11701/spbu24.2022.213
P. Dashkovskiy, N. Zibert
State resolutions issued during the period under review were aimed at strengthening scientific and atheistic propaganda and eradicating religion in society, as a result of which religious communities trying to obtain registration faced hidden opposition from the authorities. At the same time, registered communities were forced to account for numerous regulations of the state authorities. Otherwise, they could lose their state registration and cease their activities. This situation provoked the emergence of a large number of unregistered religious groups, and on the other, strengthened the position of registered associations due to the constant influx of new believers into them. Special attention is paid to the study of the situation of religious communities in Western Siberia in the late 1950s — early 1960s, when a new wave of church closures took place within the framework of the anti- religious campaign of N. S. Khrushchev. During this period, not only clergymen, but also ordinary parishioners came under the special control of state authorities. In addition, the activities of the so-called “forbidden sects” were completely banned, the list of which was defined in the instructions for the application of legislation on cults, published in 1961. In addition, in order to reduce the role of religion in Soviet society, resolutions were issued that negatively affected the economic situation of churches. The study concluded that the administrative pressure exerted by the authorities on religious associations, the introduction of a system of registration of persons who attend church, and the repressive methods of work of state regulatory bodies, not only provoked the growth of illegally operating religious groups, but also increased the number of people hiding their religious beliefs.
{"title":"The Situation of Religious Communities in Western Siberia in the Context of the State Confessional Policy in the Mid-1950s — Early 1960s","authors":"P. Dashkovskiy, N. Zibert","doi":"10.21638/11701/spbu24.2022.213","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21638/11701/spbu24.2022.213","url":null,"abstract":"State resolutions issued during the period under review were aimed at strengthening scientific and atheistic propaganda and eradicating religion in society, as a result of which religious communities trying to obtain registration faced hidden opposition from the authorities. At the same time, registered communities were forced to account for numerous regulations of the state authorities. Otherwise, they could lose their state registration and cease their activities. This situation provoked the emergence of a large number of unregistered religious groups, and on the other, strengthened the position of registered associations due to the constant influx of new believers into them. Special attention is paid to the study of the situation of religious communities in Western Siberia in the late 1950s — early 1960s, when a new wave of church closures took place within the framework of the anti- religious campaign of N. S. Khrushchev. During this period, not only clergymen, but also ordinary parishioners came under the special control of state authorities. In addition, the activities of the so-called “forbidden sects” were completely banned, the list of which was defined in the instructions for the application of legislation on cults, published in 1961. In addition, in order to reduce the role of religion in Soviet society, resolutions were issued that negatively affected the economic situation of churches. The study concluded that the administrative pressure exerted by the authorities on religious associations, the introduction of a system of registration of persons who attend church, and the repressive methods of work of state regulatory bodies, not only provoked the growth of illegally operating religious groups, but also increased the number of people hiding their religious beliefs.","PeriodicalId":53957,"journal":{"name":"Noveishaya Istoriya Rossii-Modern History of Russia","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2022-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"67780550","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-01-01DOI: 10.21638/11701/spbu24.2022.102
A. V. Khatanzeyskiy
This analyzes the significance of Novaya Zemlya in the course of military operations in the Arctic during World War II. Data on the deployment of troops in the Novaya Zemlya archipelago and nearby islands are provided based on an analysis of archive documents. The military history of the archipelago is examined from the creation of the Belomorskaya military flotilla in 1941 until its disbandment in April 1945. Minor importance of the region at the initial stage of the war is replaced by an increase in the activity of the German naval forces in 1942, especially submarines. The result of this was the expansion of military operations in the Arctic Sea theater, expressed in enemy attacks on polar stations and sea convoys. In response, the Soviet command created a naval base on Novaya Zemlya and increased the fleet’s ship composition. By the end of the war, there was a qualitative and quantitative increase in military infrastructure. The natural and climatic factor had a huge impact on the conduct of military operations, because of it the main combat activity of the warring parties directly depended on the polar summer and navigation period. The experience of the main Department of the Northern Sea route in the development of the region in the 1930s was taken into account. The author concluded that the possession of Novaya Zemlya was key both for the control of navigation and for the possession of the entire surrounding region. Despite all efforts, the enemy still failed to disrupt Maritime navigation in the Arctic, and to break the courageous resistance of military seamen and employees of the Main Administration of the Northern Sea Way.
{"title":"Novaya Zemlya Archipelago in the Defense System of the Soviet Arctic During the Great Patriotic War","authors":"A. V. Khatanzeyskiy","doi":"10.21638/11701/spbu24.2022.102","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21638/11701/spbu24.2022.102","url":null,"abstract":"This analyzes the significance of Novaya Zemlya in the course of military operations in the Arctic during World War II. Data on the deployment of troops in the Novaya Zemlya archipelago and nearby islands are provided based on an analysis of archive documents. The military history of the archipelago is examined from the creation of the Belomorskaya military flotilla in 1941 until its disbandment in April 1945. Minor importance of the region at the initial stage of the war is replaced by an increase in the activity of the German naval forces in 1942, especially submarines. The result of this was the expansion of military operations in the Arctic Sea theater, expressed in enemy attacks on polar stations and sea convoys. In response, the Soviet command created a naval base on Novaya Zemlya and increased the fleet’s ship composition. By the end of the war, there was a qualitative and quantitative increase in military infrastructure. The natural and climatic factor had a huge impact on the conduct of military operations, because of it the main combat activity of the warring parties directly depended on the polar summer and navigation period. The experience of the main Department of the Northern Sea route in the development of the region in the 1930s was taken into account. The author concluded that the possession of Novaya Zemlya was key both for the control of navigation and for the possession of the entire surrounding region. Despite all efforts, the enemy still failed to disrupt Maritime navigation in the Arctic, and to break the courageous resistance of military seamen and employees of the Main Administration of the Northern Sea Way.","PeriodicalId":53957,"journal":{"name":"Noveishaya Istoriya Rossii-Modern History of Russia","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2022-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"67779903","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-01-01DOI: 10.21638/11701/spbu24.2022.106
Yuri N. Timkin
In June 1921, the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks) adopted a decision on the first general purge of the party and for the period August 1 — October 1. The party organizations set as a goal to free themselves from all “clinging” members who pursued selfish material or other interests. The subject of the study is the analysis of the organization, conduct, and results of the purge in the Vyatka provincial organization of the party, as well as a socio-psychological portrait of those expelled after the purge. The work uses archival sources and the principle of historicism, methods of historical institutionalism, and case studies. It turned out that the purge took place at a later date, from September to November 1921, which indicated both the weakness of party discipline and low level of party organization. The number of excluded and expelled members was much more than in the whole country, which was due to the non-proletarian composition of the organization, the crisis at the beginning of the NEP, and the nature of the attitude of peasant communists to NEP. The main result of the purge was an increase in more disciplined and executive party members who believe in the ideals of communism. Nevertheless, the purge did not reach its goal, since the crisis in the party organizations of the province kept growing. In the 1922–1924, many county-level organizations whose members were purged found themselves in a state of deep disintegration and were again subjected to purges.
{"title":"The First General Purge of the RCP(b) in 1921: Institutional and Human Dimensions (Basing on Archival Material of the Vyatka Gubernia)","authors":"Yuri N. Timkin","doi":"10.21638/11701/spbu24.2022.106","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21638/11701/spbu24.2022.106","url":null,"abstract":"In June 1921, the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks) adopted a decision on the first general purge of the party and for the period August 1 — October 1. The party organizations set as a goal to free themselves from all “clinging” members who pursued selfish material or other interests. The subject of the study is the analysis of the organization, conduct, and results of the purge in the Vyatka provincial organization of the party, as well as a socio-psychological portrait of those expelled after the purge. The work uses archival sources and the principle of historicism, methods of historical institutionalism, and case studies. It turned out that the purge took place at a later date, from September to November 1921, which indicated both the weakness of party discipline and low level of party organization. The number of excluded and expelled members was much more than in the whole country, which was due to the non-proletarian composition of the organization, the crisis at the beginning of the NEP, and the nature of the attitude of peasant communists to NEP. The main result of the purge was an increase in more disciplined and executive party members who believe in the ideals of communism. Nevertheless, the purge did not reach its goal, since the crisis in the party organizations of the province kept growing. In the 1922–1924, many county-level organizations whose members were purged found themselves in a state of deep disintegration and were again subjected to purges.","PeriodicalId":53957,"journal":{"name":"Noveishaya Istoriya Rossii-Modern History of Russia","volume":"30 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2022-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"67780085","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}