Peer review is an essential component of the evaluation and dissemination of new scientific knowledge. The peer review process can be viewed as a decision support framework relying on scholarly review systems, where decision-makers (editors) solicit input from experts (reviewers) to make editorial decisions on submitted manuscripts. Unfortunately, the challenges editors face in securing sufficient reviewers are well-documented, leading to prolonged review times and potentially diminished review quality. We explore and validate this trend through a literature review and interviews with scholars. We then employ a design science research methodology to design, develop, and evaluate potential incentive mechanisms to reverse that trend. In addition to proposing formal design principles that such mechanisms should follow, we suggest a concrete blockchain-based token system that enables editors to offer review incentives while enabling reviewers to flexibly utilize these incentives to meet their needs. We also explain how different types of tokens can be connected to practical submission and reward policies that journals may adopt. Our cost analysis, along with a survey-based field study and qualitative interviews with academics, highlight the effectiveness of our solution. Finally, we propose a formal design theory framework that designers of peer review systems can follow to create meaningful incentives to attract reviewers.
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