Pub Date : 2018-04-03DOI: 10.11606/51678-31662017000200005
Lorenzo Baravalle
Dual inheritance theory is possibly the most promising research programme nowadays available about cultural evolution. However, many misunderstandings still surround its goals and the means to achieve them. In this article, I shall discuss the explicit engagement with population thinking displayed by many supporters of this programme. This, supposedly innocent, engagement actually hides an ambiguity with respect to a set of metaphysical and explanatory commitments. I shall show, by taking into account the two most common interpretations of population thinking – those of Mayr and Sober –, that they lead to two substantially different approaches to many topics, like the causal structure of populations and the best way to model it. The compatibility between both interpretations and dual inheritance theory reveals that there exist, in it, two distinct explanatory projects, whose difference is rarely stressed.
{"title":"El papel del pensamiento poblacional en la teoría de la doble herencia","authors":"Lorenzo Baravalle","doi":"10.11606/51678-31662017000200005","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.11606/51678-31662017000200005","url":null,"abstract":"Dual inheritance theory is possibly the most promising research programme nowadays available about cultural evolution. However, many misunderstandings still surround its goals and the means to achieve them. In this article, I shall discuss the explicit engagement with population thinking displayed by many supporters of this programme. This, supposedly innocent, engagement actually hides an ambiguity with respect to a set of metaphysical and explanatory commitments. I shall show, by taking into account the two most common interpretations of population thinking – those of Mayr and Sober –, that they lead to two substantially different approaches to many topics, like the causal structure of populations and the best way to model it. The compatibility between both interpretations and dual inheritance theory reveals that there exist, in it, two distinct explanatory projects, whose difference is rarely stressed.","PeriodicalId":168872,"journal":{"name":"Scientiae Studia","volume":"33 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-04-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126124400","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2018-04-03DOI: 10.11606/51678-31662017000200004
A. Roffé, Santiago Ginnobili
Es una opinion extendida que la teoria de la seleccion natural, tal como fue formulada originalmente por Darwin de manera “cualitativa”, ha sido reemplazada por una version cuantitativa superior, brindada por la genetica de poblaciones. En este articulo se discute contra esa tesis, sosteniendo en cambio que ambas teorias son complementarias, no sucesivas. Para ello, se introduce una linea de argumentacion novedosa, que toma su inspiracion en la critica al “inductivismo estrecho” de Hempel. Se sostiene que los genetistas de poblaciones serian incapaces de aplicar exitosamente su teoria sin hipotesis “ecologicas” preconcebidas, provenientes de la teoria darwiniana, que permitan particionar a la poblacion en rasgos selectivamente relevantes. Se enfatiza ademas que la falla en notar este punto se debe a una mala comprension de la estructura de la teoria darwiniana y de su ley o principio fundamental. A la luz de una mejor reconstruccion de dicho principio, se reexamina en mayor detalle la relacion existente entre ambas teorias.
{"title":"Son los genetistas de poblaciones inductivistas estrechos","authors":"A. Roffé, Santiago Ginnobili","doi":"10.11606/51678-31662017000200004","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.11606/51678-31662017000200004","url":null,"abstract":"Es una opinion extendida que la teoria de la seleccion natural, tal como fue formulada originalmente por Darwin de manera “cualitativa”, ha sido reemplazada por una version cuantitativa superior, brindada por la genetica de poblaciones. En este articulo se discute contra esa tesis, sosteniendo en cambio que ambas teorias son complementarias, no sucesivas. Para ello, se introduce una linea de argumentacion novedosa, que toma su inspiracion en la critica al “inductivismo estrecho” de Hempel. Se sostiene que los genetistas de poblaciones serian incapaces de aplicar exitosamente su teoria sin hipotesis “ecologicas” preconcebidas, provenientes de la teoria darwiniana, que permitan particionar a la poblacion en rasgos selectivamente relevantes. Se enfatiza ademas que la falla en notar este punto se debe a una mala comprension de la estructura de la teoria darwiniana y de su ley o principio fundamental. A la luz de una mejor reconstruccion de dicho principio, se reexamina en mayor detalle la relacion existente entre ambas teorias.","PeriodicalId":168872,"journal":{"name":"Scientiae Studia","volume":"12 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-04-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132545634","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2018-04-03DOI: 10.11606/51678-31662017000200010
Julio Alejandro Castro-Moreno
This article presents a documentary analysis about Dobzhansky’s understanding, presented in various places, of evolution and related ideas. This analysis is undertaken in order to argue that his famous phrase, “Nothing in biology makes sense except in the light of evolution”, should not be considered adequate, but on the contrary. In particular, it is proposed to re-evaluate this slogan since Dobzhansky displayed a problematic understanding of evolution, especially when he made philosophical reflections on the subject, and when he tried to explain it on the basis of his religious beliefs. The article shows that Dobzhansky supported his idea of evolution based on notions such as progress, perfection, linearity and creation, and he conceived of the “man” as the pinnacle of the evolutionary ladder. So, it is suggested that it is not appropriate to defend Dobzhansky’s sentence, since how he understands evolution is understood is highly debatable.
{"title":"La evolución según Dobzhansky: creacionismo, linealidad y progreso","authors":"Julio Alejandro Castro-Moreno","doi":"10.11606/51678-31662017000200010","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.11606/51678-31662017000200010","url":null,"abstract":"This article presents a documentary analysis about Dobzhansky’s understanding, presented in various places, of evolution and related ideas. This analysis is undertaken in order to argue that his famous phrase, “Nothing in biology makes sense except in the light of evolution”, should not be considered adequate, but on the contrary. In particular, it is proposed to re-evaluate this slogan since Dobzhansky displayed a problematic understanding of evolution, especially when he made philosophical reflections on the subject, and when he tried to explain it on the basis of his religious beliefs. The article shows that Dobzhansky supported his idea of evolution based on notions such as progress, perfection, linearity and creation, and he conceived of the “man” as the pinnacle of the evolutionary ladder. So, it is suggested that it is not appropriate to defend Dobzhansky’s sentence, since how he understands evolution is understood is highly debatable.","PeriodicalId":168872,"journal":{"name":"Scientiae Studia","volume":"16 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-04-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121715880","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2018-04-03DOI: 10.11606/51678-31662017000200008
Gustavo Caponi
The laws stated by the argentine paleontologist Florentino Ameghino (1854-1911) in his work Phylogeny, of 1884, allow understanding of what was involved in the reformulation of the objectives of Natural History of living beings, especially in Paleontology, resulting from the advent of Darwinism. In addition, these laws seem to find their basis in the deepest foundations of evolutionary perspective: although they arise, in fact, from mere empirical generalizations, the laws proposed in Phylogeny seem to find their justification in the assumption that evolutionary processes are always irreversible. They aim to identify paths in the morphospace that can be traversed in one way only, and whose knowledge allows, consequently, to serialize morphological changes. These laws, which are not causal, are laws of succession that, precisely because of the irreversibility of the series they establish, might also deserve the label of ‘historical laws’.
{"title":"Las flechas de la evolución: Florentino Ameghino y las leyes de la filogenia","authors":"Gustavo Caponi","doi":"10.11606/51678-31662017000200008","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.11606/51678-31662017000200008","url":null,"abstract":"The laws stated by the argentine paleontologist Florentino Ameghino (1854-1911) in his work Phylogeny, of 1884, allow understanding of what was involved in the reformulation of the objectives of Natural History of living beings, especially in Paleontology, resulting from the advent of Darwinism. In addition, these laws seem to find their basis in the deepest foundations of evolutionary perspective: although they arise, in fact, from mere empirical generalizations, the laws proposed in Phylogeny seem to find their justification in the assumption that evolutionary processes are always irreversible. They aim to identify paths in the morphospace that can be traversed in one way only, and whose knowledge allows, consequently, to serialize morphological changes. These laws, which are not causal, are laws of succession that, precisely because of the irreversibility of the series they establish, might also deserve the label of ‘historical laws’.","PeriodicalId":168872,"journal":{"name":"Scientiae Studia","volume":"66 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-04-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130925884","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2018-04-03DOI: 10.11606/51678-31662017000200007
M. Casanueva
The logical conceptual structure of Mendelian genetics, presented in a graph-model format, provides the context to discuss some peculiarities of relations among the concepts of law, model and mechanism are discussed. It is shown how such concepts can be considered within the same system without any contradictions. Basically, a theory is a family of models, a model is an interpretation that satisfies the postulates of the theory, that is the constraints (laws) that express the functioning of its parts, and a mechanism is a model that, in addition, permits the localization or the spatiotemporal referencing of its parts or components.
{"title":"Leyes, mecanismos y modelos en biología: el caso de la genética mendeliana","authors":"M. Casanueva","doi":"10.11606/51678-31662017000200007","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.11606/51678-31662017000200007","url":null,"abstract":"The logical conceptual structure of Mendelian genetics, presented in a graph-model format, provides the context to discuss some peculiarities of relations among the concepts of law, model and mechanism are discussed. It is shown how such concepts can be considered within the same system without any contradictions. Basically, a theory is a family of models, a model is an interpretation that satisfies the postulates of the theory, that is the constraints (laws) that express the functioning of its parts, and a mechanism is a model that, in addition, permits the localization or the spatiotemporal referencing of its parts or components.","PeriodicalId":168872,"journal":{"name":"Scientiae Studia","volume":"20 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-04-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130759391","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2018-04-03DOI: 10.11606/51678-31662017000200003
Maximiliano Martínez, E. García, C. Bernal
En este articulo, exponemos algunas de las criticas al enfoque reduccionista y al concepto de “ley de la naturaleza”, para luego defender la necesidad de un enfoque alternativo en la ciencia y su filosofia. Sin pretender ser exhaustivos, dada la enorme literatura al respecto, buscamos mostrar en una primera parte como las nociones duras de reduccionismo y ley son blanco de criticas poderosas que nos obligan a replantearnos la utilidad de las mismas. En la segunda parte de este articulo, mostramos como un enfoque alternativo que se ha venido posicionando protagonicamente en las ultimas decadas, el de la complejidad, puede superar varias de las debilidades de los conceptos recien mencionados y abrir nuevos horizontes para la investigacion cientifica, los cuales resultan mas acordes con el estado actual de la ciencia y de nuestro conocimiento cada vez mayor del mundo. Finalizamos con algunos ejemplos en donde se evidencia que una aproximacion compleja, holista, resulta mas provechosa que una aproximacion rigida y tradicional enfocada en reduccionismo y leyes.
{"title":"Reduccionismo, leyes naturales y complejidad: diferentes estrategias de investigación y explicación científica","authors":"Maximiliano Martínez, E. García, C. Bernal","doi":"10.11606/51678-31662017000200003","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.11606/51678-31662017000200003","url":null,"abstract":"En este articulo, exponemos algunas de las criticas al enfoque reduccionista y al concepto de “ley de la naturaleza”, para luego defender la necesidad de un enfoque alternativo en la ciencia y su filosofia. Sin pretender ser exhaustivos, dada la enorme literatura al respecto, buscamos mostrar en una primera parte como las nociones duras de reduccionismo y ley son blanco de criticas poderosas que nos obligan a replantearnos la utilidad de las mismas. En la segunda parte de este articulo, mostramos como un enfoque alternativo que se ha venido posicionando protagonicamente en las ultimas decadas, el de la complejidad, puede superar varias de las debilidades de los conceptos recien mencionados y abrir nuevos horizontes para la investigacion cientifica, los cuales resultan mas acordes con el estado actual de la ciencia y de nuestro conocimiento cada vez mayor del mundo. Finalizamos con algunos ejemplos en donde se evidencia que una aproximacion compleja, holista, resulta mas provechosa que una aproximacion rigida y tradicional enfocada en reduccionismo y leyes.","PeriodicalId":168872,"journal":{"name":"Scientiae Studia","volume":"20 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-04-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129525674","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2018-04-03DOI: 10.11606/51678-31662017000200013
Maurizio Esposito
{"title":"Marcel Weber y la filosofía de la biología experimental: la cultura material de las ciencias entre pasado y futuro","authors":"Maurizio Esposito","doi":"10.11606/51678-31662017000200013","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.11606/51678-31662017000200013","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":168872,"journal":{"name":"Scientiae Studia","volume":"31 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-04-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126796231","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2018-04-03DOI: 10.11606/51678-31662017000200006
Martín Díaz, Pablo Lorenzano
The general aim of this article is to carry out a reconstruction of the theory of Population Dynamics (DP) in Ecology, according to Castle’s (2001) general stance with regard to the semantic view of theories, but doing it within the framework of metatheoretical structuralism. Thus, we will first identify Population Dynamics’ basic theory-element: its core K(DP) – with the class of potential models, the class of models (through the identification of its fundamental law) and the class of partial potential models (though leaving aside the identification of its constraints and its intertheoretical links) –, and its domain of intended applications I(DP). Then, we will establish the general guiding lines of its theory-net, developing in some detail one of its main lines of specialization – namely, that related to the so-called “continuous growing” of the considered populations –, with DP’s principal “models”, and leave developing of the other of its main lines of specialization – namely, that related to the so-called “discrete growing” of the considered populations – for a further publication.
{"title":"La red teórica de la dinámica de poblaciones","authors":"Martín Díaz, Pablo Lorenzano","doi":"10.11606/51678-31662017000200006","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.11606/51678-31662017000200006","url":null,"abstract":"The general aim of this article is to carry out a reconstruction of the theory of Population Dynamics (DP) in Ecology, according to Castle’s (2001) general stance with regard to the semantic view of theories, but doing it within the framework of metatheoretical structuralism. Thus, we will first identify Population Dynamics’ basic theory-element: its core K(DP) – with the class of potential models, the class of models (through the identification of its fundamental law) and the class of partial potential models (though leaving aside the identification of its constraints and its intertheoretical links) –, and its domain of intended applications I(DP). Then, we will establish the general guiding lines of its theory-net, developing in some detail one of its main lines of specialization – namely, that related to the so-called “continuous growing” of the considered populations –, with DP’s principal “models”, and leave developing of the other of its main lines of specialization – namely, that related to the so-called “discrete growing” of the considered populations – for a further publication.","PeriodicalId":168872,"journal":{"name":"Scientiae Studia","volume":"15 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-04-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129957389","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2018-04-03DOI: 10.11606/51678-31662017000200002
J. Álvarez
Biological sciences have often been deemed “special” sciences that follow a sui generis approach in relation to the physiochemical sciences, to which some think they should be reduced. In this article, this claim is addressed showing that scientific understanding takes place within the circuit of scientific understanding (CSU) - proper to all sciences and comprising two paths - the inventive path, related to practices of discovery and the explanatory path, associated with the actions of justification. Three very significant cases in the history of biology illustrate this contention: Darwin’s theory of natural selection, Hamilton’s theory of inclusive fitness, and Wolpert’s theory of positional information. After this inspection, three main consequences are drawn. First: scientific explanation is just one element, in addition to invention, of scientific understanding that takes place in CSU. Second: within CSU one should distinguish the basis for the formulation of hypotheses, in the inventive path, from the basis for their acceptance in the explanatory path that rules their conversion into principles. Third: biological sciences are not ‘special: they exhibit the same credentials, as regards scientific explanation and understanding, like all the other sciences.
{"title":"Invención y explicación: la comprensión científica en biología","authors":"J. Álvarez","doi":"10.11606/51678-31662017000200002","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.11606/51678-31662017000200002","url":null,"abstract":"Biological sciences have often been deemed “special” sciences that follow a sui generis approach in relation to the physiochemical sciences, to which some think they should be reduced. In this article, this claim is addressed showing that scientific understanding takes place within the circuit of scientific understanding (CSU) - proper to all sciences and comprising two paths - the inventive path, related to practices of discovery and the explanatory path, associated with the actions of justification. Three very significant cases in the history of biology illustrate this contention: Darwin’s theory of natural selection, Hamilton’s theory of inclusive fitness, and Wolpert’s theory of positional information. After this inspection, three main consequences are drawn. First: scientific explanation is just one element, in addition to invention, of scientific understanding that takes place in CSU. Second: within CSU one should distinguish the basis for the formulation of hypotheses, in the inventive path, from the basis for their acceptance in the explanatory path that rules their conversion into principles. Third: biological sciences are not ‘special: they exhibit the same credentials, as regards scientific explanation and understanding, like all the other sciences.","PeriodicalId":168872,"journal":{"name":"Scientiae Studia","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-04-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124342244","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2018-04-03DOI: 10.11606/51678-31662017000200009
Felipe Faria
The use of an evolutionary law should be a function of its heuristic value in the composition of phylogenetic sequences. This was one of the characteristics of the law of brain growth proposed by O. C. Marsh (1831-1899), which often led to the conclusion that there is a tendency for bodily complexity to increase during the evolutionary process. Several criticisms were then made, often based on the impossibility that a trend could operate in the evolutionary process that had natural selection as its mechanism, which in turn is based on the proposal of random variation. Nevertheless, Marsh’s law remains being used due to its explanatory, and to a certain extent, predictive potential.
{"title":"A lei de Marsh do crescimento cerebral e a ideia de progresso biológico na evolução","authors":"Felipe Faria","doi":"10.11606/51678-31662017000200009","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.11606/51678-31662017000200009","url":null,"abstract":"The use of an evolutionary law should be a function of its heuristic value in the composition of phylogenetic sequences. This was one of the characteristics of the law of brain growth proposed by O. C. Marsh (1831-1899), which often led to the conclusion that there is a tendency for bodily complexity to increase during the evolutionary process. Several criticisms were then made, often based on the impossibility that a trend could operate in the evolutionary process that had natural selection as its mechanism, which in turn is based on the proposal of random variation. Nevertheless, Marsh’s law remains being used due to its explanatory, and to a certain extent, predictive potential.","PeriodicalId":168872,"journal":{"name":"Scientiae Studia","volume":"117 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-04-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127020088","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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