Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin最新文献

The use of videoconferencing platforms has globally risen to facilitate face-to-face communication since the onset of COVID-19. But how do our first impressions of people we meet on Zoom compare to in-person interactions? Specifically, do we view others' personalities as accurately (in line with their unique personality) and normatively (in line with the average, desirable personality) as in-person? Across two Zoom first-impression round-robin studies (exploratory study: N = 567, Dyads = 3,053; preregistered replication: N = 371, Dyads = 1,961), which we compared to an in-person round-robin study (N = 306; Dyads = 1,682), people viewed others' personalities as accurately and as normatively on Zoom as in-person. Moreover, people better liked interaction partners they viewed more accurately and normatively. However, in interactions of poorer audio-video quality, people viewed others less accurately, less normatively, and liked them less. Overall, through a screen, our impressions of others are as accurate and normative as face-to-face, but it depends on the quality of that screen.

Although many college students intend to major in Science, Technology, Engineering, and Mathematics (STEM), dropout from these fields is high, especially among members of historically underrepresented groups, such as women and racial-ethnic minorities. We propose a minimal, yet potentially powerful intervention to broaden participation in STEM: giving positive feedback to students in STEM. Studies 1 and 2 found that giving positive feedback is less normative in math (vs. English) courses, and instructors' feedback-giving practices and students' experiences mirror these norms. However, students who received positive (vs. only objective) feedback on introductory-level college calculus exams showed greater belonging and self-efficacy in math, which predicted better STEM outcomes (i.e., increased interest in STEM and higher final math course grades, respectively, Study 3). These findings were especially strong for racial-ethnic minority students. Giving positive (vs. only objective) feedback is thus a potentially transformative tool that boosts student outcomes, especially for underrepresented groups.

Honor cultures are characterized by a heightened sensitivity to reputation threats and strong expectations for the defense of honor. U.S. states vary in the extent to which they express the cultural norms of honor, but researchers have frequently relied upon a dichotomous classification that differentiates states as honor or dignity states. We created and validated a continuous, six-item index of honor norms and values across all U.S. states (Study 1). In Study 2, our honor index was correlated with historical variables theoretically associated with the genesis of honor cultures. In Study 3, we validated our honor index further by showing that it predicted several race-/ethnicity-specific outcomes that prior research has connected with honor (e.g., homicide rates, suicide rates). This new index equips researchers with a more nuanced understanding of U.S. honor cultures and a measure that can be used in future investigations.

Research into social identity and morality judgments typically focuses on how the former influences the latter. We approach this theme from the opposite direction, establishing the influence of morality on perceptions of social identity. In three studies, conducted in two cultures, we show that in-group members acting immorally are excluded from the group. Extending this investigation to the overlooked study of out-group-on-out-group behavior, in Studies 2 and 3, we compare perceptions of social inclusion for in-group members following (im)moral behavior toward the in-group with perceptions of out-group members following (im)moral behavior toward the out-group. We show that people treat in-group and out-group members alike with respect to binding morals, which concern preservation and protection of the group, but not individualizing morals, which concern preservation and protection of individual rights. Finally, in Study 3, we confirm the underlying motivating mechanism of reasserting in-group superiority by affirming the positive distinctiveness of one's own group.

The concept of mindfulness has enjoyed much resonance among researchers. Despite this past work, we argue there is a need for a domain-specific conceptualization and measure of financial mindfulness (FM). We first define FM as "the tendency to be highly aware of one's current objective financial state while possessing an acceptance of that state," and, second, develop and validate an eight-item scale to measure individual differences in FM. This article has nine studies, including a field survey administered by a financial services provider to examine actual behavior. Importantly, the FM-Scale is associated with financial behaviors (i.e., sunk cost bias) above and beyond related scales (i.e., money management stress, self-control, and general mindfulness). To the best of our knowledge, our work is the first to provide a succinct way to measure FM that incorporates elements of both awareness and acceptance, highlighting the role of financial acceptance specifically.

People tend to remember information from which they chose better than information assigned to them-a pattern known as the self-choice effect. The present studies tested the hypothesis that choosing for another person also improves memory. Studies 1a and 1b found that choosing for self and choosing for others both enhance memory compared with having no choice. Study 2 found that choosing for others boosts memory regardless of the closeness of the other. Study 3 found no memory benefit of making easy or difficult choices for others, contrary to predictions. And in Study 4 choosing for others enhanced memory only for chosen items. A mini meta-analysis combining all studies supported the conclusion that choosing for others enhances memory on a par with choosing for oneself. These results suggest that the effects of choice on memory signify something other than self-reference, which we presume to be substantially reduced when choosing for others.

This research tested whether institutional change impacts policy support and attitudes toward the social groups impacted by policy change. Study 1 demonstrated across a variety of topics that, when a hypothetical state legislature banned (vs. affirmed) a practice (e.g., allowing companies to implement mandatory anti-racism training), participants perceived less support for the policy and more negative attitudes toward the group impacted (e.g., Black Americans). Study 2, a longitudinal study, investigated the short- and long-term impact of real-world policy change-the U.S. Supreme Court's Dobbs v. Jackson Women's Health Organization ruling that gave states the right to restrict access to abortion. Although the ruling did not produce lasting change in personal support for abortion restriction, it did lead participants to perceive more support for traditional gender roles and to personally endorse traditional gender attitudes more strongly. These results demonstrate the power of institutional policies to influence individually held intergroup attitudes.

Empathic accuracy-the ability to decipher others' thoughts and feelings-promotes relationship satisfaction. Those high in attachment avoidance tend to be less empathically accurate; however, past research has been limited to relatively negative or neutral contexts. We extend work on attachment and empathic accuracy to the positive context of love. To do so, we combined data from three dyadic studies (N = 303 dyads) in which couple members shared a time of love and rated each other's positive emotions. Using the Truth and Bias Model of Judgment, we found that individuals higher (vs. lower) in attachment avoidance were less accurate in inferring their partners' positive emotions during the conversation, but did not systematically over- or under-perceive their partners' positive emotions. Our results suggest that avoidant individuals may be less sensitive to positive cues in their relationships, potentially reducing relational intimacy.

More than 5,000 Native American and Alaska Native women and girls go missing annually in the United States, and murder is the third leading cause of death for those aged 10 to 24. The current studies assess why, despite such statistics, individuals who are not Native American fail to advocate for Missing and Murdered Indigenous Women and Girls (MMIWG). The Pilot Study (N = 205) and Study 1 (N = 3,992) revealed that greater cognitive invisibility of contemporary Native Peoples (i.e., the absence of cognitive representations) was related to greater minimization of Native Peoples' experiences with racism. Racism minimization was associated with greater blaming of MMIWG victims and less blaming of societal contributors to the epidemic. These factors predicted greater apathy toward MMIWG and less MMIWG advocacy. The results suggest that the cognitive invisibility of Native Peoples affords attitudes and beliefs that allow non-Native individuals to deny, justify, and distance themselves from the MMIWG epidemic.

Utilizing reverse correlation, we investigated Black and White participants' mental representations of Black-White Biracial people. Across 200 trails, Black and White participants chose which of two faces best fit specific social categories. Using these decisions, we visually estimated Black and White people's mental representations of Biracial people by generating classification images (CIs). Independent raters blind to condition determined that White CI generators' Biracial CI was prototypically Blacker (i.e., more Afrocentric facial features and darker skin tone) than Black CI generators' Biracial CI (Study 1a/b). Furthermore, independent raters could not distinguish between White CI generators' Black and Biracial CIs, a bias not exhibited by Black CI generators (Study 2). A separate task demonstrated that prejudiced White participants allocated fewer imaginary funds to the more prototypically Black Biracial CI (Study 3), providing converging evidence. How phenotypicality bias, the outgroup homogeneity effect, and hypodescent influences people's mental images of ingroup/outgroup members is discussed.