This is a conceptual paper on the present economic policies and on the fundamentals of relative economics. This paper is intended to promote a holistic thinking and a broader framework for our development. The author looks at some of the important ideas of scholars relating to economic planning and development. The author reviews ideas like Environmental Economics, Ecological Economics, Gram Swarajya. The author proposes that there is a need of a fresh thinking about developmental yardsticks.
{"title":"Relative Economics & Mahaveer’s Concepts for Planning and Policy Making","authors":"T. Jain","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3308558","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3308558","url":null,"abstract":"This is a conceptual paper on the present economic policies and on the fundamentals of relative economics. This paper is intended to promote a holistic thinking and a broader framework for our development. The author looks at some of the important ideas of scholars relating to economic planning and development. The author reviews ideas like Environmental Economics, Ecological Economics, Gram Swarajya. The author proposes that there is a need of a fresh thinking about developmental yardsticks.","PeriodicalId":226815,"journal":{"name":"Philosophy & Methodology of Economics eJournal","volume":"605 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-12-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"117078183","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
All of J .M .Keynes’s earlier 1933-1935 versions of his IS-LM(LP) model contained a serious inconsistency. These earlier models all incorporated both actual and expected outcomes in the same model. The units did not match up. Keynes solved this problem by himself by splitting off the D-Z model from the IS-LM(LP) model. The D-Z model incorporated an analysis of expected results, expectations, uncertainty, and confidence.The major result that Keynes made use of in his analysis of the D-Z model was the Aggregate Supply Curve, which is a locus of all possible, expected D=Z outcomes. Only one of these expected outcomes could actually occur. The one outcome that actually occurred was called Y. Keynes then combined the actual Aggregate Income or Demand, Y, with r, the nominal long run rate of interest, to form the IS-LM(LP) model.
The misbelief that IS-LM(LP) had to incorporate expectations in order to actually represent what Keynes meant was a catastrophic error made by the Pseudo Keynesians-Joan Robinson, Austin Robinson, Richard Kahn, and Roy Harrod, as well as by the economics profession at large. Unfortunately, no other economist, except Hugh Townshend, had grasped the necessary connections that had to exist between the two models.
{"title":"There Was No IS-LM Enigma: Both Keynes’s IS-LM(LP) and D-Z Models of Chapters 20 and 21 Together Make Up Keynes’s General Theory","authors":"M. E. Brady","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3308001","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3308001","url":null,"abstract":"All of J .M .Keynes’s earlier 1933-1935 versions of his IS-LM(LP) model contained a serious inconsistency. These earlier models all incorporated both actual and expected outcomes in the same model. The units did not match up. Keynes solved this problem by himself by splitting off the D-Z model from the IS-LM(LP) model. The D-Z model incorporated an analysis of expected results, expectations, uncertainty, and confidence.The major result that Keynes made use of in his analysis of the D-Z model was the Aggregate Supply Curve, which is a locus of all possible, expected D=Z outcomes. Only one of these expected outcomes could actually occur. The one outcome that actually occurred was called Y. Keynes then combined the actual Aggregate Income or Demand, Y, with r, the nominal long run rate of interest, to form the IS-LM(LP) model.<br><br>The misbelief that IS-LM(LP) had to incorporate expectations in order to actually represent what Keynes meant was a catastrophic error made by the Pseudo Keynesians-Joan Robinson, Austin Robinson, Richard Kahn, and Roy Harrod, as well as by the economics profession at large. Unfortunately, no other economist, except Hugh Townshend, had grasped the necessary connections that had to exist between the two models.","PeriodicalId":226815,"journal":{"name":"Philosophy & Methodology of Economics eJournal","volume":"24 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-12-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125737610","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
A great advantage of our rigorous doctoral training is that as PhD economists we speak a common language that allows for efficient vetting and quick dissemination of ideas and insights. But what good is sophisticated grammar and a powerful vocabulary if the contents of our narratives are lacking? Our top three “most important” criteria for admissions to economics PhD programs are prior coursework in math, the quantitative GRE score, and prior coursework in economics. To attract top talent and prevent becoming a stagnant discipline that loses the influence we have in society and academia, students’ creativity, originality, and drive should receive more weight.
{"title":"Towards the Next Generation of Scholarship: Challenges and Opportunities for Full Participation in Ph.D. Training in Economics","authors":"Thomas D. Jeitschko","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3308233","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3308233","url":null,"abstract":"A great advantage of our rigorous doctoral training is that as PhD economists we speak a common language that allows for efficient vetting and quick dissemination of ideas and insights. But what good is sophisticated grammar and a powerful vocabulary if the contents of our narratives are lacking? Our top three “most important” criteria for admissions to economics PhD programs are prior coursework in math, the quantitative GRE score, and prior coursework in economics. To attract top talent and prevent becoming a stagnant discipline that loses the influence we have in society and academia, students’ creativity, originality, and drive should receive more weight.","PeriodicalId":226815,"journal":{"name":"Philosophy & Methodology of Economics eJournal","volume":"13 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-12-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121216043","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Diamond (2009) compares the citation time series for Schumpeter and Keynes from 1956 to 2006. Citations to Schumpeter steadily increase throughout the period, whereas citations to Keynes begin to level off and then trend slightly downward beginning in the 1990s. As a result, citations to Schumpeter begin to outstrip those to Keynes. This paper replicates Diamond (2009) and extends the analysis to 2017, which incorporates citations since the onset of the Great Recession. The replication confirms the results in Diamond (2009). The analysis beyond 2006 shows citations to Schumpeter remain larger than to Keynes, but citations to Keynes undergo a resurgence. The paper argues the Great Recession helped renew interest in Keynes. Google Trends data for Schumpeter and Keynes are compared and provide evidence showing the heightened interest in Keynes during the Great Recession. For example, in the United States, the peak of Keynes's search interest occurs in February 2009, five months after Lehman Brothers declared bankruptcy.
{"title":"Schumpeter vs. Keynes Redux: 'Still Not Dead'","authors":"John T. Dalton, Lillian R. Gaeto","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3301547","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3301547","url":null,"abstract":"Diamond (2009) compares the citation time series for Schumpeter and Keynes from 1956 to 2006. Citations to Schumpeter steadily increase throughout the period, whereas citations to Keynes begin to level off and then trend slightly downward beginning in the 1990s. As a result, citations to Schumpeter begin to outstrip those to Keynes. This paper replicates Diamond (2009) and extends the analysis to 2017, which incorporates citations since the onset of the Great Recession. The replication confirms the results in Diamond (2009). The analysis beyond 2006 shows citations to Schumpeter remain larger than to Keynes, but citations to Keynes undergo a resurgence. The paper argues the Great Recession helped renew interest in Keynes. Google Trends data for Schumpeter and Keynes are compared and provide evidence showing the heightened interest in Keynes during the Great Recession. For example, in the United States, the peak of Keynes's search interest occurs in February 2009, five months after Lehman Brothers declared bankruptcy.","PeriodicalId":226815,"journal":{"name":"Philosophy & Methodology of Economics eJournal","volume":"38 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-12-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134323963","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
PROBLEM SOLVERS OF ALL KINDS, UNITE! We have nothing to lose but our illusions. (Warning: If we lose our illusions we might be losing everything, if our world is but an illusion !!!)
~ We will remember that We didn't make the world, and it doesn't have to satisfy our solutions.
~ We realize that mathematical equations are a minor part of any solution. The major elements should include the ease with which others can understand and replicate our efforts.
~ Before We rush to try our solutions, We will do our best to think of all the unintended consequences that can arise. That being said, if We see no other options, We will use the solutions We have developed to the best of our abilities, as we look for more complete solutions.
~ We will not be overly impressed by the tools we have learnt to solve problems though we will boldly use them when deemed absolutely necessary. This implies that even if there are no problems to solve, we need to keep looking for new techniques and more importantly new thoughts or sometimes just old forgotten ones, (that seems like we have an unresolved problem).
~ We will never sacrifice reality for elegance without explaining why We have done so.
~ Nor will We give the people who use our solution false comfort about its accuracy. Instead, We will make explicit its assumptions and oversights.
~ We understand that our work may have enormous effects on society and the economy, many of them beyond our comprehension.
~ If we print these pages, we will plant at least one tree as soon as possible and many more as often as we can ... if we are convinced ... that it is absolutely necessary ...
{"title":"The Problem Solver’s Non-Hypocritic Hippocratic Oath","authors":"R. Kashyap","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3305534","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3305534","url":null,"abstract":"PROBLEM SOLVERS OF ALL KINDS, UNITE! We have nothing to lose but our illusions. (Warning: If we lose our illusions we might be losing everything, if our world is but an illusion !!!)<br><br>~ We will remember that We didn't make the world, and it doesn't have to satisfy our solutions. <br><br>~ We realize that mathematical equations are a minor part of any solution. The major elements should include the ease with which others can understand and replicate our efforts. <br><br>~ Before We rush to try our solutions, We will do our best to think of all the unintended consequences that can arise. That being said, if We see no other options, We will use the solutions We have developed to the best of our abilities, as we look for more complete solutions. <br><br>~ We will not be overly impressed by the tools we have learnt to solve problems though we will boldly use them when deemed absolutely necessary. This implies that even if there are no problems to solve, we need to keep looking for new techniques and more importantly new thoughts or sometimes just old forgotten ones, (that seems like we have an unresolved problem). <br><br>~ We will never sacrifice reality for elegance without explaining why We have done so. <br><br>~ Nor will We give the people who use our solution false comfort about its accuracy. Instead, We will make explicit its assumptions and oversights. <br><br>~ We understand that our work may have enormous effects on society and the economy, many of them beyond our comprehension. <br><br>~ If we print these pages, we will plant at least one tree as soon as possible and many more as often as we can ... if we are convinced ... that it is absolutely necessary ...","PeriodicalId":226815,"journal":{"name":"Philosophy & Methodology of Economics eJournal","volume":"37 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-12-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125192717","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2018-12-01DOI: 10.1215/00182702-7202512
Scott Scheall, Reinhard Schumacher
Little is known about the relationship between Carl Menger, founder of the Austrian School of Economics and one of the three fathers of marginal utility theory, and Karl Menger, whose Vienna Mathematical Colloquium was crucial to the development of mathematical economics. The present paper begins to fill this gap in the literature.
{"title":"Karl Menger as Son of Carl Menger","authors":"Scott Scheall, Reinhard Schumacher","doi":"10.1215/00182702-7202512","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1215/00182702-7202512","url":null,"abstract":"Little is known about the relationship between Carl Menger, founder of the Austrian School of Economics and one of the three fathers of marginal utility theory, and Karl Menger, whose Vienna Mathematical Colloquium was crucial to the development of mathematical economics. The present paper begins to fill this gap in the literature.","PeriodicalId":226815,"journal":{"name":"Philosophy & Methodology of Economics eJournal","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129919165","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Why is it that so many economic policies constantly fall short of their initial intended goals? In the social sciences, unintended consequences are outcomes of a purposeful action that are not intended or foreseen. The law of unintended consequences refers to how economic decisions may have effects that are unexpected. Adam Smith's “invisible hand,” is an example of a positive unintended consequence. For instance, the U.S. government has imposed quotas on imports of steel in order to protect steel companies and steelworkers from the lower-priced competition. But they also make less of the cheap steel available to U.S. automakers. As a result, the automakers have to pay more for steel than their foreign competitors do. In Korea, the towns which adopted the suicide prevention law failed to mitigate the suicide rate or even worsening it. In the state of Maharashtra India, the implementation of the family planning program resulted in strong son preference result in an adverse sex ratio in the state. Daniel Ellsberg's (1972) critique of the “quagmire model,” for U.S.catastrophic entanglement in the Vietnam War. Some Sub-Saharan African countries use agrochemicals that increased the value of harvest but are also associated with increasing costs of human illness. Economic effects of 1929 U.S. Prohibition were largely negative, eliminated thousands of jobs, with one of the unintended economic consequences of Prohibition, was on decreasing government tax revenues. 2010 U. S. Dodd-Frank Act discouraging companies from sourcing 'conflict minerals' from the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo increased the probability of infant deaths in villages near the regulated ‘conflict mineral’ deposits by at least 143 percent. The law of unintended consequences rarely defined, is that actions of people (especially of government) always have effects that are unintended. In 1692 the English philosopher John Locke urged a parliamentary bill designed to cut the interest from 6 percent to 4 percent that instead of benefiting borrowers, as intended, it would hurt them. French economic journalist Frédéric Bastiat distinguished the seen were the obviously visible consequences of an action or policy. The unseen were the less obvious unintended, consequences. In 1936 by the American sociologist, Robert K. Merton recognized five sources of unanticipated consequences. I am adding the sixth source and refer to it as the "Coriolis Effect". The Coriolis force, named after French mathematician Gaspard Gustave de Coriolis (1792–1843). In 1835, Coriolis derived the expression of a force acting in rotating systems, now known as the Coriolis force. Scientists have invented an imaginary clockwise circulation force, called the Coriolis force, to account for the Coriolis effect. In the 1870s, a handful of committed economists hoped to make economics a science as highly regarded as physics applied by Newton’s physical laws of motion to economic science. When Newton's laws are modified t
为什么如此多的经济政策总是达不到最初的预期目标?在社会科学中，意想不到的后果是有目的的行为所产生的结果，而这种行为是不打算或无法预见的。意外后果定律指的是经济决策如何产生意想不到的影响。亚当·斯密的“看不见的手”就是一个积极的意外后果的例子。例如，美国政府为了保护钢铁公司和钢铁工人免受低价竞争的影响，对钢铁进口实施了配额。但它们也减少了可供美国汽车制造商使用的廉价钢材。因此，汽车制造商不得不支付比外国竞争对手更高的钢材价格。在韩国，实施《防止自杀法》的地方，自杀率非但没有下降，反而进一步恶化。在印度马哈拉施特拉邦，计划生育计划的实施导致了强烈的重男轻女，导致该邦的性别比例失调。丹尼尔·埃尔斯伯格(Daniel Ellsberg, 1972)对美国在越南战争中灾难性纠缠的“泥潭模型”的批评。一些撒哈拉以南非洲国家使用农用化学品，增加了收成的价值，但也增加了人类疾病的成本。1929年美国禁酒令对经济的影响很大程度上是负面的，减少了成千上万的工作岗位，禁酒令的一个意想不到的经济后果是减少了政府的税收收入。2010年美国多德-弗兰克法案不鼓励公司从刚果民主共和国东部采购“冲突矿产”，这使得受监管的“冲突矿产”矿床附近村庄的婴儿死亡率至少增加了143%。意想不到的后果法则很少被定义，它是指人们(尤其是政府)的行为总是会产生意想不到的影响。1692年，英国哲学家约翰·洛克(John Locke)敦促议会通过一项法案，旨在将利率从6%降至4%，这不仅不会如预期的那样使借款人受益，反而会损害他们的利益。法国经济记者弗拉尔姆·巴斯夏指出，所谓“看得见的”是一项行动或政策的明显后果。看不见的是不太明显的意外后果。1936年，美国社会学家罗伯特·k·默顿(Robert K. Merton)指出了造成意外后果的五个原因。我正在添加第六个源，并将其称为“科里奥利效应”。科里奥利力，以法国数学家加斯帕德·古斯塔夫·德·科里奥利(1792-1843)的名字命名。1835年，科里奥利导出了作用在旋转系统中的力的表达式，现在被称为科里奥利力。科学家们发明了一种假想的顺时针循环力，称为科里奥利力，以解释科里奥利效应。在19世纪70年代，少数坚定的经济学家希望把经济学变成一门像物理学一样受到高度重视的科学，将牛顿的物理运动定律应用于经济科学。当牛顿定律被修改为旋转参考系时，科里奥利定律和运动或倾向于远离中心的速度就会增加。科里奥利力会微小地改变子弹的方向，影响射击精度，尤其是远距离射击。在加利福尼亚州萨克拉门托的网格线上，向北射击1000码(910米)将向右偏转2.8英寸(71毫米)。当一个简单的规则被强加于一个复杂的系统时，负面的意想不到的后果会反复出现。考虑到物理、社会和经济系统的复杂性，可能会出现意想不到的负面后果，并引起人们的注意。因此，政策制定者在计算经济政策时也应该意识到“科里奥利力”现象，因为“科里奥利力”可能会将预期政策的方向转向不希望的和不可预测的经济结果。
{"title":"'Coriolis Effect' of Economic Policies","authors":"M. Bayraktar","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3290825","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3290825","url":null,"abstract":"Why is it that so many economic policies constantly fall short of their initial intended goals? In the social sciences, unintended consequences are outcomes of a purposeful action that are not intended or foreseen. The law of unintended consequences refers to how economic decisions may have effects that are unexpected. Adam Smith's “invisible hand,” is an example of a positive unintended consequence. For instance, the U.S. government has imposed quotas on imports of steel in order to protect steel companies and steelworkers from the lower-priced competition. But they also make less of the cheap steel available to U.S. automakers. As a result, the automakers have to pay more for steel than their foreign competitors do. In Korea, the towns which adopted the suicide prevention law failed to mitigate the suicide rate or even worsening it. In the state of Maharashtra India, the implementation of the family planning program resulted in strong son preference result in an adverse sex ratio in the state. Daniel Ellsberg's (1972) critique of the “quagmire model,” for U.S.catastrophic entanglement in the Vietnam War. Some Sub-Saharan African countries use agrochemicals that increased the value of harvest but are also associated with increasing costs of human illness. Economic effects of 1929 U.S. Prohibition were largely negative, eliminated thousands of jobs, with one of the unintended economic consequences of Prohibition, was on decreasing government tax revenues. 2010 U. S. Dodd-Frank Act discouraging companies from sourcing 'conflict minerals' from the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo increased the probability of infant deaths in villages near the regulated ‘conflict mineral’ deposits by at least 143 percent. The law of unintended consequences rarely defined, is that actions of people (especially of government) always have effects that are unintended. In 1692 the English philosopher John Locke urged a parliamentary bill designed to cut the interest from 6 percent to 4 percent that instead of benefiting borrowers, as intended, it would hurt them. French economic journalist Frédéric Bastiat distinguished the seen were the obviously visible consequences of an action or policy. The unseen were the less obvious unintended, consequences. In 1936 by the American sociologist, Robert K. Merton recognized five sources of unanticipated consequences. I am adding the sixth source and refer to it as the \"Coriolis Effect\". The Coriolis force, named after French mathematician Gaspard Gustave de Coriolis (1792–1843). In 1835, Coriolis derived the expression of a force acting in rotating systems, now known as the Coriolis force. Scientists have invented an imaginary clockwise circulation force, called the Coriolis force, to account for the Coriolis effect. In the 1870s, a handful of committed economists hoped to make economics a science as highly regarded as physics applied by Newton’s physical laws of motion to economic science. When Newton's laws are modified t","PeriodicalId":226815,"journal":{"name":"Philosophy & Methodology of Economics eJournal","volume":"23 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-11-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116655423","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
R J Kent’s 2007 History Of Political Economy article ends with the claim that “…But there certainly are many unanswered questions concerning Keynes’s role in the development of the multiplier…”. Pace Kent, anyone who has read Keynes’s chapter 26 in the A Treatise on Probability in 1921 and compared the mathematical analysis provided there with the mathematical analysis presented in Richard Kahn’s June, 1931 Economic Journal article, will immediately recognize that Kahn’s formal representation is identical to Keynes’s except for the specific variables used by Keynes and Kahn, q for Keynes and k for Kahn.
There are no more “unanswered questions concerning Keynes’s role in the development of the multiplier…”. Keynes developed the logical and mathematical theory of the multiplier at least 10 years before the publication of Kahn’s article and applied his knowledge by providing an application of the multiplier theory in May of 1929, at least two years before the publication of Kahn’s article, as shown by Kent in his paper.
Paul Samuelson missed a golden opportunity in his 1977 Journal of Economic Literature to end the mystery of the multiplier, but overlooked Keynes’s technical analysis in his analysis of Keynes’s risk analysis in chapter 26 of the General Theory. The real unanswered question is why it took nine decades for economists to recognize that it was Keynes who showed Kahn how to apply the multiplier and not the other way around.
R·J·肯特(R J Kent)在2007年发表的《政治经济史》(History Of Political economics)文章最后写道:“……但是，关于凯恩斯在乘数发展过程中所扮演的角色，肯定还有许多悬而未决的问题……”佩斯·肯特，任何读过凯恩斯在1921年的《概率论》第26章，并将其中提供的数学分析与理查德·卡恩1931年6月发表在《经济杂志》上的文章进行比较的人，都会立即意识到，除了凯恩斯和卡恩使用的特定变量(q代表凯恩斯，k代表卡恩)之外，卡恩的形式表示与凯恩斯的形式表示是相同的。不再有“关于凯恩斯在乘数发展中的作用的悬而未决的问题……”。正如肯特在他的论文中所示，凯恩斯在卡恩的文章发表至少10年前就提出了乘数的逻辑和数学理论，并在1929年5月通过提供乘数理论的应用来应用他的知识，至少比卡恩的文章发表早两年。保罗·萨缪尔森(Paul Samuelson)在1977年的《经济文献杂志》(Journal of Economic Literature)上错失了终结乘数之谜的黄金机会，但在《通论》第26章对凯恩斯风险分析的分析中，却忽略了凯恩斯的技术分析。真正没有答案的问题是，为什么经济学家花了90年时间才认识到，是凯恩斯向卡恩展示了如何应用乘数，而不是相反。
{"title":"The Final Chapter in Keynes's 'History of the Multiplier Doctrine' Had Already Been Written in the 'A Treatise on Probability' in 1921 in Chapter 26","authors":"M. E. Brady","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3289830","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3289830","url":null,"abstract":"R J Kent’s 2007 History Of Political Economy article ends with the claim that “…But there certainly are many unanswered questions concerning Keynes’s role in the development of the multiplier…”. Pace Kent, anyone who has read Keynes’s chapter 26 in the A Treatise on Probability in 1921 and compared the mathematical analysis provided there with the mathematical analysis presented in Richard Kahn’s June, 1931 Economic Journal article, will immediately recognize that Kahn’s formal representation is identical to Keynes’s except for the specific variables used by Keynes and Kahn, q for Keynes and k for Kahn.<br><br>There are no more “unanswered questions concerning Keynes’s role in the development of the multiplier…”. Keynes developed the logical and mathematical theory of the multiplier at least 10 years before the publication of Kahn’s article and applied his knowledge by providing an application of the multiplier theory in May of 1929, at least two years before the publication of Kahn’s article, as shown by Kent in his paper.<br><br>Paul Samuelson missed a golden opportunity in his 1977 Journal of Economic Literature to end the mystery of the multiplier, but overlooked Keynes’s technical analysis in his analysis of Keynes’s risk analysis in chapter 26 of the General Theory. The real unanswered question is why it took nine decades for economists to recognize that it was Keynes who showed Kahn how to apply the multiplier and not the other way around. <br>","PeriodicalId":226815,"journal":{"name":"Philosophy & Methodology of Economics eJournal","volume":"60 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-11-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122512302","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Keynes had completely developed the Logical Theory of the Multiplier in his A Treatise on Probability in 1921 in chapter 26 on page 315 and in footnote 1 on page 315. This same analysis appears in his second, 1908, Fellowship Dissertation at Cambridge University. Keynes, however, had no interest in actually publishing a worked out application of the Logical Theory of the Multiplier where one would use arithmetic to actually calculate a worked out example of the process. As pointed out by Kent, Keynes did work out all of the arithmetic steps involved in the multiplier process in 1929, but also made an arithmetic error which he was not concerned with since he already knew that the Multiplier process was mathematically and logically airtight.
Keynes left the actual presentation of the arithmetic of a completely worked out example of a Multiplier problem, which would be based on the Logical Theory of the Multiplier that he had already worked out in 1908 and 1921, to Kahn. The mathematics of the Investment multiplier, presented on pp. 114-115 of chapter 10 of the General Theory in 1936, is identical to the mathematics used by Keynes in both 1908 and 1921 with respect to his example involving a series of reinsurances aimed at shifting the risk.
The main problem in the vast literature of the Keynesian Multiplier concept is that no economist was familiar with Keynes’s Risk model in chapter 26 of the A Treatise on Probability. The only economist in the 20th Century to take Keynes’s risk model seriously was Paul Samuelson in a paper published in 1977 in the Journal of Economic Literature. Unfortunately, Samuelson overlooked the footnote that contained Keynes’s worked out analysis in which he took the limit of a geometrical, infinite, declining series to arrive at a finite single number answer.
凯恩斯在1921年的《概率论》第315页的第26章和第315页的脚注1中完全发展了乘数的逻辑理论。同样的分析出现在他1908年在剑桥大学的第二篇奖学金论文中。然而，凯恩斯并没有兴趣出版一个乘数逻辑理论的实际应用，在这个应用中，人们会使用算术来实际计算出这个过程的一个实际例子。正如肯特指出的那样，凯恩斯确实在1929年计算出了乘数过程中涉及的所有算术步骤，但他也犯了一个算术错误，他并不关心这个错误，因为他已经知道乘数过程在数学和逻辑上是无懈可击的。凯恩斯把一个完全解决的乘数问题的实际计算方法留给了卡恩，这个乘数问题将基于他在1908年和1921年已经提出的乘数逻辑理论。1936年在《通论》第10章第114-115页提出的投资乘数的数学方法，与凯恩斯在1908年和1921年所使用的数学方法完全相同，他的例子涉及一系列旨在转移风险的再保险。在凯恩斯乘数概念的大量文献中，主要问题是没有经济学家熟悉凯恩斯在《概率论》(A Treatise on Probability)第26章中的风险模型。20世纪唯一认真对待凯恩斯风险模型的经济学家是保罗•萨缪尔森(Paul Samuelson)，他于1977年在《经济文献杂志》(Journal of Economic Literature)上发表了一篇论文。不幸的是，萨缪尔森忽略了一个脚注，其中包含了凯恩斯的分析，在这个分析中，他取了一个几何的、无限的、递减的级数的极限，得到了一个有限的单个数字的答案。
{"title":"On Keynes’s Formal Development of the Logical Theory of the Multiplier in the A Treatise on Probability in 1921: It Was Keynes Who Helped Kahn, Not Kahn Who Helped Keynes","authors":"M. E. Brady","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3286460","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3286460","url":null,"abstract":"Keynes had completely developed the Logical Theory of the Multiplier in his A Treatise on Probability in 1921 in chapter 26 on page 315 and in footnote 1 on page 315. This same analysis appears in his second, 1908, Fellowship Dissertation at Cambridge University. Keynes, however, had no interest in actually publishing a worked out application of the Logical Theory of the Multiplier where one would use arithmetic to actually calculate a worked out example of the process. As pointed out by Kent, Keynes did work out all of the arithmetic steps involved in the multiplier process in 1929, but also made an arithmetic error which he was not concerned with since he already knew that the Multiplier process was mathematically and logically airtight. <br><br> Keynes left the actual presentation of the arithmetic of a completely worked out example of a Multiplier problem, which would be based on the Logical Theory of the Multiplier that he had already worked out in 1908 and 1921, to Kahn. The mathematics of the Investment multiplier, presented on pp. 114-115 of chapter 10 of the General Theory in 1936, is identical to the mathematics used by Keynes in both 1908 and 1921 with respect to his example involving a series of reinsurances aimed at shifting the risk.<br><br>The main problem in the vast literature of the Keynesian Multiplier concept is that no economist was familiar with Keynes’s Risk model in chapter 26 of the A Treatise on Probability. The only economist in the 20th Century to take Keynes’s risk model seriously was Paul Samuelson in a paper published in 1977 in the Journal of Economic Literature. Unfortunately, Samuelson overlooked the footnote that contained Keynes’s worked out analysis in which he took the limit of a geometrical, infinite, declining series to arrive at a finite single number answer.","PeriodicalId":226815,"journal":{"name":"Philosophy & Methodology of Economics eJournal","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-11-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131056128","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Rational Expectations is an approach to probability and expectations that was initiated by Muth in 1961. Muth’s concept is based on an immense muddle and confusion in his mind about subjective and objective concepts of probability that confuses subjective probability with objective probability.
Like Nelson Goodman’s Grue concept, where the color green turns into the color blue at some point in the future, at some point rational expectationists claim that subjective probabilities become true, correct, right and objective. This is what they mean by the term rational. Rational is objective and/or true probability. This is impossible and demonstrates a great lack of knowledge about basic theories of probability. There is no existing theory of probability that supports the claims made by rational expectationists. There is no right(wrong), correct, true, or objective probability, probability distribution, or expectation if you assume that you are applying the subjective theory of probability. Likewise, all objective theories of probability deny the existence of subjective probability.
This approach has infected the entire economics profession since the early 1970’s and created an even more immense muddle than was originally created by Muth in 1961.
{"title":"Given B. De Finetti’s Conclusion that 'Probability (Objective) Does not Exist', Then Rational Expectations Does not Exist Either","authors":"M. E. Brady","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3282452","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3282452","url":null,"abstract":"Rational Expectations is an approach to probability and expectations that was initiated by Muth in 1961. Muth’s concept is based on an immense muddle and confusion in his mind about subjective and objective concepts of probability that confuses subjective probability with objective probability. <br><br>Like Nelson Goodman’s Grue concept, where the color green turns into the color blue at some point in the future, at some point rational expectationists claim that subjective probabilities become true, correct, right and objective. This is what they mean by the term rational. Rational is objective and/or true probability. This is impossible and demonstrates a great lack of knowledge about basic theories of probability. There is no existing theory of probability that supports the claims made by rational expectationists. There is no right(wrong), correct, true, or objective probability, probability distribution, or expectation if you assume that you are applying the subjective theory of probability. Likewise, all objective theories of probability deny the existence of subjective probability.<br><br>This approach has infected the entire economics profession since the early 1970’s and created an even more immense muddle than was originally created by Muth in 1961.","PeriodicalId":226815,"journal":{"name":"Philosophy & Methodology of Economics eJournal","volume":"14 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-11-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116991160","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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