Abstract Beginning in the early 1960s—and especially by the end of the decade—a large number of the ethnic Hmong people in Thailand aligned themselves with the Communist Party of Thailand (CPT). By the 1970s, most of the CPT's “liberated areas” were located in remote, mountainous areas populated by Hmong people. In this paper, I situate Hmong involvement in CPT through the literature related to the multi-ethnic connections being made through the organisation of armed groups and argue that Hmong involvement with the CPT was transnational, transcultural and gender-relations-transforming. The first Hmong Thai to join the CPT was recruited in neighbouring Laos. Other Hmong in Thailand heard about the CPT through radio broadcasts from Laos in Hmong language. Furthermore, many of the early CPT recruits travelled from their homes in Thailand for political and military instruction at a basic training centre called A-30, which was located somewhere in northern Laos near the border with China. There, most Hmong CPT recruits learned to speak, read and write central Thai language. Hmong CPT also started to meaningfully interact with other Thais, including those from northeastern and southern Thailand and Chinese Thais from Bangkok. Later, those deemed to have particular potential were sent to study in China or in Vietnam for specific military training. Some Hmong sent their children to study with the CPT; others went on their own. The Hmong also interacted with people from other communist movements in Southeast Asia.
{"title":"The Hmong and the Communist Party of Thailand: A Transnational, Transcultural and Gender-Relations-Transforming Experience","authors":"I. Baird","doi":"10.1017/trn.2020.11","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/trn.2020.11","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Beginning in the early 1960s—and especially by the end of the decade—a large number of the ethnic Hmong people in Thailand aligned themselves with the Communist Party of Thailand (CPT). By the 1970s, most of the CPT's “liberated areas” were located in remote, mountainous areas populated by Hmong people. In this paper, I situate Hmong involvement in CPT through the literature related to the multi-ethnic connections being made through the organisation of armed groups and argue that Hmong involvement with the CPT was transnational, transcultural and gender-relations-transforming. The first Hmong Thai to join the CPT was recruited in neighbouring Laos. Other Hmong in Thailand heard about the CPT through radio broadcasts from Laos in Hmong language. Furthermore, many of the early CPT recruits travelled from their homes in Thailand for political and military instruction at a basic training centre called A-30, which was located somewhere in northern Laos near the border with China. There, most Hmong CPT recruits learned to speak, read and write central Thai language. Hmong CPT also started to meaningfully interact with other Thais, including those from northeastern and southern Thailand and Chinese Thais from Bangkok. Later, those deemed to have particular potential were sent to study in China or in Vietnam for specific military training. Some Hmong sent their children to study with the CPT; others went on their own. The Hmong also interacted with people from other communist movements in Southeast Asia.","PeriodicalId":23341,"journal":{"name":"TRaNS: Trans -Regional and -National Studies of Southeast Asia","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2020-10-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"78195780","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract The concept of al-wala’ wa-l-bara’ (loyalty and disavowal) has become the ideology of modern Salafism; it is used to justify unfriendly relationships with non-Muslims. This concept is usually implemented by reserving love only for fellow Muslims and showing insularity towards non-Muslims. What is the ideological concept that guides some Muslims in their relationship with groups that are considered heretics? This article intends to scrutinize the theological matrix used by vigilante groups in their anti-heresy campaign or attacks on the Ahmadiyya. It also aims to determine why some people believe that persecuting the Ahmadiyya is a theologically justifiable idea. What theological and ideological reasons can be used to justify attacks against the Ahmadiyya community? How do they cope with the conflict between divine law and human/state law? This article argues that instead of feeling guilty, the perpetrators of faith-based violence often feel they have just fulfilled a good religious duty. Committing violence against religious groups deemed heretics is believed to be more than al-amr bi al-màrūf wa al-nahy `an al-munkar (“commanding right and forbidding wrong”)—it is a jihad. Violence is seen not as an illegal act, but as a “virtue” or an effort to save them from the punishment of God in Hell. In justifying the breaching of state law, the idea of a hierarchy in the law is constructed, i.e. state/human law is hierarchically lower than divine law, so attacking the Ahmadiyya is seen as a transgression of human law for the sake of upholding the divine view.
al-wala ' wa-l-bara '(忠诚和否认)的概念已经成为现代萨拉菲主义的意识形态;它被用来为与非穆斯林的不友好关系辩护。这个概念通常是通过只对穆斯林同胞保留爱而对非穆斯林表现出孤立来实现的。是什么样的意识形态观念引导着一些穆斯林与被认为是异端的团体建立关系?这篇文章的目的是仔细审查神学矩阵使用的治安团体在他们的反异端运动或攻击艾哈迈迪亚。它还旨在确定为什么有些人认为迫害艾哈迈迪亚派在神学上是合理的。有什么神学和意识形态的理由可以用来证明攻击艾哈迈迪亚教派是正当的?他们如何处理神法和人/国家法之间的冲突?这篇文章认为，基于信仰的暴力的肇事者通常不会感到内疚，而是觉得他们刚刚履行了一项良好的宗教义务。对被视为异端的宗教团体实施暴力被认为不仅仅是al-amr bi al-màrūf wa al-nahy ' an al-munkar(“命令正确，禁止错误”)——而是圣战。暴力不被视为非法行为，而是一种“美德”，或者是一种拯救他们免受上帝地狱惩罚的努力。在为违反国家法律辩护时，构建了法律中的等级观念，即国家/人类法律在等级上低于神法，因此攻击艾哈迈迪亚被视为为了维护神的观点而违反人类法律。
{"title":"“It's a Jihad”: Justifying Violence towards the Ahmadiyya in Indonesia","authors":"A. Burhani","doi":"10.1017/trn.2020.8","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/trn.2020.8","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract The concept of al-wala’ wa-l-bara’ (loyalty and disavowal) has become the ideology of modern Salafism; it is used to justify unfriendly relationships with non-Muslims. This concept is usually implemented by reserving love only for fellow Muslims and showing insularity towards non-Muslims. What is the ideological concept that guides some Muslims in their relationship with groups that are considered heretics? This article intends to scrutinize the theological matrix used by vigilante groups in their anti-heresy campaign or attacks on the Ahmadiyya. It also aims to determine why some people believe that persecuting the Ahmadiyya is a theologically justifiable idea. What theological and ideological reasons can be used to justify attacks against the Ahmadiyya community? How do they cope with the conflict between divine law and human/state law? This article argues that instead of feeling guilty, the perpetrators of faith-based violence often feel they have just fulfilled a good religious duty. Committing violence against religious groups deemed heretics is believed to be more than al-amr bi al-màrūf wa al-nahy `an al-munkar (“commanding right and forbidding wrong”)—it is a jihad. Violence is seen not as an illegal act, but as a “virtue” or an effort to save them from the punishment of God in Hell. In justifying the breaching of state law, the idea of a hierarchy in the law is constructed, i.e. state/human law is hierarchically lower than divine law, so attacking the Ahmadiyya is seen as a transgression of human law for the sake of upholding the divine view.","PeriodicalId":23341,"journal":{"name":"TRaNS: Trans -Regional and -National Studies of Southeast Asia","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2020-06-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"79877330","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract In 1913, a new generation of Indonesians asserted their agency by publicly demanding equality in colonial society. Through four case studies—the prohibition of traditional forms of deference, the sudden popularity of Western dress, the adoption of new legal assimilation guidelines for Indonesians, and the discussion of employee rights at a railway company—we argue that this new assertiveness reflected a broad change in mentality that we consider a turning point in Indonesian history. By focusing on Indonesian agency, we challenge the Eurocentric periodization of the Indonesian past that emphasized WWI as a trigger of change.
{"title":"1913 in Indonesian History: Demanding Equality, Changing Mentality","authors":"Bart Luttikhuis, Arnout H. C. van der Meer","doi":"10.1017/trn.2020.6","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/trn.2020.6","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract In 1913, a new generation of Indonesians asserted their agency by publicly demanding equality in colonial society. Through four case studies—the prohibition of traditional forms of deference, the sudden popularity of Western dress, the adoption of new legal assimilation guidelines for Indonesians, and the discussion of employee rights at a railway company—we argue that this new assertiveness reflected a broad change in mentality that we consider a turning point in Indonesian history. By focusing on Indonesian agency, we challenge the Eurocentric periodization of the Indonesian past that emphasized WWI as a trigger of change.","PeriodicalId":23341,"journal":{"name":"TRaNS: Trans -Regional and -National Studies of Southeast Asia","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2020-06-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"74553382","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract This article investigates how the Chinese Expeditionary Force joined the Burma Campaign and retreated to India in 1942, and how the Chinese, American, and British authorities negotiated to determine the destiny of Chinese forces in India. This article argues that the choice of Ramgarh, a small town in northeast India, as the site of a training centre for the Chinese Expeditionary Force sheds light on a decades-long programme of colonial internment-camp building in British India, and illuminates the difficult relationship between Chinese and British authorities during World War II. In doing so, it also argues that the historiography of China's War of Resistance requires Southeast and South Asian perspectives.
{"title":"Establishing the Ramgarh Training Center: The Burma Campaign, the Colonial Internment Camp, and the Wartime Sino-British Relations","authors":"Yina Cao","doi":"10.1017/trn.2020.7","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/trn.2020.7","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract This article investigates how the Chinese Expeditionary Force joined the Burma Campaign and retreated to India in 1942, and how the Chinese, American, and British authorities negotiated to determine the destiny of Chinese forces in India. This article argues that the choice of Ramgarh, a small town in northeast India, as the site of a training centre for the Chinese Expeditionary Force sheds light on a decades-long programme of colonial internment-camp building in British India, and illuminates the difficult relationship between Chinese and British authorities during World War II. In doing so, it also argues that the historiography of China's War of Resistance requires Southeast and South Asian perspectives.","PeriodicalId":23341,"journal":{"name":"TRaNS: Trans -Regional and -National Studies of Southeast Asia","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2020-06-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"85374826","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract The role of Majelis Ulama Indonesia (Indonesian Ulema Council) in influencing the construction of democracy through its fatwas has fluctuated since its establishment in 1975. During the Suharto regime, which was characterised by authoritarian national leadership, MUI fatwas tended to serve the interests of the regime. Since the reform era, they have stimulated undemocratic circumstances in Indonesian Islam. This article examines MUI fatwas and their influence on democracy in the context of Indonesian Islam. The main argument of this article is that fatwas in themselves can improve or worsen the implementation of democracy. Fatwas may impede democracy if their contents are not aligned with democratic principles, while they may support the development of democracy if their contents promote democracy. Rising conservatism in Indonesia has been influenced by the issuance of fatwas that do not promote democratic values. In addition to examining the roles of fatwa givers and the methodology of fatwa issuance, this article analyses the social and political circumstances driving their issuance. This article presents examples of MUI fatwas that have democratic and undemocratic characteristics. It concludes that democratic circumstances can be achieved through opening spaces for fatwa issuance among additional fatwa institutions in Indonesia, as the monopolisation of fatwa issuance has created undemocratic tendencies in Indonesian Islam.
{"title":"Fatwas and Democracy: Majelis Ulama Indonesia (MUI, Indonesian Ulema Council) and Rising Conservatism in Indonesian Islam","authors":"Syafiq Hasyim","doi":"10.1017/trn.2019.13","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/trn.2019.13","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract The role of Majelis Ulama Indonesia (Indonesian Ulema Council) in influencing the construction of democracy through its fatwas has fluctuated since its establishment in 1975. During the Suharto regime, which was characterised by authoritarian national leadership, MUI fatwas tended to serve the interests of the regime. Since the reform era, they have stimulated undemocratic circumstances in Indonesian Islam. This article examines MUI fatwas and their influence on democracy in the context of Indonesian Islam. The main argument of this article is that fatwas in themselves can improve or worsen the implementation of democracy. Fatwas may impede democracy if their contents are not aligned with democratic principles, while they may support the development of democracy if their contents promote democracy. Rising conservatism in Indonesia has been influenced by the issuance of fatwas that do not promote democratic values. In addition to examining the roles of fatwa givers and the methodology of fatwa issuance, this article analyses the social and political circumstances driving their issuance. This article presents examples of MUI fatwas that have democratic and undemocratic characteristics. It concludes that democratic circumstances can be achieved through opening spaces for fatwa issuance among additional fatwa institutions in Indonesia, as the monopolisation of fatwa issuance has created undemocratic tendencies in Indonesian Islam.","PeriodicalId":23341,"journal":{"name":"TRaNS: Trans -Regional and -National Studies of Southeast Asia","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2020-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"73875152","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract An increasing number of reports and studies on offenses against religious minorities has been published in Indonesia since the country's democratic transition in 1998. While the literature on intolerance unveils the young democracy's institutional problems which have undermined and eroded minority rights, such as direct elections and the lack of judicial independence, it leaves many critical questions to address. Although the number of victims of religious intolerance increased, in the same institutional settings, a large number of religious minorities has managed to prevent escalating violence and avoid being targeted by intolerant groups. Under what circumstances and how do minorities deter attacks in a time of heightened tension against them under a democratic system that has afforded them little protection? This article sheds light on the case of the Shi'a who suffered a series of attacks in Sampang, Madura in the East Java province, but have since gradually developed resilience. A series of attacks in Sampang in 2011–12 was one of the most destructive events against religious minorities in Indonesia. Examining the Sampang incidents, this article argues that if the religious minority can develop a cohesive network with elements of the majority capable of mobilising state power, it would build a safety net preventing attacks by intolerant groups. Thus, this article aims to develop our understanding of how religious minorities address violence caused by hostile socio-political forces and adapt to Indonesia's democracy.
{"title":"The Politics of Religious Pluralism in Indonesia: The Shi'a Response to the Sampang Incidents of 2011–12","authors":"Ken Miichi, Yuka Kayane","doi":"10.1017/trn.2019.12","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/trn.2019.12","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract An increasing number of reports and studies on offenses against religious minorities has been published in Indonesia since the country's democratic transition in 1998. While the literature on intolerance unveils the young democracy's institutional problems which have undermined and eroded minority rights, such as direct elections and the lack of judicial independence, it leaves many critical questions to address. Although the number of victims of religious intolerance increased, in the same institutional settings, a large number of religious minorities has managed to prevent escalating violence and avoid being targeted by intolerant groups. Under what circumstances and how do minorities deter attacks in a time of heightened tension against them under a democratic system that has afforded them little protection? This article sheds light on the case of the Shi'a who suffered a series of attacks in Sampang, Madura in the East Java province, but have since gradually developed resilience. A series of attacks in Sampang in 2011–12 was one of the most destructive events against religious minorities in Indonesia. Examining the Sampang incidents, this article argues that if the religious minority can develop a cohesive network with elements of the majority capable of mobilising state power, it would build a safety net preventing attacks by intolerant groups. Thus, this article aims to develop our understanding of how religious minorities address violence caused by hostile socio-political forces and adapt to Indonesia's democracy.","PeriodicalId":23341,"journal":{"name":"TRaNS: Trans -Regional and -National Studies of Southeast Asia","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2020-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"75987799","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract Indonesian women were at the forefront of activism during the turbulent period prior to reformasi and were a part of the leadership that demanded democratic change. Two decades after Indonesia embarked on democratic reforms, the country continues to face challenges on socio-religious and political fronts. Both the rise of political Islam and the increased presence of religion and faith in the public sphere are among the key features of Indonesia's consolidating democracy. This development has reinvigorated the discourse on citizenship and rights and also the historical debate over the relationship between religion and the state. Bearing this in mind, this paper looks at the narrative of women's rights and women's status in the public domain and public policy in Indonesia. It is evident, especially in the past decade, that much of the public conversation within the religious framework is increasingly centred on women's traditional social roles. This fact has motivated this study. Several norms and ideas that are relied on are based on cultural and faith-based interpretations - of gender. Therefore, this paper specifically examines examples of the ways in which social, legal, and political trends in this context affect progress with respect to gender equality and gender policy. I argue that these trends are attempts to subject women to conservative religious doctrines and to confine them to traditional gender roles. The article discusses how these developments should be seen in the context of the democratic transition in Indonesia.
{"title":"Rising public piety and the status of women in Indonesia two decades after reformasi","authors":"Dina Afrianty","doi":"10.1017/trn.2019.14","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/trn.2019.14","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Indonesian women were at the forefront of activism during the turbulent period prior to reformasi and were a part of the leadership that demanded democratic change. Two decades after Indonesia embarked on democratic reforms, the country continues to face challenges on socio-religious and political fronts. Both the rise of political Islam and the increased presence of religion and faith in the public sphere are among the key features of Indonesia's consolidating democracy. This development has reinvigorated the discourse on citizenship and rights and also the historical debate over the relationship between religion and the state. Bearing this in mind, this paper looks at the narrative of women's rights and women's status in the public domain and public policy in Indonesia. It is evident, especially in the past decade, that much of the public conversation within the religious framework is increasingly centred on women's traditional social roles. This fact has motivated this study. Several norms and ideas that are relied on are based on cultural and faith-based interpretations - of gender. Therefore, this paper specifically examines examples of the ways in which social, legal, and political trends in this context affect progress with respect to gender equality and gender policy. I argue that these trends are attempts to subject women to conservative religious doctrines and to confine them to traditional gender roles. The article discusses how these developments should be seen in the context of the democratic transition in Indonesia.","PeriodicalId":23341,"journal":{"name":"TRaNS: Trans -Regional and -National Studies of Southeast Asia","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2020-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"84238503","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract The processes of democratisation and liberalisation initiated during the course of the Indonesian Reformasi era (1998-) generated a stronger porosity in the State's frontiers and led to the formation of certain semi-institutionalised organisations. The approaching 2019 presidential elections have enabled these organisations to position themselves as political and moral brokers. The Islamic Defenders Front militia (FPI) appears to be one of the main actors in this process. It has succeeded in imposing itself in the public sphere, channelling political support and utilising extensive media coverage. While avoiding providing direct opposition to the ruling government and the Constitution, this organisation promotes the social morals followed by a large part of the population and encourages radicalism and violent actions in the name of Islam. The organisation collaborates with a section of the regional and national political elites, some sections of the army and police, several groups that are—more or less—criminal in nature, a number of local communities in different areas, and a variety of violent Islamist groups. Thus, it is at the crossroads of multiple political, economic, social, and religious interests. At the same time, the organisation's leaders maintain their own political objectives. They manipulate the dynamics of the electoral decentralised system to their advantage by obtaining political concessions that serve their personal goals. The capacity of the organisation to impose its discourse on the public stage has led to an urgent need to interrogate both the institutional and ideological transformations initiated by the Indonesian decentralisation since 1999.
{"title":"Islamic Defenders Front Militia (Front Pembela Islam) and its Impact on Growing Religious Intolerance in Indonesia","authors":"G. Facal","doi":"10.1017/trn.2018.15","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/trn.2018.15","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract The processes of democratisation and liberalisation initiated during the course of the Indonesian Reformasi era (1998-) generated a stronger porosity in the State's frontiers and led to the formation of certain semi-institutionalised organisations. The approaching 2019 presidential elections have enabled these organisations to position themselves as political and moral brokers. The Islamic Defenders Front militia (FPI) appears to be one of the main actors in this process. It has succeeded in imposing itself in the public sphere, channelling political support and utilising extensive media coverage. While avoiding providing direct opposition to the ruling government and the Constitution, this organisation promotes the social morals followed by a large part of the population and encourages radicalism and violent actions in the name of Islam. The organisation collaborates with a section of the regional and national political elites, some sections of the army and police, several groups that are—more or less—criminal in nature, a number of local communities in different areas, and a variety of violent Islamist groups. Thus, it is at the crossroads of multiple political, economic, social, and religious interests. At the same time, the organisation's leaders maintain their own political objectives. They manipulate the dynamics of the electoral decentralised system to their advantage by obtaining political concessions that serve their personal goals. The capacity of the organisation to impose its discourse on the public stage has led to an urgent need to interrogate both the institutional and ideological transformations initiated by the Indonesian decentralisation since 1999.","PeriodicalId":23341,"journal":{"name":"TRaNS: Trans -Regional and -National Studies of Southeast Asia","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2020-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"81373480","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"TRN volume 8 issue 1 Cover and Back matter","authors":"","doi":"10.1017/trn.2020.5","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/trn.2020.5","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":23341,"journal":{"name":"TRaNS: Trans -Regional and -National Studies of Southeast Asia","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2020-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"73553373","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract The successful ‘Defending Islam’ rallies of 2016–2017 provide clear evidence that Islamism is on the rise in contemporary Indonesia. Mainstream Islamic authorities, including groups such as Nahdlatul Ulama and Muhammadiyah, are increasingly losing their authority to newer, more conservative Islamic preachers and groups. What explains this phenomenon – and what does it mean for the moderate perspectives that many predicted would dominate Islam in Indonesia in the post-Reformasi era? This article argues that three main mechanisms can explain the rise of Islamism in Indonesia: 1) the creation of a ‘marketplace of ideas’ in post-Reformasi Indonesia and the way in which this marketplace has contributed to the rise of Islamism and the breakdown of Islamic authority; 2) the ascent of new Islamic authority figures, who propagate their views using new methods, ranging from social media to campus da'wa organisations and community-based activities (majelis taklim); and 3) the growing influence of new Islamic groups and preachers, who are building alliances with established religious elites and politicians. Such alliances strengthen the influence of new Islamic authorities, while further marginalising religious minorities, such as Ahmadi and Shi'a Muslims.
{"title":"Rising Islamism and the Struggle for Islamic Authority in Post-Reformasi Indonesia","authors":"Alexander R. Arifianto","doi":"10.1017/trn.2019.10","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/trn.2019.10","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract The successful ‘Defending Islam’ rallies of 2016–2017 provide clear evidence that Islamism is on the rise in contemporary Indonesia. Mainstream Islamic authorities, including groups such as Nahdlatul Ulama and Muhammadiyah, are increasingly losing their authority to newer, more conservative Islamic preachers and groups. What explains this phenomenon – and what does it mean for the moderate perspectives that many predicted would dominate Islam in Indonesia in the post-Reformasi era? This article argues that three main mechanisms can explain the rise of Islamism in Indonesia: 1) the creation of a ‘marketplace of ideas’ in post-Reformasi Indonesia and the way in which this marketplace has contributed to the rise of Islamism and the breakdown of Islamic authority; 2) the ascent of new Islamic authority figures, who propagate their views using new methods, ranging from social media to campus da'wa organisations and community-based activities (majelis taklim); and 3) the growing influence of new Islamic groups and preachers, who are building alliances with established religious elites and politicians. Such alliances strengthen the influence of new Islamic authorities, while further marginalising religious minorities, such as Ahmadi and Shi'a Muslims.","PeriodicalId":23341,"journal":{"name":"TRaNS: Trans -Regional and -National Studies of Southeast Asia","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2020-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"83414185","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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