In his book This complicated form of life , Newton Garver presents a curious interpretation of Wittgensteins’s early philosophy. Based on some passages of Notebooks and, especially, in considerations about Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus ’ 'ontology', the commentator concludes that wittgensteinian philosophy, at least in its first phase, implies a pantheistic mystical-religious position. More precisely, Garver uses an abductive reasoning for (supposedly) show that pantheism would be the best explanation for the fact that there are, according to him, two ontologies in the Tractatus , namely, an ontology of facts and an one of objects. The aim of this text is to present and refute this interpretation. After reconstruct in detail the Garver’s position, I will present two arguments against it. At first, I will show that the commentator’s interpretation implies an unacceptable idea, according to which the pantheistic God would be founded rather than the foundation , as is commonly understood in the pantheistic traditions. In the second, I will show that it is possible to explain plausibly the 'ontology' of facts and objects present in the Tractatus , without resorting to pantheism.
{"title":"WITTGENSTEIN, ONTOLOGIA E PANTEÍSMO","authors":"Alison Vander Mandeli","doi":"10.5216/PHI.V22I2.41846","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5216/PHI.V22I2.41846","url":null,"abstract":"In his book This complicated form of life , Newton Garver presents a curious interpretation of Wittgensteins’s early philosophy. Based on some passages of Notebooks and, especially, in considerations about Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus ’ 'ontology', the commentator concludes that wittgensteinian philosophy, at least in its first phase, implies a pantheistic mystical-religious position. More precisely, Garver uses an abductive reasoning for (supposedly) show that pantheism would be the best explanation for the fact that there are, according to him, two ontologies in the Tractatus , namely, an ontology of facts and an one of objects. The aim of this text is to present and refute this interpretation. After reconstruct in detail the Garver’s position, I will present two arguments against it. At first, I will show that the commentator’s interpretation implies an unacceptable idea, according to which the pantheistic God would be founded rather than the foundation , as is commonly understood in the pantheistic traditions. In the second, I will show that it is possible to explain plausibly the 'ontology' of facts and objects present in the Tractatus , without resorting to pantheism.","PeriodicalId":30368,"journal":{"name":"Philosophos Revista de Filosofia","volume":"22 1","pages":"11-11"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-02-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42086108","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This article presents some aspects of the notion of ‘panoptism’, starting from the considerations and reflections of the French philosopher Michel Foucault, particularly in the books he published in the period between 1971 and 1976, together with the lectures given at the College de France also in those years. Moreover, the discussion will stop at the present moment, showing that panopticism has generated practices of power, rules, uses and habits that are part of our daily life and that deeply interfere in the ways of acting, relating and producing subjectivities and subjections.
{"title":"PODER Y PANOPTISMO EN EL SEGUNDO MICHEL FOUCAULT","authors":"O. Guerrero","doi":"10.5216/PHI.V22I2.49693","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5216/PHI.V22I2.49693","url":null,"abstract":"This article presents some aspects of the notion of ‘panoptism’, starting from the considerations and reflections of the French philosopher Michel Foucault, particularly in the books he published in the period between 1971 and 1976, together with the lectures given at the College de France also in those years. Moreover, the discussion will stop at the present moment, showing that panopticism has generated practices of power, rules, uses and habits that are part of our daily life and that deeply interfere in the ways of acting, relating and producing subjectivities and subjections.","PeriodicalId":30368,"journal":{"name":"Philosophos Revista de Filosofia","volume":"22 1","pages":"187-187"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-02-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43240401","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"A NATUREZA DA FORÇA: NOTAS SOBRE O TEXTO LATINO DE IN PHYSICA II, 1, L. 11-14 DE FILOPONO","authors":"Evaniel Brás dos Santos","doi":"10.5216/PHI.V22I2.43243","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5216/PHI.V22I2.43243","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":30368,"journal":{"name":"Philosophos Revista de Filosofia","volume":"22 1","pages":"125-125"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-02-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48837916","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In this paper, I present an interpretation of the historical mobility of existence according to Heidegger’s existential analytic of Being and Time . The interpretation is based on a conceptual framework that includes the notions of relational change and emergent determination. Following an analogue of David Weberman’s criterion for genuine relational changes, I shall examine the mobility of existential historicity, aiming to emphasize the commitment of the existential notion of movement with a modal conception of relational change in existence. This conception also entails the idea of plasticity or non-fixity of the existential past.
{"title":"HISTORICIDADE, MUDANÇAS RELACIONAIS E NÃO FIXIDEZ DO PASSADO EXISTENCIAL","authors":"Róbson Ramos dos Reis","doi":"10.5216/phi.v22i2.45852","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5216/phi.v22i2.45852","url":null,"abstract":"In this paper, I present an interpretation of the historical mobility of existence according to Heidegger’s existential analytic of Being and Time . The interpretation is based on a conceptual framework that includes the notions of relational change and emergent determination. Following an analogue of David Weberman’s criterion for genuine relational changes, I shall examine the mobility of existential historicity, aiming to emphasize the commitment of the existential notion of movement with a modal conception of relational change in existence. This conception also entails the idea of plasticity or non-fixity of the existential past.","PeriodicalId":30368,"journal":{"name":"Philosophos Revista de Filosofia","volume":"22 1","pages":"247"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-02-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46480907","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The question of whether Nietzsche should or at least could be incorporated into the hermeneutical tradition has been a debate for many scholars is the last decades. Differing claims, both for and against, have been advanced by people such as Vattimo, Davey, Babich and Grondin. This work attempts to discuss some of these claims, addressing the hermeneutical background to Nietzsche’s thought focusing on two key concepts of his philosophy: finitude and truth. I argue that Nietzsche’s philosophy can be understood as hermeneutical thinking since it assumes the radical purpose to think our finite situation (in both epistemological and existential senses) in a way that is very close to the hermeneutical circularity of human understanding. I also argue that this interpretation allows such polemical theses as the will to power, perspectivism, and “theory of errors” to become comprehensive as a whole, and mutually compatible.
{"title":"NIETZSCHE AND HERMENEUTICAL THINKING: FINITUDE AND TRUTH","authors":"Rebeca Furtado de Melo","doi":"10.5216/PHI.V22I2.46011","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5216/PHI.V22I2.46011","url":null,"abstract":"The question of whether Nietzsche should or at least could be incorporated into the hermeneutical tradition has been a debate for many scholars is the last decades. Differing claims, both for and against, have been advanced by people such as Vattimo, Davey, Babich and Grondin. This work attempts to discuss some of these claims, addressing the hermeneutical background to Nietzsche’s thought focusing on two key concepts of his philosophy: finitude and truth. I argue that Nietzsche’s philosophy can be understood as hermeneutical thinking since it assumes the radical purpose to think our finite situation (in both epistemological and existential senses) in a way that is very close to the hermeneutical circularity of human understanding. I also argue that this interpretation allows such polemical theses as the will to power, perspectivism, and “theory of errors” to become comprehensive as a whole, and mutually compatible.","PeriodicalId":30368,"journal":{"name":"Philosophos Revista de Filosofia","volume":"22 1","pages":"211-211"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-02-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44786658","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Unamuno, like all the great classic Western thinkers, is eternally relevant to the present time. His reflections concerning what a democracy should be are in this sense an expression of the timelessness of his political thought. Certainly the question of what democratic citizenship is and involves is motivating the thinking of many of today’s philosophers; it is also no less certain that no other author has been so consistent in taking to the limit the relation between the idea of that concept and its implementation in his civic life. Unamuno – as an irascible “intellectual-politician” in self-exile in Paris owing to his confrontation with the Miguel Primo de Rivera dictatorship, the monarchy and the king– is the highest example of how current democracy and citizenship should be understood and practised in terms of political intervention established on free examination of conscience. And it is precisely here where the influence of German liberal Protestantism played as decisive role in his intellectual formation, especially for an author so adept in heresy as deconstruction of orthodoxies and dogmas that disallow individual thought in its freedom and autonomy.
Unamuno，就像所有伟大的西方经典思想家一样，与当今时代永远相关。从这个意义上说，他对民主应该是什么的思考表达了他的政治思想的永恒性。当然，民主公民身份是什么以及涉及什么的问题激发了当今许多哲学家的思考；同样可以肯定的是，没有其他作者如此始终如一地将这一概念的理念及其在公民生活中的实施之间的关系发挥到极限。Unamuno是一位脾气暴躁的“知识分子政治家”，由于与Miguel Primo de Rivera独裁政权、君主制和国王的对抗而流亡巴黎，他是当前民主和公民身份应如何在建立在良心自由检查基础上的政治干预中得到理解和实践的最高例子。正是在这里，德国自由主义新教的影响在他的思想形成中发挥了决定性作用，尤其是对于一位如此擅长异端的作家来说，比如解构正统和教条，这些正统和教条不允许个人思想的自由和自主权。
{"title":"LA CIUDADANÍA EN MIGUEL DE UNAMUNO: EL LIBRE EXAMEN Y LA PARTICIPACIÓN POLÍTICA","authors":"Emanuel José Maroco dos Santos","doi":"10.5216/PHI.V22I1.44198","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5216/PHI.V22I1.44198","url":null,"abstract":"Unamuno, like all the great classic Western thinkers, is eternally relevant to the present time. His reflections concerning what a democracy should be are in this sense an expression of the timelessness of his political thought. Certainly the question of what democratic citizenship is and involves is motivating the thinking of many of today’s philosophers; it is also no less certain that no other author has been so consistent in taking to the limit the relation between the idea of that concept and its implementation in his civic life. Unamuno – as an irascible “intellectual-politician” in self-exile in Paris owing to his confrontation with the Miguel Primo de Rivera dictatorship, the monarchy and the king– is the highest example of how current democracy and citizenship should be understood and practised in terms of political intervention established on free examination of conscience. And it is precisely here where the influence of German liberal Protestantism played as decisive role in his intellectual formation, especially for an author so adept in heresy as deconstruction of orthodoxies and dogmas that disallow individual thought in its freedom and autonomy.","PeriodicalId":30368,"journal":{"name":"Philosophos Revista de Filosofia","volume":"22 1","pages":"37-66"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-07-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44727924","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In 1935-1936, Husserl claims that we are living in a crisis of Reason. This crisis would be the result of the way in which scientific objectivity colonized the sciences in general, leading us to a rationality completely disconnected of our lives. For Husserl, the meaning of the Reason was established by the Greeks and since then it would have been distorted, arriving, in the contemporaneity, in a crisis. From this position, in 1947, Horkheimer reaffirms that we live in a crisis and writes a history of Reason very close to that presented by Husserl. This paper aims to show whether Horkheimer’s position on the problem of Reason was merely a “comment” on Husserl’s work as says Moura, or whether Horkheimer would have presented us something new.
{"title":"A LEITURA DE HORKHEIMER DA CRISE DA RAZÃO – UM ADENDO AO ANÚNCIO DE HUSSERL?","authors":"R. Manzi","doi":"10.5216/PHI.V22I1.44755","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5216/PHI.V22I1.44755","url":null,"abstract":"In 1935-1936, Husserl claims that we are living in a crisis of Reason. This crisis would be the result of the way in which scientific objectivity colonized the sciences in general, leading us to a rationality completely disconnected of our lives. For Husserl, the meaning of the Reason was established by the Greeks and since then it would have been distorted, arriving, in the contemporaneity, in a crisis. From this position, in 1947, Horkheimer reaffirms that we live in a crisis and writes a history of Reason very close to that presented by Husserl. This paper aims to show whether Horkheimer’s position on the problem of Reason was merely a “comment” on Husserl’s work as says Moura, or whether Horkheimer would have presented us something new.","PeriodicalId":30368,"journal":{"name":"Philosophos Revista de Filosofia","volume":"22 1","pages":"193-220"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-07-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48603922","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In this article, one aims to analyze the Hume´s discussion about the idea of space, presenting the debate about the rejection of the theory of infinite divisibility of extension and its defense of the perceptive atomism. Therefore, one starts from the context of analysis which Hume is inserted, that is, the debate between Locke and Berkeley regarding the abstraction of the extension. In this sense, the text attempts to point how Hume´s debate concerning space results in sustaining the existence of mathematical points and to show how the thesis regarding the relational nature of space is Hume´s form to seek the link between his perceptive atomism and abstractionism.
{"title":"A IDEIA DE ESPAÇO NO TRATADO DA NATUREZA HUMANA, DE HUME","authors":"Andrea Cachel","doi":"10.5216/PHI.V22I1.40949","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5216/PHI.V22I1.40949","url":null,"abstract":"In this article, one aims to analyze the Hume´s discussion about the idea of space, presenting the debate about the rejection of the theory of infinite divisibility of extension and its defense of the perceptive atomism. Therefore, one starts from the context of analysis which Hume is inserted, that is, the debate between Locke and Berkeley regarding the abstraction of the extension. In this sense, the text attempts to point how Hume´s debate concerning space results in sustaining the existence of mathematical points and to show how the thesis regarding the relational nature of space is Hume´s form to seek the link between his perceptive atomism and abstractionism.","PeriodicalId":30368,"journal":{"name":"Philosophos Revista de Filosofia","volume":"22 1","pages":"11-36"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-07-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42685738","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In this paper I present and discuss the solution offered by John Perry to Frege’s Puzzle in terms of the reflexive content of utterances. I first discuss his purported solution for the indexical version of the Puzzle, and argue that reflexive content cannot explain the triviality of some utterances. Hence, it is not the sort of thing that accounts for cognitive significance adequately. I then discuss Perry’s solution for the Puzzle as arising for proper names. I argue that, even if reflexive content does explain cognitive significance in this case, it does not do so in terms of the meaning of expressions, as Perry originally intended.
{"title":"SOME REMARKS ON PERRY’S REFLEXIVE CONTENT AND COGNITIVE SIGNIFICANCE","authors":"Filipe Martone","doi":"10.5216/PHI.V20I2.40935","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5216/PHI.V20I2.40935","url":null,"abstract":"In this paper I present and discuss the solution offered by John Perry to Frege’s Puzzle in terms of the reflexive content of utterances. I first discuss his purported solution for the indexical version of the Puzzle, and argue that reflexive content cannot explain the triviality of some utterances. Hence, it is not the sort of thing that accounts for cognitive significance adequately. I then discuss Perry’s solution for the Puzzle as arising for proper names. I argue that, even if reflexive content does explain cognitive significance in this case, it does not do so in terms of the meaning of expressions, as Perry originally intended.","PeriodicalId":30368,"journal":{"name":"Philosophos Revista de Filosofia","volume":"22 1","pages":"67-83"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-07-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46737970","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Political “founding myths” are a recurring theme in many thinkers, from Plato to Rousseau, including Machiavelli and Hobbes. In The Social Contract , Rousseau handles it in the chapter on the Lawgiver, showing that when Moses or Muhammad have given laws to their peoples, they haven’t called them to deliberate rationally about the adequacy of their proposals to public good, since it was impossible for these incipient nations to do reflections of this kind, because they lacked the understanding and social spirit that would allow them to discern the value of this legislation. Thus, the Lawgiver had to persuade people without convincing them, invoking the one valid argument for their ears: divine authority. These ideas pose a crucial problem concerning to other aspects of Rousseau’s thought. For him, the laws are valid only when approved by sovereign people’s will. However, one can ask, as does Hilail Gildin: “Can a society based on a code which a people has been duped into accepting because they believe it to express the divine will, and which a people would not dare to modify for that very reason, be a society in which the people regards itself as the only legitimate source of law?”
{"title":"Da fundação mítica ao exercício da soberania popular: como unir vontade e entendimento?","authors":"Renato Moscateli","doi":"10.5216/PHI.V22I1.40283","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5216/PHI.V22I1.40283","url":null,"abstract":"Political “founding myths” are a recurring theme in many thinkers, from Plato to Rousseau, including Machiavelli and Hobbes. In The Social Contract , Rousseau handles it in the chapter on the Lawgiver, showing that when Moses or Muhammad have given laws to their peoples, they haven’t called them to deliberate rationally about the adequacy of their proposals to public good, since it was impossible for these incipient nations to do reflections of this kind, because they lacked the understanding and social spirit that would allow them to discern the value of this legislation. Thus, the Lawgiver had to persuade people without convincing them, invoking the one valid argument for their ears: divine authority. These ideas pose a crucial problem concerning to other aspects of Rousseau’s thought. For him, the laws are valid only when approved by sovereign people’s will. However, one can ask, as does Hilail Gildin: “Can a society based on a code which a people has been duped into accepting because they believe it to express the divine will, and which a people would not dare to modify for that very reason, be a society in which the people regards itself as the only legitimate source of law?”","PeriodicalId":30368,"journal":{"name":"Philosophos Revista de Filosofia","volume":"22 1","pages":"163-192"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-07-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49158568","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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