Pub Date : 2024-12-11DOI: 10.1109/LCSYS.2024.3516636
Vade Shah;Keith Paarporn;Jason R. Marden
When multiple agents are engaged in a network of conflict, some can advance their competitive positions by forming alliances with each other. However, the costs associated with establishing an alliance may outweigh the potential benefits. This study investigates costly alliance formation in the framework of coalitional Blotto games, in which two players compete separately against a common adversary and are able to collude by exchanging resources with one another. Previous work has shown that both players in the alliance can mutually benefit if one player unilaterally donates, or transfers, a portion of their budget to the other. In this letter, we consider a variation where the transfer of resources is inherently inefficient, meaning that the recipient of the transfer only receives a fraction of the donation. Our findings reveal that even in the presence of inefficiencies, mutually beneficial transfers are still possible. More formally, our main result provides necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of such transfers, offering insights into the robustness of alliance formation in competitive environments with resource constraints.
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The scenario approach is widely used in robust control system design and chance-constrained optimization, maintaining convexity without requiring assumptions about the probability distribution of uncertain parameters. However, the approach can demand large sample sizes, making it intractable for safety-critical applications that require very low levels of constraint violation. To address this challenge, we propose a novel yet simple constraint scaling method, inspired by large deviations theory. Under mild nonparametric conditions on the underlying probability distribution, we show that our method yields an exponential reduction in sample size requirements for bilinear constraints with low violation levels compared to the classical approach, thereby significantly improving computational tractability. Numerical experiments on robust pole assignment problems support our theoretical findings.
{"title":"Reduced Sample Complexity in Scenario-Based Control System Design via Constraint Scaling","authors":"Jaeseok Choi;Anand Deo;Constantino Lagoa;Anirudh Subramanyam","doi":"10.1109/LCSYS.2024.3515861","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/LCSYS.2024.3515861","url":null,"abstract":"The scenario approach is widely used in robust control system design and chance-constrained optimization, maintaining convexity without requiring assumptions about the probability distribution of uncertain parameters. However, the approach can demand large sample sizes, making it intractable for safety-critical applications that require very low levels of constraint violation. To address this challenge, we propose a novel yet simple constraint scaling method, inspired by large deviations theory. Under mild nonparametric conditions on the underlying probability distribution, we show that our method yields an exponential reduction in sample size requirements for bilinear constraints with low violation levels compared to the classical approach, thereby significantly improving computational tractability. Numerical experiments on robust pole assignment problems support our theoretical findings.","PeriodicalId":37235,"journal":{"name":"IEEE Control Systems Letters","volume":"8 ","pages":"2793-2798"},"PeriodicalIF":2.4,"publicationDate":"2024-12-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142858886","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-12-11DOI: 10.1109/LCSYS.2024.3515858
Weizhen Wang;Jianping He;Xiaoming Duan
We study the inherent trade-off in Markov chain-based surveillance strategies between the efficiency, as measured by Kemeny’s constant, and unpredictability, as measured by the entropy rate. We first formulate a multi-objective optimization problem to account for these two criteria and demonstrate the intrinsic contradiction between them, emphasizing the need for a trade-off through the concept of Pareto optimality. We then employ the $varepsilon $