A presente exposição se orienta pela investigação de um possível interesse de Ludwig Feuerbach (1804-1872) pelo tema do conhecimento, neste caso específico tomando por base o escrito Pensamentos sobre a morte e a imortalidade (Gedanken über Tod und Unsterblichkeit [1830]). Embora esta temática pareça constituir um objeto lateral no interior da obra e, por isso, ali não exista um tratamento sistemático da mesma, procuro justificar a legitimidade de concluir que a questão do conhecimento não está apenas presente, mas que dela decorrem implicações diretas para a compreensão de outros problemas que aparecem seja no referido texto de 1830, seja em obras futuras, algo que sugere a importância de examinar tal questão mais demoradamente. Neste texto investigo o problema com base em uma tipologia do saber, para daí avaliar pontos como a distinção entre subjetividade e objetividade, assim como sobre as capacidades humanas a propósito de uma compreensão da exterioridade – em que comparece a centralidade da sensibilidade como condição de possibilidade do conhecimento –, sem desconsiderar a viabilidade da abstração. Finalizo anunciando o tema da valorização da natureza, que parece já estar considerado aqui em 1830 (e que virá retomado no pensamento feuerbachiano posterior), procurando igualmente compreender a questão do conhecimento a partir de um vínculo com a natureza e com a dimensão espácio-temporal que determina qualquer existência real. Palavras-chave: Ludwig Feuerbach, conhecimento, Pensamentos sobre a morte e a imortalidade.
这个展览是由路德维希·费尔巴哈(1804-1872)对知识主题可能感兴趣的调查指导的，在这个特殊的情况下，基于关于死亡和不朽的书面思想(Gedanken uber Tod und Unsterblichkeit[1830])。尽管这个主题做一方在工作目的,因此,在不存在一个系统治疗的要找自己,证明结论的合法性问题知识不只是礼物,但她正在直接影响理解其他问题的出现是在1830年的文本,在未来工作的建议更站在考察这些问题的重要性。本文调查的问题的基础上,一个语言知识,从而评估分主观和客观的区别,以及关于人类能力的目的理解外部条件—且在向心性敏感的知识—抽象,没有背叛的可行性。关闭宣布恢复自然的主题,似乎已经被认为是在1830年(和他会恢复对feuerbachiano思维),同时了解问题的知识从一个时空与大小和特性决定着任何真实的存在。关键词:路德维希·费尔巴哈，知识，对死亡和不朽的思考。
{"title":"Sobre o conhecimento em Ludwig Feuerbach: uma investigação a partir dos Gedanken über Tod und Unsterblichkeit (1830)","authors":"José Edmar Lima Filho","doi":"10.4013/fsu.2021.222.03","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4013/fsu.2021.222.03","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000\u0000\u0000A presente exposição se orienta pela investigação de um possível interesse de Ludwig Feuerbach (1804-1872) pelo tema do conhecimento, neste caso específico tomando por base o escrito Pensamentos sobre a morte e a imortalidade (Gedanken über Tod und Unsterblichkeit [1830]). Embora esta temática pareça constituir um objeto lateral no interior da obra e, por isso, ali não exista um tratamento sistemático da mesma, procuro justificar a legitimidade de concluir que a questão do conhecimento não está apenas presente, mas que dela decorrem implicações diretas para a compreensão de outros problemas que aparecem seja no referido texto de 1830, seja em obras futuras, algo que sugere a importância de examinar tal questão mais demoradamente. Neste texto investigo o problema com base em uma tipologia do saber, para daí avaliar pontos como a distinção entre subjetividade e objetividade, assim como sobre as capacidades humanas a propósito de uma compreensão da exterioridade – em que comparece a centralidade da sensibilidade como condição de possibilidade do conhecimento –, sem desconsiderar a viabilidade da abstração. Finalizo anunciando o tema da valorização da natureza, que parece já estar considerado aqui em 1830 (e que virá retomado no pensamento feuerbachiano posterior), procurando igualmente compreender a questão do conhecimento a partir de um vínculo com a natureza e com a dimensão espácio-temporal que determina qualquer existência real.\u0000\u0000\u0000\u0000Palavras-chave: Ludwig Feuerbach, conhecimento, Pensamentos sobre a morte e a imortalidade.\u0000\u0000\u0000\u0000\u0000\u0000","PeriodicalId":41989,"journal":{"name":"Filosofia Unisinos","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-08-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44401010","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Martha Nussbaum ha defendido la tesis de que la literatura puede ser filosofía moral. Esta idea, poco popular en los círculos filosóficos, ha sido atacada desde distintos frentes. Una de las objeciones fundamentales es que la literatura no cumple con las labores tradicionalmente filosóficas. En particular, se dice que la filosofía se encarga de hacer un trabajo conceptual sistemático y de argumentar para mostrar la verdad de un punto de vista. Este texto defiende que la literatura puede cumplir justamente esas labores, de manera que una obra literaria puede ser, a la vez, un trabajo de filosofía; en particular, de filosofía moral. El argumento central se basa en dos ideas de corte wittgensteiniano. En primer lugar, que una forma de sistematizar es brindar una visión panorámica que aclara el campo problemático. En segundo lugar, que algunas verdades, especialmente en el ámbito moral, no pueden capturarse mediante el lenguaje, pero que pueden mostrarse a través de él.
{"title":"Martha Nussbaum y la literatura como filosofía moral","authors":"Hernan Medina-Botero","doi":"10.4013/fsu.2021.222.02","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4013/fsu.2021.222.02","url":null,"abstract":"Martha Nussbaum ha defendido la tesis de que la literatura puede ser filosofía moral. Esta idea, poco popular en los círculos filosóficos, ha sido atacada desde distintos frentes. Una de las objeciones fundamentales es que la literatura no cumple con las labores tradicionalmente filosóficas. En particular, se dice que la filosofía se encarga de hacer un trabajo conceptual sistemático y de argumentar para mostrar la verdad de un punto de vista. Este texto defiende que la literatura puede cumplir justamente esas labores, de manera que una obra literaria puede ser, a la vez, un trabajo de filosofía; en particular, de filosofía moral. El argumento central se basa en dos ideas de corte wittgensteiniano. En primer lugar, que una forma de sistematizar es brindar una visión panorámica que aclara el campo problemático. En segundo lugar, que algunas verdades, especialmente en el ámbito moral, no pueden capturarse mediante el lenguaje, pero que pueden mostrarse a través de él.","PeriodicalId":41989,"journal":{"name":"Filosofia Unisinos","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-08-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48345914","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper presents social and political dimensions of forgiveness within Jacques Derrida’s philosophy. Derrida’s philosophy of forgiveness is an example of how philosophy can help us understand and resolve contemporary social and political issues. Derrida believes that traditional concept of forgiveness should be broadened beyond the bounds of the rational and the imaginable. According to Derrida, traditional concept of forgiveness needs rethinking because of the phenomenon of proliferation of scenes of forgiveness after the Second World War that produced globalization of forgiveness and trivialized and decharacterized this term. According to Derrida, the act of forgiveness can only be thought beyond the limits of common sense and in the space of the impossible, and that is the forgiveness of something that common sense cannot forgive. Derrida’s philosophy of forgiveness has wide social and political implications as it transcends binary oppositions: present/past, self/other, friend/enemy and so forth. All concepts within Derrida’s philosophy of politics (friendship, enemy, hospitality, forgiveness, justice, and so on) are significant for societies eroded with traumas of wars and ethno-national divisions and conflicts. Keywords: Derrida, philosophy, forgiveness, enemy, migration, asylum, hospitality.
{"title":"Jacques Derrida’s philosophy of forgiveness","authors":"S. Ivic","doi":"10.4013/fsu.2021.222.01","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4013/fsu.2021.222.01","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000\u0000\u0000This paper presents social and political dimensions of forgiveness within Jacques Derrida’s philosophy. Derrida’s philosophy of forgiveness is an example of how philosophy can help us understand and resolve contemporary social and political issues. Derrida believes that traditional concept of forgiveness should be broadened beyond the bounds of the rational and the imaginable. According to Derrida, traditional concept of forgiveness needs rethinking because of the phenomenon of proliferation of scenes of forgiveness after the Second World War that produced globalization of forgiveness and trivialized and decharacterized this term. According to Derrida, the act of forgiveness can only be thought beyond the limits of common sense and in the space of the impossible, and that is the forgiveness of something that common sense cannot forgive. Derrida’s philosophy of forgiveness has wide social and political implications as it transcends binary oppositions: present/past, self/other, friend/enemy and so forth. All concepts within Derrida’s philosophy of politics (friendship, enemy, hospitality, forgiveness, justice, and so on) are significant for societies eroded with traumas of wars and ethno-national divisions and conflicts.\u0000Keywords: Derrida, philosophy, forgiveness, enemy, migration, asylum, hospitality.\u0000\u0000\u0000","PeriodicalId":41989,"journal":{"name":"Filosofia Unisinos","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-08-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45162764","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
1 A shorter precursor of this paper was presented under the title ‘Thought, Reason, and Language’ during the 2 Meeting on Cognition & Language – 2eC&L, held at the Federal University of Uberlândia – UFU (Uberlândia, MG, Brazil), on November 6-8, 2019; and under the present title during the international online research workshop Mind and Language, hosted by the University of Luxembourg on September 25-26, 2020. I wish to thank the participants of both events for their valuable questions, comments, and suggestions. I also wish to thank the members of the PhD reading circle for philosophy at the University of Luxembourg, who discussed an earlier version of the paper with me. I owe additional thanks to Frank Hofmann, Raquel Krempel, Nora Schleich, Andy Orlando, and Deven Burks for commenting on drafts of this text. 2 University of Luxembourg, Institute of Philosophy. Campus Belval. Maison des Sciences Humaines 11, Porte de Sciences L-4366, Esch-Sur-Alzette, Luxembourg. Email: hannes.fraissler@gmail.com. ABSTRACT
1本文的简短前体在2019年11月6日至8日在uberl印度联邦大学- UFU (uberl印度，MG，巴西)举行的认知与语言- 2eC&L会议上以“思想，理性和语言”的标题发表;并在2020年9月25日至26日由卢森堡大学主办的国际在线研究研讨会“思维与语言”期间以目前的标题进行。我要感谢两场活动的与会者提出的宝贵问题、意见和建议。我还要感谢卢森堡大学哲学博士阅读圈的成员，他们与我讨论了这篇论文的早期版本。我还要感谢Frank Hofmann, Raquel Krempel, Nora Schleich, Andy Orlando和Deven Burks对本文草稿的评论。2卢森堡大学哲学研究所;校园Belval。卢森堡，Esch-Sur-Alzette, Esch-Sur-Alzette, Porte de Sciences L-4366, Maison des Sciences humanes 11。电子邮件:hannes.fraissler@gmail.com。摘要
{"title":"A private language argument to elucidate the relation between mind and language","authors":"Hannes Fraissler","doi":"10.4013/FSU.2021.221.06","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4013/FSU.2021.221.06","url":null,"abstract":"1 A shorter precursor of this paper was presented under the title ‘Thought, Reason, and Language’ during the 2 Meeting on Cognition & Language – 2eC&L, held at the Federal University of Uberlândia – UFU (Uberlândia, MG, Brazil), on November 6-8, 2019; and under the present title during the international online research workshop Mind and Language, hosted by the University of Luxembourg on September 25-26, 2020. I wish to thank the participants of both events for their valuable questions, comments, and suggestions. I also wish to thank the members of the PhD reading circle for philosophy at the University of Luxembourg, who discussed an earlier version of the paper with me. I owe additional thanks to Frank Hofmann, Raquel Krempel, Nora Schleich, Andy Orlando, and Deven Burks for commenting on drafts of this text. 2 University of Luxembourg, Institute of Philosophy. Campus Belval. Maison des Sciences Humaines 11, Porte de Sciences L-4366, Esch-Sur-Alzette, Luxembourg. Email: hannes.fraissler@gmail.com. ABSTRACT","PeriodicalId":41989,"journal":{"name":"Filosofia Unisinos","volume":"22 1","pages":"48-58"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-03-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42104981","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
1 Universidade do Vale do Rio dos Sinos UNISINOS Programa de Pós-Graduação em Filosofia. Av. Unisinos, 950, Prédio B09, 4o. Andar, 93022-000, São Leopoldo, RS, Brasil. Email: siastein@me.com. ABSTRACT In Linguistic Bodies, Ezequiel A. Di Paolo, Elena Clare Cuffari and Hanne De Jaegher (2018) propose a dialectic method to explain organism’s movements and exchanges, i.e., life interactions and evolution, that can also explain the evolution from life to cultural relations, that include linguistic interactions. One of the main questions Linguistic Bodies wants to answer is how to explain human life and culture without a reductive scientific thought. If one defies radical reductionism, one of the central risks is to dissociate physical inquiries from biological investigations. In the book, the authors oppose the analytical mode of thinking present in many natural sciences to a dialectical mode of thinking that would explain living beings’ interactions. It is relevant to question if they succeeded in defending the dialectical model they profess to be the best suited to explain human social phenomena. Following this line of rationale, in this paper, I will, first, show that dialectical methods are over-ambitious and, second, inquire into the anti-reductionist attitude present in the dialectical model advocated in Linguistic Bodies.
1 university sidade do Vale do b里约热内卢do Sinos UNISINOS program de Pós-Graduação em Filosofia。avi . Unisinos, 1995, pracimdio B09, 1940。安达尔，9302.2 000，巴西RS o Leopoldo。电子邮件:siastein@me.com。在《语言体》一书中，Ezequiel a . Di Paolo、Elena Clare Cuffari和Hanne De Jaegher(2018)提出了一种辩证的方法来解释有机体的运动和交流，即生命的相互作用和进化，这种方法也可以解释从生命到文化关系的进化，其中包括语言的相互作用。语言体想要回答的主要问题之一是如何在没有还原的科学思想的情况下解释人类生活和文化。如果有人反对激进的还原论，其中一个主要风险是将物理研究与生物研究分离开来。在这本书中，作者反对许多自然科学中存在的分析思维模式，而反对解释生物相互作用的辩证思维模式。他们是否成功地捍卫了他们自称最适合解释人类社会现象的辩证模式，这是一个相关的问题。根据这一基本原理，在本文中，我将首先表明辩证方法过于雄心勃勃，其次，探讨在《语言体》中提倡的辩证模式中存在的反还原论态度。
{"title":"Nature-Life continuity: is there a necessary method of inquiry?","authors":"S. Stein","doi":"10.4013/FSU.2021.221.12","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4013/FSU.2021.221.12","url":null,"abstract":"1 Universidade do Vale do Rio dos Sinos UNISINOS Programa de Pós-Graduação em Filosofia. Av. Unisinos, 950, Prédio B09, 4o. Andar, 93022-000, São Leopoldo, RS, Brasil. Email: siastein@me.com. ABSTRACT In Linguistic Bodies, Ezequiel A. Di Paolo, Elena Clare Cuffari and Hanne De Jaegher (2018) propose a dialectic method to explain organism’s movements and exchanges, i.e., life interactions and evolution, that can also explain the evolution from life to cultural relations, that include linguistic interactions. One of the main questions Linguistic Bodies wants to answer is how to explain human life and culture without a reductive scientific thought. If one defies radical reductionism, one of the central risks is to dissociate physical inquiries from biological investigations. In the book, the authors oppose the analytical mode of thinking present in many natural sciences to a dialectical mode of thinking that would explain living beings’ interactions. It is relevant to question if they succeeded in defending the dialectical model they profess to be the best suited to explain human social phenomena. Following this line of rationale, in this paper, I will, first, show that dialectical methods are over-ambitious and, second, inquire into the anti-reductionist attitude present in the dialectical model advocated in Linguistic Bodies.","PeriodicalId":41989,"journal":{"name":"Filosofia Unisinos","volume":"22 1","pages":"102-107"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-03-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43498722","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Libertarians assume that the sense of agency supports their belief in the agent’s ability to have done otherwise; however, they do not present arguments in favor of their assumption beyond introspection. Although agents may hold this belief, the mechanisms that give rise to the sense of agency—the comparator model and the perception of the relation between action and events in the environment—do not provide reasons to support it. Nonetheless, these mechanisms can help explain why agents hold the belief in the first place, and the investigation makes clear that the workings of the mechanisms that give rise to the sense of agency are compatible with determinism. Here, I will defend that a compatibilist explanation can be given as to why the sense of agency may seem to support libertarian beliefs. Hence, the sense of agency does not support the libertarian position in the free will debate; it is merely the pre-reflective experience of action as self-caused, and it is associated with control mechanisms.
{"title":"The sense of agency does not evidence regulative control","authors":"Beatriz Sorrentino Marques","doi":"10.4013/FSU.2021.221.08","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4013/FSU.2021.221.08","url":null,"abstract":"Libertarians assume that the sense of agency supports their belief in the agent’s ability to have done otherwise; however, they do not present arguments in favor of their assumption beyond introspection. Although agents may hold this belief, the mechanisms that give rise to the sense of agency—the comparator model and the perception of the relation between action and events in the environment—do not provide reasons to support it. Nonetheless, these mechanisms can help explain why agents hold the belief in the first place, and the investigation makes clear that the workings of the mechanisms that give rise to the sense of agency are compatible with determinism. Here, I will defend that a compatibilist explanation can be given as to why the sense of agency may seem to support libertarian beliefs. Hence, the sense of agency does not support the libertarian position in the free will debate; it is merely the pre-reflective experience of action as self-caused, and it is associated with control mechanisms.","PeriodicalId":41989,"journal":{"name":"Filosofia Unisinos","volume":"22 1","pages":"69-77"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-03-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46050116","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Many neuroscientific experiments, based on monitoring brain activity, suggest that it is possible to predict the conscious intention/choice/decision of an agent before he himself knows that. Some neuroscientists and philosophers interpret the results of these experiments as showing that free will is an illusion, since it is the brain and not the conscious mind that intends/chooses/decides. Assuming that the methods and results of these experiments are reliable the question is if they really show that free will is an illusion. To address this problem, I argue that first it is needed to answer three questions related to the relationship between conscious mind and brain: 1. Do brain events cause conscious events? 2. Do conscious events cause brain events? 3. Who is the agent, that is, who consciously intends/chooses/ decides, the conscious mind, the brain, or both? I answer these questions by arguing that the conscious mind is a property of the brain due to which the brain has the causal capacity to interact adaptively with its body, and trough the body, with the physical and sociocultural environment. In other words, the brain is the agent and the conscious mind, in its various forms cognitive, volitional and emotional and contents, is its guide of action. Based on this general view I argue that the experiments aforementioned do not show that free will is an illusion, and as a starting point for examining this problem I point out, from some exemplary situations, what I believe to be some of the necessary conditions for free will.
{"title":"Brain as agent and conscious mind as action guide: from Libet-style experiments to necessary conditions for free will","authors":"J. Coelho","doi":"10.4013/FSU.2021.221.09","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4013/FSU.2021.221.09","url":null,"abstract":"Many neuroscientific experiments, based on monitoring brain activity, suggest that it is possible to predict the conscious intention/choice/decision of an agent before he himself knows that. Some neuroscientists and philosophers interpret the results of these experiments as showing that free will is an illusion, since it is the brain and not the conscious mind that intends/chooses/decides. Assuming that the methods and results of these experiments are reliable the question is if they really show that free will is an illusion. To address this problem, I argue that first it is needed to answer three questions related to the relationship between conscious mind and brain: 1. Do brain events cause conscious events? 2. Do conscious events cause brain events? 3. Who is the agent, that is, who consciously intends/chooses/ decides, the conscious mind, the brain, or both? I answer these questions by arguing that the conscious mind is a property of the brain due to which the brain has the causal capacity to interact adaptively with its body, and trough the body, with the physical and sociocultural environment. In other words, the brain is the agent and the conscious mind, in its various forms cognitive, volitional and emotional and contents, is its guide of action. Based on this general view I argue that the experiments aforementioned do not show that free will is an illusion, and as a starting point for examining this problem I point out, from some exemplary situations, what I believe to be some of the necessary conditions for free will.","PeriodicalId":41989,"journal":{"name":"Filosofia Unisinos","volume":"22 1","pages":"78-83"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-03-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43384120","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
My aim in this programmatic paper is to explore the relationship among three important notions: intentionality, disposition and artefact. There wouldn’t be artefacts without what I call “intentional work,” a sustained activity directed to the production of some good. I first present contextualism as a method. Then I use it to delimit the problematic concept ARTEFACT, with the intention to apply it to repertoires of mental dispositions that affect directly our personal identity. The unavoidable but loose criterion of human intervention is used, at least to some degree. Attitudes are intentional states with conceptual content, and concepts are dispositions. We acquire concepts during our lives, sometimes unconsciously, sometimes explicitly through definition of some kind, and each cognitive agent has a unique repertoire of concepts and a unique idiolect as well. The idea that our mental representations (at least some of them) are artefacts might sound strange at first sight, but I shall try to show that it makes full sense. Most of our mental dispositions –those provided with a conceptual content– are themselves artefacts. At the end, we are all different psychologically and culturally because our idiolects and repertoires of concepts are different. For a large part, what makes our species so special is an ongoing process through which homo sapiens makes itself what it is.Keywords: Intentionality, disposition, artefact, contextualism, repertoire.
{"title":"Artefacts: the big picture in broad terms","authors":"A. Leclerc","doi":"10.4013/FSU.2021.221.05","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4013/FSU.2021.221.05","url":null,"abstract":"My aim in this programmatic paper is to explore the relationship among three important notions: intentionality, disposition and artefact. There wouldn’t be artefacts without what I call “intentional work,” a sustained activity directed to the production of some good. I first present contextualism as a method. Then I use it to delimit the problematic concept ARTEFACT, with the intention to apply it to repertoires of mental dispositions that affect directly our personal identity. The unavoidable but loose criterion of human intervention is used, at least to some degree. Attitudes are intentional states with conceptual content, and concepts are dispositions. We acquire concepts during our lives, sometimes unconsciously, sometimes explicitly through definition of some kind, and each cognitive agent has a unique repertoire of concepts and a unique idiolect as well. The idea that our mental representations (at least some of them) are artefacts might sound strange at first sight, but I shall try to show that it makes full sense. Most of our mental dispositions –those provided with a conceptual content– are themselves artefacts. At the end, we are all different psychologically and culturally because our idiolects and repertoires of concepts are different. For a large part, what makes our species so special is an ongoing process through which homo sapiens makes itself what it is.Keywords: Intentionality, disposition, artefact, contextualism, repertoire.","PeriodicalId":41989,"journal":{"name":"Filosofia Unisinos","volume":"22 1","pages":"40-47"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-03-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48619782","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
El presente articulo tiene como objetivo establecer en que sentido resultan justificables desde un punto de vista epistemico las proposiciones englobadas bajo el empleo perceptual de ‘ver-como’, desarrollado por Wittgenstein en la Segunda Parte de Philosophical Investigations. Para ello, en primer lugar, se aclarara el vinculo interno entre ‘experiencia visual’ e ‘interpretacion’ en la clase de casos mencionados. En segundo lugar, se mostrara como el ‘ver-como’ respeta la solucion a la paradoja del seguimiento de reglas, en tanto no presupone ningun intermediario ni necesita alguno para dar cuenta de lo percibido, resaltando las nociones de ‘practica’, ‘familiaridad’ y ‘contexto’ comunes tanto en la mencionada solucion como en los casos de ‘ver-como’. En tercer lugar, se recurrira a la distincion general entre certezas o ‘hinges’ y ‘proposiciones’ de caracter epistemico presentada por Wittgenstein en On Certainty. Dicha distincion servira para ubicar el caso de la percepcion de aspectos presentes en los empleos de ‘ver-como’ como un posible campo de aplicacion de la denominada Epistemologia Hinge, mostrando como, en casos particulares, las certezas perceptuales que modelan nuestra forma de vida y que carecen de fundamento, pueden ser recontextualizadas y ameritar una justificacion razonable.Palabras claves: Wittgenstein, percepcion de aspectos, ver-como, ejes, certezas, justificacion.
{"title":"Ver-como y epistemología hinge","authors":"Maria Sol Yuan","doi":"10.4013/FSU.2021.221.04","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4013/FSU.2021.221.04","url":null,"abstract":"El presente articulo tiene como objetivo establecer en que sentido resultan justificables desde un punto de vista epistemico las proposiciones englobadas bajo el empleo perceptual de ‘ver-como’, desarrollado por Wittgenstein en la Segunda Parte de Philosophical Investigations. Para ello, en primer lugar, se aclarara el vinculo interno entre ‘experiencia visual’ e ‘interpretacion’ en la clase de casos mencionados. En segundo lugar, se mostrara como el ‘ver-como’ respeta la solucion a la paradoja del seguimiento de reglas, en tanto no presupone ningun intermediario ni necesita alguno para dar cuenta de lo percibido, resaltando las nociones de ‘practica’, ‘familiaridad’ y ‘contexto’ comunes tanto en la mencionada solucion como en los casos de ‘ver-como’. En tercer lugar, se recurrira a la distincion general entre certezas o ‘hinges’ y ‘proposiciones’ de caracter epistemico presentada por Wittgenstein en On Certainty. Dicha distincion servira para ubicar el caso de la percepcion de aspectos presentes en los empleos de ‘ver-como’ como un posible campo de aplicacion de la denominada Epistemologia Hinge, mostrando como, en casos particulares, las certezas perceptuales que modelan nuestra forma de vida y que carecen de fundamento, pueden ser recontextualizadas y ameritar una justificacion razonable.Palabras claves: Wittgenstein, percepcion de aspectos, ver-como, ejes, certezas, justificacion.","PeriodicalId":41989,"journal":{"name":"Filosofia Unisinos","volume":"22 1","pages":"29-37"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-03-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42093782","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The relevance of cognitive penetration has been pointed out concerning three fields within philosophy: philosophy of science, philosophy of mind, and epistemology. This paper argues that this phenomenon is also relevant to the philosophy of language. First, I will defend that there are situations where ethical, social, or cultural rules can affect our taste perceptions. This influence can cause speakers to utter conflicting contents that lead them to disagree and, subsequently, to negotiate the circumstances of application of the taste predicates they have used to describe or express their taste perceptions. Then, to account for the proper dynamics of these cases, I will develop a theoretical framework build upon two elements: the Lewisian idea of the score of a conversation (Lewis, 1979), and Richard’s (2008) taxonomy of the different attitudes speakers can have in taste disagreements. In a nutshell, I will argue that speakers can accommodate these conflicting contents as exceptions to the rule that determines the circumstances of application of taste predicates.Keywords: Cognitive penetration, Common ground, Circumstances of application, Accommodation, Exceptions, Score of the conversation, Taste predicates.
{"title":"Cognitive penetration and taste predicates: making an exception to the rule","authors":"David Bordonaba-Plou","doi":"10.4013/FSU.2021.221.02","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4013/FSU.2021.221.02","url":null,"abstract":"The relevance of cognitive penetration has been pointed out concerning three fields within philosophy: philosophy of science, philosophy of mind, and epistemology. This paper argues that this phenomenon is also relevant to the philosophy of language. First, I will defend that there are situations where ethical, social, or cultural rules can affect our taste perceptions. This influence can cause speakers to utter conflicting contents that lead them to disagree and, subsequently, to negotiate the circumstances of application of the taste predicates they have used to describe or express their taste perceptions. Then, to account for the proper dynamics of these cases, I will develop a theoretical framework build upon two elements: the Lewisian idea of the score of a conversation (Lewis, 1979), and Richard’s (2008) taxonomy of the different attitudes speakers can have in taste disagreements. In a nutshell, I will argue that speakers can accommodate these conflicting contents as exceptions to the rule that determines the circumstances of application of taste predicates.Keywords: Cognitive penetration, Common ground, Circumstances of application, Accommodation, Exceptions, Score of the conversation, Taste predicates.","PeriodicalId":41989,"journal":{"name":"Filosofia Unisinos","volume":"22 1","pages":"12-20"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-03-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42056376","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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