Pub Date : 2021-01-28DOI: 10.31577/ORGF.2021.28111
E. Corazza, Chris Genovesi
In their 2018 paper “On the Metaphoric Use of (Fictional) Proper Names”, Corazza & Genovesi explored what speakers do when they utter a fictional name in a metaphorical way to refer to actual individuals. The example given was “Odysseus returned home” referring to their friend Bill, who had returned after a long and hectic journey. With such an example in mind, Corazza & Genovesi claimed that speakers produce a metaphorical utterance where properties of Odysseus are mapped onto the referent that the speaker intends so that they refer to that person. That is to say, the name “Odysseus” somewhat ceases to be a proper name, and instead becomes something akin to a Donnellan’s referential use of descriptions, i.e. a description that successfully picks out an object of discourse even if the latter does not satisfy the descriptive content conveyed by the description. In our example Bill does not satisfy the property of being called “Odysseus”. In this paper, we connect the previous work by Corazza & Genovesi’s with anaphora, in particular with the use of anaphoric definite descriptions linked to a metaphorical use of a proper name. With fictional proper names in mind, we are interested 254 Eros Corazza – Christopher Genovesi Organon F 28 (1) 2021: 253–268 in cases where speakers anaphorically refer to the actual referent. For example, we are interested in utterances of the sort “Odysseus returned home, he1 is hungry” or “Odysseus1 returned home, the/that brave soldier1 is hungry”, where “Odysseus” is metaphorically used to refer to the actual person, Bill, the individual the speaker has in mind. Such sentences leave us wondering how the anaphoric pronoun or description simultaneously carries the content from the fictional subject, and refers to Bill. On a cursory analysis, anaphora forces the properties attributed to the actual referent (e.g., Bill) into the background, like pragmatic presupposition. In the cases of anaphoric complex demonstratives and definite descriptions, the speaker emphasizes, or makes salient the further implications shared between the fictional character (e.g., Odysseus) and the actual referent (e.g., Bill; and that Bill, like Odysseus, had a harrowing journey).
Corazza和Genovesi在2018年的论文《论（虚构的）专有名词的隐喻性使用》中探讨了当说话者以隐喻的方式说出虚构的名字来指代实际的个人时，他们会做什么。举个例子是“奥德修斯回家了”，指的是他们的朋友比尔，他在经历了漫长而忙碌的旅程后回来了。考虑到这样一个例子，Corazza和Genovesi声称，说话者产生了一种隐喻性话语，奥德修斯的属性被映射到说话者想要的指称对象上，从而指称那个人。也就是说，“奥德修斯”这个名字在某种程度上不再是一个恰当的名字，而是变成了类似于唐纳兰对描述的指称性使用，即一种成功地挑选出话语对象的描述，即使后者不满足描述所传达的描述性内容。在我们的例子中，比尔不满足被称为“奥德修斯”的性质。在本文中，我们将Corazza和Genovesi的先前工作与回指联系起来，特别是与专有名称的隐喻使用相关的回指明确描述的使用。考虑到虚构的专有名称，我们感兴趣的是254 Eros Corazza–Christopher Genovesi Organon F 28（1）2021:253–268在说话者回指实际指称的情况下。例如，我们对“奥德修斯回家了，他饿了”或“奥德修斯回来了，勇敢的士兵饿了”之类的话语感兴趣，其中“奥德修斯”被比喻为实际的人，比尔，说话者心目中的那个人。这样的句子让我们想知道回指代词或描述是如何同时携带虚构主题的内容，并指代比尔的。粗略地分析，回指将实际被指对象（如Bill）的属性强行置于背景中，就像语用预设一样。在回指复杂指示词和明确描述的情况下，说话者强调或突出虚构人物（例如奥德修斯）和实际指代物（例如比尔；比尔和奥德修斯一样，经历了一段痛苦的旅程）之间的进一步含义。
{"title":"On Anaphors Linked to Names Used Metaphorically","authors":"E. Corazza, Chris Genovesi","doi":"10.31577/ORGF.2021.28111","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.31577/ORGF.2021.28111","url":null,"abstract":"In their 2018 paper “On the Metaphoric Use of (Fictional) Proper Names”, Corazza & Genovesi explored what speakers do when they utter a fictional name in a metaphorical way to refer to actual individuals. The example given was “Odysseus returned home” referring to their friend Bill, who had returned after a long and hectic journey. With such an example in mind, Corazza & Genovesi claimed that speakers produce a metaphorical utterance where properties of Odysseus are mapped onto the referent that the speaker intends so that they refer to that person. That is to say, the name “Odysseus” somewhat ceases to be a proper name, and instead becomes something akin to a Donnellan’s referential use of descriptions, i.e. a description that successfully picks out an object of discourse even if the latter does not satisfy the descriptive content conveyed by the description. In our example Bill does not satisfy the property of being called “Odysseus”. In this paper, we connect the previous work by Corazza & Genovesi’s with anaphora, in particular with the use of anaphoric definite descriptions linked to a metaphorical use of a proper name. With fictional proper names in mind, we are interested 254 Eros Corazza – Christopher Genovesi Organon F 28 (1) 2021: 253–268 in cases where speakers anaphorically refer to the actual referent. For example, we are interested in utterances of the sort “Odysseus returned home, he1 is hungry” or “Odysseus1 returned home, the/that brave soldier1 is hungry”, where “Odysseus” is metaphorically used to refer to the actual person, Bill, the individual the speaker has in mind. Such sentences leave us wondering how the anaphoric pronoun or description simultaneously carries the content from the fictional subject, and refers to Bill. On a cursory analysis, anaphora forces the properties attributed to the actual referent (e.g., Bill) into the background, like pragmatic presupposition. In the cases of anaphoric complex demonstratives and definite descriptions, the speaker emphasizes, or makes salient the further implications shared between the fictional character (e.g., Odysseus) and the actual referent (e.g., Bill; and that Bill, like Odysseus, had a harrowing journey).","PeriodicalId":43025,"journal":{"name":"Organon F","volume":"28 1","pages":"253-268"},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2021-01-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41657582","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-01-28DOI: 10.31577/ORGF.2021.28102
Fiora Salis
According to Millianism, the meaning of a name is exhausted by its referent. According to anti-realism about fictional entities, there are no such entities. If there are no fictional entities, how can we explain the apparent meaningfulness of fictional names? Our best theory of fiction, Walton’s theory of make-believe, makes the same assumptions but lacks the theoretical resources to answer the question. In this paper, I propose a pragmatic solution in terms of two main dimensions of meaning, a subjective, psychological dimension and an intersubjective, public dimension. The psychological dimension builds on the notion of mental files; the public dimension builds on Stalnaker’s notion of common ground. The account is coherent with two main theoretical principles, parsimony and uniformity. Furthermore, it satisfies three explanatory conditions posed by the intentionality of our thought and discourse about fiction, object-directedness, counterfictional imagining and intersubjective identification.
{"title":"The Meanings of Fictional Names","authors":"Fiora Salis","doi":"10.31577/ORGF.2021.28102","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.31577/ORGF.2021.28102","url":null,"abstract":"According to Millianism, the meaning of a name is exhausted by its referent. According to anti-realism about fictional entities, there are no such entities. If there are no fictional entities, how can we explain the apparent meaningfulness of fictional names? Our best theory of fiction, Walton’s theory of make-believe, makes the same assumptions but lacks the theoretical resources to answer the question. In this paper, I propose a pragmatic solution in terms of two main dimensions of meaning, a subjective, psychological dimension and an intersubjective, public dimension. The psychological dimension builds on the notion of mental files; the public dimension builds on Stalnaker’s notion of common ground. The account is coherent with two main theoretical principles, parsimony and uniformity. Furthermore, it satisfies three explanatory conditions posed by the intentionality of our thought and discourse about fiction, object-directedness, counterfictional imagining and intersubjective identification.","PeriodicalId":43025,"journal":{"name":"Organon F","volume":"28 1","pages":"9-43"},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2021-01-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46062930","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-11-01DOI: 10.31577/orgf.2020.27407
Siavash Asadi
Frege argues that considering Socrates as an object in the proposition “Socrates exists” raises two problems. First, this proposition would be uninformative. Second, its negation entails a contradiction. Attempting to solve these problems, Frege claims that Socrates is representing the concept of a man whose name is Socrates. Therefore, existence is a second-order concept. This paper surveys the main modern theories about the types of existence, in order to find another response to Frege’s problems. For, if Socrates’ existence differs from the type that “exists” implies, “Socrates exists” is informative and its negation is not a contradiction. At last, this paper argues for an idea, in which “existence” is not a concept or property. Existence is the principle of the objects. So, “Socrates exists” is in fact “the existence is Socrates,” and “Socrates does not exist” is “there is no existence that be Socrates.” This idea could be an alternative for responding to Frege’s problems.
{"title":"Subject and Predicate in Existential Propositions: A Survey of Frege’s Problem and Its Solutions","authors":"Siavash Asadi","doi":"10.31577/orgf.2020.27407","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.31577/orgf.2020.27407","url":null,"abstract":"Frege argues that considering Socrates as an object in the proposition “Socrates exists” raises two problems. First, this proposition would be uninformative. Second, its negation entails a contradiction. Attempting to solve these problems, Frege claims that Socrates is representing the concept of a man whose name is Socrates. Therefore, existence is a second-order concept. This paper surveys the main modern theories about the types of existence, in order to find another response to Frege’s problems. For, if Socrates’ existence differs from the type that “exists” implies, “Socrates exists” is informative and its negation is not a contradiction. At last, this paper argues for an idea, in which “existence” is not a concept or property. Existence is the principle of the objects. So, “Socrates exists” is in fact “the existence is Socrates,” and “Socrates does not exist” is “there is no existence that be Socrates.” This idea could be an alternative for responding to Frege’s problems.","PeriodicalId":43025,"journal":{"name":"Organon F","volume":"27 1","pages":"522-538"},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2020-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42455989","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-11-01DOI: 10.31577/orgf.2020.27401
Nader A. Alsamaani
Time sensitivity seems to affect our intuitive evaluation of the reasonable risk of fallibility in testimonies. All things being equal, we tend to be less demanding in accepting time sensitive testimonies as opposed to time insensitive testimonies. This paper considers this intuitive response to testimonies as a strategy of acceptance. It argues that the intuitive strategy, which takes time sensitivity into account, is epistemically superior to two adjacent strategies that do not: the undemanding strategy adopted by non-reductionists and the cautious strategy adopted by reductionists. The paper demonstrates that in adopting the intuitive strategy of acceptance, one is likely to form more true beliefs and fewer false beliefs. Also, in following the intuitive strategy, the listener will be fulfilling his epistemic duties more efficiently.
{"title":"Time Sensitivity and Acceptance of Testimony","authors":"Nader A. Alsamaani","doi":"10.31577/orgf.2020.27401","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.31577/orgf.2020.27401","url":null,"abstract":"Time sensitivity seems to affect our intuitive evaluation of the reasonable risk of fallibility in testimonies. All things being equal, we tend to be less demanding in accepting time sensitive testimonies as opposed to time insensitive testimonies. This paper considers this intuitive response to testimonies as a strategy of acceptance. It argues that the intuitive strategy, which takes time sensitivity into account, is epistemically superior to two adjacent strategies that do not: the undemanding strategy adopted by non-reductionists and the cautious strategy adopted by reductionists. The paper demonstrates that in adopting the intuitive strategy of acceptance, one is likely to form more true beliefs and fewer false beliefs. Also, in following the intuitive strategy, the listener will be fulfilling his epistemic duties more efficiently.","PeriodicalId":43025,"journal":{"name":"Organon F","volume":"27 1","pages":"422-436"},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2020-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44357415","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-11-01DOI: 10.31577/orgf.2020.27402
C. Sankey
: The aim of this paper is to document Laudan’s rejection of the appeal to intuition in the context of his development of normative naturalism. At one point in the development of his methodological thinking, Laudan appealed to pre-analytic intuitions, which might be employed to identify episodes in the history of science against which theories of scientific methodology are to be tested. However, Laudan came to reject this appeal to intuitions, and rejected this entire approach to the evaluation of a theory of method. This is an important stage in the development of his normative naturalist meta-methodol-ogy.
{"title":"Laudan, Intuition and Normative Naturalism","authors":"C. Sankey","doi":"10.31577/orgf.2020.27402","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.31577/orgf.2020.27402","url":null,"abstract":": The aim of this paper is to document Laudan’s rejection of the appeal to intuition in the context of his development of normative naturalism. At one point in the development of his methodological thinking, Laudan appealed to pre-analytic intuitions, which might be employed to identify episodes in the history of science against which theories of scientific methodology are to be tested. However, Laudan came to reject this appeal to intuitions, and rejected this entire approach to the evaluation of a theory of method. This is an important stage in the development of his normative naturalist meta-methodol-ogy.","PeriodicalId":43025,"journal":{"name":"Organon F","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2020-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45928141","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-11-01DOI: 10.31577/orgf.2020.27403
Jorge Luis Méndez-martínez
In the realm of the philosophy of sounds and auditory experience there is an ongoing discussion concerned with the nature of sounds. One of the contestant views within this ontology of sound is that of the Property View, which holds that sounds are properties of the sounding objects. A way of developing this view is through the idea of dispositionalism, namely, by sustaining the theory according to which sounds are dispositional properties (Pasnau 1999; Kulvicki 2008; Roberts 2017). That portrayal, however, is not sufficient, as it has not inquired the metaphysical debates about dispositions beyond the conditional analysis. In this paper, I try to advance this view by including recent developments (for instance Bird 2007; Vetter 2015) in the field of dispositionalism and I analyse whether this new version can sort out known and new objections to Property View.
{"title":"If Sounds Were Dispositions: A Framework Proposal for an Undeveloped Theory","authors":"Jorge Luis Méndez-martínez","doi":"10.31577/orgf.2020.27403","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.31577/orgf.2020.27403","url":null,"abstract":"In the realm of the philosophy of sounds and auditory experience there is an ongoing discussion concerned with the nature of sounds. One of the contestant views within this ontology of sound is that of the Property View, which holds that sounds are properties of the sounding objects. A way of developing this view is through the idea of dispositionalism, namely, by sustaining the theory according to which sounds are dispositional properties (Pasnau 1999; Kulvicki 2008; Roberts 2017). That portrayal, however, is not sufficient, as it has not inquired the metaphysical debates about dispositions beyond the conditional analysis. In this paper, I try to advance this view by including recent developments (for instance Bird 2007; Vetter 2015) in the field of dispositionalism and I analyse whether this new version can sort out known and new objections to Property View.","PeriodicalId":43025,"journal":{"name":"Organon F","volume":"27 1","pages":"446-479"},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2020-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46138478","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-11-01DOI: 10.31577/orgf.2020.27404
Jan Wiślicki
The paper discusses Tarski’s approach to quotation. It starts from showing that it is vulnerable to semantic inconsistencies connected with what is known as Reach’s puzzle, formulated in 1938 by a Czech logician Karel Reach. This fact gives rise to serious problems concerning the relation between the metalanguage and an object language. Moreover, the paper touches upon a historic aspect, pointing out that the problem at hand is discussed in the only paper signed up as Al. Tajtelbaum, i.e. Alfred Tarski’s original name. It argues that the puzzle reveals the importance of reopening the discussion on the understanding and limitations of deriving the metalanguage from an object language.
{"title":"Could Tajtelbaum Question What Tarski Could Not?","authors":"Jan Wiślicki","doi":"10.31577/orgf.2020.27404","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.31577/orgf.2020.27404","url":null,"abstract":"The paper discusses Tarski’s approach to quotation. It starts from showing that it is vulnerable to semantic inconsistencies connected with what is known as Reach’s puzzle, formulated in 1938 by a Czech logician Karel Reach. This fact gives rise to serious problems concerning the relation between the metalanguage and an object language. Moreover, the paper touches upon a historic aspect, pointing out that the problem at hand is discussed in the only paper signed up as Al. Tajtelbaum, i.e. Alfred Tarski’s original name. It argues that the puzzle reveals the importance of reopening the discussion on the understanding and limitations of deriving the metalanguage from an object language.","PeriodicalId":43025,"journal":{"name":"Organon F","volume":"27 1","pages":"480-493"},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2020-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45851545","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-11-01DOI: 10.31577/orgf.2020.27408
A. Mărășoiu
I consider and reject a specific criticism advanced by Korsgaard against virtue ethics and epistemology when these are conceived with the help of what she calls the image of the “Good Dog.” I consider what virtue ethics and epistemology would look like if the Good Dog picture of virtues were largely correct. I argue that attention to the features that make Korsgaard undermine the usefulness of virtues when conceived along the lines of the Good Dog picture reveals the opposite of what she claims. On the Good Dog picture, virtue ethics and epistemology are seen as more promising approaches to rationality than Korsgaard’s own advocacy of reflection.
{"title":"Defending the Good Dog Picture of Virtues","authors":"A. Mărășoiu","doi":"10.31577/orgf.2020.27408","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.31577/orgf.2020.27408","url":null,"abstract":"I consider and reject a specific criticism advanced by Korsgaard against virtue ethics and epistemology when these are conceived with the help of what she calls the image of the “Good Dog.” I consider what virtue ethics and epistemology would look like if the Good Dog picture of virtues were largely correct. I argue that attention to the features that make Korsgaard undermine the usefulness of virtues when conceived along the lines of the Good Dog picture reveals the opposite of what she claims. On the Good Dog picture, virtue ethics and epistemology are seen as more promising approaches to rationality than Korsgaard’s own advocacy of reflection.","PeriodicalId":43025,"journal":{"name":"Organon F","volume":"27 1","pages":"539-555"},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2020-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47519713","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-11-01DOI: 10.31577/orgf.2020.27409
M. Kölbel
This paper develops an account of judge-dependence, conceived of as a generalization of the better known notion of responsedependence. It then solves a number of problems for the view that aesthetic judgements are judge-dependent in this sense. Finally, a parallel case for the judge-dependence of moral judgement is assessed.
{"title":"The Judge-Dependence of Aesthetic and Moral Judgement","authors":"M. Kölbel","doi":"10.31577/orgf.2020.27409","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.31577/orgf.2020.27409","url":null,"abstract":"This paper develops an account of judge-dependence, conceived of as a generalization of the better known notion of responsedependence. It then solves a number of problems for the view that aesthetic judgements are judge-dependent in this sense. Finally, a parallel case for the judge-dependence of moral judgement is assessed.","PeriodicalId":43025,"journal":{"name":"Organon F","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2020-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42197552","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-11-01DOI: 10.31577/orgf.2020.27406
Soo Lam Wong
The puzzle of material constitution can be expressed in at least two ways. First, how can the constituting object and the constituted object, which are materially and spatially coincident, be regarded as different objects? Second, how can the constituting object and the constituted object, which are qualitatively distinct, be regarded as identical objects? Monists argue that the constituting and constituted objects are identical since they are materially and spatially coincident and the property differences between then are simply differences in description, perspective or context. In contrast, pluralists argue that the constituting and constituted objects are not identical even if they are materially and spatially coincident since they are qualitatively distinct. This paper proposes a solution to the puzzle of material constitution called ‘Fregean Monism’ (FM), and shows that it can better account for the property differences between the constituting and constituted objects without the need to regard them as two distinct objects. On the FM view, the puzzle of material constitution is partly a semantic puzzle and partly a metaphysical puzzle, and shows how a solution to the semantic part of the puzzle, based on the Fregean distinction between sense and reference, can yield a satisfactory solution to the metaphysical part of the puzzle. The key idea is that while the reference of a term picks out both the Fregean Monism: A Solution to the Puzzle of Material Constitution 505 Organon F 27 (4) 2020: 504–521 referent object and referent properties, the sense of the term determine which referent properties are picked out.
物质构成之谜至少可以用两种方式来表达。首先，构成物体和构成物体在物质和空间上重合，如何被视为不同的物体？第二，构成客体和构成客体在性质上是不同的，如何被视为相同的客体？一元论者认为，构成物和构成物是相同的，因为它们在物质和空间上是一致的，而两者之间的性质差异只是描述、视角或上下文的差异。相反，多元主义者认为，构成和构成的物体是不相同的，即使它们在物质和空间上是一致的，因为它们在质量上是不同的。本文提出了一种解决物质构成之谜的方法，称为“Fregean一元论”（FM），并表明它可以更好地解释构成物和构成物之间的性质差异，而不需要将它们视为两个不同的物体。在FM的观点中，物质构成之谜一部分是语义之谜，一部分是形而上学之谜，并展示了如何基于意义和指称之间的Fregean区别来解决谜题的语义部分，从而对谜题的形而上学部分产生令人满意的解决方案。关键思想是，虽然一个术语的引用既能挑出Fregean一元论：物质构成之谜的解决方案505 Organon F 27（4）2020:504–521指称对象和指称属性，但术语的意义决定了哪些指称属性被挑出。
{"title":"Fregean Monism: A Solution to the Puzzle of Material Constitutiom","authors":"Soo Lam Wong","doi":"10.31577/orgf.2020.27406","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.31577/orgf.2020.27406","url":null,"abstract":"The puzzle of material constitution can be expressed in at least two ways. First, how can the constituting object and the constituted object, which are materially and spatially coincident, be regarded as different objects? Second, how can the constituting object and the constituted object, which are qualitatively distinct, be regarded as identical objects? Monists argue that the constituting and constituted objects are identical since they are materially and spatially coincident and the property differences between then are simply differences in description, perspective or context. In contrast, pluralists argue that the constituting and constituted objects are not identical even if they are materially and spatially coincident since they are qualitatively distinct. This paper proposes a solution to the puzzle of material constitution called ‘Fregean Monism’ (FM), and shows that it can better account for the property differences between the constituting and constituted objects without the need to regard them as two distinct objects. On the FM view, the puzzle of material constitution is partly a semantic puzzle and partly a metaphysical puzzle, and shows how a solution to the semantic part of the puzzle, based on the Fregean distinction between sense and reference, can yield a satisfactory solution to the metaphysical part of the puzzle. The key idea is that while the reference of a term picks out both the Fregean Monism: A Solution to the Puzzle of Material Constitution 505 Organon F 27 (4) 2020: 504–521 referent object and referent properties, the sense of the term determine which referent properties are picked out.","PeriodicalId":43025,"journal":{"name":"Organon F","volume":"27 1","pages":"504-521"},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2020-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46732992","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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