Pub Date : 2016-10-31DOI: 10.22201/IIFS.18704905E.2016.218
Sebastián Briceño
It is commonly held that Bradley’s regress has a solution within a tropeontology. This seems to happen when a bundle is understood as constituted by non-transferable tropes. It also seems to happen when a bundle is understood as constituted by transferable tropes related by a relational trope of compresence whose existence specifically depends on those relata. In this article I demonstrate that these proposals fail in addressing the essential question that underlies the regress, incurring in a question-begging response already anticipated by Bradley.
{"title":"El regreso de Bradley y el problema de la unidad-compleja: ¿tropos al rescate?","authors":"Sebastián Briceño","doi":"10.22201/IIFS.18704905E.2016.218","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.22201/IIFS.18704905E.2016.218","url":null,"abstract":"It is commonly held that Bradley’s regress has a solution within a tropeontology. This seems to happen when a bundle is understood as constituted by non-transferable tropes. It also seems to happen when a bundle is understood as constituted by transferable tropes related by a relational trope of compresence whose existence specifically depends on those relata. In this article I demonstrate that these proposals fail in addressing the essential question that underlies the regress, incurring in a question-begging response already anticipated by Bradley.","PeriodicalId":43820,"journal":{"name":"CRITICA-REVISTA HISPANOAMERICANA DE FILOSOFIA","volume":"85 1","pages":"47-75"},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2016-10-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"82497022","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2016-10-31DOI: 10.22201/IIFS.18704905E.2016.216
M. Otero
Kripke formulates four objections to a simple dispositional solution to the Wittgenstenian rule-following puzzle. I present here two partially dispositional proposals, which are different from the simple view discussed by Kripke, and argue that they are not affected by his four objections to it. One of the two proposals may be attributed, although precautiously, to Wittgenstein himself. The other one, which I prefer, invokes a teleological notion of disposition. The two proposals rely on the concept of simplicity, or —alternatively— the concept of natural similarity. Some Kripkean criticisms of the use of such concepts to solve the rule-following problem are rejected.
{"title":"Respuestas disposicionalistas al problema wittgensteiniano-kripkeano sobre el significado y el seguimiento de reglas","authors":"M. Otero","doi":"10.22201/IIFS.18704905E.2016.216","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.22201/IIFS.18704905E.2016.216","url":null,"abstract":"Kripke formulates four objections to a simple dispositional solution to the Wittgenstenian rule-following puzzle. I present here two partially dispositional proposals, which are different from the simple view discussed by Kripke, and argue that they are not affected by his four objections to it. One of the two proposals may be attributed, although precautiously, to Wittgenstein himself. The other one, which I prefer, invokes a teleological notion of disposition. The two proposals rely on the concept of simplicity, or —alternatively— the concept of natural similarity. Some Kripkean criticisms of the use of such concepts to solve the rule-following problem are rejected.","PeriodicalId":43820,"journal":{"name":"CRITICA-REVISTA HISPANOAMERICANA DE FILOSOFIA","volume":"14 1","pages":"21-45"},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2016-10-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"78843309","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2016-10-31DOI: 10.22201/IIFS.18704905E.2016.227
Asbjørn Steglich‐Petersen
In a recent article in this journal, Esteban Cespedes (2015) seeks to defend the contrastive account of singular causation from my criticisms (Steglich-Petersen 2012). Cespedes objects to my argument on three counts: (1) it is circular in presupposing a principle that it seeks to establish; (2) that same principle is false; and (3) even if the principle were true, it would not speak against the contrastive account. In this note I argue that all three objections are unconvincing.
{"title":"A Reply to \"Céspedes\" Defense of Causal Contrastivism","authors":"Asbjørn Steglich‐Petersen","doi":"10.22201/IIFS.18704905E.2016.227","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.22201/IIFS.18704905E.2016.227","url":null,"abstract":"In a recent article in this journal, Esteban Cespedes (2015) seeks to defend the contrastive account of singular causation from my criticisms (Steglich-Petersen 2012). Cespedes objects to my argument on three counts: (1) it is circular in presupposing a principle that it seeks to establish; (2) that same principle is false; and (3) even if the principle were true, it would not speak against the contrastive account. In this note I argue that all three objections are unconvincing.","PeriodicalId":43820,"journal":{"name":"CRITICA-REVISTA HISPANOAMERICANA DE FILOSOFIA","volume":"28 1","pages":"93-98"},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2016-10-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"84419291","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2015-12-07DOI: 10.22201/IIFS.18704905E.2015.525
A. Heras, David Teira
Exploramos aqui la conexion entre los conceptos de riesgo e igualdad en el argumento del observador imparcial. La concepcion de la justicia que elegiria un observador imparcial se justifica por la pureza del procedimiento de eleccion. Sin embargo, si modelizamos esta decision utilizando medidas del riesgo habituales en matematica financiera, veremos como el criterio de eleccion del observador bajo el velo de la ignorancia contiene una preferencia implicita por el grado de desigualdad resultante. Esto nos obliga a reconsiderar la pureza procedimental de la eleccion.
{"title":"CÓMO MIDE EL RIESGO EL OBSERVADOR IMPARCIAL","authors":"A. Heras, David Teira","doi":"10.22201/IIFS.18704905E.2015.525","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.22201/IIFS.18704905E.2015.525","url":null,"abstract":"Exploramos aqui la conexion entre los conceptos de riesgo e igualdad en el argumento del observador imparcial. La concepcion de la justicia que elegiria un observador imparcial se justifica por la pureza del procedimiento de eleccion. Sin embargo, si modelizamos esta decision utilizando medidas del riesgo habituales en matematica financiera, veremos como el criterio de eleccion del observador bajo el velo de la ignorancia contiene una preferencia implicita por el grado de desigualdad resultante. Esto nos obliga a reconsiderar la pureza procedimental de la eleccion.","PeriodicalId":43820,"journal":{"name":"CRITICA-REVISTA HISPANOAMERICANA DE FILOSOFIA","volume":"115 1","pages":"47-65"},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2015-12-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"79341549","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2015-12-07DOI: 10.22201/IIFS.18704905E.2015.531
Felipe Curcó Cobos
The purpose of this paper is to discuss a thesis of Epistemic Abstinence that was developed by an important group of political theorists starting in the 1980s. The thesis is of central importance to political liberalism. It is meant to secure a consensus on procedural rules and public principles of justice by insisting that the many interests and fundamental conceptions that coexist in society abstain from making claims about the truth their own moral precepts within the public sphere. I argue that this strategy breaks down because the thesis of Epistemic Abstinence cannot be applied to itself.
{"title":"La abstinencia epistémica: un análisis crítico en torno al problema de la verdad en el liberalismo político","authors":"Felipe Curcó Cobos","doi":"10.22201/IIFS.18704905E.2015.531","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.22201/IIFS.18704905E.2015.531","url":null,"abstract":"The purpose of this paper is to discuss a thesis of Epistemic Abstinence that was developed by an important group of political theorists starting in the 1980s. The thesis is of central importance to political liberalism. It is meant to secure a consensus on procedural rules and public principles of justice by insisting that the many interests and fundamental conceptions that coexist in society abstain from making claims about the truth their own moral precepts within the public sphere. I argue that this strategy breaks down because the thesis of Epistemic Abstinence cannot be applied to itself.","PeriodicalId":43820,"journal":{"name":"CRITICA-REVISTA HISPANOAMERICANA DE FILOSOFIA","volume":"7 1","pages":"67-92"},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2015-12-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"83268655","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2015-12-07DOI: 10.22201/IIFS.18704905E.2015.521
E. Ramírez, Ivan Mayerhofer
Este articulo trata el problema de los objetos creados que pueden ser repetidos, como las obras musicales y las literarias. En la seccion 2 presentamos una serie de desiderata intuitivos que toda teoria debe satisfacer. En las secciones 3 y 4 presentamos un silogismo disyuntivo extendido. Los objetos en cuestion pueden ser o bien universales concretos, particulares concretos, universales abstractos o particulares abstractos. Mostramos como es que las teorias que consideran que son cualquiera de las tres ultimas opciones fracasan. Por lo tanto, debemos entender a dichos objetos como universales concretos. En la seccion 5 ofrecemos una teoria breve pero detallada de la naturaleza metafisica de los universales concretos para despues mostrar como esta propuesta permite dar cuenta de los desiderata intuitivos a la vez que se evitan las objeciones presentadas en contra de teorias alternativas
{"title":"A plea for concrete universals","authors":"E. Ramírez, Ivan Mayerhofer","doi":"10.22201/IIFS.18704905E.2015.521","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.22201/IIFS.18704905E.2015.521","url":null,"abstract":"Este articulo trata el problema de los objetos creados que pueden ser repetidos, como las obras musicales y las literarias. En la seccion 2 presentamos una serie de desiderata intuitivos que toda teoria debe satisfacer. En las secciones 3 y 4 presentamos un silogismo disyuntivo extendido. Los objetos en cuestion pueden ser o bien universales concretos, particulares concretos, universales abstractos o particulares abstractos. Mostramos como es que las teorias que consideran que son cualquiera de las tres ultimas opciones fracasan. Por lo tanto, debemos entender a dichos objetos como universales concretos. En la seccion 5 ofrecemos una teoria breve pero detallada de la naturaleza metafisica de los universales concretos para despues mostrar como esta propuesta permite dar cuenta de los desiderata intuitivos a la vez que se evitan las objeciones presentadas en contra de teorias alternativas","PeriodicalId":43820,"journal":{"name":"CRITICA-REVISTA HISPANOAMERICANA DE FILOSOFIA","volume":"85 1","pages":"3-46"},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2015-12-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"83505884","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2015-12-07DOI: 10.22201/IIFS.18704905E.2015.496
Juan Esteban Hernández Betancur
El debate reciente iniciado por Hubert Dreyfus y John McDowell ha llamado la atencion sobre la relacion entre racionalidad y accion no reflexiva. En este articulo propongo una forma de especificar el desacuerdo entre quienes llamare intelectualistas y antiintelectualistas. A la luz de esta propuesta arguyo que el principal argumento antiintelectualista solo tiene exito si se acepta al menos uno de tres presupuestos implicitos que estan lejos de ser autoevidentes y cuya verdad es puesta en duda por fenomenos familiares. Termino con consideraciones que sugieren que el intelectualista ha quedado en una mejor posicion argumentativa
{"title":"Racionalidad y acción no reflexiva. El debate Dreyfus-McDowell","authors":"Juan Esteban Hernández Betancur","doi":"10.22201/IIFS.18704905E.2015.496","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.22201/IIFS.18704905E.2015.496","url":null,"abstract":"El debate reciente iniciado por Hubert Dreyfus y John McDowell ha llamado la atencion sobre la relacion entre racionalidad y accion no reflexiva. En este articulo propongo una forma de especificar el desacuerdo entre quienes llamare intelectualistas y antiintelectualistas. A la luz de esta propuesta arguyo que el principal argumento antiintelectualista solo tiene exito si se acepta al menos uno de tres presupuestos implicitos que estan lejos de ser autoevidentes y cuya verdad es puesta en duda por fenomenos familiares. Termino con consideraciones que sugieren que el intelectualista ha quedado en una mejor posicion argumentativa","PeriodicalId":43820,"journal":{"name":"CRITICA-REVISTA HISPANOAMERICANA DE FILOSOFIA","volume":"4 1","pages":"43-63"},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2015-12-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"91010163","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2015-12-07DOI: 10.22201/IIFS.18704905E.2015.500
María Inés Silenzi, R. Moro
espanolSe ha propuesto (y criticado) el uso de heuristicas como una herramienta para solucionar el problema de marco. Los objetivos de este trabajo son proveer una clarificacion de la literatura filosofica sobre el tema e intentar resolver los debates pendientes considerando la evidencia empirica disponible. Luego de distinguir varios aspectos del problema de marco, analizaremos las disputas filosoficas sobre el tema. A continuacion comentaremos la literatura sobre la evidencia empirica relevante proveniente de la psicologia cognitiva. Argumentaremos que las heuristicas pueden ser utiles para solucionar solo un aspecto del problema de marco, aun con varias restricciones. EnglishThe use of heuristics has been proposed (and criticized) as a tool to solve the frame problem. The goals of this paper are to provide a clarification of the philosophical literature and to attempt to solve the remaining debates by considering the available empirical evidence. After distinguishing various aspects of the frame problem, we analyze the philosophical disputes around the issue. We, then, discuss the relevant empirical evidence from cognitive psychology. We argue that the heuristics can be useful to solve only one aspect of the frame problem and this solution will be limited by several restrictions.
西班牙人提出(并批评)使用启发式作为解决框架问题的工具。本文的目的是澄清关于这一主题的哲学文献，并考虑到现有的经验证据，试图解决悬而未决的争论。在区分了马可问题的几个方面之后，我们将分析关于这个问题的哲学争论。在这篇文章中，我们将讨论来自认知心理学的相关经验证据。我们认为，启发式可能只有助于解决框架问题的一个方面，即使有几个限制。EnglishThe use of一直提议(heuristics and criticized) as a tool to frame废物问题。The目标of this paper are to提供澄清of The philosophical文学and to特意to知情同意对报告的讨论虽然ngok可经验证据。在区分了框架问题的各个方面之后，我们分析了围绕这个问题的哲学争论。= =地理= =根据美国人口普查，这个县的面积为。我们争辩that the heuristics can be有用to知情only one监测器of the frame problem and this solution will be limited by若干限制。
{"title":"Sobre el uso de heurísticas como posible solución del problema de marco","authors":"María Inés Silenzi, R. Moro","doi":"10.22201/IIFS.18704905E.2015.500","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.22201/IIFS.18704905E.2015.500","url":null,"abstract":"espanolSe ha propuesto (y criticado) el uso de heuristicas como una herramienta para solucionar el problema de marco. Los objetivos de este trabajo son proveer una clarificacion de la literatura filosofica sobre el tema e intentar resolver los debates pendientes considerando la evidencia empirica disponible. Luego de distinguir varios aspectos del problema de marco, analizaremos las disputas filosoficas sobre el tema. A continuacion comentaremos la literatura sobre la evidencia empirica relevante proveniente de la psicologia cognitiva. Argumentaremos que las heuristicas pueden ser utiles para solucionar solo un aspecto del problema de marco, aun con varias restricciones. EnglishThe use of heuristics has been proposed (and criticized) as a tool to solve the frame problem. The goals of this paper are to provide a clarification of the philosophical literature and to attempt to solve the remaining debates by considering the available empirical evidence. After distinguishing various aspects of the frame problem, we analyze the philosophical disputes around the issue. We, then, discuss the relevant empirical evidence from cognitive psychology. We argue that the heuristics can be useful to solve only one aspect of the frame problem and this solution will be limited by several restrictions.","PeriodicalId":43820,"journal":{"name":"CRITICA-REVISTA HISPANOAMERICANA DE FILOSOFIA","volume":"92 1","pages":"65-91"},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2015-12-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"85671779","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2015-12-07DOI: 10.22201/iifs.18704905e.2015.519
Diego Parente, Andrés Crelier
{"title":"Beth Preston, \"A Philosophy of Material Culture. Action, Function, and Mind\", (Routledge Studies in contemporary philosophy, v. 48), New York, Routledge, 2013, 264 pp.","authors":"Diego Parente, Andrés Crelier","doi":"10.22201/iifs.18704905e.2015.519","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.22201/iifs.18704905e.2015.519","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":43820,"journal":{"name":"CRITICA-REVISTA HISPANOAMERICANA DE FILOSOFIA","volume":"13 1","pages":"105-111"},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2015-12-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"82585100","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2015-12-07DOI: 10.22201/IIFS.18704905E.2015.503
E. Céspedes
An argument proposed by Steglich-Petersen (2012) establishes that while contrastive causation can be applied to general causation and causal explanation, it is a mistake to consider it in cases of singular causation. I attempt to show that there is no mistake. Steglich-Petersen’s argument does not seem to be strong enough and is actually circular. Furthermore, I briefly argue that even if we take his argument to be valid, there is still a response from the side of contrastive causation.
{"title":"A defense of the contrastive theory of causation","authors":"E. Céspedes","doi":"10.22201/IIFS.18704905E.2015.503","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.22201/IIFS.18704905E.2015.503","url":null,"abstract":"An argument proposed by Steglich-Petersen (2012) establishes that while contrastive causation can be applied to general causation and causal explanation, it is a mistake to consider it in cases of singular causation. I attempt to show that there is no mistake. Steglich-Petersen’s argument does not seem to be strong enough and is actually circular. Furthermore, I briefly argue that even if we take his argument to be valid, there is still a response from the side of contrastive causation.","PeriodicalId":43820,"journal":{"name":"CRITICA-REVISTA HISPANOAMERICANA DE FILOSOFIA","volume":"5 1","pages":"93-99"},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2015-12-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"89463961","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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