Pub Date : 2017-01-02DOI: 10.22201/IIFS.18704905E.2017.116
David Frydrych
espanolEste articulo revisa cuestiones metodologicas que han guiado, moldeado y plagado las discusiones de la filosofia analitica del derecho. Explica brevemente los conceptos de analisis conceptual, definiciones analiticas y parecidos de familia, y sostiene que los casos centrales se usan de mas de una manera. Presenta criticas a esos conceptos y metodos, cuyos defectos se deben a la falta de un paradigma comun acerca del impacto de los contraejemplos. Explica sucintamente desiderata “metateoricos” y sostiene que, hasta la fecha, recurrir a estas normas no ha sido de tanta ayuda para la filosofia del derecho como algunos sugieren. Finalmente, el texto vuelve a la seleccion de conceptos preguntandose si la teorizacion legal es una empresa invariablemente “normativa”, y concluye que ciertas metodologias “normativistas”, como la interpretacion constructivista de Dworkin o la invocacion al caso central del punto de vista interno de Finnis, son innecesarias. EnglishThis article surveys methodological matters that shape, drive, and plague analytic legal philosophy. Section 2 briefly explicates conceptual analysis, analytic definitions, and family resemblance concepts. It also argues that central cases are used in more than one way. Section 3 presents criticisms of those concepts and methods, and suggests that some of these difficulties are due to the lack of a shared paradigm regarding a counterexample’s impact. Section 4 explains “metatheoretical” desiderata. It contends that, to date, legal philosophical appeals to such norms have not been as helpful as some suggest. Section 5 returns to the issue of concept selection by addressing whether legal theorising is an invariably “normative” enterprise. It argues that certain “normativist” methodologies, such as Dworkin’s constructive interpretation and Finnis’ appeal to the central case of the internal point of view, are unnecessary.
{"title":"Down the Methodological Rabbit Hole","authors":"David Frydrych","doi":"10.22201/IIFS.18704905E.2017.116","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.22201/IIFS.18704905E.2017.116","url":null,"abstract":"espanolEste articulo revisa cuestiones metodologicas que han guiado, moldeado y plagado las discusiones de la filosofia analitica del derecho. Explica brevemente los conceptos de analisis conceptual, definiciones analiticas y parecidos de familia, y sostiene que los casos centrales se usan de mas de una manera. Presenta criticas a esos conceptos y metodos, cuyos defectos se deben a la falta de un paradigma comun acerca del impacto de los contraejemplos. Explica sucintamente desiderata “metateoricos” y sostiene que, hasta la fecha, recurrir a estas normas no ha sido de tanta ayuda para la filosofia del derecho como algunos sugieren. Finalmente, el texto vuelve a la seleccion de conceptos preguntandose si la teorizacion legal es una empresa invariablemente “normativa”, y concluye que ciertas metodologias “normativistas”, como la interpretacion constructivista de Dworkin o la invocacion al caso central del punto de vista interno de Finnis, son innecesarias. EnglishThis article surveys methodological matters that shape, drive, and plague analytic legal philosophy. Section 2 briefly explicates conceptual analysis, analytic definitions, and family resemblance concepts. It also argues that central cases are used in more than one way. Section 3 presents criticisms of those concepts and methods, and suggests that some of these difficulties are due to the lack of a shared paradigm regarding a counterexample’s impact. Section 4 explains “metatheoretical” desiderata. It contends that, to date, legal philosophical appeals to such norms have not been as helpful as some suggest. Section 5 returns to the issue of concept selection by addressing whether legal theorising is an invariably “normative” enterprise. It argues that certain “normativist” methodologies, such as Dworkin’s constructive interpretation and Finnis’ appeal to the central case of the internal point of view, are unnecessary.","PeriodicalId":43820,"journal":{"name":"CRITICA-REVISTA HISPANOAMERICANA DE FILOSOFIA","volume":"298 1","pages":"41-73"},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2017-01-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"73653109","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2016-10-31DOI: 10.22201/IIFS.18704905E.2016.223
Marta Campdelacreu Arqués
espanolEn Sutton 2012, Catherine Sutton presenta una nueva e interesante solucion al mayor problema al que se enfrenta el co-ubicacionismo (colocationism): el problema de la fundamentacion. Sin embargo, si es correcto rechazar (como se defiende en este articulo) la tesis defendida por Sutton segun la cual los trozos o pedazos de materia estan extrinsecamente compuestos, entonces su respuesta al problema de la fundamentacion resulta incompleta. Ademas, es dificil ver como podria completarse. EnglishIn Sutton 2012, Catherine Sutton offers a new and very interesting solution to the most challenging problem facing colocationism: the grounding problem. However, if I am right in rejecting her thesis that lumps or pieces of matter are extrinsically composed, then her proposal is no longer a complete answer to the grounding problem, and it is difficult to see how it might be supplemented.
{"title":"Sutton’s Solution to the Grounding Problem and Intrinsically Composed Colocated Objects","authors":"Marta Campdelacreu Arqués","doi":"10.22201/IIFS.18704905E.2016.223","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.22201/IIFS.18704905E.2016.223","url":null,"abstract":"espanolEn Sutton 2012, Catherine Sutton presenta una nueva e interesante solucion al mayor problema al que se enfrenta el co-ubicacionismo (colocationism): el problema de la fundamentacion. Sin embargo, si es correcto rechazar (como se defiende en este articulo) la tesis defendida por Sutton segun la cual los trozos o pedazos de materia estan extrinsecamente compuestos, entonces su respuesta al problema de la fundamentacion resulta incompleta. Ademas, es dificil ver como podria completarse. EnglishIn Sutton 2012, Catherine Sutton offers a new and very interesting solution to the most challenging problem facing colocationism: the grounding problem. However, if I am right in rejecting her thesis that lumps or pieces of matter are extrinsically composed, then her proposal is no longer a complete answer to the grounding problem, and it is difficult to see how it might be supplemented.","PeriodicalId":43820,"journal":{"name":"CRITICA-REVISTA HISPANOAMERICANA DE FILOSOFIA","volume":"89 1","pages":"77-92"},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2016-10-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"86056642","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2016-10-31DOI: 10.22201/IIFS.18704905E.2016.234
R. Caso
One of the issues concerning a strictly objective interpretation of probability is the debate between reductionist and non-reductionist accounts of chance. In section 1, we introduce the debate between these two camps, and identify the main challenges each of them face. As is well known, the discovery of the incompatibility between reductionist positions concerning chance and an intuitive credence-chance principle, namely Lewis [1980]'s Principal Principle, generated a new, two-pronged way of addressing this debate. Reductionists face the motivation problem: they are required to provide motivation for alternative credence-chance principles compatible with their metaphysical assumptions. Non-reductionists face the explanation problem: they are required explain why it is rational for us to let chance guide credence in the way specified by her favored credence-chance norm. In section 2, we revisit some known background in order to set the scene for the discussion to follow. In section 3, we follow Briggs [2009] in identifying further problems for the reductionist, and argue that, in view of these, the reductionist's prospects of being able to meet the motivation problem are slim at best. In section 4, we turn to a fuller discussion of the explanation problem. As Hall [2004] argues, it turns out that the reductionist faces this problem too. In 4.1, we delineate a formal strategy for justifying any favored credence-chance norm. In 4.2, we show how the anti-reductionist is able to put in motion this formal strategy by providing a motivation for a key assumption upon which the strategy relies. In 4.3, we argue that the reductionist's prospects of being able to provide a similar justification of the assumption are also slim. We claim that these considerations provide a dialectical advantage to the anti-reductionist camp. 1. Reductionism and anti-reductionism about chance According to a broad class of reductionist views on chance, facts about chance at a world supervene upon (or at any rate are reducible to) the global distribution of categorical facts throughout the entire history of that world. Variation with respect to the nature of the supervenience base is possible, as long as no modal facts, no primitive dispositions or propensities are allowed among the fundamental properties of the
{"title":"Vindicating Chance: On the Reductionism/Non-Reductionism Debate","authors":"R. Caso","doi":"10.22201/IIFS.18704905E.2016.234","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.22201/IIFS.18704905E.2016.234","url":null,"abstract":"One of the issues concerning a strictly objective interpretation of probability is the debate between reductionist and non-reductionist accounts of chance. In section 1, we introduce the debate between these two camps, and identify the main challenges each of them face. As is well known, the discovery of the incompatibility between reductionist positions concerning chance and an intuitive credence-chance principle, namely Lewis [1980]'s Principal Principle, generated a new, two-pronged way of addressing this debate. Reductionists face the motivation problem: they are required to provide motivation for alternative credence-chance principles compatible with their metaphysical assumptions. Non-reductionists face the explanation problem: they are required explain why it is rational for us to let chance guide credence in the way specified by her favored credence-chance norm. In section 2, we revisit some known background in order to set the scene for the discussion to follow. In section 3, we follow Briggs [2009] in identifying further problems for the reductionist, and argue that, in view of these, the reductionist's prospects of being able to meet the motivation problem are slim at best. In section 4, we turn to a fuller discussion of the explanation problem. As Hall [2004] argues, it turns out that the reductionist faces this problem too. In 4.1, we delineate a formal strategy for justifying any favored credence-chance norm. In 4.2, we show how the anti-reductionist is able to put in motion this formal strategy by providing a motivation for a key assumption upon which the strategy relies. In 4.3, we argue that the reductionist's prospects of being able to provide a similar justification of the assumption are also slim. We claim that these considerations provide a dialectical advantage to the anti-reductionist camp. 1. Reductionism and anti-reductionism about chance According to a broad class of reductionist views on chance, facts about chance at a world supervene upon (or at any rate are reducible to) the global distribution of categorical facts throughout the entire history of that world. Variation with respect to the nature of the supervenience base is possible, as long as no modal facts, no primitive dispositions or propensities are allowed among the fundamental properties of the","PeriodicalId":43820,"journal":{"name":"CRITICA-REVISTA HISPANOAMERICANA DE FILOSOFIA","volume":"70 1","pages":"3-33"},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2016-10-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"76543344","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2016-10-31DOI: 10.22201/IIFS.18704905E.2016.215
S. Soames
El proyecto de Wittgenstein en el Tractatus consistia en reemplazar las proposiciones de Frege y Russell con una nueva concepcion que capturara la esencia del pensamiento y el lenguaje representacionales. Segun creia, esta era la unica tarea real de la filosofia. Argumento aqui que su explicacion de las proposiciones atomicas fue una implementacion incompleta de intuiciones valiosas, que, si hubieran sido ligeramente revisadas, podrian haberse extendido a todas las proposiciones tractarianas. Si Wittgenstein hubiera seguido este camino, habria hecho descubrimientos en el estudio del lenguaje y la mente que apenas empiezan a emerger hoy en dia. Sin embargo, hacerlos habria implicado quitarle al Tractatus sus pretensiones de reconstruir de manera fundamental la filosofia
{"title":"Propositions, The \"Tractatus\", and \"The Single Great Problem of Philosophy\"","authors":"S. Soames","doi":"10.22201/IIFS.18704905E.2016.215","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.22201/IIFS.18704905E.2016.215","url":null,"abstract":"El proyecto de Wittgenstein en el Tractatus consistia en reemplazar las proposiciones de Frege y Russell con una nueva concepcion que capturara la esencia del pensamiento y el lenguaje representacionales. Segun creia, esta era la unica tarea real de la filosofia. Argumento aqui que su explicacion de las proposiciones atomicas fue una implementacion incompleta de intuiciones valiosas, que, si hubieran sido ligeramente revisadas, podrian haberse extendido a todas las proposiciones tractarianas. Si Wittgenstein hubiera seguido este camino, habria hecho descubrimientos en el estudio del lenguaje y la mente que apenas empiezan a emerger hoy en dia. Sin embargo, hacerlos habria implicado quitarle al Tractatus sus pretensiones de reconstruir de manera fundamental la filosofia","PeriodicalId":43820,"journal":{"name":"CRITICA-REVISTA HISPANOAMERICANA DE FILOSOFIA","volume":"4 1","pages":"3-19"},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2016-10-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"88484064","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2016-10-31DOI: 10.22201/IIFS.18704905E.2016.235
L. Ribeiro
espanolDe acuerdo con la explicacion de la responsabilidad moral de Harry Frankfurt, un agente es moralmente responsable solo si sus elecciones y acciones reflejadas no estan constrenidas por una irresistible fuerza —ya sea de la perspectiva de primera o de tercera persona—. Argumentare aqui que esta afirmacion es problematica. Teniendo en cuenta algunos de los presupuestos de la discusion de Frankfurt, parece que hay casos segun los cuales uno puede ser considerado responsable, aunque las elecciones y acciones reflejadas esten constrenidas por una fuerza irresistible. La conclusion es que Frankfurt deberia haber admitido que la ausencia de una fuerza irresistible no es una condicion necesaria para la responsabilidad. EnglishAccording to Harry Frankfurt’s account of moral responsibility, an agent is morally responsible only if her reflected choices and actions are not constrained by an irresistible force —either from the first- or the third-person perspective. I shall argue here that this claim is problematic. Given some of the background assumptions of Frankfurt’s discussion, there seem to be cases according to which one may be deemed responsible, although one’s reflected choices and actions are constrained by an irresistible force. The conclusion is that Frankfurt should have acknowledged that freedom from an irresistible force is not a necessary condition for responsibility.
{"title":"Revisiting Frankfurt on freedom and responsibility","authors":"L. Ribeiro","doi":"10.22201/IIFS.18704905E.2016.235","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.22201/IIFS.18704905E.2016.235","url":null,"abstract":"espanolDe acuerdo con la explicacion de la responsabilidad moral de Harry Frankfurt, un agente es moralmente responsable solo si sus elecciones y acciones reflejadas no estan constrenidas por una irresistible fuerza —ya sea de la perspectiva de primera o de tercera persona—. Argumentare aqui que esta afirmacion es problematica. Teniendo en cuenta algunos de los presupuestos de la discusion de Frankfurt, parece que hay casos segun los cuales uno puede ser considerado responsable, aunque las elecciones y acciones reflejadas esten constrenidas por una fuerza irresistible. La conclusion es que Frankfurt deberia haber admitido que la ausencia de una fuerza irresistible no es una condicion necesaria para la responsabilidad. EnglishAccording to Harry Frankfurt’s account of moral responsibility, an agent is morally responsible only if her reflected choices and actions are not constrained by an irresistible force —either from the first- or the third-person perspective. I shall argue here that this claim is problematic. Given some of the background assumptions of Frankfurt’s discussion, there seem to be cases according to which one may be deemed responsible, although one’s reflected choices and actions are constrained by an irresistible force. The conclusion is that Frankfurt should have acknowledged that freedom from an irresistible force is not a necessary condition for responsibility.","PeriodicalId":43820,"journal":{"name":"CRITICA-REVISTA HISPANOAMERICANA DE FILOSOFIA","volume":"32 1","pages":"35-56"},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2016-10-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"89187743","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2016-10-31DOI: 10.22201/IIFS.18704905E.2016.237
J. L. F. López, Xavier de Donato Rodríguez
espanolEn este trabajo desarrollamos reconstrucciones estructuralistas de las teorias del flogisto, de Priestley, y del oxigeno, de Lavoisier. Nuestra propuesta es una alternativa a la de Caamano (2009 y 2011) en una pretension de ajustarnos mas a las formulaciones de esas teorias tal y como se dieron historicamente. EnglishIn this work we develop structuralist reconstructions of phlogiston theory, by Priestley, and oxygen theory, by Lavoisier. Our proposal is an alternative to that offered by Caamano (2009 and 2011) in an attempt to adjust better to the actual historical formulations of these theories.
在这项工作中，我们发展了普里斯特利的燃素理论和拉瓦锡的氧气理论的结构重建。我们的建议是Caamano(2009和2011)的替代方案，旨在更符合这些理论的公式，因为它们是历史上给出的。= =地理= =根据美国人口普查，这个县的面积为。Our提案is an替代to that offered by Caamano(2009年和2011年)in an特意to adjust better to the当前历史formulations这些不同。
{"title":"Flogisto versus oxígeno: una nueva reconstrucción y su fundamentación histórica","authors":"J. L. F. López, Xavier de Donato Rodríguez","doi":"10.22201/IIFS.18704905E.2016.237","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.22201/IIFS.18704905E.2016.237","url":null,"abstract":"espanolEn este trabajo desarrollamos reconstrucciones estructuralistas de las teorias del flogisto, de Priestley, y del oxigeno, de Lavoisier. Nuestra propuesta es una alternativa a la de Caamano (2009 y 2011) en una pretension de ajustarnos mas a las formulaciones de esas teorias tal y como se dieron historicamente. EnglishIn this work we develop structuralist reconstructions of phlogiston theory, by Priestley, and oxygen theory, by Lavoisier. Our proposal is an alternative to that offered by Caamano (2009 and 2011) in an attempt to adjust better to the actual historical formulations of these theories.","PeriodicalId":43820,"journal":{"name":"CRITICA-REVISTA HISPANOAMERICANA DE FILOSOFIA","volume":"33 1","pages":"87-116"},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2016-10-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"74659603","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2016-10-31DOI: 10.22201/IIFS.18704905E.2016.213
Julio Montero
espanolDurante decadas, los filosofos han concebido los derechos humanos como una clase de derechos naturales de los que gozamos por el mero hecho de ser seres humanos. Sin embargo, esta interpretacion ha sido severamente cuestionada en los ultimos anos. Toda una familia de autores, identificados con una concepcion “practico-dependiente”, asevera que los derechos humanos constituyen una practica sui generis completamente ajena a la tradicion del derecho natural. En contra de esta postura, este articulo argumenta que el discurso de los derechos naturales es parte constitutiva de la doctrina actual de los derechos humanos y que puede hacer un aporte crucial a la adecuada justificacion y comprension de sus funciones, su contenido y su alcance normativo. Mas concretamente, mi tesis sera que si bien los derechos humanos no pueden reducirse a derechos naturales, bien podrian derivar de derechos naturales previos. EnglishFor decades, philosophers tended to think about human rights as natural rights that we enjoy just in virtue of our common humanity. However, in recent years, this view has been persistently challenged by a group of authors defending an alternative “practice-dependent” approach. According to them, contemporary human rights constitute a sui generis practice which is completely foreign to the natural rights tradition. Contrary to this claim, this article argues that natural rights discourse is an integral part of current human rights doctrine and that it may help us understand and justify the functions, content and normative reach of human rights norms. More concretely, my thesis is that although human rights are not reducible to natural rights, they may nevertheless derive from natural rights which are prior to them.
{"title":"Pueden los derechos naturales hacer alguna contribución a la filosofía de los derechos humanos","authors":"Julio Montero","doi":"10.22201/IIFS.18704905E.2016.213","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.22201/IIFS.18704905E.2016.213","url":null,"abstract":"espanolDurante decadas, los filosofos han concebido los derechos humanos como una clase de derechos naturales de los que gozamos por el mero hecho de ser seres humanos. Sin embargo, esta interpretacion ha sido severamente cuestionada en los ultimos anos. Toda una familia de autores, identificados con una concepcion “practico-dependiente”, asevera que los derechos humanos constituyen una practica sui generis completamente ajena a la tradicion del derecho natural. En contra de esta postura, este articulo argumenta que el discurso de los derechos naturales es parte constitutiva de la doctrina actual de los derechos humanos y que puede hacer un aporte crucial a la adecuada justificacion y comprension de sus funciones, su contenido y su alcance normativo. Mas concretamente, mi tesis sera que si bien los derechos humanos no pueden reducirse a derechos naturales, bien podrian derivar de derechos naturales previos. EnglishFor decades, philosophers tended to think about human rights as natural rights that we enjoy just in virtue of our common humanity. However, in recent years, this view has been persistently challenged by a group of authors defending an alternative “practice-dependent” approach. According to them, contemporary human rights constitute a sui generis practice which is completely foreign to the natural rights tradition. Contrary to this claim, this article argues that natural rights discourse is an integral part of current human rights doctrine and that it may help us understand and justify the functions, content and normative reach of human rights norms. More concretely, my thesis is that although human rights are not reducible to natural rights, they may nevertheless derive from natural rights which are prior to them.","PeriodicalId":43820,"journal":{"name":"CRITICA-REVISTA HISPANOAMERICANA DE FILOSOFIA","volume":"124 1","pages":"61-88"},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2016-10-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"88634986","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2016-10-31DOI: 10.22201/IIFS.18704905E.2016.211
J. Burgess
espanolEn el texto se exponen las opiniones de Saul Kripke acerca del funcionalismo en la filosofia de la mente, que aun permanecen en gran parte sin publicarse, con base en la transcripcion de una charla suya de 1984 sobre este tema, y se identifican algunas preguntas sin resolver. EnglishSaul Kripke’s still largely unpublished views on functionalism in the philosophy of mind are expounded on the basis of a transcript of a 1984 lecture of his on the topic, and some unresolved questions identified.
本文阐述了索尔·克里普克关于心灵哲学中的功能主义的观点，这些观点在很大程度上仍未发表，基于他1984年关于这个主题的演讲的转录，并确定了一些未解决的问题。EnglishSaul Kripke ' s still largely未出版关于functionalism in the philosophy of mind are expounded根据1984年发表其职业transcript on the议题,and some unresolved问题确定。
{"title":"Kripke on Functionalism","authors":"J. Burgess","doi":"10.22201/IIFS.18704905E.2016.211","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.22201/IIFS.18704905E.2016.211","url":null,"abstract":"espanolEn el texto se exponen las opiniones de Saul Kripke acerca del funcionalismo en la filosofia de la mente, que aun permanecen en gran parte sin publicarse, con base en la transcripcion de una charla suya de 1984 sobre este tema, y se identifican algunas preguntas sin resolver. EnglishSaul Kripke’s still largely unpublished views on functionalism in the philosophy of mind are expounded on the basis of a transcript of a 1984 lecture of his on the topic, and some unresolved questions identified.","PeriodicalId":43820,"journal":{"name":"CRITICA-REVISTA HISPANOAMERICANA DE FILOSOFIA","volume":"27 1","pages":"3-18"},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2016-10-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"83008405","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2016-10-31DOI: 10.22201/IIFS.18704905E.2016.214
J. González, Mariana Córdoba
espanolNuestro proposito es trastornar el tratamiento habitual del problema de las clases naturales en filosofia de la ciencia, analizandolo sincronicamente y poniendo la quimica en el foco. Analizaremos tres problemas que la disciplina presenta al microesencialismo: (1) la insuficiencia del numero atomico como propiedad y criterio esencial, (2) la imposibilidad de la mecanica cuantica de dar cuenta de la estructura molecular y, por consiguiente, de importantes propiedades macroscopicas de las sustancias, (3) la imposibilidad de definir propiedades centrales, como la acidez, a partir de las propiedades microscopicas. Argumentaremos que, sin embargo, cabe mantener la nocion de clase natural en quimica, pero reformulandola desde la perspectiva del realismo activo y el pluralismo ideologico de Hasok Chang. Esta propuesta permite pensar que si bien las clasificaciones no deben ser interpretadas en un sentido esencialista, no son arbitrarias ni meramente convencionales, porque la realidad puede hacer fracasar un sistema de clasificacion y dar exito a otro. EnglishOur purpose is to subvert the traditional analysis of the problem of natural kinds in philosophy of science, which will be analyzed from a synchronic perspective and focusing on chemistry. Three problems of essentialist microstructuralism in chemistry will be considered: (1) the atomic number is insufficient as an essential property and criterion, (2) quantum mechanics cannot account for molecular shape and, hence, for important macroscopic properties of substances, (3) it is not possible to define relevant properties, as acidity, from microscopic ones. We will argue it is convenient to maintain the notion of natural kind, though, but it can be redefined from the perspective of active realism and ideological pluralism proposed by Hasok Chang. This approach allows us to think that classifications must not be considered from an essentialist approach, but they are not arbitrary or merely conventional either, since reality can make a classification system fail and make another one work.
我们的目的是通过同步分析和聚焦化学，打破科学哲学中对自然类问题的常规处理。讨论三个问题向microesencialismo纪律:(1)不足atomico号码和财产的最基本的标准,(2)无法mecanica cuantica意识到情况的分子结构和重要的属性,因此macroscopicas物质、中央(3)无法定义属性,如酸性microscopicas特性起。然而，我们认为，在化学中保留自然阶级有害是合适的，但要从张hasok的积极现实主义和意识形态多元化的角度对其进行改革。这一建议表明，虽然分类不应以本质主义的意义来解释，但它们不是任意的或仅仅是传统的，因为现实可以使一种分类系统失败而使另一种分类系统成功。EnglishOur目的is to subvert the传统analysis of the problem of natural kinds in philosophy of science, which will be analyzed from synchronic观点和研究化学。三problems of essentialist microstructuralism in chemistry将被视为:(1)the的number is as an property and雅典”不足、(2)量子分子mechanics不能account for shape and hence, for重要macroscopic properties of物质,(3)it is not可能定义的有关properties、as acidity from microscopic ones。不过，我们认为保留自然的概念是方便的，但可以从Hasok Chang提出的积极现实主义和意识形态多元化的角度重新定义它。这种方法使我们认为，分类不应以一种本质主义的方法来考虑，但它们既不是任意的，也不是仅仅是传统的，因为现实可能使一种分类系统失效，使另一种分类系统起作用。
{"title":"El problema de las clases naturales en química: algunas dificultades para el microestructuralismo","authors":"J. González, Mariana Córdoba","doi":"10.22201/IIFS.18704905E.2016.214","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.22201/IIFS.18704905E.2016.214","url":null,"abstract":"espanolNuestro proposito es trastornar el tratamiento habitual del problema de las clases naturales en filosofia de la ciencia, analizandolo sincronicamente y poniendo la quimica en el foco. Analizaremos tres problemas que la disciplina presenta al microesencialismo: (1) la insuficiencia del numero atomico como propiedad y criterio esencial, (2) la imposibilidad de la mecanica cuantica de dar cuenta de la estructura molecular y, por consiguiente, de importantes propiedades macroscopicas de las sustancias, (3) la imposibilidad de definir propiedades centrales, como la acidez, a partir de las propiedades microscopicas. Argumentaremos que, sin embargo, cabe mantener la nocion de clase natural en quimica, pero reformulandola desde la perspectiva del realismo activo y el pluralismo ideologico de Hasok Chang. Esta propuesta permite pensar que si bien las clasificaciones no deben ser interpretadas en un sentido esencialista, no son arbitrarias ni meramente convencionales, porque la realidad puede hacer fracasar un sistema de clasificacion y dar exito a otro. EnglishOur purpose is to subvert the traditional analysis of the problem of natural kinds in philosophy of science, which will be analyzed from a synchronic perspective and focusing on chemistry. Three problems of essentialist microstructuralism in chemistry will be considered: (1) the atomic number is insufficient as an essential property and criterion, (2) quantum mechanics cannot account for molecular shape and, hence, for important macroscopic properties of substances, (3) it is not possible to define relevant properties, as acidity, from microscopic ones. We will argue it is convenient to maintain the notion of natural kind, though, but it can be redefined from the perspective of active realism and ideological pluralism proposed by Hasok Chang. This approach allows us to think that classifications must not be considered from an essentialist approach, but they are not arbitrary or merely conventional either, since reality can make a classification system fail and make another one work.","PeriodicalId":43820,"journal":{"name":"CRITICA-REVISTA HISPANOAMERICANA DE FILOSOFIA","volume":"17 1","pages":"89-117"},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2016-10-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"82736543","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2016-10-31DOI: 10.22201/IIFS.18704905E.2016.236
Santiago Ginnobili, C. Carman
espanolUsualmente se ha asumido que una unica distincion puede dar cuenta del papel que cumplen los conceptos en una teoria respecto de la contrastacion y respecto de la explicacion. Intentaremos mostrar que esta asuncion es incorrecta. Por una parte, no hay razones para considerar que esta coincidencia deba darse y, por otra, como pretenderemos probar a partir de varios ejemplos, de hecho, no se da. La base de contrastacion de una teoria no tiene por que coincidir con el explanandum de la teoria. Para defender este punto asumiremos el estructuralismo metateorico, y se extraeran consecuencias para la concepcion metateorica presupuesta. EnglishIt is usually held that one distinction can account for the role that concepts play in a theory regarding both test and explanation. We will demonstrate that this assumption is incorrect. On the one hand, there is no reason to think that this coincidence should exist. On the other, this is not the case, as we will show analysing several examples. The testing basis of a theory does not have to coincide with the explanandum of the theory. To defend this point we will endorse the metatheoretical structuralism. In addition, we will consider some repercussions that this discussion has for the assumed metatheoretical framework.
然而，在实践中，人们普遍认为，只有一种区别才能解释概念在对比和解释理论中的作用。我们将试图证明这次亚松森会议是错误的。一方面，没有理由认为这种巧合一定会发生，另一方面，正如我们将从几个例子中证明的那样，事实上，它并不发生。一个理论的对比基础不一定要与理论的解释相一致。在这一点上，我们将假定元理论结构主义，并对假定的元理论概念得出结论。通常EnglishIt is that one distinction can account for the role举行概念play in a theory关于both test和解释。我们将证明这个假设是错误的。在一个方面，没有理由认为这个巧合应该存在。另一方面，这不是情况，因为我们将展示分析几个例子。= =地理= =根据美国人口普查，这个县的面积为。= =地理= =根据美国人口普查，这个县的面积为。此外，我们将考虑这一讨论对假定的元理论框架的一些影响。
{"title":"Explicar y contrastar","authors":"Santiago Ginnobili, C. Carman","doi":"10.22201/IIFS.18704905E.2016.236","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.22201/IIFS.18704905E.2016.236","url":null,"abstract":"espanolUsualmente se ha asumido que una unica distincion puede dar cuenta del papel que cumplen los conceptos en una teoria respecto de la contrastacion y respecto de la explicacion. Intentaremos mostrar que esta asuncion es incorrecta. Por una parte, no hay razones para considerar que esta coincidencia deba darse y, por otra, como pretenderemos probar a partir de varios ejemplos, de hecho, no se da. La base de contrastacion de una teoria no tiene por que coincidir con el explanandum de la teoria. Para defender este punto asumiremos el estructuralismo metateorico, y se extraeran consecuencias para la concepcion metateorica presupuesta. EnglishIt is usually held that one distinction can account for the role that concepts play in a theory regarding both test and explanation. We will demonstrate that this assumption is incorrect. On the one hand, there is no reason to think that this coincidence should exist. On the other, this is not the case, as we will show analysing several examples. The testing basis of a theory does not have to coincide with the explanandum of the theory. To defend this point we will endorse the metatheoretical structuralism. In addition, we will consider some repercussions that this discussion has for the assumed metatheoretical framework.","PeriodicalId":43820,"journal":{"name":"CRITICA-REVISTA HISPANOAMERICANA DE FILOSOFIA","volume":"214 1","pages":"57-86"},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2016-10-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"79539869","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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