Pub Date : 2018-04-01DOI: 10.22201/IIFS.18704905E.2018.03
Rodrigo Moro, Marcelo Auday, F. Tohmé
espanolKaushik Basu presenta el dilema del viajero (DV) como un desafio a la teoria de juegos. El desafio ha sido investigado experimentalmente. Al enfrentarse a la version de Basu del DV o similares, los participantes (incluyendo a expertos en teoria de juegos) se comportan como sugiere Basu. Sin embargo, un pequeno cambio en el juego tiene como consecuencia revertir las tendencias de eleccion. La cuestion es, entonces, si es posible brindar una explicacion de los principales hallazgos empiricos como consecuencias de decisiones racionales (es decir, racionalizarlos). Hay varias propuestas en la literatura pero ninguna provee una explicacion satisfactoria de por que expertos en teoria de juegos jugando entre si usualmente rechazan la unica estrategia no dominada del DV. El objetivo de este articulo es sugerir una propuesta alternativa que solucione este problema. EnglishKaushik Basu presents the Traveler’s Dilemma (TD) as a challenge to Game Theory. This challenge has been experimentally investigated. When faced with Basu’s version of the TD, participants (including experts in game theory) behave in the way Basu suggests. However, a little change in the game turns out to reverse participants’ choices. The question is, then, whether it is possible to provide an account of the main empirical findings as consequences of rational choices (i.e., to rationalize them). There are several proposals in the literature but none of them provides a satisfactory account for why experts in game theory playing against each other usually reject the only undominated option of the TD. The goal of this article is to suggest an alternative proposal that fixes this problem.
espanolKaushik Basu提出旅行者困境(DV)是对博弈论的挑战。这一挑战已经进行了实验研究。当面对巴苏版本的DV或类似的DV时，参与者(包括博弈论专家)会按照巴苏的建议行事。然而，游戏中的一个小变化会逆转选择的趋势。因此，问题是，是否有可能将主要的经验发现解释为理性决策的结果(即使它们合理化)。在文献中有几个建议，但没有一个提供了一个令人满意的解释，为什么博弈论专家通常拒绝DV独特的非支配策略。本文的目的是提出一个替代方案来解决这个问题。《旅行者的困境》(TD)是对游戏理论的挑战。这个挑战已经进行了实验研究。当面对Basu版本的TD时，参与者(包括游戏理论专家)的行为符合Basu的建议。然而,小a change in the game转动out to reverse参与者”选择。因此，问题是，是否有可能将主要的经验发现作为理性选择的结果(即，使它们合理化)。There are若干提案in the文献but none of察提供令人满意的account for why专家in game theory against矛盾通常拒绝the only undominated踢球TD的备选案文。The goal of this is to suggest条得到替代提案fixes this problem。
{"title":"On Rationality in The Traveler’s Dilemma","authors":"Rodrigo Moro, Marcelo Auday, F. Tohmé","doi":"10.22201/IIFS.18704905E.2018.03","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.22201/IIFS.18704905E.2018.03","url":null,"abstract":"espanolKaushik Basu presenta el dilema del viajero (DV) como un desafio a la teoria de juegos. El desafio ha sido investigado experimentalmente. Al enfrentarse a la version de Basu del DV o similares, los participantes (incluyendo a expertos en teoria de juegos) se comportan como sugiere Basu. Sin embargo, un pequeno cambio en el juego tiene como consecuencia revertir las tendencias de eleccion. La cuestion es, entonces, si es posible brindar una explicacion de los principales hallazgos empiricos como consecuencias de decisiones racionales (es decir, racionalizarlos). Hay varias propuestas en la literatura pero ninguna provee una explicacion satisfactoria de por que expertos en teoria de juegos jugando entre si usualmente rechazan la unica estrategia no dominada del DV. El objetivo de este articulo es sugerir una propuesta alternativa que solucione este problema. EnglishKaushik Basu presents the Traveler’s Dilemma (TD) as a challenge to Game Theory. This challenge has been experimentally investigated. When faced with Basu’s version of the TD, participants (including experts in game theory) behave in the way Basu suggests. However, a little change in the game turns out to reverse participants’ choices. The question is, then, whether it is possible to provide an account of the main empirical findings as consequences of rational choices (i.e., to rationalize them). There are several proposals in the literature but none of them provides a satisfactory account for why experts in game theory playing against each other usually reject the only undominated option of the TD. The goal of this article is to suggest an alternative proposal that fixes this problem.","PeriodicalId":43820,"journal":{"name":"CRITICA-REVISTA HISPANOAMERICANA DE FILOSOFIA","volume":"28 1","pages":"55-68"},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2018-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"87339864","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2018-04-01DOI: 10.22201/IIFS.18704905E.2018.103
Godfrey Guillaumin
{"title":"Sergio F. Martínez y Xiang Huang, Hacia una filosofía de la ciencia centrada en prácticas","authors":"Godfrey Guillaumin","doi":"10.22201/IIFS.18704905E.2018.103","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.22201/IIFS.18704905E.2018.103","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":43820,"journal":{"name":"CRITICA-REVISTA HISPANOAMERICANA DE FILOSOFIA","volume":"22 1","pages":"115-131"},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2018-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"86190159","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2018-04-01DOI: 10.22201/IIFS.18704905E.2018.01
Víctor M. Verdejo
Can subjects genuinely possess concepts they do not understand fully? A simple argument can show that, on the assumption that possession conditions are taken to fully individuate concepts, this question must be answered in the negative.In this paper, I examine this negative answer as possibly articulated within Christopher Peacocke’s seminal theory. I then discuss four central lines of attack to the view that possession of concepts requires full understanding. I conclude that theorists should acknowledge the existence of indefinitely many cases of genuine concept possession for partially understood concepts and therefore face the determination challenge, namely, the challenge of fully determining concept individuation from concept possession conditions of partially understood concepts.
{"title":"Fully Understanding Concept Possession","authors":"Víctor M. Verdejo","doi":"10.22201/IIFS.18704905E.2018.01","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.22201/IIFS.18704905E.2018.01","url":null,"abstract":"Can subjects genuinely possess concepts they do not understand fully? A simple argument can show that, on the assumption that possession conditions are taken to fully individuate concepts, this question must be answered in the negative.In this paper, I examine this negative answer as possibly articulated within Christopher Peacocke’s seminal theory. I then discuss four central lines of attack to the view that possession of concepts requires full understanding. I conclude that theorists should acknowledge the existence of indefinitely many cases of genuine concept possession for partially understood concepts and therefore face the determination challenge, namely, the challenge of fully determining concept individuation from concept possession conditions of partially understood concepts.","PeriodicalId":43820,"journal":{"name":"CRITICA-REVISTA HISPANOAMERICANA DE FILOSOFIA","volume":"78 1","pages":"3-27"},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2018-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"76093437","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2018-04-01DOI: 10.22201/iifs.18704905e.2018.99
Manuel Almagro Holgado
El objeto de esta nota crítica es comentar algunas de las ideas que aparecen en el libro The Objects of Thought (2013) de Tim Crane y, posteriormente, discutir con más detalle una de ellas, concretamente la propuesta de Crane para explicar la verdad sobre lo que decimos acerca de cosas que no existen —en lo que sigue me referiré a esto como “problema de la no existencia”—. La tarea de explicar estos casos —en los que pensamos o decimos que es verdad que un objeto no existente tiene tal y cual propiedad— ha ocupado un lugar destacado entre los problemas filosóficos desde la antigüedad (cfr. Teeteto 189a). Así que, además de tener presencia histórica en la literatura, este problema sobresale entre las principales cuestiones filosóficas porque supone un obstáculo importante para las posiciones que parten de la concepción tradicional de lo mental y que tratan de dar cuenta de la función y naturaleza de la mente, como es el caso de Crane en la obra que comentamos aquí.1 En su libro, Crane ofrece una solución reduccionista al problema de la no existencia.2 Su propuesta consiste en explicar la verdad de lo que decimos acerca de algo que no existe apelando a su dependencia de otras verdades sobre
这个注意是评论的批评对象的一些意见(Objects of Thought)一书中2013年)蒂姆起重机,然后更详细讨论其中之一,即拟议起重机解释真相我们所说的关于事情—实际上并不存在什么我继续将这个像“不存在问题”—。解释这些情况的任务——在这些情况下，我们认为或说一个不存在的物体确实具有这样或那样的属性——自古以来就在哲学问题中占据了突出的位置。Teeteto 189a)。所以,除了文学的历史,这个问题存在峰值之间的哲学的主要问题,因为这意味着一个重大障碍出发阵地传统发展观精神和试图干掉他思想的作用和性质,如起重机在建筑工地提供您们aquí.1在你的书中,起重机不existencia.2论者解决问题他的建议是解释我们所说的不存在的东西的真相，通过诉诸于它对其他真相的依赖
{"title":"Verdad sobre la no existencia: un problema para la teoría reduccionista de Tim Crane. Nota crítica sobre \"The Objects of Thought\": Tim Crane, \"The Objects of Thought\", Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2013, 208 pp.","authors":"Manuel Almagro Holgado","doi":"10.22201/iifs.18704905e.2018.99","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.22201/iifs.18704905e.2018.99","url":null,"abstract":"El objeto de esta nota crítica es comentar algunas de las ideas que aparecen en el libro The Objects of Thought (2013) de Tim Crane y, posteriormente, discutir con más detalle una de ellas, concretamente la propuesta de Crane para explicar la verdad sobre lo que decimos acerca de cosas que no existen —en lo que sigue me referiré a esto como “problema de la no existencia”—. La tarea de explicar estos casos —en los que pensamos o decimos que es verdad que un objeto no existente tiene tal y cual propiedad— ha ocupado un lugar destacado entre los problemas filosóficos desde la antigüedad (cfr. Teeteto 189a). Así que, además de tener presencia histórica en la literatura, este problema sobresale entre las principales cuestiones filosóficas porque supone un obstáculo importante para las posiciones que parten de la concepción tradicional de lo mental y que tratan de dar cuenta de la función y naturaleza de la mente, como es el caso de Crane en la obra que comentamos aquí.1 En su libro, Crane ofrece una solución reduccionista al problema de la no existencia.2 Su propuesta consiste en explicar la verdad de lo que decimos acerca de algo que no existe apelando a su dependencia de otras verdades sobre","PeriodicalId":43820,"journal":{"name":"CRITICA-REVISTA HISPANOAMERICANA DE FILOSOFIA","volume":"13 1","pages":"99-113"},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2018-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"78381339","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2018-01-01DOI: 10.22201/iifs.18704905e.2018.1073
S. Bañón, M. Vicent
espanolLos argumentos neurocientificos focalizados en demostrar diferencias sexuales en el cerebro gozan de una gran popularidad. Algunas de las conclusiones de dichos experimentos han derivado en propuestas neuroeducativas que promueven la educacion segregada por sexos. Estas propuestas carecen del rigor necesario para poder ser aplicadas. No solo porque los estudios neurocientificos estan lejos de poder aseverar diferencias sexuales significativas en el cerebro, sino porque falta un dialogo critico entre las ciencias que fundamente estrategias educativas adecuadas en el ambito de las diferencias sexuales del cerebro. Concluimos que es necesario establecer un dialogo entre los diferentes ambitos que conforman la neuroeducacion, porque solamente de este modo se pueden fundamentar modelos educativos democraticos donde la igualdad de genero sea un valor irrenunciable. EnglishNeuro-scientific arguments focused on demonstrating sexual differences in the brain are very popular. Some of the conclusions of these experiments have derived in neuro-educational proposals aimed at fostering single-sex education projects. Such proposals are insufficiently rigorous for their application to be justified, not only because neuro-scientific studies are far from being able to identify significant sexual differences in the brain, but because the necessary critical dialogue between sciences that might sustain appropriate educational strategies is lacking. We conclude that there is a need to establish such a dialogue between the different areas involved in the neuro-education field. Only through a dialogue of this kind would we be able to base democratic educational models where gender equality is an inalienable value
{"title":"La diferencia sexual en las neurociencias y la neuroeducación","authors":"S. Bañón, M. Vicent","doi":"10.22201/iifs.18704905e.2018.1073","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.22201/iifs.18704905e.2018.1073","url":null,"abstract":"espanolLos argumentos neurocientificos focalizados en demostrar diferencias sexuales en el cerebro gozan de una gran popularidad. Algunas de las conclusiones de dichos experimentos han derivado en propuestas neuroeducativas que promueven la educacion segregada por sexos. Estas propuestas carecen del rigor necesario para poder ser aplicadas. No solo porque los estudios neurocientificos estan lejos de poder aseverar diferencias sexuales significativas en el cerebro, sino porque falta un dialogo critico entre las ciencias que fundamente estrategias educativas adecuadas en el ambito de las diferencias sexuales del cerebro. Concluimos que es necesario establecer un dialogo entre los diferentes ambitos que conforman la neuroeducacion, porque solamente de este modo se pueden fundamentar modelos educativos democraticos donde la igualdad de genero sea un valor irrenunciable. EnglishNeuro-scientific arguments focused on demonstrating sexual differences in the brain are very popular. Some of the conclusions of these experiments have derived in neuro-educational proposals aimed at fostering single-sex education projects. Such proposals are insufficiently rigorous for their application to be justified, not only because neuro-scientific studies are far from being able to identify significant sexual differences in the brain, but because the necessary critical dialogue between sciences that might sustain appropriate educational strategies is lacking. We conclude that there is a need to establish such a dialogue between the different areas involved in the neuro-education field. Only through a dialogue of this kind would we be able to base democratic educational models where gender equality is an inalienable value","PeriodicalId":43820,"journal":{"name":"CRITICA-REVISTA HISPANOAMERICANA DE FILOSOFIA","volume":"40 1","pages":"3-26"},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2018-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"85346937","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2017-10-31DOI: 10.22201/IIFS.18704905E.2017.199
Shahid Rahman, Nicolas Clerbout, Juan Redmond
espanolMediante un estudio dialogico de la nocion de igualdad definicional de la teoria constructiva de tipos (TCT), se mostrara que tal igualdad, que en la TCT provee el criterio de identidad asociado a un tipo, puede comprenderse, desde el punto de vista ludico, como resultado de una forma especifica de interaccion dialogica regida por la regla formal, mas conocida recientemente como la regla socratica, que prescribe el uso de jugadas de espejo (copy-cat moves). Esto se ilustrara con el desarrollo dialogico de las partes esenciales de la demostracion del axioma de eleccion de Per Martin-Lof, quien baso su prueba en la igualdad definicional entre la funcion que prueba el antecedente y la funcion que ocurre en el consecuente. EnglishThe main aim of the present paper is to show, by means of a dialogical study, that the notion of judgemental equality of Constructive Type Theory (CTT), which in this theory furnishes the criterion of identity of a type, can be understood from the game-theoretical point of view as the result of a specific form of dialogical interaction governed by the development rule known as formal rule or (more recently) Socratic rule, which prescribes the use of copy-cat moves. It will be shown, as an example, how to develop the core of a winning strategy for Per Martin-Lof’s demonstration of the Axiom of Choice, who based his proof in the judgemental equality between the function in the antecedent and the function occurring in the consequent of the axiom.
espanolMediante dialogico研究nocion建设性definicional平等理论类型(TCT),负债,这样的平等身份,在TCT提供标准类型相关联,可以了解从ludico的观点,由于一种方式指定interaccion dialogica由正式的规则,但最近称为socratica法则,规定使用镜像戏剧(copy-cat moves)。这将通过Per Martin-Lof证明选择公理的基本部分的对话发展来说明，他的证明基于证明先行词的函数和发生在结果中的函数之间的定义相等。EnglishThe主要aim is to show of the目前paper, by means of a dialogical study, that the notion of judgemental equality of Type建设性Theory(科技委),which in this Theory furnishes the雅典of identity of a Type, can be不言而喻,from the game-theoretical point of view the公诉机关的具体form of dialogical interaction受by the development rule正式任命rule or more惧)Socratic rule, which prescribes the use of copy-cat moves。It will be,作为示例,how to会议应为the core of a trial)战略Per Martin-Lof’s demonstration of the Axiom of Choice,基础proof in the judgemental equality between the function in the antecedent and the function occurring in the consequent of the Axiom。
{"title":"Interacción e igualdad. La interpretación dialógica de la teoría constructiva de tipos","authors":"Shahid Rahman, Nicolas Clerbout, Juan Redmond","doi":"10.22201/IIFS.18704905E.2017.199","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.22201/IIFS.18704905E.2017.199","url":null,"abstract":"espanolMediante un estudio dialogico de la nocion de igualdad definicional de la teoria constructiva de tipos (TCT), se mostrara que tal igualdad, que en la TCT provee el criterio de identidad asociado a un tipo, puede comprenderse, desde el punto de vista ludico, como resultado de una forma especifica de interaccion dialogica regida por la regla formal, mas conocida recientemente como la regla socratica, que prescribe el uso de jugadas de espejo (copy-cat moves). Esto se ilustrara con el desarrollo dialogico de las partes esenciales de la demostracion del axioma de eleccion de Per Martin-Lof, quien baso su prueba en la igualdad definicional entre la funcion que prueba el antecedente y la funcion que ocurre en el consecuente. EnglishThe main aim of the present paper is to show, by means of a dialogical study, that the notion of judgemental equality of Constructive Type Theory (CTT), which in this theory furnishes the criterion of identity of a type, can be understood from the game-theoretical point of view as the result of a specific form of dialogical interaction governed by the development rule known as formal rule or (more recently) Socratic rule, which prescribes the use of copy-cat moves. It will be shown, as an example, how to develop the core of a winning strategy for Per Martin-Lof’s demonstration of the Axiom of Choice, who based his proof in the judgemental equality between the function in the antecedent and the function occurring in the consequent of the axiom.","PeriodicalId":43820,"journal":{"name":"CRITICA-REVISTA HISPANOAMERICANA DE FILOSOFIA","volume":"119 1","pages":"49-89"},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2017-10-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"89043357","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2017-10-31DOI: 10.22201/iifs.18704905e.2017.195
E. Sacchi, A. Voltolini
espanolQueremos mostrar que ninguno de los argumentos conocidos a favor del externismo fenomenico (PE) es convincente. PE es la tesis de que las propiedades fenomenicas de nuestras experiencias se tienen que individuar en modo amplio en la medida en la que estan constituidas por propiedades del mundo. Examinamos los que nos parecen los cinco mejores argumentos a favor de PE. Intentamos mostrar que ninguno de ellos puede establecer el resultado deseado. Mientras no aparezcan argumentos mejores en el debate, no tenemos razon para renunciar a una idea que parece intuitiva y atractiva para muchos psicologos cognitivos: que la fenomenologia es estrecha, es decir, que las propiedades fenomenicas son propiedades intrinsecas de nuestras experiencias. Esta idea subyace a la posicion filosofica opuesta, el internismo fenomenico (PI). EnglishWe maintain that no extant argument in favor of phenomenal externalism (PE) is really convincing. PE is the thesis that the phenomenal properties of our experiences must be individuated widely insofar as they are constituted by worldly properties. We consider what we take to be the five best arguments for PE. We try to show that none of them really proves what it aims at proving. Unless better arguments in favor of phenomenal externalism show up in the debate, we see no reason to relinquish an idea that seems intuitive and appeals to many cognitive scientists: that phenomenology is narrow, i.e., that phenomenal properties are intrinsic properties of our experiences. This idea grounds the opposite philosophical position, phenomenal internalism (PI).
我们想要证明，没有一个已知的支持现象外部性(PE)的论点是令人信服的。PE的论点是，我们的经验的现象性质必须在很大程度上个性化，因为它们是由世界的性质构成的。我们研究了我们认为的支持ep的五大理由。我们试图表明，他们都不能建立预期的结果。在辩论中出现更好的论点之前，我们没有理由放弃一个对许多认知心理学家来说似乎直观且有吸引力的观点:现象学是狭隘的，即现象属性是我们经验的内在属性。这一观点的基础是相反的哲学立场，现象内在主义(PI)。我们坚持认为，不存在支持现象外部性(PE)的论点确实令人信服。= =地理= =根据美国人口普查，这个县的面积为。我们认为我们认为什么是体育的五大最佳论据。我们试图to show that none of them真正proves what it在试验场。除非better论点in忙of phenomenal externalism show up in the辩论,we see no reason to relinquish an主意that intuitive人and上诉加入许多cognitive科学家:that phenomenology is narrow,即其phenomenal properties是intrinsic properties of our经验。= =地理= =根据美国人口普查，这个县的土地面积为。
{"title":"Against Phenomenal Externalism","authors":"E. Sacchi, A. Voltolini","doi":"10.22201/iifs.18704905e.2017.195","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.22201/iifs.18704905e.2017.195","url":null,"abstract":"espanolQueremos mostrar que ninguno de los argumentos conocidos a favor del externismo fenomenico (PE) es convincente. PE es la tesis de que las propiedades fenomenicas de nuestras experiencias se tienen que individuar en modo amplio en la medida en la que estan constituidas por propiedades del mundo. Examinamos los que nos parecen los cinco mejores argumentos a favor de PE. Intentamos mostrar que ninguno de ellos puede establecer el resultado deseado. Mientras no aparezcan argumentos mejores en el debate, no tenemos razon para renunciar a una idea que parece intuitiva y atractiva para muchos psicologos cognitivos: que la fenomenologia es estrecha, es decir, que las propiedades fenomenicas son propiedades intrinsecas de nuestras experiencias. Esta idea subyace a la posicion filosofica opuesta, el internismo fenomenico (PI). EnglishWe maintain that no extant argument in favor of phenomenal externalism (PE) is really convincing. PE is the thesis that the phenomenal properties of our experiences must be individuated widely insofar as they are constituted by worldly properties. We consider what we take to be the five best arguments for PE. We try to show that none of them really proves what it aims at proving. Unless better arguments in favor of phenomenal externalism show up in the debate, we see no reason to relinquish an idea that seems intuitive and appeals to many cognitive scientists: that phenomenology is narrow, i.e., that phenomenal properties are intrinsic properties of our experiences. This idea grounds the opposite philosophical position, phenomenal internalism (PI).","PeriodicalId":43820,"journal":{"name":"CRITICA-REVISTA HISPANOAMERICANA DE FILOSOFIA","volume":"95 1","pages":"25-48"},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2017-10-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"74404760","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2017-10-31DOI: 10.22201/IIFS.18704905E.2017.179
K. Alleva, J. Díez, Lucía Federico
The goal of this article is to show that formal analysis and reconstructions may be useful to discuss and shed light on substantive meta-theoretical issues. We proceed here by exemplification, analysing and reconstructing as a case study a paradigmatic biochemical theory, the Monod-Wyman-Changeux (MWC) theory of allosterism, and applying the reconstruction to the discussion of some issues raised by prominent representatives of the new mechanist philosophy. We conclude that our study shows that at least in this case mechanicism and (some version of) more traditional accounts are not rivals but complementary approaches.
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Pub Date : 2017-10-31DOI: 10.22201/iifs.18704905e.2017.182
Gonzalo Villa Rosas
espanolEste articulo tiene como objetivo explorar dos objeciones planteadas en contra del segundo enfoque defendido por Bulygin en relacion con la definicion de la naturaleza de las reglas juridicas que otorgan competencia juridica. Segun la primera, tal enfoque es vago en cuanto a lo que estas reglas juridicas definen. Esta vaguedad se debe a la falta de una definicion adecuada de la competencia juridica. Defendere la reduccion de la complejidad de definientia definiendo la competencia juridica como una especie de competencia en sentido general. Segun la segunda, este enfoque no reduccionista no puede explicar la normatividad de este tipo de reglas. Contra este enfoque, sostendre que las reglas juridicas que otorgan competencia desempenan tanto una funcion deontica como una funcion definitoria en cuanto reglas constitutivas de la practica juridica. EnglishThis paper aims to explore two objections raised against Bulygin’s second approach to the definition of the nature of legal power-conferring rules. According to the first objection, such an account is vague about what is defined by legal power-conferring rules qua constitutive rules. I maintain that this vagueness is rooted in the lack of a suitable definition of legal power. I shall be arguing for the reduction of the complexity of the definientia by defining legal power as a species of competence. According to the second objection, this non-reductive approach cannot explain the normativity of this kind of rules. Against this approach, it argues that legal powerconferring rules perform a deontic and a definitional function as constitutive rules of legal practice.
{"title":"Commanding and Defining. On Eugenio Bulygin’s Theory of Legal Power-Conferring Rules","authors":"Gonzalo Villa Rosas","doi":"10.22201/iifs.18704905e.2017.182","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.22201/iifs.18704905e.2017.182","url":null,"abstract":"espanolEste articulo tiene como objetivo explorar dos objeciones planteadas en contra del segundo enfoque defendido por Bulygin en relacion con la definicion de la naturaleza de las reglas juridicas que otorgan competencia juridica. Segun la primera, tal enfoque es vago en cuanto a lo que estas reglas juridicas definen. Esta vaguedad se debe a la falta de una definicion adecuada de la competencia juridica. Defendere la reduccion de la complejidad de definientia definiendo la competencia juridica como una especie de competencia en sentido general. Segun la segunda, este enfoque no reduccionista no puede explicar la normatividad de este tipo de reglas. Contra este enfoque, sostendre que las reglas juridicas que otorgan competencia desempenan tanto una funcion deontica como una funcion definitoria en cuanto reglas constitutivas de la practica juridica. EnglishThis paper aims to explore two objections raised against Bulygin’s second approach to the definition of the nature of legal power-conferring rules. According to the first objection, such an account is vague about what is defined by legal power-conferring rules qua constitutive rules. I maintain that this vagueness is rooted in the lack of a suitable definition of legal power. I shall be arguing for the reduction of the complexity of the definientia by defining legal power as a species of competence. According to the second objection, this non-reductive approach cannot explain the normativity of this kind of rules. Against this approach, it argues that legal powerconferring rules perform a deontic and a definitional function as constitutive rules of legal practice.","PeriodicalId":43820,"journal":{"name":"CRITICA-REVISTA HISPANOAMERICANA DE FILOSOFIA","volume":"34 1","pages":"75-105"},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2017-10-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"80696715","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2017-10-31DOI: 10.22201/IIFS.18704905E.2017.188
P. H. H. Bernat
espanolEl objetivo del presente trabajo es definir los rasgos generales de un modelo de teoria del conocimiento viable para el ambito probatorio judicial. En concreto, se estudian los limites y las posibilidades de aplicacion al derecho de una de las propuestas mas relevantes en la epistemologia contemporanea: la epistemologia de virtudes robusta. Como mostrare aqui, dicho proyecto es inadecuado pues un epistemologia de la prueba juridica satisfactoria y completa exige la conjuncion tanto de la perspectiva del agente epistemico (el juez de los hechos) como de la perspectiva del sistema probatorio (las reglas o condiciones de indagacion). EnglishThe purpose of this paper is to define the general features of a suitable epistemology for law. In particular, the paper is concerned with a very influential project that is nowadays offered in the literature: robust virtue epistemology. As I will show here, such a project is untenable for law, since a satisfactory and complete epistemology of legal proof requires the conjunction of both the agent’s perspective (the “trier-of-facts”) and the inquiry system’s perspective (the rules of evidence).
本研究的目的是界定司法证据领域可行的知识理论模型的一般特征。本研究的目的是分析在法律实践中应用美德认识论的局限性和可能性，这是当代认识论中最相关的建议之一:罗布斯塔美德认识论。正如我将在这里指出的，这样一个项目是不充分的，因为一个令人满意和完整的法律证明认识论需要结合认识论行为人(事实的法官)和证据系统(调查的规则或条件)的观点。= =地理= =根据美国人口普查，这个县的面积为。尤其是有关,the paper is with a非常influential project that is某offered In the文献:强劲的道德epistemology。我将在此说明，这样一个项目对法律来说是站不住脚的，因为一个令人满意和完整的法律证明认识论需要结合代理的观点(“事实的分类”)和调查制度的观点(证据的规则)。
{"title":"Epistemología de virtudes robusta: sobre los límites y las posibilidades de su aplicación a la prueba de los hechos en el derecho","authors":"P. H. H. Bernat","doi":"10.22201/IIFS.18704905E.2017.188","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.22201/IIFS.18704905E.2017.188","url":null,"abstract":"espanolEl objetivo del presente trabajo es definir los rasgos generales de un modelo de teoria del conocimiento viable para el ambito probatorio judicial. En concreto, se estudian los limites y las posibilidades de aplicacion al derecho de una de las propuestas mas relevantes en la epistemologia contemporanea: la epistemologia de virtudes robusta. Como mostrare aqui, dicho proyecto es inadecuado pues un epistemologia de la prueba juridica satisfactoria y completa exige la conjuncion tanto de la perspectiva del agente epistemico (el juez de los hechos) como de la perspectiva del sistema probatorio (las reglas o condiciones de indagacion). EnglishThe purpose of this paper is to define the general features of a suitable epistemology for law. In particular, the paper is concerned with a very influential project that is nowadays offered in the literature: robust virtue epistemology. As I will show here, such a project is untenable for law, since a satisfactory and complete epistemology of legal proof requires the conjunction of both the agent’s perspective (the “trier-of-facts”) and the inquiry system’s perspective (the rules of evidence).","PeriodicalId":43820,"journal":{"name":"CRITICA-REVISTA HISPANOAMERICANA DE FILOSOFIA","volume":"28 1","pages":"3-24"},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2017-10-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"81060901","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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