Pub Date : 2017-10-31DOI: 10.22201/IIFS.18704905E.2017.207
Manuel García-Carpintero
espanolEn su discusion “Obras de ficcion, formas de conciencia y literatura”, Josep Corbi formula una serie de criticas certeras a mis ideas sobre la distincion que he hecho entre ficcion y no ficcion en Relatar lo ocurrido como invencion (2016). En esta nota de respuesta expongo primero de forma sucinta el nucleo de esas ideas y despues proporciono las que considero las razones mas decisivas para adoptarlas, a pesar de las dificultades que senala Corbi. EnglishIn his paper “Obras de ficcion, formas de conciencia y literatura”, Josep Corbi raises a few sharp objections to my distinction between fiction and non-fiction, as I formulate it in my recently published Relatar lo ocurrido como invencion (2016). In this response, I present first in a compact form such ideas, and then I try to answer to Corbi’s criticisms.
在他的讨论“小说作品、意识形式和文学”中，Josep Corbi对我的想法提出了一系列准确的批评，关于我在叙述作为发明发生的事情时对小说和非小说所作的区分(2016)。在这一答复中，我首先简要地阐述了这些想法的核心，然后给出了我认为采用这些想法的最决定性的理由，尽管Corbi指出了困难。Josep Corbi在他的论文“Obras de ficcion, formas de conciencia y literatura”中，对我区分小说和非小说提出了一些尖锐的反对意见，因为我在最近出版的报告中阐述了作为发明发生的事情(2016)。在这个回答中，我首先提出了一个简短的想法，然后我试图回答Corbi的批评。
{"title":"Las normas y su puesta en vigor: respuesta a Josep Corbí","authors":"Manuel García-Carpintero","doi":"10.22201/IIFS.18704905E.2017.207","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.22201/IIFS.18704905E.2017.207","url":null,"abstract":"espanolEn su discusion “Obras de ficcion, formas de conciencia y literatura”, Josep Corbi formula una serie de criticas certeras a mis ideas sobre la distincion que he hecho entre ficcion y no ficcion en Relatar lo ocurrido como invencion (2016). En esta nota de respuesta expongo primero de forma sucinta el nucleo de esas ideas y despues proporciono las que considero las razones mas decisivas para adoptarlas, a pesar de las dificultades que senala Corbi. EnglishIn his paper “Obras de ficcion, formas de conciencia y literatura”, Josep Corbi raises a few sharp objections to my distinction between fiction and non-fiction, as I formulate it in my recently published Relatar lo ocurrido como invencion (2016). In this response, I present first in a compact form such ideas, and then I try to answer to Corbi’s criticisms.","PeriodicalId":43820,"journal":{"name":"CRITICA-REVISTA HISPANOAMERICANA DE FILOSOFIA","volume":"1 1","pages":"113-132"},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2017-10-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"73085282","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2017-10-31DOI: 10.22201/iifs.18704905e.2017.210
Carla Merino-Rajme
Carlos Montemayor, Minding Time: A Philosophical and TheoreticalApproach to the Psychology of Time, Brill, Leiden, 2013, xiv +154 pp.
Carlos Montemayor:《思考时间:时间心理学的哲学与理论研究》，《中国社会科学》2013年第14期，第154页。
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Pub Date : 2017-10-31DOI: 10.22201/iifs.18704905e.2017.185
R. Mena
Ernie Lepore and Matthew Stone, Imagination and Convention: Distinguishing Grammar and Inference in Language, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2014, 272 pp.
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Pub Date : 2017-10-31DOI: 10.22201/iifs.18704905e.2017.181
J. Moreso
espanolEste articulo analiza la tesis del relativismo etico, tal y como se defiende en Alchourron y Bulygin 1983. En ese trabajo, los autores plantean, por una parte, una sugerente concepcion conforme a la cual considerar cuales son nuestras obligaciones es equivalente a pensar que hemos de hacer y, por otra, una concepcion relativista de la etica. Presentan tres objeciones a las concepciones constructivistas de la etica que no son relativistas: a) el argumento de la carga de la prueba, b) una version del dilema de Eutifron y c) el argumento del particularismo. En este articulo se presentan contraargumentos a estas objeciones tratando de mostrar que no son concluyentes y que, por lo tanto, queda un espacio para la objetividad en el ambito normativo. EnglishThis article analyzes the thesis of ethical relativism, as defended by Alchourron and Bulygin (1983). These authors offer, on the one hand, a suggestive conception according to which the question “what are our obligations?” is equivalent to thinking about what is to be done; on the other hand, they defend a relativist conception of ethics. They present three objections to constructivist accounts of ethics that are not relativist: a) the argument of the burden of the proof; b) a version of the dilemma of Euthyphro, and c) the argument of particularism. This article presents counterarguments to these objections in the attempt to show that they are not conclusive and that a space therefore remains for objectivity in the normative sphere.
本文分析了Alchourron和Bulygin在1983年提出的伦理相对主义理论。在这篇论文中，作者提出了一个具有启蒙性的概念，根据这个概念，考虑我们的义务是什么，就像思考我们必须做什么一样，另一方面，一个相对主义的伦理概念。他们对非相对论的建构主义伦理学概念提出了三个反对意见:a)举证责任的论点，b) Eutifron困境的一个版本，c)特殊主义的论点。本文对这些反对意见提出了反对意见，试图表明它们不是结论性的，因此在规范范围内仍有客观性的空间。这篇文章分析了Alchourron和Bulygin(1983)所捍卫的伦理相对主义的论点。这些authors offer, on the one hand, suggestive概念根据to which the问题“what are our义务?-这相当于思考要做什么;另一方面，他们提倡一种相对主义的伦理观念。他们对建构主义对非相对主义伦理的解释提出三个反对意见:a)证据负担的论点;version of the dilemma Euthyphro, (b)和c):《particularism触发。本文对这些反对意见提出了反对意见，试图表明它们不是结论性的，因此在规范范围内保留了客观性的空间。
{"title":"On Deontic Truth and Values","authors":"J. Moreso","doi":"10.22201/iifs.18704905e.2017.181","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.22201/iifs.18704905e.2017.181","url":null,"abstract":"espanolEste articulo analiza la tesis del relativismo etico, tal y como se defiende en Alchourron y Bulygin 1983. En ese trabajo, los autores plantean, por una parte, una sugerente concepcion conforme a la cual considerar cuales son nuestras obligaciones es equivalente a pensar que hemos de hacer y, por otra, una concepcion relativista de la etica. Presentan tres objeciones a las concepciones constructivistas de la etica que no son relativistas: a) el argumento de la carga de la prueba, b) una version del dilema de Eutifron y c) el argumento del particularismo. En este articulo se presentan contraargumentos a estas objeciones tratando de mostrar que no son concluyentes y que, por lo tanto, queda un espacio para la objetividad en el ambito normativo. EnglishThis article analyzes the thesis of ethical relativism, as defended by Alchourron and Bulygin (1983). These authors offer, on the one hand, a suggestive conception according to which the question “what are our obligations?” is equivalent to thinking about what is to be done; on the other hand, they defend a relativist conception of ethics. They present three objections to constructivist accounts of ethics that are not relativist: a) the argument of the burden of the proof; b) a version of the dilemma of Euthyphro, and c) the argument of particularism. This article presents counterarguments to these objections in the attempt to show that they are not conclusive and that a space therefore remains for objectivity in the normative sphere.","PeriodicalId":43820,"journal":{"name":"CRITICA-REVISTA HISPANOAMERICANA DE FILOSOFIA","volume":"23 1","pages":"61-74"},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2017-10-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"90514784","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2017-10-31DOI: 10.22201/IIFS.18704905E.2017.184
Hugo R. Zuleta
I criticize an argument presented by Pablo Navarro and Jorge Rodriguez (2014) against the conception of legal systems as sets of statements closed under logical consequence. First, I show that the example on which they ground their argument incurs in a fallacy of equivocation. Then, I recognize that the authors are right about the fact that two different normative bases can react differently to changes, but I claim that that is not a decisive reason for choosing always the expressly enacted norms as the system’s basis, that the selection of the best basis should be guided by methodological considerations and that, to that purpose, it is necessary to consider the whole set of logical consequences as part of the system.
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Pub Date : 2017-10-31DOI: 10.22201/IIFS.18704905E.2017.180
M. Sebastián
espanolEn un articulo publicado recientemente (2014) en esta revista, Javier Vidal argumenta que toda creencia de primera persona es una creencia consciente, una conclusion que pone en jaque ciertas teorias de la consciencia, como el mismo expone. El razonamiento de Vidal se basa en un argumento que muestra que uno conoce toda creencia de primera persona que tiene y en un principio (SC*) que vincula conocimiento y consciencia. Mi objetivo en este trabajo es mostrar que el razonamiento de Vidal no es solido. En particular, hago patente que el argumento depende de rechazar la relacion ampliamente aceptada en epistemologia entre creencia y conocimiento. Ademas, argumento que SC* o bien prejuzga la cuestion o bien involucra una nocion de consciencia no relevante para la discusion. EnglishIn a recent paper in this journal (2014), Javier Vidal has argued that every first-person belief is a conscious one, a conclusion that jeopardizes certain theories of consciousness as he shows. Vidal’s reasoning is builded upon an argument to the effect that one knows all first person beliefs that one has and a principle (SC*) that links knowledge and consciousness. My aim in this paper is to show that Vidal’s reasoning is unsound. In particular, I show that the argument depends upon the rejection of the relation, widely accepted in epistemology, between belief and knowledge. Moreover, I argue that SC* either begs the question or involves a notion of consciousness that is not relevant for the discussion.
哈维尔·维达尔(Javier Vidal)最近在该杂志2014年发表的一篇文章中认为，所有第一人称信仰都是一种有意识的信仰，这一结论对某些意识理论提出了质疑。维达尔的推理基于一个论点，即一个人知道他所拥有的每一个第一人称信仰，以及一个将知识和意识联系起来的原则(SC*)。我在这项工作的目的是表明维达尔的推理是不可靠的。在我看来，信仰和知识之间的关系在认识论中被广泛接受是很重要的。此外，SC*的论点要么预先判断问题，要么涉及与讨论无关的意识伤害。在最近的一篇论文(2014)中，Javier Vidal认为每个第一个人的信仰都是一个有意识的人，他的结论是，某些意识理论是危险的。维达' s - is builded upon an触发to the effect of that one无人知道all first人计划署that one你and a原则(SC) * that knowledge and consciousness连结。维达My aim in this paper is to show that ' s reasoning is unsound。尤其是,I show that the触发的upon the拒收,宣传的In epistemology,信仰与知识。此外，我认为SC*要么要求这个问题，要么涉及一种不属于讨论范围的意识概念。
{"title":"Hay muchas cosas que creo de mí mismo (consciente e inconscientemente) sin saber que las creo","authors":"M. Sebastián","doi":"10.22201/IIFS.18704905E.2017.180","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.22201/IIFS.18704905E.2017.180","url":null,"abstract":"espanolEn un articulo publicado recientemente (2014) en esta revista, Javier Vidal argumenta que toda creencia de primera persona es una creencia consciente, una conclusion que pone en jaque ciertas teorias de la consciencia, como el mismo expone. El razonamiento de Vidal se basa en un argumento que muestra que uno conoce toda creencia de primera persona que tiene y en un principio (SC*) que vincula conocimiento y consciencia. Mi objetivo en este trabajo es mostrar que el razonamiento de Vidal no es solido. En particular, hago patente que el argumento depende de rechazar la relacion ampliamente aceptada en epistemologia entre creencia y conocimiento. Ademas, argumento que SC* o bien prejuzga la cuestion o bien involucra una nocion de consciencia no relevante para la discusion. EnglishIn a recent paper in this journal (2014), Javier Vidal has argued that every first-person belief is a conscious one, a conclusion that jeopardizes certain theories of consciousness as he shows. Vidal’s reasoning is builded upon an argument to the effect that one knows all first person beliefs that one has and a principle (SC*) that links knowledge and consciousness. My aim in this paper is to show that Vidal’s reasoning is unsound. In particular, I show that the argument depends upon the rejection of the relation, widely accepted in epistemology, between belief and knowledge. Moreover, I argue that SC* either begs the question or involves a notion of consciousness that is not relevant for the discussion.","PeriodicalId":43820,"journal":{"name":"CRITICA-REVISTA HISPANOAMERICANA DE FILOSOFIA","volume":"38 1","pages":"37-60"},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2017-10-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"85048456","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2017-10-31DOI: 10.22201/IIFS.18704905E.2017.183
María Gabriela Scataglini
In this text I compare Eugenio Bulygin’s and Cristina Redondo’s conceptions about those statements that register the fact that members of a society accept some rules as guides for their behavior. I inquire into what makes it possible for the observer to identify or recognize valid legal rules as such, and my answer is inspired by Wittgenstein’s rule-following considerations, taken up from Brandom’s critique against “regularism”. I concur with Redondo on those points where she is in disagreement with Bulygin, although I express a slight but crucial difference with Redondo’s position.
{"title":"Bulygin-redondo: desencuentros cercanos sobre enunciados Hartianos del tercer tipo","authors":"María Gabriela Scataglini","doi":"10.22201/IIFS.18704905E.2017.183","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.22201/IIFS.18704905E.2017.183","url":null,"abstract":"In this text I compare Eugenio Bulygin’s and Cristina Redondo’s conceptions about those statements that register the fact that members of a society accept some rules as guides for their behavior. I inquire into what makes it possible for the observer to identify or recognize valid legal rules as such, and my answer is inspired by Wittgenstein’s rule-following considerations, taken up from Brandom’s critique against “regularism”. I concur with Redondo on those points where she is in disagreement with Bulygin, although I express a slight but crucial difference with Redondo’s position.","PeriodicalId":43820,"journal":{"name":"CRITICA-REVISTA HISPANOAMERICANA DE FILOSOFIA","volume":"5 1","pages":"107-123"},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2017-10-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"81815822","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2017-10-31DOI: 10.22201/IIFS.18704905E.2017.204
Josep Corbí
espanol"Relatar lo ocurrido como invencion: una introduccion a la filosofia de la ficcion contemporanea (2016a)" ofrece al lector en castellano una magnifica oportunidad para familiarizarse con algunos aspectos centrales de la filosofia del lenguaje contemporanea y sus implicaciones para la teoria de la ficcion. Garcia-Carpintero recorre los argumentos fundamentales en favor y en contra de cada una de las posiciones relevantes, y nos propone finalmente un analisis alternativo de la norma de la ficcion y una teoria neofregeana de los terminos referenciales que logra esquivar algunas objeciones tradicionales. Esta discusion incluye, no obstante, dos objeciones a su norma de la ficcion: una se refiere a las formas de la conciencia que esa norma presupone y la otra a la naturaleza del interes que suscitan los proyectos imaginativos vinculados a las obras de ficcion. English"Relatar lo ocurrido como invencion: una introduccion a la filosofia de la ficcion contemporanea (2016a)" offers to the Spanish reader an excellent opportunity to get in touch with central aspects in the current philosophy of language and their implications for fiction theory. In his book, Garcia-Carpintero carefully presents the fundamental lines of argument for and against the most relevant views and, on this basis, defends his own analysis of the norm of fiction as well as a neo-Fregean theory of referential terms that averts some traditional objections. My review includes, however, two objections concerning Garcia-Carpintero’s norm of fiction, one relative to the forms of awareness that it seems to presuppose, and the other regarding the nature of the interest associated with the imaginative projects that are constitutive of fictional works.
{"title":"Obras de ficción, formas de conciencia y literatura","authors":"Josep Corbí","doi":"10.22201/IIFS.18704905E.2017.204","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.22201/IIFS.18704905E.2017.204","url":null,"abstract":"espanol\"Relatar lo ocurrido como invencion: una introduccion a la filosofia de la ficcion contemporanea (2016a)\" ofrece al lector en castellano una magnifica oportunidad para familiarizarse con algunos aspectos centrales de la filosofia del lenguaje contemporanea y sus implicaciones para la teoria de la ficcion. Garcia-Carpintero recorre los argumentos fundamentales en favor y en contra de cada una de las posiciones relevantes, y nos propone finalmente un analisis alternativo de la norma de la ficcion y una teoria neofregeana de los terminos referenciales que logra esquivar algunas objeciones tradicionales. Esta discusion incluye, no obstante, dos objeciones a su norma de la ficcion: una se refiere a las formas de la conciencia que esa norma presupone y la otra a la naturaleza del interes que suscitan los proyectos imaginativos vinculados a las obras de ficcion. English\"Relatar lo ocurrido como invencion: una introduccion a la filosofia de la ficcion contemporanea (2016a)\" offers to the Spanish reader an excellent opportunity to get in touch with central aspects in the current philosophy of language and their implications for fiction theory. In his book, Garcia-Carpintero carefully presents the fundamental lines of argument for and against the most relevant views and, on this basis, defends his own analysis of the norm of fiction as well as a neo-Fregean theory of referential terms that averts some traditional objections. My review includes, however, two objections concerning Garcia-Carpintero’s norm of fiction, one relative to the forms of awareness that it seems to presuppose, and the other regarding the nature of the interest associated with the imaginative projects that are constitutive of fictional works.","PeriodicalId":43820,"journal":{"name":"CRITICA-REVISTA HISPANOAMERICANA DE FILOSOFIA","volume":"55 1","pages":"91-112"},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2017-10-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"89833294","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2017-10-29DOI: 10.22201/iifs.18704905e.2017.118
Diego Dei Vecchi
espanolEl autor pone en duda la posibilidad de una ciencia juridica acorde a las exigencias del positivismo juridico normativista, segun el cual describir el derecho es dar cuenta neutralmente de lo que juridicamente se debe hacer. Replantea la tesis de Joseph Raz de que, para proferir enunciados descriptivos tales, debe adoptarse hipoteticamente el punto de vista juridico, en si mismo moralmente comprometido; segun esa tesis, una ciencia juridica acorde a las exigencias ha de pronunciarse profiriendo enunciados de un tipo que Raz denomina “no comprometidos”. El texto aborda varias posturas criticas contra esta vision y muestra que si bien es posible rechazar la tesis de Raz tal como la postula, se corre el peligro de descartar como no problematico mas de lo plausiblemente descartable. Asi, recurriendo a dos viejas discusiones de la filosofia del derecho reformula y da plausibilidad a la tesis de la necesidad de asumir el punto de vista juridico. EnglishThe author calls into question the possibility of a legal science in accordance with the requirements of normative legal positivism, which holds that to describe the law is to give an account of legal rights and duties. To evaluate the possibility of this program the author reformulates Joseph Raz’s thesis which states that legal scientists must adopt the legal point of view; to this end they must proffer statements of a peculiar type, which Raz has called detached legal statements. This paper attempts to show that even though the thesis can be rejected as Raz postulates it, this would risk discarding as “non-problematic” more than what is reasonable to discard. Thus, resorting to two familiar discussions in the philosophy of law, the “legal point of view thesis” is reformulated and shown as plausible.
作者质疑一门符合规范主义法律实证主义要求的法律科学的可能性，根据这种法律实证主义，对法律的描述是对法律必须做什么的中立解释。重申约瑟夫·拉兹(Joseph Raz)的论点，即为了作出这样的描述性陈述，必须假定采用法律观点，而法律观点本身就是道德上的妥协;根据这一论点，一门符合要求的法律科学必须通过作出一种拉兹称之为“不妥协”的陈述来作出裁决。在这篇文章中，我们提出了一些反对这种观点的批评立场，并表明，尽管有可能拒绝拉兹的论点，但它有被抛弃的危险，因为它没有问题，超过了看似可以抛弃的。因此，他借鉴了两种古老的法律哲学讨论，重新阐述了法律观点的必要性，并使其具有可信性。作者对一门法律科学是否符合规范法律实证主义的要求提出了质疑，这种法律实证主义认为，要描述法律，就必须说明法律权利和义务。为了评估这一方案的可能性，作者重写了Joseph Raz的论文，其中指出法律科学家必须采用法律观点;为此，他们必须提供一种特殊类型的声明，这就是所谓的独立法律声明。This paper任何to show that虽然thesis can be rejected划入Raz postulates it,这将risk discarding“non-problematic“more than what is reasonable discard。因此,借助two in the philosophy of law,家庭讨论“法律point of view thesis”reformulated和日内瓦其他可行。
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espanolEn un articulo reciente titulado “Is General Jurisprudence Interesting?”, David Enoch responde su propia pregunta de forma sonoramente negativa. Este articulo examina criticamente la naturaleza de la afirmacion de Enoch, las presuposiciones sobre las que descansa y la manera en la que intenta mostrar que tal es el caso. Habiendo arguido que muchas de las visiones al respecto dependen de un entendimiento pobre e idiosincrasico de las cuestiones de las que se ocupa la teoria general del derecho, asi como de las relaciones entre esas cuestiones y muchas otras investigaciones acerca de la naturaleza del derecho, el articulo concluye ofreciendo la propia version de la autora acerca de aquello que hace de la teoria general del derecho algo intrigante, cautivador y. . . tambien. . . interesante. EnglishIn a recent article entitled, “Is General Jurisprudence Interesting?”, David Enoch answers his own question resoundingly in the negative. This article critically examines the character of Enoch’s claim, the presuppositions it rests on, and the way in which he seeks to establish it. Having argued that many of Enoch’s views in this regard hinge on a narrow and idiosyncratic understanding of the questions that general jurisprudence addresses, and of the relations between those questions and many other inquiries concerning the character of law, the article concludes by offering its author’s own vision of what makes general jurisprudence engaging, intriguing, and. . . well. . . interesting.
最近一篇题为“一般法理学感兴趣吗?”大卫·以诺以一种明显否定的方式回答了自己的问题。以诺在《创世纪》第1章第2节中说:“神的儿子以诺是神的儿子，神的儿子以诺是神的儿子。”arguido了许多幻想就此取决于一个可怜的谅解和idiosincrasico问题涉及权利的一般理论,就是关系这些问题和许多其他权利的性质,这篇文章对研究结论提供的封面,提交人关于这一些引人注目的法的一般理论前,迷人的和。。。还有……有趣的。EnglishIn总最近entitled条,“Is Interesting编辑部吗?= =地理= =根据美国人口普查，该镇的土地面积为。这篇文章批判性地审视了以诺的主张的特征，它的前提，以及它试图建立它的方式。已经argued that许多《Enoch views有鉴于此,hinge on a narrow and idiosyncratic understanding of the一般问题that it, and of the relations between编辑部的那些问题和许多其他调查关于查阅of law, the条在文末by offering its own vision of what提交人曾参与编辑部intriguing,将军。。。嗯……interesting。
{"title":"Why General Jurisprudence Is Interesting","authors":"J. Dickson","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.2921820","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.2921820","url":null,"abstract":"espanolEn un articulo reciente titulado “Is General Jurisprudence Interesting?”, David Enoch responde su propia pregunta de forma sonoramente negativa. Este articulo examina criticamente la naturaleza de la afirmacion de Enoch, las presuposiciones sobre las que descansa y la manera en la que intenta mostrar que tal es el caso. Habiendo arguido que muchas de las visiones al respecto dependen de un entendimiento pobre e idiosincrasico de las cuestiones de las que se ocupa la teoria general del derecho, asi como de las relaciones entre esas cuestiones y muchas otras investigaciones acerca de la naturaleza del derecho, el articulo concluye ofreciendo la propia version de la autora acerca de aquello que hace de la teoria general del derecho algo intrigante, cautivador y. . . tambien. . . interesante. EnglishIn a recent article entitled, “Is General Jurisprudence Interesting?”, David Enoch answers his own question resoundingly in the negative. This article critically examines the character of Enoch’s claim, the presuppositions it rests on, and the way in which he seeks to establish it. Having argued that many of Enoch’s views in this regard hinge on a narrow and idiosyncratic understanding of the questions that general jurisprudence addresses, and of the relations between those questions and many other inquiries concerning the character of law, the article concludes by offering its author’s own vision of what makes general jurisprudence engaging, intriguing, and. . . well. . . interesting.","PeriodicalId":43820,"journal":{"name":"CRITICA-REVISTA HISPANOAMERICANA DE FILOSOFIA","volume":"46 1","pages":"11-39"},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2017-02-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"83684975","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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