Journal of Development Economics最新文献

Is elite persistence weaker in Africa than in other parts of the world, given historical barriers to intergenerational inheritance of status, such as limited private property rights and frequent economic and political crises? In the absence of linked intergenerational data, we use name analysis to address this question. Using surnames associated with two Sierra Leonean elites, Krio descendants of settlers and members of chiefly lineages, we measure elite persistence in politics, education and business since 1960. Both groups were highly overrepresented in elite positions at independence, and remain overrepresented today. Benchmarking our results against other countries shows that Sierra Leone's educational elites are as persistent as elsewhere, but elite persistence in the political sphere is lower than in the United Kingdom, our main comparator. We also show marked path dependence: chiefly descendants remain more overrepresented in politics and mining, while the Krio are highly over-represented in education and the professions.

We investigate the impact of tax cascading on upstream and downstream firms. As a natural experiment, we explore a reform that replaced turnover taxes with value-added taxes for service industries in China, which effectively removed tax cascading. We find a relative increase in sales, R&D investment, and employment for affected service firms. These changes are mainly driven by increased outsourcing from manufacturing firms, and are unlikely to be caused by changes in firms’ tax burden or output prices. Our study provides new evidence on how taxation affects supplier networks and firm performance.

We study the effects of an increase in post-secondary educational opportunities on teen fertility by exploiting policy-induced variation from Ser Pilo Paga (SPP), a generous college financial aid program in Colombia that dramatically expanded college opportunities for low-income students. Our preferred empirical approach uses a triple difference design that leverages variation in the share of female students eligible for the program across municipalities and the fact that the introduction of SPP should not affect the education and fertility decisions of older women not targeted by the program. We find that after the introduction of SPP, fertility rates for women aged 15–19 years old decreased in more affected municipalities by about 6 percent relative to less affected municipalities. This effect accounts for approximately one-fourth of the overall decrease in teen fertility observed in the years following the program’s announcement. Our results suggest that increasing economic opportunities through expanding college access can contribute to lowering teen fertility rates.

We study the interaction between transit improvements and land use policies. Bengaluru, one of India’s largest cities, inaugurated a metro system in 2011 but has extremely low building heights, even near metro stations. We build a rich dataset and a quantitative spatial model in which heterogeneous workers choose among different commuting modes. We find that the metro increases citywide output and welfare, even net of costs. However, the net gains are several times larger with transit-oriented development (TOD), i.e., when height limits are relaxed near stations. Moreover, TOD and the construction of the metro are complementary policies.

Public sector recruitment exams can be highly competitive. Does this competition encourage candidates to develop generalizable skills, or do investments in exam preparation burden candidates who fail to get selected? I address this question by studying the impact of a partial public sector hiring freeze in the state of Tamil Nadu, India on male college graduates. The hiring freeze eliminated 86% of the usual vacancies. This increased the applicant-to-vacancy ratio for the remaining posts. Cohorts that were exposed to the hiring freeze delayed full-time employment, most likely in order to invest more time in exam preparation. A decade after the hiring freeze ended, the affected cohorts demonstrate a lower earning capacity, have delayed household formation, and appear more likely to remain unemployed. Together, these results suggest that highly competitive exams encourage candidates to make investments that are ultimately unproductive.

I assess the efficiency of transport networks for every country in Africa. Using spatial data from various sources, I simulate trade flows over more than 70,000 links covering the entire continent. I maximise over the space of networks and find the optimal road system for every African state. My simulations predict that Africa would gain 1.3% of total welfare from reorganising its national road systems, and 0.8% from optimally expanding it by a tenth. I then construct a dataset of local network inefficiency and find that colonial infrastructure projects significantly skew trade networks towards a sub-optimal equilibrium today. I find suggestive evidence that regional favouritism played a role sustaining these imbalances.

This paper provides evidence of matching frictions in the Indian labor market. Using several methods to elicit genuine preferences of job-seekers over jobs, we show that: (a) there is substantial variation in job-seekers preferences over the same jobs; and (b) placement officers, responsible for placing job-seekers in jobs, have poor knowledge of it. Providing placement offers with this information improves matching of job-seekers to interviews, even after taking into account redistribution of jobs across job-seekers. Treated job-seekers get more preferred jobs and retain them in the short run (three months), but not in the longer run (six months).

How can one motivate field staff to meet activity goals on time? Can introducing competition within groups motivate workers to meet goals faster than simply setting targets for workers? We conducted an experiment that assigned temporary field workers for a mobile app registration project into two treatment groups: field workers pursuing individual goals versus competing for a shared group-goal. We measure whether field workers reached their goal, the time to reach the goal, and the number of registered users per field worker. Our model suggests that field workers complete tasks more quickly with in-group competitive targets compared to individual targets. In line with this prediction, we observed that in-group competition led to an increased number of registrations and faster target achievement. Although the effects do not significantly vary by gender, the competition treatment proved more effective for employed individuals, those with less experience, and those with higher ability.

Randomizing different schools of thought in training altruism finds that training junior deputy ministers in the utility of empathy renders at least a 0.4 standard deviation increase in altruism. Treated ministers increased their perspective-taking: blood donations doubled, but only when blood banks requested their exact blood type. Perspective-taking in strategic dilemmas improved. Field measures such as orphanage visits and volunteering in impoverished schools also increased, as did their test scores in teamwork assessments in policy scenarios. Overall, our results underscore that the utility of empathy can be a parsimonious foundation for the formation of prosociality, even impacting the behavior of adults in the field.

During public health emergencies, spreading accurate information and increasing adherence to recommended behaviors is critical for communal welfare. However, uncertainty, mistrust, and misinformation can slow the adoption of best practices. Preexisting social networks can amplify and endorse information from authorities, and technology makes peer-to-peer messaging scalable and fast. Using text messages and small cash incentives, we test a peer-based information campaign to encourage adherence to recommended COVID-19-related health behaviors in Zambia. None of the treatments affected health behavior among primary study participants or their peers. The suggestion to pass messages to peers increases dissemination, but financial incentives do not have any additional impact.