Objectives: Counter-empathy involves responding to others' assumed emotions incongruently. Research on dispositional counter-empathy predominantly focuses on specific counter-empathic constructs without clearly mapping its cardinal dimensions. We develop and test a Three-Dimensional Model of Counter-Empathy (3DCE) that includes schadenfreude, gluckschmerz, and affective sadism.
Method: Across five studies (total N = 1878), we test the 3DCE and develop the Various Indices of Counter-Empathy (VICE). Study 1a and Study 1b administered items representing the 3DCE to develop the VICE. Study 2 administered the VICE, measures of counter-empathic constructs, empathy, everyday sadism, and socially aversive outcomes. Study 3a and Study 3b administered vignettes of others' good fortunes and misfortunes, and depictions of general and social harms, and participants reported their reactions.
Results: The 3DCE and validity of the VICE are supported by exploratory and confirmatory factor analyses; a "bass-ackward" factor analysis mapping the hierarchical structure of counter-empathy; incremental analyses predicting socially aversive outcomes beyond empathy; correlations with relevant constructs; and predicting counter-empathic reactions to specific scenarios.
Conclusions: The 3DCE and VICE can help situate prior research in the broader structure of counter-empathy, help expand the study of vicarious emotion beyond empathy, and suggest counter-empathy contributes to socially aversive outcomes beyond a lack of empathy.
Objective: Research has accumulated evidence for religious residue, or the tendency for aspects of religion to persist after de-identification. The current study sought to examine whether religious residue extends to political orientation; or religious dones report more liberal political attitudes after leaving religion.
Method: We report data from eight samples drawn from three countries (N = 11,017), using both cross-sectional (Studies 1a-f) and longitudinal (Studies 2 and 3) designs.
Results: Studies 1a-f (n = 7089) revealed that adult religious dones reported significantly more politically liberal attitudes than religious individuals and, when pooling samples together, never-religious individuals. Study 2 (n = 2071) confirmed religious dones report more liberal attitudes than religious individuals in a longitudinal sample of adolescents and young adults. In Study 3 (n = 1857), we replicated this longitudinal finding among adolescents and young adults and found that religious de-identification predicted a more liberal political orientation over time.
Conclusions: Rather than demonstrating religious residue in the political domain, religious dones become more politically liberal after leaving religion. We discuss this contextual boundary condition of religious residue across cultures.

