Consciousness and Cognition最新文献

Until recently, little was known about whether or how autobiographical memory (i.e., memory of personal information) activates eye movement. This issue is now being addressed by several studies demonstrating not only how autobiographical memory activates eye movement, but also how eye movement influences the characteristics of autobiographical retrieval. This paper summarizes this research and presents a hypothesis according to which fixations and saccades during autobiographical retrieval mirror the construction of the visual image of the retrieved event. This hypothesis suggests that eye movements during autobiographical retrieval mirror the attempts of the visual system to generate and manipulate mental representations of autobiographical retrieval. It offers a theoretical framework for a burgeoning area of research that provides a rigorous behavioral evaluation of the phenomenological experience of memory.

A long-standing issue concerning synesthesia is whether the trait is continuous or discontinuous with ordinary perception. Here, we found that a substantial proportion of non-synesthetes (>10 % out of >200 unselected participants) spontaneously became aware of their synesthesia by participating in an online survey that forced them to select colors for stimuli that evoke color sensations in synesthetes. Notably, the test-retest consistencies of color sensation in these non-synesthetes were comparable to those in self-claimed synesthetes, revealing their strong though latent synesthetic dispositions. The effect was absent or weak in a matched control survey that did not include the color-picking test. Therefore, the color-picking task likely provided the predisposed “borderline non-synesthetes” with an opportunity to dwell on their tendency toward synesthesia and allowed their subconscious sensations to become conscious ones. The finding suggests that the general population has a continuum of synesthetic disposition that encompasses both synesthetes and non-synesthetes.

This study examined proactive control in a two-target task using an endogenous cueing method. Participants identified two target words (T1 then T2) presented in rapid succession. T1 was presented alone or interleaved with a distractor word. In Experiment 1, informative pre-cues that signalled T1 selection difficulty were randomly intermixed with uninformative pre-cues. The results revealed a cueing effect for both T1 and T2, with better performance for informative cues than for uninformative cues. In Experiment 2, informative and uninformative cues were mixed for one group, and blocked for another group. In the mixed cue group, we again found a T2 cueing effect. In the blocked cue group, a cueing effect was observed for both T1 and T2, with the T2 cueing effect restricted to the shortest T1-T2 SOA. The results demonstrate that pre-cues of attentional conflict can modulate performance in a two-target task used to measure the attentional blink.

Human behavior is flexibly regulated by specific goals of cognitive tasks. One notable example is goal-directed modulation of metacognitive behavior, where logically equivalent decision-making problems can yield different patterns of introspective confidence depending on the frame in which they are presented. While this observation highlights the important heuristic nature of metacognitive monitoring, computational mechanisms underlying this phenomenon remain elusive. We confirmed the confidence framing effect in two-alternative dot-number discrimination and in previously published preference-choice data, demonstrating distinctive confidence patterns between “choose more” or “choose less” frames. Formal model comparisons revealed a simple confidence heuristic behind this phenomenon, which assigns greater weight to chosen than unchosen stimulus evidence. This computation appears to be based on internal evidence constituted under specific task demands rather than physical stimulus intensity itself, a view justified in terms of ecological rationality. These results shed light on the adaptive nature of human decision-making and metacognitive monitoring.

Mentally contrasting a desired future with reality is a self-regulation strategy that helps people effectively pursue important personal wishes. People with higher self-regulation skills are more likely to spontaneously use mental contrasting. Because one central cognitive function underlying self-regulation is working memory capacity, we investigated whether people with low rather than high working memory capacity are less likely to spontaneously use mental contrasting. Study 1 provided correlational evidence that participants with lower working memory capacity, as measured by the Operation-Span Task, were less likely to use mental contrasting when elaborating an important interpersonal wish. Study 2 provided experimental evidence that manipulating low working memory capacity by inducing cognitive load (vs. no load) led fewer participants to use mental contrasting. The findings have theoretical implications by illuminating the processes that impede mental contrasting, and they have applied implications for understanding how to foster the use of mental contrasting in everyday life.

Aphantasia is a condition in which people are unable to experience visual imagery. Since visual imagery is thought to be key to language processing, we hypothesized the experience of a story would differ between individuals with aphantasia and controls. Forty-seven individuals with aphantasia were compared to fifty-one matched controls on their experience of reading a short story and their general reading habits. Aphantasics were less likely to be engaged with, interested in, and absorbed in the story, and experienced reduced emotional engagement with and sympathy for the story characters, compared to controls. Yet, aphantasics and controls did not differ in how much they liked or appreciated the story, and in general, the reading habits of the two groups also did not differ. Results have implications for embodied theories of language, suggesting visual imagery may influence how a story is experienced, but it is not the only route to story enjoyment.

Working memory is typically measured with specifically designed psychological tasks. When evaluating the validity of working memory tasks, we commonly focus on the reliability of the outcome measurements. Only rarely do we focus on how participants experience these tasks. Accounting for lived experience of working memory task may help us better understand variability in working memory performance and conscious experience in general. We replicated recently established protocols for the phenomenological investigation of working memory using the visual span task. We collected subjective reports from eighteen healthy participants (10 women) aged 21 to 35 years. We observed that working memory can be phenomenologically characterized at three different time scales: background feelings, strategies, and tactics. On the level of tactics, we identified transmodality (i.e., how one modality of lived experience can be transformed into another one) as the central phenomenological dynamic at play during working memory task performance.

Recent research has suggested that episodic memory can guide our decision-making. Forgetting is one essential characteristic of memory. If certain memories are suppressed to be forgotten, decisions that rely on such memories should be impacted. So far, little research has examined whether suppression of episodic memory would impact decision-making. In the current pre-registered study, the effect of memory suppression on subsequent reinforcement decision-making was examined by combining the Think/No-think paradigm and a reinforcement decision-making task. We found that suppressing memories of learned associations significantly impaired recollected memories of those associations, and participants’ decision bias disappeared after their memory associations were suppressed. Furthermore, the more memory associations participants recalled, the higher decision preferences they exhibited. Our findings provide additional support for the role of episodic memory in reinforcement decision-making, and suggest that suppressing memory associations can lead to behavioral consequences.

William James’s use of “time in passing” and “stream of thoughts” may be two sides of the same coin that emerge from the brain segmenting the continuous flow of information into discrete events. Herein, we investigated how the density of events affects two temporal experiences: the felt duration and speed of time. Using a temporal bisection task, participants classified seconds-long videos of naturalistic scenes as short or long (duration), or slow or fast (passage of time). Videos contained a varying number and type of events. We found that a large number of events lengthened subjective duration and accelerated the felt passage of time. Surprisingly, participants were also faster at estimating their felt passage of time compared to duration. The perception of duration scaled with duration and event density, whereas the felt passage of time scaled with the rate of change. Altogether, our results suggest that distinct mechanisms underlie these two experiential times.

The sense of self is a fundamental construct in the study of the mind, yet its psychological nature remains elusive. We introduce a novel 25-item inventory to investigate selfhood both as an enduring trait and a temporary state. We hypothesized two foundational aspects of the self: identity (related to self-referencing and continuity over time) and agency (the perception of controlling own's actions and thoughts). Results from two population studies highlight a singular self-trait factor combining agency and identity. In contrast, self-state measures revealed a bifactorial structure with a high-order factor and three lower-order subfactors: state-identity, state-agency, and state-technology. These factors were predictive of psychosis-like experiences, schizotypal traits, and hopelessness. Mediation analysis demonstrated that the negative association between the sense of self and hopelessness is mediated by depressive manifestations. Our research provides a tool to shed new light on the complexity of the sense of self and its mental health implications.