Consciousness and Cognition最新文献

We assessed whether self-related automatic and others-related controlled processes are modulated by chronotype and time-of-day. Here, a shape-label matching task composed of three geometrical shapes arbitrarily associated with you, friend, and stranger was used. Twenty Morning-types, and twenty Evening-types performed the task at the optimal and non-optimal times of day (i.e., 8 AM, or 8:30 PM). Morning-types did not exhibit noticeable synchrony effects, thus proving the better adaptation of these participants to non-optimal moments of the day as compared to Evening-types. Contrary to our predictions regarding the absence of automatic-processing modulation and the presence of controlled-processing influences by time-of-day, we found an influence on self-related but not others-related processing only in Evening-type participants. Although brain structures are not directly tackled, we argue that such modulation may be due to the dependence of the activation of the ventromedial prefrontal cortex (VMPFC), an essential component of the self-attention network on circadian rhythms.

Reading other minds is a pervasive feature of human social life. A decade of research indicates that people can automatically track an agent’s beliefs regardless of whether this is required. But little is known about the principles t guide automatic belief tracking. In six experiments adapting a false belief task introduced by Kovács et al. (2010), we tested whether belief tracking is interrupted by either an agent’s lack of perceptual access or else by an agent’s constrained action possibilities. We also tested whether such manipulations create interruptions when participants were instructed to track beliefs. Our main finding: the agent’s lack of perceptual access did not interrupt belief tracking when participants were not instructed to track beliefs. Overall, our findings raise a challenge: some of the phenomena that have been labelled mindreading are perhaps not mindreading at all, or—more likely—they are mindreading but not as we know it.

Attentional scaling is a crucial mechanism that enables us to flexibly allocate our attention to larger or smaller regions in the visual field. Although previous studies have demonstrated the critical role of attentional scaling in visual processing, its impact on modulating visual awareness is not yet fully understood. This study investigates the adaptive control of attentional scaling and its influence on visual awareness in an attentional blink paradigm. Participants were required to attend to the first target’s location, which was manipulated either session-wise, trial-wise, or such that it could be learned across a block of trials. Discrete, all-or-none, awareness was expected when attention was allocated to a narrow area, while gradual awareness was expected when attention was allocated to a larger area. We used mixture modeling to assess second target awareness across these different attentional scales. The results revealed that participants could adaptively control their attentional scale both across stable sessions, and through (implicit) statistical learning in blocks of successive trials. This produced gradual perceptual awareness when the participants adopted a broad attentional scale, causing an attentional “blur”. However, trial-wise cues did not allow for attentional scaling, resulting in more discrete target perception overall, and an attentional “blink”. We conclude that the attentional scale is to some extent under adaptive control during the attentional blink/blur, where it can produce qualitatively different modes of perceptual awareness.

Seeing an embodied humanoid avatar move its arms can induce in the observer the illusion that its own (static) arms are moving accordingly, the kinematic signals emanating from this avatar thus being considered like those from the biological body. Here, we investigated the causal relationship between these kinaesthetic illusions and the illusion of body ownership, manipulated through visuomotor synchronisation. The results of two experiments revealed that the sense of body ownership over an avatar seen from a first-person perspective was intimately linked to visuomotor synchrony. This was not the case for kinaesthetic illusions indicating that when superimposed on the biological body, the avatar is inevitably treated at the sensorimotor level as one’s own body, whether consciously considered as such or not. The question of whether these two bodily experiences (body ownership and kinaesthetic illusion) are underpinned by distinct representations, the body image, and the body schema, is discussed.

Grapheme–color synesthesia is expected to provide a clue to solving the “binding problem” of visual features. Synesthetic research uses non-synesthetes as a control group and shows that synesthetes perform better with synesthetic color congruency, while non-synesthetes’ performances do not. However, non-synesthetes also have certain grapheme–color associations. Therefore, this study examined whether non-synesthetes’ grapheme–color associations improve their performance in a visual search task. The results indicated that non-synesthetes were significantly faster at detecting congruent targets with their grapheme–color associations, such as red for “A,” blue for “B,” and yellow for “C.” However, the effect was not found in relation to numerical characters. This study has implications for future neuroscience and consciousness research regarding grapheme–color synesthesia.

In the present article, I review theory and evidence on the psychological mechanisms of mind wandering, paying special attention to its relation with executive control. I then suggest applying a dual-process framework (i.e., automatic vs. controlled processing) to mind wandering and goal-directed thought. I present theoretical arguments and empirical evidence in favor of the view that mind wandering is based on automatic processing, also considering its relation to the concept of working memory. After that, I outline three scenarios for an interplay between mind wandering and goal-directed thought during task performance (parallel automatic processing, off-task thought substituting on-task thought, and non-disruptive mind wandering during controlled processing) and address the ways in which the mind-wandering and focused-attention spells can terminate. Throughout the article, I formulate empirical predictions. In conclusion, I discuss how automatic and controlled processing may be balanced in human conscious cognition.

The present EEG study with 32 healthy participants investigated whether affective knowledge about a person influences the visual awareness of their face, additionally considering the impact of facial appearance. Faces differing in perceived trustworthiness based on appearance were associated with negative or neutral social information and shown as target stimuli in an attentional blink task. As expected, participants showed enhanced awareness of faces associated with negative compared to neutral social information. On the neurophysiological level, this effect was connected to differences in the time range of the early posterior negativity (EPN)—a component associated with enhanced attention and facilitated processing of emotional stimuli. The findings indicate that the social-affective relevance of a face based on emotional knowledge is accessed during a phase of attentional enhancement for conscious perception and can affect prioritization for awareness. In contrast, no clear evidence for influences of facial trustworthiness during the attentional blink was found.

We seem to have rich experience across our visual field. Yet we are surprisingly poor at tasks involving the periphery and low spatial attention. Recently, Lau and collaborators have argued that a phenomenon known as “subjective inflation” allows us to reconcile these phenomena. I show inflation is consistent with multiple interpretations, with starkly different consequences for richness and for theories of consciousness more broadly. What’s more, we have only weak reasons favouring any of these interpretations over the others. I provisionally argue for an interpretation on which subjective experience is genuinely rich, but (in peripheral/unattended areas) unreliable as a guide to the external world. The main challenge for this view is that it appears to imply that experience in the periphery is not just unreliable but unstable. However, I argue that this consequence, while initially appearing unintuitive, is in fact plausible.

Fluency theories predict higher truth judgments for easily processed statements. We investigated two factors relevant for processing fluency: repetition and syntactic complexity. In three online experiments, we manipulated syntactic complexity by creating simple and complex versions of trivia statements. Experiments 1 and 2 replicated the repetition-based truth effect. However, syntactic complexity did not affect truth judgments although complex statements were processed slower than simple statements. This null effect is surprising given that both studies had high statistical power and varied in the relative salience of syntactic complexity. Experiment 3 provides a preregistered test of the discounting explanation by using improved trivia statements of equal length and by manipulating the salience of complexity in a randomized design. As predicted by fluency theories, simple statements were more likely judged as true than complex ones, while this effect was small and not moderated by the salience of complexity.

It is unclear whether implicit memory (priming) is affected by aging. Some studies have reported no difference between young and older adults, while others have uncovered reliable reductions. An important factor that may explain these discrepancies is the manner of encoding. Processing requirements (perceptual/conceptual) have varied considerably between studies, yet processing abilities are not equally affected by aging. This study examined whether processing during encoding moderates age effects on priming. Young and older participants studied object-word pairs and made natural/manufactured (conceptual) and left/right rotation (perceptual) judgements in relation to the word or object. Objects served as targets on a subsequent continuous identification with recognition task to assess priming and recognition. Priming and recognition were greater in young than older adults for attended items, with a larger effect size in the conceptual than the perceptual condition. Findings suggest that age differences in priming may be a function of processing at encoding.