Consciousness and Cognition最新文献

Previous work has established a link between executive attention ability and mind wandering propensity, these studies typically collapse thought reports into a single category of task-unrelated thoughts (TUTs). We have shown that these TUTs can be differentiated by the emotional valence of their content. Awareness of TUTs might also be an important to consider, yet little work has been done on this front. The current study conceptually replicated and extended previous work by investigating the relationship between individual differences in executive attention, emotional valence and awareness of TUTs. Latent variable models indicated that Executive Attention was differentially correlated with emotional valence TUTs. However, only Attention Control was related to frequency of mind wandering with awareness. Intra-individual analyses indicated that negatively valenced TUTs and TUTs that occurred without awareness were associated with worse performance. Considering different dimensions of TUTs can provide a more complete picture of individual differences in mind wandering.

Some dissociative experiences may be related, in part, to REM intrusion into waking consciousness. If so, some aspects of dream content may be associated with daytime dissociative experiences. We tested the hypothesis that some types of dream content would predict daytime dissociative symptomology. As part of a longitudinal study of the impact of dreams on everyday behavior we administered a battery of survey instruments to 219 volunteers. Assessments included the Dissociative Experiences Scale (DES), along with other measures known to be related to either REM intrusion effects or dissociative experiences. We also collected dream reports and sleep measures across a two-week period from a subgroup of the individuals in the baseline group. Of this subgroup we analyzed two different subsamples; 24 individuals with dream recall for at least half the nights in the two-week period; and 30 individuals who wore the DREEM Headband which captured measures of sleep architecture. In addition to using multiple regression analyses to quantify associations between DES and REM intrusion and dream content variables we used a split half procedure to create high vs low DES groups and then compared groups across all measures. Participants in the high DES group evidenced significantly greater nightmare distress scores, REM Behavior Disorder scores, paranormal beliefs, lucid dreams, and sleep onset times. Validated measures of dreamed first person perspective and overall dream coherence in a time series significantly predicted overall DES score accounting for 26% of the variance in dissociation. Dream phenomenology and coherence of the dreamed self significantly predicts dissociative symptomology as an individual trait. REM intrusion may be one source of dissociative experiences. Attempts to ameliorate dissociative symptoms or to treat nightmare distress should consider the stability of dream content as a viable indicator of dissociative tendencies.

Conscious visual experiences are enriched by concurrent auditory information, implying audiovisual interactions. In the present study, we investigated how prior conscious experience of auditory and visual information influences the subsequent audiovisual temporal integration under the surface of awareness. We used continuous flash suppression (CFS) to render perceptually invisible a ball-shaped object constantly moving and bouncing inside a square frame window. To examine whether audiovisual temporal correspondence facilitates the ball stimulus to enter awareness, the visual motion was accompanied by click sounds temporally congruent or incongruent with the bounces of the ball. In Experiment 1, where no prior experience of the audiovisual events was given, we found no significant impact of audiovisual correspondence on visual detection time. However, when the temporally congruent or incongruent bounce-sound relations were consciously experienced prior to CFS in Experiment 2, congruent sounds yielded faster detection time compared to incongruent sounds during CFS. In addition, in Experiment 3, explicit processing of the incongruent bounce-sound relation prior to CFS slowed down detection time when the ball bounces became later congruent with sounds during CFS. These findings suggest that audiovisual temporal integration may take place outside of visual awareness though its potency is modulated by previous conscious experiences of the audiovisual events. The results are discussed in light of the framework of multisensory causal inference.

It is not clear whether personality is related to basic perceptual processes at the level of automatic bottom-up processes or controlled top-down processes. Two experiments examined how personality influences perceptual dynamics, focusing on how cognitive flexibility moderates the relationship between personality and perceptual reversals of the Necker cube. The participants viewed stimuli either passively or with the intent to either hold or switch the orientation of the Necker cube. The influence of openness was predominantly evident in conditions necessitating intentional control over perceptual reversals. The link between openness and intentional perceptual reversals was always moderated by cognitive flexibility, which was measured in three different ways. No relationship was detected between personality traits and reversals in the passive viewing condition, suggesting that relatively spontaneous adaptation-inhibition processes may not be personality-dependent. Overall, our research sheds light on the nuanced influence of personality traits on perceptual experiences, mediated by cognitive flexibility.

People’s memory for scenes has consequences, including for eyewitness testimony. Negative scenes may lead to a particular memory error, where narrowed scene boundaries lead people to recall being closer to a scene than they were. But boundary restriction—including attenuation of the opposite phenomenon boundary extension—has been difficult to replicate, perhaps because heightened arousal accompanying negative scenes, rather than negative valence itself, drives the effect. Indeed, in Green et al. (2019) arousal alone, conditioned to a particular neutral image category, increased boundary restriction for images in that category. But systematic differences between image categories may have driven these results, irrespective of arousal. Here, we clarify whether boundary restriction stems from the external arousal stimulus or image category differences. Presenting one image category (everyday-objects), half accompanied by arousal (Experiment 1), and presenting both neutral image categories (everyday-objects, nature), without arousal (Experiment 2), resulted in no difference in boundary judgement errors. These findings suggest that image features—including inherent valence, arousal, and complexity—are not sufficient to induce boundary restriction or reduce boundary extension for neutral images, perhaps explaining why boundary restriction is inconsistently demonstrated in the lab.

The isolated approaching of physical, neural and mental states and the binary classification into stable traits and fluctuating states previously lead to a limited understanding concerning underlying processes and possibilities to explain, measure and regulate neural and mental performance along with the interaction of mental states and neurocognitive traits. In this article these states are integrated by i) differentiating the model of the brain as a complex, self-organizing system, ii) showing possibilities to measure this model, iii) offering a classification of mental states and iv) presenting a holistic operationalization of state regulations and trait trainings to enhance neural and mental high-performance on a macro- and micro scale. This model integrates current findings from the theory of constructed emotions, the theory of thousand brains and complex systems theory and yields several testable hypotheses to provide an integrated reference frame for future research and applied target points to regulate and enhance performance.

A serial reaction time task was used to test whether the representations of a probabilistic second-order sequence structure are (i) stored in an effector-dependent, effector-independent intrinsic or effector-independent visuospatial code and (ii) are inter-manually accessible. Participants were trained either with the dominant or non-dominant hand. Tests were performed with both hands in the practice sequence, a random sequence, and a mirror sequence. Learning did not differ significantly between left and right-hand practice, suggesting symmetric intermanual transfer from the dominant to the non-dominant hand and vice versa. In the posttest, RTs were shorter for the practice sequence than for the random sequence, and longest for the mirror sequence. Participants were unable to freely generate or recognize the practice sequence, indicating implicit knowledge of the probabilistic sequence structure. Because sequence-specific learning did not differ significantly between hands, we conclude that representations of the probabilistic sequence structure are stored in an effector-independent visuospatial code.

Mental rotation tasks are frequently used as standard measures of mental imagery. However, aphantasia research has brought such use into question. Here, we assessed a large group of individuals who lack visual imagery (aphantasia) on two mental rotation tasks: a three-dimensional block-shape, and a human manikin rotation task. In both tasks, those with aphantasia had slower, but more accurate responses than controls. Both groups demonstrated classic linear increases in response time and error-rate as functions of angular disparity. In the three-dimensional block-shape rotation task, a within-group speed-accuracy trade-off was found in controls, whereas faster individuals in the aphantasia group were also more accurate. Control participants generally favoured using object-based mental rotation strategies, whereas those with aphantasia favoured analytic strategies. These results suggest that visual imagery is not crucial for successful performance in classical mental rotation tasks, as alternative strategies can be effectively utilised in the absence of holistic mental representations.

To what degree human cognition is influenced by subliminal stimuli is a controversial empirical question. One striking example was reported by Linser and Goschke (2007): participants overestimated how much control they had over objectively uncontrollable stimuli when masked congruent primes were presented immediately before the action. Critically, however, unawareness of the masked primes was established by post hoc data selection. In our preregistered study we sought to explore these findings while adjusting prime visibility based on individual thresholds, so that each participant underwent both visible and non-visible conditions. In experiment 1, N = 39 participants engaged in a control judgement task: following the presentation of a semantic prime, they freely selected between two keys, which triggered the appearance of a colored circle. The color of the circles, however, was independent of the key-press. Subsequently, participants assessed their perceived control over the circle’s color, based on their key-presses, via a rating scale that ranged from 0 % (no control) to 100 % (complete control). Contrary to Linser and Goschke (2007)'s findings, this experiment demonstrated that predictive information influenced the experience of agency only when primes were consciously processed. In experiment 2, utilizing symbolic (arrow) primes, N = 35 participants had to rate their feeling of control over the effect-stimulus’ identity during a two-choice identification paradigm (i.e., they were instructed to press a key corresponding to a target stimulus; with a contingency between target and effect stimulus of 75 %/25 %). The results revealed no significant influence of subliminal priming on agency perceptions. In summary, this study implies that unconscious stimuli may not exert a substantial influence on the conscious experience of agency, underscoring the need for careful consideration of methodological aspects and experimental design's impact on observed phenomena.

Decomposition of chunks has been widely accepted as a critical proxy of restructuring, but the role of composition in forming new representations has been largely neglected. This study aims to investigate the roles of both decomposition and composition processes in chunk restructuring, as well as their relationships with “aha” experiences during problem-solving. Participants were asked to move a part of a character to another character to create two new characters. Across three experiments, the characters to be decomposed or composed were varied in terms of tight or loose chunks. The results showed that decomposition or composition of tight chunks led to lower success rates, longer response times, and significantly stronger “Aha!” emotional experiences (mainly in terms of surprise and suddenness). This study provides evidence for the contribution of both decomposition and composition processes to restructuring in creative insight.