Pub Date : 2025-09-01Epub Date: 2025-08-12DOI: 10.1016/j.concog.2025.103921
Aijun Wang , Jiwen Zhang , Guanying Liu , Haocheng Zhu , Zepeng Xing , Chunlin Yue , Xiaoyu Tang
Multisensory integration depends on binding tendency (the prior expectation that auditory and visual signals share a common cause) and sensory reliability (the precision of unisensory inputs). However, the distinct developmental contributions of these factors to temporal audiovisual integration remain unclear. Using the sound-induced flash illusion (SiFI) and its reverse variant (FiSI) combined with Bayesian causal inference modeling, we compared performance across early school-aged children, mid-to-late school-aged children, and adults. Our findings show that binding tendency remains stable from childhood to adulthood, with no significant differences in prior expectations between age groups. In contrast, adults exhibited significantly lower visual precision than early school-aged children. These results demonstrate that developmental improvements in audiovisual temporal integration primarily reflect enhanced visual reliability rather than changes in binding tendency.
{"title":"Developmentally enhanced visual reliability reduces susceptibility to the sound-induced flash illusion: Evidence from bayesian causal inference","authors":"Aijun Wang , Jiwen Zhang , Guanying Liu , Haocheng Zhu , Zepeng Xing , Chunlin Yue , Xiaoyu Tang","doi":"10.1016/j.concog.2025.103921","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.concog.2025.103921","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Multisensory integration depends on binding tendency (the prior expectation that auditory and visual signals share a common cause) and sensory reliability (the precision of unisensory inputs). However, the distinct developmental contributions of these factors to temporal audiovisual integration remain unclear. Using the sound-induced flash illusion (SiFI) and its reverse variant (FiSI) combined with Bayesian causal inference modeling, we compared performance across early school-aged children, mid-to-late school-aged children, and adults. Our findings show that binding tendency remains stable from childhood to adulthood, with no significant differences in prior expectations between age groups. In contrast, adults exhibited significantly lower visual precision than early school-aged children. These results demonstrate that developmental improvements in audiovisual temporal integration primarily reflect enhanced visual reliability rather than changes in binding tendency.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":51358,"journal":{"name":"Consciousness and Cognition","volume":"134 ","pages":"Article 103921"},"PeriodicalIF":2.0,"publicationDate":"2025-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144814068","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
A hallmark of the human mind is its tendency to generate spontaneous thoughts, whether during tasks or in idle moments. This phenomenon is typically studied in the laboratory using the Thought-Probe Protocol (TPP), in which participants report the content of their thoughts when prompted at various intervals. Although well validated, the TPP nonetheless suffers from several limitations, such as its inability to track the flow of thoughts between probes. To address these issues, researchers have recently revisited the Think-Aloud Protocol (TAP), which involves the continuous verbalization of spontaneous thoughts. While the TAP offers access to the ongoing flow of thoughts, its validity relative to other methods has not yet been fully established. In this study, we compared four methods for assessing spontaneous thoughts: the TAP, TPP, Daily Life Experience Sampling Protocol (DLESP), and retrospective thought listing. We focused on the phenomenological characteristics of thoughts and features that predicted their recall after a one-day delay. Our results revealed minimal differences between the TAP and TPP in terms of thought characteristics and memory predictors. However, thoughts reported with these two methods differed from those assessed more ecologically with the DLESP, and certain thought features were overrepresented in retrospective thought listing. Overall, our findings suggest that the TAP is as valid as the TPP for investigating spontaneous thought, although thought characteristics may differ between laboratory and real-world settings. They also suggest that concurrent reporting methods, such as the TAP and TPP, provide a more representative view of spontaneous thought features than retrospective assessments.
{"title":"Validity of the think-aloud procedure in comparison to other methods for studying the phenomenological features and memory of spontaneous thought","authors":"Arya Gilles , Gaëlle Panneels , Arnaud D’Argembeau , David Stawarczyk","doi":"10.1016/j.concog.2025.103910","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.concog.2025.103910","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>A hallmark of the human mind is its tendency to generate spontaneous thoughts, whether during tasks or in idle moments. This phenomenon is typically studied in the laboratory using the Thought-Probe Protocol (TPP), in which participants report the content of their thoughts when prompted at various intervals. Although well validated, the TPP nonetheless suffers from several limitations, such as its inability to track the flow of thoughts between probes. To address these issues, researchers have recently revisited the Think-Aloud Protocol (TAP), which involves the continuous verbalization of spontaneous thoughts. While the TAP offers access to the ongoing flow of thoughts, its validity relative to other methods has not yet been fully established. In this study, we compared four methods for assessing spontaneous thoughts: the TAP, TPP, Daily Life Experience Sampling Protocol (DLESP), and retrospective thought listing. We focused on the phenomenological characteristics of thoughts and features that predicted their recall after a one-day delay. Our results revealed minimal differences between the TAP and TPP in terms of thought characteristics and memory predictors. However, thoughts reported with these two methods differed from those assessed more ecologically with the DLESP, and certain thought features were overrepresented in retrospective thought listing. Overall, our findings suggest that the TAP is as valid as the TPP for investigating spontaneous thought, although thought characteristics may differ between laboratory and real-world settings. They also suggest that concurrent reporting methods, such as the TAP and TPP, provide a more representative view of spontaneous thought features than retrospective assessments.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":51358,"journal":{"name":"Consciousness and Cognition","volume":"134 ","pages":"Article 103910"},"PeriodicalIF":2.0,"publicationDate":"2025-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144771001","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-09-01Epub Date: 2025-08-05DOI: 10.1016/j.concog.2025.103918
Diane Mézière , Johanna K. Kaakinen , Emilia Ranta , Karin Kukkonen , Jonathan Smallwood , Jaana Simola
While reading narrative texts, readers’ attention often fluctuates from the text (e.g., immersion) to text-unrelated thoughts (e.g., mind-wandering). Research on mind-wandering and immersion suggests that they influence the reading process differently. In this article, we examine the types of thoughts readers have while reading a literary text. Specifically, we investigated the effect of immersion and mind-wandering on eye-movement behaviour during reading. Fifty-six participants read extracts from a novel while their eye-movements were monitored. Participants’ thoughts were probed using multidimensional experience sampling. We identified four types of thought: Immersion, Mind-wandering, Sub-Vocalization, and Social Episodic Thoughts. We then ran General Additive Mixed Models (GAMMs) to examine the relationship between these thought types and eye movements. Results show that eye movements are influenced by the types of thoughts readers experience while reading literary texts. These results have important implications for the way that mind-wandering is typically investigated, particularly in reading research.
{"title":"Do eye movements reflect readers’ thoughts during reading? Evidence from multidimensional experience sampling and eye movements","authors":"Diane Mézière , Johanna K. Kaakinen , Emilia Ranta , Karin Kukkonen , Jonathan Smallwood , Jaana Simola","doi":"10.1016/j.concog.2025.103918","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.concog.2025.103918","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>While reading narrative texts, readers’ attention often fluctuates from the text (e.g., immersion) to text-unrelated thoughts (e.g., mind-wandering). Research on mind-wandering and immersion suggests that they influence the reading process differently. In this article, we examine the types of thoughts readers have while reading a literary text. Specifically, we investigated the effect of immersion and mind-wandering on eye-movement behaviour during reading. Fifty-six participants read extracts from a novel while their eye-movements were monitored. Participants’ thoughts were probed using multidimensional experience sampling. We identified four types of thought: Immersion, Mind-wandering, Sub-Vocalization, and Social Episodic Thoughts. We then ran General Additive Mixed Models (GAMMs) to examine the relationship between these thought types and eye movements. Results show that eye movements are influenced by the types of thoughts readers experience while reading literary texts. These results have important implications for the way that mind-wandering is typically investigated, particularly in reading research.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":51358,"journal":{"name":"Consciousness and Cognition","volume":"134 ","pages":"Article 103918"},"PeriodicalIF":2.0,"publicationDate":"2025-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144771002","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-09-01Epub Date: 2025-08-09DOI: 10.1016/j.concog.2025.103920
Heng Li, Yu Cao
According to Conceptual Metaphor Theory, individuals represent abstract concepts, such as time, through more concrete experiences, such as the sensorimotor system. For example, left and right spatial orientations can be projected onto temporal concepts of past and future in mental models, which is consistent with various writing systems across cultures. Although evidence indicates that manual and visual experiences can influence lateral mental timelines, it remains unclear whether passive whole-body motion can exert similar effects. In this study, we explored this hypothesized effect among Chinese sighted and blind participants. Participants responded to verbal stimuli corresponding to past and future events while being displaced leftward and rightward on a motion platform. The results demonstrated an expedited categorization of future-related words during rightward motion compared to leftward motion. However, no analogous effects were observed for the categorization of past-related stimuli. This partial metaphor-congruency effect cannot be explained by linguistic conventions, as there are no explicit lateral metaphors for time in Mandarin Chinese. Therefore, a more plausible explanation relates to the malleability of future event representations, which can be more easily shaped by motion experiences compared to past event representations. Together, these findings highlight the significant role of bodily movements in influencing temporal thought.
{"title":"Moving through time: The influence of body motion on temporal concepts of future in Chinese sighted and blind people.","authors":"Heng Li, Yu Cao","doi":"10.1016/j.concog.2025.103920","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.concog.2025.103920","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>According to Conceptual Metaphor Theory, individuals represent abstract concepts, such as time, through more concrete experiences, such as the sensorimotor system. For example, left and right spatial orientations can be projected onto temporal concepts of past and future in mental models, which is consistent with various writing systems across cultures. Although evidence indicates that manual and visual experiences can influence lateral mental timelines, it remains unclear whether passive whole-body motion can exert similar effects. In this study, we explored this hypothesized effect among Chinese sighted and blind participants. Participants responded to verbal stimuli corresponding to past and future events while being displaced leftward and rightward on a motion platform. The results demonstrated an expedited categorization of future-related words during rightward motion compared to leftward motion. However, no analogous effects were observed for the categorization of past-related stimuli. This partial metaphor-congruency effect cannot be explained by linguistic conventions, as there are no explicit lateral metaphors for time in Mandarin Chinese. Therefore, a more plausible explanation relates to the malleability of future event representations, which can be more easily shaped by motion experiences compared to past event representations. Together, these findings highlight the significant role of bodily movements in influencing temporal thought.</p>","PeriodicalId":51358,"journal":{"name":"Consciousness and Cognition","volume":"134 ","pages":"103920"},"PeriodicalIF":2.0,"publicationDate":"2025-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144818159","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-08-01Epub Date: 2025-07-07DOI: 10.1016/j.concog.2025.103901
Jussi Jylkkä , Hilla Väyrynen , Enyu Lin , Catharina Walldén , Andreas Krabbe , Juuso Kähönen , Pilleriin Sikka
Both psychedelic substances and meditation have been proposed to facilitate personally meaningful and transformative experiences, with insights playing a central role. However, previous research has mainly relied on questionnaires, limiting the range of insights that can be identified. In this study, we recruited participants who provided narrative reports of insights in personally meaningful psychedelic (n = 147) or meditation (n = 66) experiences. Psychedelic experiences were facilitated both by classic (e.g., LSD, psilocybin, DMT) as well as non-classic (e.g., MDMA, ketamine, cannabis) psychedelics. Qualitative analysis revealed three main insight themes: Mystical-type (subclasses Unity, Metaphysical, and Other), Psychological (subclasses Metacognitive, Value, and Compassion), and Philosophical-existential (subclasses Purpose, Value, and Other). Mystical-type insights were more frequent in reports of meditation experiences, while value insights were more common in psychedelic reports. Otherwise, the reported insights were highly similar across the two types of reports, and only minor differences were observed between classic and non-classic psychedelics. Regression analyses indicated that metacognitive and value insights were positively associated with perceived improvements in positive affect, while mystical-type insights predicted increased meaning in life. These findings suggest that both psychedelic substances and meditation can facilitate a broad range of insights that are not fully captured by existing questionnaires. The results highlight similarities between psychedelic and meditation experiences supporting the notion that transformative experiences are not exclusive to classic psychedelics but can be facilitated through various means.
{"title":"Meditation and psychedelics facilitate similar types of mystical, psychological, and philosophical-existential insights predictive of wellbeing: a qualitative-quantitative approach","authors":"Jussi Jylkkä , Hilla Väyrynen , Enyu Lin , Catharina Walldén , Andreas Krabbe , Juuso Kähönen , Pilleriin Sikka","doi":"10.1016/j.concog.2025.103901","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.concog.2025.103901","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Both psychedelic substances and meditation have been proposed to facilitate personally meaningful and transformative experiences, with insights playing a central role. However, previous research has mainly relied on questionnaires, limiting the range of insights that can be identified. In this study, we recruited participants who provided narrative reports of insights in personally meaningful psychedelic (<em>n</em> = 147) or meditation (<em>n</em> = 66) experiences. Psychedelic experiences were facilitated both by classic (e.g., LSD, psilocybin, DMT) as well as non-classic (e.g., MDMA, ketamine, cannabis) psychedelics. Qualitative analysis revealed three main insight themes: Mystical-type (subclasses Unity, Metaphysical, and Other), Psychological (subclasses Metacognitive, Value, and Compassion), and Philosophical-existential (subclasses Purpose, Value, and Other). Mystical-type insights were more frequent in reports of meditation experiences, while value insights were more common in psychedelic reports. Otherwise, the reported insights were highly similar across the two types of reports, and only minor differences were observed between classic and non-classic psychedelics. Regression analyses indicated that metacognitive and value insights were positively associated with perceived improvements in positive affect, while mystical-type insights predicted increased meaning in life. These findings suggest that both psychedelic substances and meditation can facilitate a broad range of insights that are not fully captured by existing questionnaires. The results highlight similarities between psychedelic and meditation experiences supporting the notion that transformative experiences are not exclusive to classic psychedelics but can be facilitated through various means.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":51358,"journal":{"name":"Consciousness and Cognition","volume":"133 ","pages":"Article 103901"},"PeriodicalIF":2.1,"publicationDate":"2025-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144570944","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-08-01Epub Date: 2025-06-12DOI: 10.1016/j.concog.2025.103900
Charlott Wendt, Guido Hesselmann
Our study investigated unconscious priming from a dual-task perspective by means of a metacontrast masking paradigm with trial-by-trial assessments of prime visibility. Participants responded to target stimuli via keypress. In the prime-related direct task, they responded via vocal response (cross-modal) or keypress (unimodal), using either high (four-item) or low (two-item) complexity subjective or objective visibility measures, and responded with either one or two hands. We tested how these manipulations affect response times (RTs) and error rates. In two out of three experiments, participants were unaware of the prime at the shortest stimulus-onset asynchrony (SOA), with visibility measures increasing at longer SOAs. RTs were consistently longer in dual-task than single-task conditions. Priming effects were comparable across task types in Experiments 1 and 2, but larger in dual-task conditions in Experiment 3, likely due to increased prime visibility. RTs were also prolonged in unimodal and high-complexity conditions, while two-hands responses led to faster RTs. Priming effects were larger in unimodal conditions, but unaffected by complexity. Hand usage did not affect priming in Experiment 2, but in Experiment 3 where two-hands responses led to increased priming effects. Taken together, our findings highlight the important role of task characteristics like modality, hand usage and complexity in the design of masked priming experiments. We recommend careful consideration of these factors when employing unconscious priming paradigms with trial-by-trial prime visibility judgments, as such paradigms continue to advance our understanding of unconscious cognitive processing.
{"title":"In the hands of metacontrast: Investigating the dual-task structure of an unconscious priming paradigm","authors":"Charlott Wendt, Guido Hesselmann","doi":"10.1016/j.concog.2025.103900","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.concog.2025.103900","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Our study investigated unconscious priming from a dual-task perspective by means of a metacontrast masking paradigm with trial-by-trial assessments of prime visibility. Participants responded to target stimuli via keypress. In the prime-related direct task, they responded via vocal response (cross-modal) or keypress (unimodal), using either high (four-item) or low (two-item) complexity subjective or objective visibility measures, and responded with either one or two hands. We tested how these manipulations affect response times (RTs) and error rates. In two out of three experiments, participants were unaware of the prime at the shortest stimulus-onset asynchrony (SOA), with visibility measures increasing at longer SOAs. RTs were consistently longer in dual-task than single-task conditions. Priming effects were comparable across task types in Experiments 1 and 2, but larger in dual-task conditions in Experiment 3, likely due to increased prime visibility. RTs were also prolonged in unimodal and high-complexity conditions, while two-hands responses led to faster RTs. Priming effects were larger in unimodal conditions, but unaffected by complexity. Hand usage did not affect priming in Experiment 2, but in Experiment 3 where two-hands responses led to increased priming effects. Taken together, our findings highlight the important role of task characteristics like modality, hand usage and complexity in the design of masked priming experiments. We recommend careful consideration of these factors when employing unconscious priming paradigms with trial-by-trial prime visibility judgments, as such paradigms continue to advance our understanding of unconscious cognitive processing.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":51358,"journal":{"name":"Consciousness and Cognition","volume":"133 ","pages":"Article 103900"},"PeriodicalIF":2.1,"publicationDate":"2025-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144262926","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-08-01Epub Date: 2025-06-10DOI: 10.1016/j.concog.2025.103891
Ege Kingir , Ryo Segawa , Janis K. Hesse , Igor Kagan , Melanie Wilke
No-report paradigms help to avoid report-related confounds in conscious perception studies. A novel no-report binocular rivalry paradigm by Hesse and Tsao (2020) tracks conscious content using eye position as subjects follow fixation points linked to the rivaling stimuli. However, it remains unclear whether perceptual switches arise spontaneously or are induced by external factors such as visual transients due to fixation point shifts and saccades. We found an increased probability of perceptual switches time-locked to fixation point shifts, indicating that some switches are externally driven. To disentangle the effects of visual changes and saccades, we implemented a two-factorial design and found that saccades play a larger role in eliciting perceptual switches. We estimate that 14% of saccades trigger a switch, accounting for 24% of all perceptual transitions. Our findings provide an analysis framework and guidelines for excluding externally driven perceptual switches, enabling a clearer focus on internally generated perceptual dynamics.
{"title":"Fixation shifts in a novel “no-report” binocular rivalry paradigm induce saccade-related perceptual switches","authors":"Ege Kingir , Ryo Segawa , Janis K. Hesse , Igor Kagan , Melanie Wilke","doi":"10.1016/j.concog.2025.103891","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.concog.2025.103891","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>No-report paradigms help to avoid report-related confounds in conscious perception studies. A novel no-report binocular rivalry paradigm by Hesse and Tsao (2020) tracks conscious content using eye position as subjects follow fixation points linked to the rivaling stimuli. However, it remains unclear whether perceptual switches arise spontaneously or are induced by external factors such as visual transients due to fixation point shifts and saccades. We found an increased probability of perceptual switches time-locked to fixation point shifts, indicating that some switches are externally driven. To disentangle the effects of visual changes and saccades, we implemented a two-factorial design and found that saccades play a larger role in eliciting perceptual switches. We estimate that 14% of saccades trigger a switch, accounting for 24% of all perceptual transitions. Our findings provide an analysis framework and guidelines for excluding externally driven perceptual switches, enabling a clearer focus on internally generated perceptual dynamics.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":51358,"journal":{"name":"Consciousness and Cognition","volume":"133 ","pages":"Article 103891"},"PeriodicalIF":2.1,"publicationDate":"2025-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144240640","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-08-01Epub Date: 2025-05-30DOI: 10.1016/j.concog.2025.103890
Ludwig Crespin
To many influential dream researchers, dreaming consciousness is not of the same kind as waking. In its most radical and paradoxical form, this theoretical stance consists in maintaining that dream is a case of conscious experience lacking cognitive access. In a more moderate and common form, dreamers have cognitive access to their oneiric experience but lack any executive function: they have no conscious control over their thoughts and actions within the dream. Consideration of dreaming consciousness, in other words, would imply the loss of self-regulation. Neither of these two theories holds. First, because the very reason showing dreams are consciously experienced, i.e. the fact we can recollect them on awakening, implies they are access conscious in the minimal sense that the dreamer noticed them. Second, because, consistent with this first evidence, dream reports also indicate dreamers are able to rationally assess their situation within the dream and self-regulate their dream behavior as a result. I argue, however, that dreamers have reduced, if altered, extended consciousness with limited access to their waking autobiographical self, and that this could explain why many researchers have the retrospective illusion that the dream ego has no rational control over its thoughts and actions in the dream. Indeed, it is not the same autobiographical self that regulates and recollects the dream. Finally, the fact that a dream takes place in the particular conditions of a sleeping brain should not prevent us from recognizing that it is a conscious experience in its own right.
{"title":"Dreaming is a conscious experience in its own right: proponents of non-cognitive and non-executive theories of dreaming suffer from a retrospective illusion of their waking extended self","authors":"Ludwig Crespin","doi":"10.1016/j.concog.2025.103890","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.concog.2025.103890","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>To many influential dream researchers, dreaming consciousness is not of the same kind as waking. In its most radical and paradoxical form, this theoretical stance consists in maintaining that dream is a case of conscious experience lacking cognitive access. In a more moderate and common form, dreamers have cognitive access to their oneiric experience but lack any executive function: they have no conscious control over their thoughts and actions within the dream. Consideration of dreaming consciousness, in other words, would imply the loss of self-regulation. Neither of these two theories holds. First, because the very reason showing dreams are consciously experienced, i.e. the fact we can recollect them on awakening, implies they are access conscious in the minimal sense that the dreamer noticed them. Second, because, consistent with this first evidence, dream reports also indicate dreamers are able to rationally assess their situation within the dream and self-regulate their dream behavior as a result. I argue, however, that dreamers have reduced, if altered, extended consciousness with limited access to their waking autobiographical self, and that this could explain why many researchers have the retrospective illusion that the dream ego has no rational control over its thoughts and actions in the dream. Indeed, it is not the same autobiographical self that regulates and recollects the dream. Finally, the fact that a dream takes place in the particular conditions of a sleeping brain should not prevent us from recognizing that it is a conscious experience in its own right.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":51358,"journal":{"name":"Consciousness and Cognition","volume":"133 ","pages":"Article 103890"},"PeriodicalIF":2.1,"publicationDate":"2025-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144166301","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-08-01Epub Date: 2025-06-26DOI: 10.1016/j.concog.2025.103892
Isabel T. Folger , Jared Medina
To induce the Anne Boleyn illusion, an individual’s hands are placed on either side of a mirror and stroked synchronously from the thumb to the empty space neighboring the reflected fifth finger, creating the perception of a supernumerary finger. The hidden fifth finger is stroked on the medial and lateral sides, which correspond to the fifth and “sixth” finger on the visible hand. The percept induced is robust enough to withstand biologically implausible manipulations that break other visuotactile illusions, making the illusion a promising avenue for exploring multisensory integration and illusory embodiment. The present study investigates three aspects of its underlying cognitive mechanisms. First, although embodiment was theorized to require tactile stimulation of two discrete fifth finger locations, we found that stroking only one location does not abolish or reduce the illusion. Second, manipulating the starting location of strokes produced differences in body part categorization of the percept, indicating the influence of top-down constraints from pre-existing body representations. Third, we aimed to identify factors underlying the illusion’s robustness to enhance our understanding of illusory embodiment mechanisms. We found support for the “anchoring” hypothesis, proposing that the sixth finger’s proximity to the real hand may be a critical factor.
{"title":"Anchoring to the hand, but not spatially distinct mappings, facilitates illusory supernumerary finger embodiment","authors":"Isabel T. Folger , Jared Medina","doi":"10.1016/j.concog.2025.103892","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.concog.2025.103892","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>To induce the Anne Boleyn illusion, an individual’s hands are placed on either side of a mirror and stroked synchronously from the thumb to the empty space neighboring the reflected fifth finger, creating the perception of a supernumerary finger. The hidden fifth finger is stroked on the medial and lateral sides, which correspond to the fifth and “sixth” finger on the visible hand. The percept induced is robust enough to withstand biologically implausible manipulations that break other visuotactile illusions, making the illusion a promising avenue for exploring multisensory integration and illusory embodiment. The present study investigates three aspects of its underlying cognitive mechanisms. First, although embodiment was theorized to require tactile stimulation of two discrete fifth finger locations, we found that stroking only one location does not abolish or reduce the illusion. Second, manipulating the starting location of strokes produced differences in body part categorization of the percept, indicating the influence of top-down constraints from pre-existing body representations. Third, we aimed to identify factors underlying the illusion’s robustness to enhance our understanding of illusory embodiment mechanisms. We found support for the “anchoring” hypothesis, proposing that the sixth finger’s proximity to the real hand may be a critical factor.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":51358,"journal":{"name":"Consciousness and Cognition","volume":"133 ","pages":"Article 103892"},"PeriodicalIF":2.1,"publicationDate":"2025-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144481404","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-08-01Epub Date: 2025-07-11DOI: 10.1016/j.concog.2025.103905
Christopher M. Hill , Numa Samnani , Leo Barzi , Matt Wilson
Feeling in control of one’s actions is fundamental to the formation of action-outcome relationships. Reinforcement and its valence also change the action-outcome relationship, either through behavior promotion or diminishment. In this study we evaluated how reward and punishment reinforcement modulate sense of agency, as measured by intentional binding. Moreover, using electroencephalography (EEG) we evaluated how reward and punishment reinforcement changes outcome event related potentials associated with the accuracy of participants’ judgement of the time interval between a key press and audio tone. We found that punishment reinforcement increased intentional binding between the action and outcome more than reward but not significantly more than control feedback. Punishment elicited greater outcome event-related potentials, P300s and Late Positive Potential, compared to reward and control. We also found increased N100s and diminished P300s and Late Positive Potentials when the participants did not actively participate in evoking the tone. Taken together, our findings showcase that punishment reinforcement boosts sense of agency and modulates associated neural activity more than reward and no reinforcement, as a function of increasing attention and arousal. These findings illuminate the greater effect punishment reinforcement has on behavior and brain activity by its modification of sense of agency, which is important for the development of treatments in psychiatric and neurological diseases.
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