Pub Date : 2025-04-12DOI: 10.1016/j.concog.2025.103865
Ishan Singhal , Nisheeth Srivastava
Phenomenology of mental imagery can reveal the structure of underlying mental representations, yet progress has been limited because of its private nature. Through a phenomenology-recreation task we elucidate the dynamics of mental imagery. Specifically, the temporal grain, speed of object manipulation, smoothness of contents unfolding, and temporal extent of stability of imagined contents. To gauge these properties, we asked a large cohort of participants (N = 827) to recreate these aspects of their imagination in six tasks. Results showed that temporal features of imagination unfold at distinct timescales, though a factor analysis showed that variance in these tasks could be accounted for via two factors; temporal ability and stability of mental imagery. Additionally, we contrast these regularities with those documented for visual perception, showing that imagined contents are sluggish but more stable than perception. However, both imagination and perception share a common constraint; maintaining identically sized temporal windows of conscious experience.
{"title":"Dynamics of mental imagery","authors":"Ishan Singhal , Nisheeth Srivastava","doi":"10.1016/j.concog.2025.103865","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.concog.2025.103865","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Phenomenology of mental imagery can reveal the structure of underlying mental representations, yet progress has been limited because of its private nature. Through a phenomenology-recreation task we elucidate the dynamics of mental imagery. Specifically, the temporal grain, speed of object manipulation, smoothness of contents unfolding, and temporal extent of stability of imagined contents. To gauge these properties, we asked a large cohort of participants (<em>N</em> = 827) to recreate these aspects of their imagination in six tasks. Results showed that temporal features of imagination unfold at distinct timescales, though a factor analysis showed that variance in these tasks could be accounted for via two factors; temporal ability and stability of mental imagery. Additionally, we contrast these regularities with those documented for visual perception, showing that imagined contents are sluggish but more stable than perception. However, both imagination and perception share a common constraint; maintaining identically sized temporal windows of conscious experience.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":51358,"journal":{"name":"Consciousness and Cognition","volume":"131 ","pages":"Article 103865"},"PeriodicalIF":2.1,"publicationDate":"2025-04-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143820683","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-04-10DOI: 10.1016/j.concog.2025.103853
Louis Chitiz , Bronte Mckeown , Bridget Mulholland , Raven Wallace , Ian Goodall-Halliwell , Nerissa Siu Ping-Ho , Delali Konu , Giulia L. Poerio , Jeffrey Wammes , Michael Milham , Arno Klein , Elizabeth Jefferies , Robert Leech , Jonathan Smallwood
The goal of psychological research is to understand behaviour in daily life. Although lab studies provide the control necessary to identify cognitive mechanisms behind behaviour, how these controlled situations generalise to activities in daily life remains unclear. Experience-sampling provides useful descriptions of cognition in the lab and real world and the current study examined how thought patterns generated by multidimensional experience-sampling (mDES) generalise across both contexts. We combined data from five published studies to generate a common ‘thought-space’ using data from the lab and daily life. This space represented data from both lab and daily life in an unbiased manner and grouped lab tasks and daily life activities with similar features (e.g., working in daily life was similar to working memory in the lab). Our study establishes mDES can map cognition from lab and daily life within a common space, allowing for more ecologically valid descriptions of cognition and behaviour.
{"title":"Mapping cognition across lab and daily life using Experience-Sampling","authors":"Louis Chitiz , Bronte Mckeown , Bridget Mulholland , Raven Wallace , Ian Goodall-Halliwell , Nerissa Siu Ping-Ho , Delali Konu , Giulia L. Poerio , Jeffrey Wammes , Michael Milham , Arno Klein , Elizabeth Jefferies , Robert Leech , Jonathan Smallwood","doi":"10.1016/j.concog.2025.103853","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.concog.2025.103853","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>The goal of psychological research is to understand behaviour in daily life. Although lab studies provide the control necessary to identify cognitive mechanisms behind behaviour, how these controlled situations generalise to activities in daily life remains unclear. Experience-sampling provides useful descriptions of cognition in the lab and real world and the current study examined how thought patterns generated by multidimensional experience-sampling (mDES) generalise across both contexts. We combined data from five published studies to generate a common ‘thought-space’ using data from the lab and daily life. This space represented data from both lab and daily life in an unbiased manner and grouped lab tasks and daily life activities with similar features (e.g., working in daily life was similar to working memory in the lab). Our study establishes mDES can map cognition from lab and daily life within a common space, allowing for more ecologically valid descriptions of cognition and behaviour.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":51358,"journal":{"name":"Consciousness and Cognition","volume":"131 ","pages":"Article 103853"},"PeriodicalIF":2.1,"publicationDate":"2025-04-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143808656","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-04-10DOI: 10.1016/j.concog.2025.103854
Kate T. McKay , Julie D. Henry , Olivia P. Demichelis , Reese K. Marinic , Nathan J. Evans , Sarah A. Grainger
Attention to others’ direct gaze supports many social-cognitive processes (e.g., emotion recognition, joint attention) that are known to decline with age, but it remains to be established whether attention to direct gaze itself is associated with age-related changes. We address this question across two studies. In Study 1, young (n = 42) and older (n = 45) adults completed response time tasks with non-predictive direct gaze cues and predictive direct gaze cues, designed to index reflexive and volitional covert attentional orienting to direct gaze, respectively. The results showed that young and older adults equivalently shifted their attention to predictive direct gaze cues but did not shift their attention to non-predictive direct gaze cues. Study 2 was designed to assess whether this orienting to predictive direct gaze was unique to direct gaze. A separate independent sample of young (n = 43) and older (n = 44) adults completed response time tasks with predictive direct gaze cues, predictive averted gaze cues, and predictive non-social (line orientation) cues. Attention was shifted to direct gaze but neither averted gaze nor line orientation, suggesting direct gaze was unique in being voluntarily attended-to. Pooling the predictive direct gaze task data across Studies 1 and 2, we found that young and older adults both oriented to the direct gaze cues, but that this orienting effect was reduced among older adults. The findings presented here provide novel insights into how direct gaze cues uniquely capture attention in younger and older age, and show for the first time that voluntary orienting to direct gaze is reduced in older adults. Theoretical implications are discussed.
{"title":"Attention to direct gaze in young and older adulthood","authors":"Kate T. McKay , Julie D. Henry , Olivia P. Demichelis , Reese K. Marinic , Nathan J. Evans , Sarah A. Grainger","doi":"10.1016/j.concog.2025.103854","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.concog.2025.103854","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Attention to others’ direct gaze supports many social-cognitive processes (e.g., emotion recognition, joint attention) that are known to decline with age, but it remains to be established whether attention to direct gaze itself is associated with age-related changes. We address this question across two studies. In Study 1, young (<em>n</em> = 42) and older (<em>n</em> = 45) adults completed response time tasks with non-predictive direct gaze cues and predictive direct gaze cues, designed to index reflexive and volitional covert attentional orienting to direct gaze, respectively. The results showed that young and older adults equivalently shifted their attention to predictive direct gaze cues but did not shift their attention to non-predictive direct gaze cues. Study 2 was designed to assess whether this orienting to predictive direct gaze was unique to direct gaze. A separate independent sample of young (<em>n</em> = 43) and older (<em>n</em> = 44) adults completed response time tasks with predictive direct gaze cues, predictive averted gaze cues, and predictive non-social (line orientation) cues. Attention was shifted to direct gaze but neither averted gaze nor line orientation, suggesting direct gaze was unique in being voluntarily attended-to. Pooling the predictive direct gaze task data across Studies 1 and 2, we found that young and older adults both oriented to the direct gaze cues, but that this orienting effect was reduced among older adults. The findings presented here provide novel insights into how direct gaze cues uniquely capture attention in younger and older age, and show for the first time that voluntary orienting to direct gaze is reduced in older adults. Theoretical implications are discussed.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":51358,"journal":{"name":"Consciousness and Cognition","volume":"131 ","pages":"Article 103854"},"PeriodicalIF":2.1,"publicationDate":"2025-04-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143808655","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-04-08DOI: 10.1016/j.concog.2025.103855
Marianna de Abreu Costa, Alexander Moreira-Almeida
Objective
Despite being rarely discussed, understanding the mind-brain problem (MBP) is essential to mental health. We aimed to explore the assumptions and practical implications of MBP among mental health professionals.
Methods
We recruited psychiatrists and mental health researchers. MBP perspectives were assessed directly and indirectly (via thought experiments and clinical vignettes).
Results
214 participants participated. Most (60.7%) believed the mind is a product of the brain, however endorsed lower persistence of mental characteristics than physical after the body duplication experiment. Neurobiological etiology attribution to the clinical vignette was associated with reduced attribution of patient’s responsibility, the inverse for psychological etiology. Substance dualism correlated with belief in free will and spiritual etiologies without denying neurobiological, psychological, and social etiologies.
Conclusions
MBP assumptions influence perceptions of etiology, responsibility, and free will, highlighting the importance of understanding MBP for advancing psychiatry.
{"title":"Views on the mind-brain problem do matter: Assumptions and practical implications among psychiatrists and mental health researchers in Brazil","authors":"Marianna de Abreu Costa, Alexander Moreira-Almeida","doi":"10.1016/j.concog.2025.103855","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.concog.2025.103855","url":null,"abstract":"<div><h3>Objective</h3><div>Despite being rarely discussed, understanding the<!--> <!-->mind-brain problem (MBP) is essential to mental health. We aimed to explore the assumptions and practical implications of MBP among mental health professionals.</div></div><div><h3>Methods</h3><div>We recruited psychiatrists and mental health researchers. MBP perspectives were assessed directly and indirectly (via thought experiments and clinical vignettes).</div></div><div><h3>Results</h3><div>214 participants participated. Most (60.7%) believed the mind is a product of the brain, however endorsed lower persistence of mental characteristics than physical after the<!--> <!-->body duplication experiment. Neurobiological etiology attribution to the clinical vignette was associated with reduced attribution of patient’s responsibility, the inverse for psychological etiology. Substance dualism correlated with belief in free will and spiritual etiologies without denying neurobiological, psychological, and social etiologies.</div></div><div><h3>Conclusions</h3><div>MBP assumptions influence perceptions of etiology, responsibility, and free will, highlighting the importance of understanding MBP for advancing psychiatry.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":51358,"journal":{"name":"Consciousness and Cognition","volume":"131 ","pages":"Article 103855"},"PeriodicalIF":2.1,"publicationDate":"2025-04-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143791216","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-04-04DOI: 10.1016/j.concog.2025.103852
Alexis Le Besnerais , Bruno Berberian , Ouriel Grynszpan
This study explores the sense of agency (SoA) in cooperative contexts, focusing on how predictability of a partner’s actions influences SoA. It hypothesizes that higher predictability enhances SoA. Participants performed a musical task requiring coordination with a co-agent. The predictability of the co-agent was manipulated across three action-outcome mapping conditions: Same as the participant, reversed and random. Temporal Binding (TB) and explicit judgments indicated a significant effect of predictability when participants executed the last musical note, evidenced by differences between the same mapping condition and the two others. By contrast, predictability did not significantly impact TB when the co-agent executed the last note, suggesting different cognitive processes may be involved for other-generated actions. These findings suggest that sensorimotor representations of the actions of others influence our sense of agency within collaborative contexts. Hence, our ability to smoothly anticipate a partner’s actions enhances our collaborative experience.
{"title":"The influence of the partner’s predictability on the sense of agency in joint action","authors":"Alexis Le Besnerais , Bruno Berberian , Ouriel Grynszpan","doi":"10.1016/j.concog.2025.103852","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.concog.2025.103852","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>This study explores the sense of agency (SoA) in cooperative contexts, focusing on how predictability of a partner’s actions influences SoA. It hypothesizes that higher predictability enhances SoA. Participants performed a musical task requiring coordination with a co-agent. The predictability of the co-agent was manipulated across three action-outcome mapping conditions: Same as the participant, reversed and random. Temporal Binding (TB) and explicit judgments indicated a significant effect of predictability when participants executed the last musical note, evidenced by differences between the same mapping condition and the two others. By contrast, predictability did not significantly impact TB when the co-agent executed the last note, suggesting different cognitive processes may be involved for other-generated actions. These findings suggest that sensorimotor representations of the actions of others influence our sense of agency within collaborative contexts. Hence, our ability to smoothly anticipate a partner’s actions enhances our collaborative experience.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":51358,"journal":{"name":"Consciousness and Cognition","volume":"131 ","pages":"Article 103852"},"PeriodicalIF":2.1,"publicationDate":"2025-04-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143768000","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-03-25DOI: 10.1016/j.concog.2025.103848
Anna Pelliet , Marlene Nogueira , Catarina Fagundes , Susana Capela , Fátima Saraiva , Erdem Pulcu , Catherine J. Harmer , Susannah E. Murphy , Liliana P. Capitão
Traditional paradigms for studying the unconscious processing of threatening facial expressions face methodological limitations and have predominantly focused on fear, leaving gaps in our understanding of anger. Additionally, it is unclear how the unconscious perception of anger influences subjective anger experiences. To address this, the current study employed Continuous Flash Suppression (CFS), a robust method for studying unconscious processing, to assess suppression times for angry, fearful and happy facial expressions. Following the administration of CFS, participants underwent an anger induction paradigm, and state anger symptoms were assessed at multiple timepoints. Suppression times for angry faces were compared to those for happy and fearful faces, and their relationship with state anger symptoms post-induction was examined. Results revealed that fearful faces broke suppression significantly faster than happy faces. Anger was slower to break suppression compared to fear, but no significant differences emerged between anger and happiness. In addition, the faster emergence into awareness of fear compared to anger was linked to an increased state anger after the induction, indicating that differences in the unconscious processing of these two emotions can potentially influence symptoms of subjective anger. These findings provide new insights into how angry and fearful faces are processed unconsciously, with implications for understanding the cognitive mechanisms underlying subjective anger.
{"title":"“Invisible Dangers”: Unconscious processing of angry vs fearful faces and its relationship to subjective anger","authors":"Anna Pelliet , Marlene Nogueira , Catarina Fagundes , Susana Capela , Fátima Saraiva , Erdem Pulcu , Catherine J. Harmer , Susannah E. Murphy , Liliana P. Capitão","doi":"10.1016/j.concog.2025.103848","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.concog.2025.103848","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Traditional paradigms for studying the unconscious processing of threatening facial expressions face methodological limitations and have predominantly focused on fear, leaving gaps in our understanding of anger. Additionally, it is unclear how the unconscious perception of anger influences subjective anger experiences. To address this, the current study employed Continuous Flash Suppression (CFS), a robust method for studying unconscious processing, to assess suppression times for angry, fearful and happy facial expressions. Following the administration of CFS, participants underwent an anger induction paradigm, and state anger symptoms were assessed at multiple timepoints. Suppression times for angry faces were compared to those for happy and fearful faces, and their relationship with state anger symptoms post-induction was examined. Results revealed that fearful faces broke suppression significantly faster than happy faces. Anger was slower to break suppression compared to fear, but no significant differences emerged between anger and happiness. In addition, the faster emergence into awareness of fear compared to anger was linked to an increased state anger after the induction, indicating that differences in the unconscious processing of these two emotions can potentially influence symptoms of subjective anger. These findings provide new insights into how angry and fearful faces are processed unconsciously, with implications for understanding the cognitive mechanisms underlying subjective anger.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":51358,"journal":{"name":"Consciousness and Cognition","volume":"130 ","pages":"Article 103848"},"PeriodicalIF":2.1,"publicationDate":"2025-03-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143697774","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-03-24DOI: 10.1016/j.concog.2025.103849
Sena N. Bilgin , Tadeusz W. Kononowicz
Understanding how humans monitor and evaluate temporal errors is crucial for uncovering the mechanisms of metacognitive processes, linking the fields of time perception and metacognition. In a typical paradigm, participants self-generate a time interval and subsequently can accurately evaluate its error. The implicit assumption in the field has been that participants monitor temporal representations. Even though temporal error monitoring has been replicated numerous times, it remains unclear what kind of information participants monitor when assessing the just-generated interval. Here, we assessed two scenarios in which participants could monitor sources of variability in temporal error monitoring: the internal representation of duration (Clock Hypothesis) or just motor signal (Motor Hypothesis). We assessed temporal error monitoring by inducing different levels of motor signal in motor timing, with the expectation that these levels of motor execution would influence temporal error monitoring outcomes. The motor signal was manipulated by instructing participants to either use button presses or joystick movements to produce time intervals, allowing us to evaluate and report how different levels of motor execution signal affect temporal error monitoring. According to the Clock Hypothesis, the additional motor signal should impair the accuracy of temporal error monitoring. Conversely, the Motor Hypothesis posits that additional induced signal should enhance the accuracy of temporal error monitoring. In line with the Clock Hypothesis, error monitoring performance was enhanced in a condition with a lower motor signal. These results show that humans evaluate their errors based on an informationally rich representation of internal duration, supporting metacognitive abilities in temporal error monitoring.
Public significance: Temporal error monitoring emerged from the fields of interval timing, decision-making, and metacognition, positing that humans evaluate the sign and magnitude of their temporal errors. Here, we critically test whether participants assess their timing representations as such and whether they are aware of the correctness of these evaluations.
{"title":"Temporal error monitoring: Monitoring of internal clock or just motor noise?","authors":"Sena N. Bilgin , Tadeusz W. Kononowicz","doi":"10.1016/j.concog.2025.103849","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.concog.2025.103849","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Understanding how humans monitor and evaluate temporal errors is crucial for uncovering the mechanisms of metacognitive processes, linking the fields of time perception and metacognition. In a typical paradigm, participants self-generate a time interval and subsequently can accurately evaluate its error. The implicit assumption in the field has been that participants monitor temporal representations. Even though temporal error monitoring has been replicated numerous times, it remains unclear what kind of information participants monitor when assessing the just-generated interval. Here, we assessed two scenarios in which participants could monitor sources of variability in temporal error monitoring: the internal representation of duration (Clock Hypothesis) or just motor signal (Motor Hypothesis). We assessed temporal error monitoring by inducing different levels of motor signal in motor timing, with the expectation that these levels of motor execution would influence temporal error monitoring outcomes. The motor signal was manipulated by instructing participants to either use button presses or joystick movements to produce time intervals, allowing us to evaluate and report how different levels of motor execution signal affect temporal error monitoring. According to the Clock Hypothesis, the additional motor signal should impair the accuracy of temporal error monitoring. Conversely, the Motor Hypothesis posits that additional induced signal should enhance the accuracy of temporal error monitoring. In line with the Clock Hypothesis, error monitoring performance was enhanced in a condition with a lower motor signal. These results show that humans evaluate their errors based on an informationally rich representation of internal duration, supporting metacognitive abilities in temporal error monitoring.</div><div><strong>Public significance:</strong> Temporal error monitoring emerged from the fields of interval timing, decision-making, and metacognition, positing that humans evaluate the sign and magnitude of their temporal errors. Here, we critically test whether participants assess their timing representations as such and whether they are aware of the correctness of these evaluations.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":51358,"journal":{"name":"Consciousness and Cognition","volume":"130 ","pages":"Article 103849"},"PeriodicalIF":2.1,"publicationDate":"2025-03-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143686363","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-03-21DOI: 10.1016/j.concog.2025.103851
Carl Michael Galang , Ayça Akan , Roland Pfister , Marcel Brass
Rules are deeply ingrained in our cognition. The current study investigates the influence of rule breaking on explicit sense of agency as well as the implicit perceptual illusion of temporal binding. Participants completed a free choice task that involved following or breaking a predetermined rule. The task required pressing a key that matched to a visual stimulus which triggered a corresponding change after a delay. Participants estimated the delay as an index of temporal binding. The results showed similar levels of explicit agency for rule following and breaking. Temporal binding, by contrast, was indeed influenced by rule breaking; however, the relationship is complex. Specifically, participants had smaller interval estimates for rule following vs. breaking at the 100 ms delay, likely reflecting cognitive conflict during rule breaking, whereas this effect reversed for the 400 ms and 700 ms delays. We interpret our results in relation to the wider rule breaking and temporal binding literature.
{"title":"Temporal binding during deliberate rule breaking","authors":"Carl Michael Galang , Ayça Akan , Roland Pfister , Marcel Brass","doi":"10.1016/j.concog.2025.103851","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.concog.2025.103851","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Rules are deeply ingrained in our cognition. The current study investigates the influence of rule breaking on explicit sense of agency as well as the implicit perceptual illusion of temporal binding. Participants completed a free choice task that involved following or breaking a predetermined rule. The task required pressing a key that matched to a visual stimulus which triggered a corresponding change after a delay. Participants estimated the delay as an index of temporal binding. The results showed similar levels of explicit agency for rule following and breaking. Temporal binding, by contrast, was indeed influenced by rule breaking; however, the relationship is complex. Specifically, participants had smaller interval estimates for rule following vs. breaking at the 100 ms delay, likely reflecting cognitive conflict during rule breaking, whereas this effect reversed for the 400 ms and 700 ms delays. We interpret our results in relation to the wider rule breaking and temporal binding literature.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":51358,"journal":{"name":"Consciousness and Cognition","volume":"130 ","pages":"Article 103851"},"PeriodicalIF":2.1,"publicationDate":"2025-03-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143686362","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-03-19DOI: 10.1016/j.concog.2025.103850
Alexander Berger, Markus Kiefer
Numerous previous studies have shown that masked stimuli trigger cognitive control processes, including the activation of task sets, and thereby affect subsequent processing. However, it has not been directly tested whether unconsciously activated task sets also need to be reconfigured when switching to a new task, as has been shown for consciously triggered task sets. To test whether unconsciously activated task sets are subject to inhibitory processes, we measured n-2 repetition costs following masked cue presentation in a task switching design. We furthermore simultaneously assessed event-related potentials (ERPs) to gain additional insights into task set reconfiguration processes. Results showed that task sets were inhibited following the presentation of an unmasked task cue, as reflected by n-2 repetition costs. Furthermore, a cue-locked positivity ERP component indicated that task sets were reconfigured following both mere task preparation and task execution. In contrast, no evidence for a reconfiguration of unconsciously activated task sets was observed following masked cue presentation in either measure. Thus, task set reconfiguration, including the inhibition of a task set, is likely tied to conscious task set activation, suggesting that an unconscious process – once initiated – is not terminated by inhibitory processes.
{"title":"Task set reconfiguration following masked and unmasked task cues","authors":"Alexander Berger, Markus Kiefer","doi":"10.1016/j.concog.2025.103850","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.concog.2025.103850","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Numerous previous studies have shown that masked stimuli trigger cognitive control processes, including the activation of task sets, and thereby affect subsequent processing. However, it has not been directly tested whether unconsciously activated task sets also need to be reconfigured when switching to a new task, as has been shown for consciously triggered task sets. To test whether unconsciously activated task sets are subject to inhibitory processes, we measured n-2 repetition costs following masked cue presentation in a task switching design. We furthermore simultaneously assessed event-related potentials (ERPs) to gain additional insights into task set reconfiguration processes. Results showed that task sets were inhibited following the presentation of an unmasked task cue, as reflected by n-2 repetition costs. Furthermore, a cue-locked positivity ERP component indicated that task sets were reconfigured following both mere task preparation and task execution. In contrast, no evidence for a reconfiguration of unconsciously activated task sets was observed following masked cue presentation in either measure. Thus, task set reconfiguration, including the inhibition of a task set, is likely tied to conscious task set activation, suggesting that an unconscious process – once initiated – is not terminated by inhibitory processes.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":51358,"journal":{"name":"Consciousness and Cognition","volume":"130 ","pages":"Article 103850"},"PeriodicalIF":2.1,"publicationDate":"2025-03-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143642997","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Sense of Agency (SoA) is the feeling of control over one’s actions and outcomes. People can experience “vicarious” SoA towards other agents, either other humans or artificial agents such as robots. A commonly used measure of implicit SoA is the Intentional Binding (IB) effect, which is stronger when the action is voluntary, relative to involuntary. However, it remains unclear whether this is true also for vicarious SoA. Thus, in three experiments, participants performed an IB task alone and with another agent, namely with another human (Experiment 1) or with the humanoid robot iCub (Experiments 2 and 3). The co-agents’ actions were presented as voluntary or involuntary- triggered by a mechanical device. Participants reported the time of occurrence of self-generated actions, as well as the other’s human actions (Experiment 1), the robot actions (Experiment 2) or robot outcomes (Experiment 3). Experiment 1 showed that both self- and vicarious IB occurred only when the actions were voluntary. In Experiment 2, IB for self-actions occurred only when voluntary, but vicarious IB over iCub’s actions occurred irrespective of whether the action was presented as “voluntary” or “involuntary”. Experiment 3 showed that IB over tone outcomes occurred for self-generated and robot actions. Our findings suggest that voluntariness of actions plays a role in the emergence of the IB affect (and, by extension, of SoA) only if predictive processes are at play. They also indicate that vicarious IB for robots is based on postdictive processes, and this, perceived voluntariness of the robot actions does not modulate the vicarious IB effect for robots.
{"title":"Does perceived voluntariness of others’ actions induce vicarious sense of agency? Evidence from human-robot interaction","authors":"Cecilia Roselli , Francesca Ciardo , Davide De Tommaso , Agnieszka Wykowska","doi":"10.1016/j.concog.2025.103835","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.concog.2025.103835","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Sense of Agency (SoA) is the feeling of control over one’s actions and outcomes. People can experience “vicarious” SoA towards other agents, either other humans or artificial agents such as robots. A commonly used measure of implicit SoA is the Intentional Binding (IB) effect, which is stronger when the action is voluntary, relative to involuntary. However, it remains unclear whether this is true also for vicarious SoA. Thus, in three experiments, participants performed an IB task alone and with another agent, namely with another human (Experiment 1) or with the humanoid robot iCub (Experiments 2 and 3). The co-agents’ actions were presented as voluntary or involuntary- triggered by a mechanical device. Participants reported the time of occurrence of self-generated actions, as well as the other’s human actions (Experiment 1), the robot actions (Experiment 2) or robot outcomes (Experiment 3). Experiment 1 showed that both self- and vicarious IB occurred only when the actions were voluntary. In Experiment 2, IB for self-actions occurred only when voluntary, but vicarious IB over iCub’s actions occurred irrespective of whether the action was presented as “voluntary” or “involuntary”. Experiment 3 showed that IB over tone outcomes occurred for self-generated and robot actions. Our findings suggest that voluntariness of actions plays a role in the emergence of the IB affect (and, by extension, of SoA) only if predictive processes are at play. They also indicate that vicarious IB for robots is based on postdictive processes, and this, perceived voluntariness of the robot actions does not modulate the vicarious IB effect for robots.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":51358,"journal":{"name":"Consciousness and Cognition","volume":"130 ","pages":"Article 103835"},"PeriodicalIF":2.1,"publicationDate":"2025-03-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143579912","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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