Pub Date : 2025-05-23DOI: 10.1016/j.concog.2025.103889
Jing Teng , Tuo Liu , Kelong Lu , Andrea Hildebrandt , Ning Hao
Previous research highlights the importance of semantic memory and associative ability in divergent thinking, yet their roles in visual artistic creativity remain unclear. Using an expert-novice paradigm, this study investigated the predictive roles of semantic memory structure and associative ability in divergent thinking and visual artistic creativity. Design and non-design students completed a semantic distance judgment task, an association chain task, and four creative tasks. Key demographic and baseline variables were recorded to ensure group comparability. Results revealed significant group differences in semantic memory structure and associative ability. Notably, semantic network structure strongly predicted both divergent thinking and visual artistic creativity, with the non-design group showing particularly pronounced effects. Association fluency also predicted different types of creative performances across both groups. These findings extend the associative theory of creativity to visual arts, offering insights into the cognitive foundations of artistic creativity and its implications for art education.
{"title":"Semantic memory and associative ability as predictors of divergent thinking and visual artistic creativity: An expert-novice comparison","authors":"Jing Teng , Tuo Liu , Kelong Lu , Andrea Hildebrandt , Ning Hao","doi":"10.1016/j.concog.2025.103889","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.concog.2025.103889","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Previous research highlights the importance of semantic memory and associative ability in divergent thinking, yet their roles in visual artistic creativity remain unclear. Using an expert-novice paradigm, this study investigated the predictive roles of semantic memory structure and associative ability in divergent thinking and visual artistic creativity. Design and non-design students completed a semantic distance judgment task, an association chain task, and four creative tasks. Key demographic and baseline variables were recorded to ensure group comparability. Results revealed significant group differences in semantic memory structure and associative ability. Notably, semantic network structure strongly predicted both divergent thinking and visual artistic creativity, with the non-design group showing particularly pronounced effects. Association fluency also predicted different types of creative performances across both groups. These findings extend the associative theory of creativity to visual arts, offering insights into the cognitive foundations of artistic creativity and its implications for art education.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":51358,"journal":{"name":"Consciousness and Cognition","volume":"133 ","pages":"Article 103889"},"PeriodicalIF":2.1,"publicationDate":"2025-05-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144116097","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
We investigated the influence of categorical perception on crossmodal correspondence by examining whether the chord-color crossmodal mapping differs depending on the degree of categorical perception of musical chords within individuals rather than on their physical properties. The experiment used morphed chords of pure tones graded from minor to major. Participants, who were classified as either categorizers or non-categorizers using chord tonality identification and discrimination tasks, selected a color that they thought matched each chord. The results showed that only categorizers selected similar colors for within-category chord pairs and dissimilar colors for between-category chord pairs. The findings of this study suggest that in crossmodal correspondences, categorizers may organize the relationship between features in a sensory space, and this relationship is isomorphically projected onto the relationship of other associated sensory features.
{"title":"Categorical tonality perception modulates crossmodal correspondences between musical chords and colors","authors":"Sayaka Harashima , Kazuhiko Yokosawa , Michiko Asano","doi":"10.1016/j.concog.2025.103886","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.concog.2025.103886","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We investigated the influence of categorical perception on crossmodal correspondence by examining whether the chord-color crossmodal mapping differs depending on the degree of categorical perception of musical chords within individuals rather than on their physical properties. The experiment used morphed chords of pure tones graded from minor to major. Participants, who were classified as either categorizers or non-categorizers using chord tonality identification and discrimination tasks, selected a color that they thought matched each chord. The results showed that only categorizers selected similar colors for within-category chord pairs and dissimilar colors for between-category chord pairs. The findings of this study suggest that in crossmodal correspondences, categorizers may organize the relationship between features in a sensory space, and this relationship is isomorphically projected onto the relationship of other associated sensory features.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":51358,"journal":{"name":"Consciousness and Cognition","volume":"132 ","pages":"Article 103886"},"PeriodicalIF":2.1,"publicationDate":"2025-05-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144090172","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-05-16DOI: 10.1016/j.concog.2025.103887
Nicolás Marchant , Gorka Navarrete , Vincent de Gardelle , Jaime R. Silva , Jérôme Sackur , Gabriel Reyes
Choice blindness refers to a surprising blind spot we have about choices made only seconds ago. After making a choice between two items, observers presented with the unchosen item may fail to report the incongruence, and even provide justifications for a choice they did not make. Here, we show that this effect is modulated by participant’s perception of the reliability of the environment. In three experiments, we introduced cues about the competence or incompetence of experimenters, either during or before the traditional choice blindness phase. When manifest reliability of the experimenter decreased, participants were more likely to report the mismatch between the chosen item and the item presented to them. Our results reinforce the notion that choice blindness is a context-dependent phenomenon, permeable to social cues in the context of psychological experiments. Dataset and the analysis scripts are available at the Open Science Foundation at: https://osf.io/ht769/.
{"title":"Social cues for experimenter incompetence influence choice blindness","authors":"Nicolás Marchant , Gorka Navarrete , Vincent de Gardelle , Jaime R. Silva , Jérôme Sackur , Gabriel Reyes","doi":"10.1016/j.concog.2025.103887","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.concog.2025.103887","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Choice blindness refers to a surprising blind spot we have about choices made only seconds ago. After making a choice between two items, observers presented with the unchosen item may fail to report the incongruence, and even provide justifications for a choice they did not make. Here, we show that this effect is modulated by participant’s perception of the reliability of the environment. In three experiments, we introduced cues about the competence or incompetence of experimenters, either during or before the traditional choice blindness phase. When manifest reliability of the experimenter decreased, participants were more likely to report the mismatch between the chosen item and the item presented to them. Our results reinforce the notion that choice blindness is a context-dependent phenomenon, permeable to social cues in the context of psychological experiments. Dataset and the analysis scripts are available at the Open Science Foundation at: <span><span>https://osf.io/ht769/</span><svg><path></path></svg></span>.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":51358,"journal":{"name":"Consciousness and Cognition","volume":"132 ","pages":"Article 103887"},"PeriodicalIF":2.1,"publicationDate":"2025-05-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144069343","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-05-15DOI: 10.1016/j.concog.2025.103873
Michelle Ashburner, Evan F. Risko
The experience of cognitive effort is ubiquitous as well as influential; however, our understanding of how judgments of effort are influenced by contextual change is currently limited. Recent work has suggested that explicit cue reports immediately after provision of judgments of effort are sensitive to the evaluation context in which the judgment is made (Ashburner & Risko, 2022). We extend this research here by examining whether a “mixed” vs. “pure” stimulus context (i.e., experience with multiple stimulus types vs. a single stimulus type) would also influence judgments of effort. Furthermore, using explicit cue reports, we investigated whether the cues used to make these judgments were likewise influenced by the stimulus context. Results demonstrated that the pattern of effort judgments and the explicit cue reports changed markedly across stimulus context. Implications of these results in terms of better understanding how individuals make judgments of effort are discussed.
{"title":"Judgments of effort and associated cues are influenced by stimulus context","authors":"Michelle Ashburner, Evan F. Risko","doi":"10.1016/j.concog.2025.103873","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.concog.2025.103873","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>The experience of cognitive effort is ubiquitous as well as influential; however, our understanding of how judgments of effort are influenced by contextual change is currently limited. Recent work has suggested that explicit cue reports immediately after provision of judgments of effort are sensitive to the evaluation context in which the judgment is made (<span><span>Ashburner & Risko, 2022</span></span>). We extend this research here by examining whether a “mixed” vs. “pure” stimulus context (i.e., experience with multiple stimulus types vs. a single stimulus type) would also influence judgments of effort. Furthermore, using explicit cue reports, we investigated whether the cues used to make these judgments were likewise influenced by the stimulus context. Results demonstrated that the pattern of effort judgments and the explicit cue reports changed markedly across stimulus context. Implications of these results in terms of better understanding how individuals make judgments of effort are discussed.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":51358,"journal":{"name":"Consciousness and Cognition","volume":"132 ","pages":"Article 103873"},"PeriodicalIF":2.1,"publicationDate":"2025-05-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144069339","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-05-13DOI: 10.1016/j.concog.2025.103874
Peng Liu
Dangerous objects can inhibit prepared motor actions elicited by prime gestures, resulting in prolonged reaction times—a phenomenon termed the motor interference effect caused by dangerous objects. Previous research has emphasized that motor inhibition requires the affordance activation strength elicited by dangerous targets to exceed an inhibitory threshold. However, existing studies have confounded affordance activation levels with variations in multiple factors, including prime gestures, stimulus sizes, target orientation affordances, and low-level sharp-edge features. These methodological confounding factors have led to ambiguity regarding the necessary conditions for the emergence of motor interference effects. To address this issue, this study conducted five experiments using a prime-target grip congruency judgment task. Experiment 1 controlled for shape and grip-type differences between dangerous and neutral targets. Experiment 2 further matched target sizes in the precision-grip condition to those in the power-grip condition, which eliminated stimulus sizes as a contributing factor for motor interference effects. Experiment 3 manipulated prime gestures while using identical stimuli for power-grip and precision-grip targets (the area of power-grip targets was twice that of precision-grip targets). Results showed that motor interference effects in the power-grip target condition depended on the power-grip prime gesture. To further investigate potential confounds, Experiments 4 and 5 used target stimuli without handle features and manipulated the target grasping experience to exclude the influences of target orientation affordances and low-level sharp-edge features. Taken together, these findings clarify the prerequisite conditions for motor interference effects and enhance our understanding of their underlying motor control mechanisms.
{"title":"Prime gesture and motor inhibition: Unveiling the mechanisms of motor interference effects caused by dangerous objects","authors":"Peng Liu","doi":"10.1016/j.concog.2025.103874","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.concog.2025.103874","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Dangerous objects can inhibit prepared motor actions elicited by prime gestures, resulting in prolonged reaction times—a phenomenon termed the motor interference effect caused by dangerous objects. Previous research has emphasized that motor inhibition requires the affordance activation strength elicited by dangerous targets to exceed an inhibitory threshold. However, existing studies have confounded affordance activation levels with variations in multiple factors, including prime gestures, stimulus sizes, target orientation affordances, and low-level sharp-edge features. These methodological confounding factors have led to ambiguity regarding the necessary conditions for the emergence of motor interference effects. To address this issue, this study conducted five experiments using a prime-target grip congruency judgment task. Experiment 1 controlled for shape and grip-type differences between dangerous and neutral targets. Experiment 2 further matched target sizes in the precision-grip condition to those in the power-grip condition, which eliminated stimulus sizes as a contributing factor for motor interference effects. Experiment 3 manipulated prime gestures while using identical stimuli for power-grip and precision-grip targets (the area of power-grip targets was twice that of precision-grip targets). Results showed that motor interference effects in the power-grip target condition depended on the power-grip prime gesture. To further investigate potential confounds, Experiments 4 and 5 used target stimuli without handle features and manipulated the target grasping experience to exclude the influences of target orientation affordances and low-level sharp-edge features. Taken together, these findings clarify the prerequisite conditions for motor interference effects and enhance our understanding of their underlying motor control mechanisms.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":51358,"journal":{"name":"Consciousness and Cognition","volume":"132 ","pages":"Article 103874"},"PeriodicalIF":2.1,"publicationDate":"2025-05-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143942839","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-05-12DOI: 10.1016/j.concog.2025.103878
Gabriela Oancea , Brian Maniscalco , Megan A.K. Peters , Craig S. Chapman
The ability to monitor our arm position during goal-directed behaviour allows us to bring our limb to a target as accurately as possible. Despite our success in executing accurate movements, some work suggests that individuals have limited access to information about their limb position. However, other evidence from metacognition research indicates that people have some access to details about their movements. In these studies, individuals are asked to rate their confidence after making judgements about their movements and tend to give higher confidence ratings when they are correct, showing some capacity for self-monitoring. These conflicting results suggest that we may not be able to monitor an entire movement from start to end. In the current study, participants (n = 50) made reaching movements toward targets on a screen. They were then visually presented with two movement paths: one being their actual trajectory and the other being a visually deviated version. Here, we manipulated the location that the deviation was implemented (i.e., start, middle, or end of the path). Participants were then asked to determine which trajectory was their own, while also rating their confidence in their response. Overall, accuracy was lower than expected. Nevertheless, accuracy was significantly lower when deviations occurred at the start of the reach, indicating that awareness of limb position is further reduced at the start of a movement. Additionally, participants were able to metacognitively monitor their movements because their confidence scaled with their accuracy in the task. Finally, differences in metacognitive processes between locations were found, with higher average confidence in the middle of a movement when accuracy was held constant. We conclude that people have a remarkable blindness to the properties of their own movements. As well, monitoring of a limb is significantly reduced at the start of a movement suggesting reduced attention to limb position at this time, possibly due to movement programming demands.
{"title":"Measuring motor awareness and metacognition at the start, middle, and end of a reaching movement","authors":"Gabriela Oancea , Brian Maniscalco , Megan A.K. Peters , Craig S. Chapman","doi":"10.1016/j.concog.2025.103878","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.concog.2025.103878","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>The ability to monitor our arm position during goal-directed behaviour allows us to bring our limb to a target as accurately as possible. Despite our success in executing accurate movements, some work suggests that individuals have limited access to information about their limb position. However, other evidence from metacognition research indicates that people have some access to details about their movements. In these studies, individuals are asked to rate their confidence after making judgements about their movements and tend to give higher confidence ratings when they are correct, showing some capacity for self-monitoring. These conflicting results suggest that we may not be able to monitor an entire movement from start to end. In the current study, participants (n = 50) made reaching movements toward targets on a screen. They were then visually presented with two movement paths: one being their actual trajectory and the other being a visually deviated version. Here, we manipulated the location that the deviation was implemented (i.e., start, middle, or end of the path). Participants were then asked to determine which trajectory was their own, while also rating their confidence in their response. Overall, accuracy was lower than expected. Nevertheless, accuracy was significantly lower when deviations occurred at the start of the reach, indicating that awareness of limb position is further reduced at the start of a movement. Additionally, participants were able to metacognitively monitor their movements because their confidence scaled with their accuracy in the task. Finally, differences in metacognitive processes between locations were found, with higher average confidence in the middle of a movement when accuracy was held constant. We conclude that people have a remarkable blindness to the properties of their own movements. As well, monitoring of a limb is significantly reduced at the start of a movement suggesting reduced attention to limb position at this time, possibly due to movement programming demands.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":51358,"journal":{"name":"Consciousness and Cognition","volume":"132 ","pages":"Article 103878"},"PeriodicalIF":2.1,"publicationDate":"2025-05-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143936283","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-05-09DOI: 10.1016/j.concog.2025.103871
Michael Pauen
According to a widely shared belief, an explanation of phenomenal experience in terms of neural mechanisms is impossible in principle. The reason for this “Explanatory Gap” is supposed to be a basic incompatibility between phenomenal and neuroscientific knowledge: while the latter is framed in terms of functional relationships, it is impossible to capture phenomenal experience in functional terms.
Here, we will take three steps to avert this conclusion and show what an explanation of the qualitative character of phenomenal experience might look like. In Step I, we show that two pivotal assumptions underlying the “Explanatory Gap” argument are unfounded. This means that the problem of phenomenal experience can be solved with the familiar methods of hypothesis development and testing. In Step II, we hypothesize that paradigmatic sorts of phenomenal experience like affective pain can be captured in functional terms, provided the function is framed in cognitive rather than behavioral terms: feeling affective pain is feeling an urge to avoid. In Step III, we will present empirical evidence corroborating this claim. We will also indicate how this functional description can help to identify the neural mechanisms underlying affective pain experience. We take this as a proof of principle showing that the qualitative character of phenomenal experience can be explained in objective neuroscientific terms. We will conclude with some remarks on how our approach might contribute to future progress in our understanding of consciousness in general.
{"title":"A plank across the explanatory gap: The case of pain","authors":"Michael Pauen","doi":"10.1016/j.concog.2025.103871","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.concog.2025.103871","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>According to a widely shared belief, an explanation of phenomenal experience in terms of neural mechanisms is impossible in principle. The reason for this “Explanatory Gap” is supposed to be a basic incompatibility between phenomenal and neuroscientific knowledge: while the latter is framed in terms of functional relationships, it is impossible to capture phenomenal experience in functional terms.</div><div>Here, we will take three steps to avert this conclusion and show what an explanation of the qualitative character of phenomenal experience might look like. In Step I, we show that two pivotal assumptions underlying the “Explanatory Gap” argument are unfounded. This means that the problem of phenomenal experience can be solved with the familiar methods of hypothesis development and testing. In Step II, we hypothesize that paradigmatic sorts of phenomenal experience like affective pain can be captured in functional terms, provided the function is framed in cognitive rather than behavioral terms: feeling affective pain is feeling an urge to avoid. In Step III, we will present empirical evidence corroborating this claim. We will also indicate how this functional description can help to identify the neural mechanisms underlying affective pain experience. We take this as a proof of principle showing that the qualitative character of phenomenal experience can be explained in objective neuroscientific terms. We will conclude with some remarks on how our approach might contribute to future progress in our understanding of consciousness in general.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":51358,"journal":{"name":"Consciousness and Cognition","volume":"132 ","pages":"Article 103871"},"PeriodicalIF":2.1,"publicationDate":"2025-05-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143924778","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-05-08DOI: 10.1016/j.concog.2025.103869
Gulshan Kumar , Safoora Naaz , Nahida Jabin , Arun Sasidharan , Ravindra P. Nagendra , Ravi Yadav , Bindu M. Kutty
Studies on the electrophysiological and phenomenological aspects of dream experiences provide insight on consciousness during sleep. Whole night polysomnography (PSG) studies were conducted among 29 healthy young participants with high dream recall abilities. Dreams reports were collected during the second night by multiple awakening protocol. On the third night, participants were presented with an audiovisual task and during subsequent sleep, dream reports were collected following an auditory stimuli presentation.
REM sleep dreams favor high dream recall rates when compared to N2 dreams. Enhanced EEG beta activity, functional connectivity across the brain structures of the default mode network (DMN) and activation of medial frontal cortex were observed during dream recall irrespective of the sleep states. Auditory stimulations influenced emotional dream experiences highlighting the possibility of target memory reactivation. The study highlights the potential role of dream states and dream experiences in understanding consciousness during sleep.
{"title":"Neurophysiological features of dream recall and the phenomenology of dreams: Auditory stimulation impacts dream experiences","authors":"Gulshan Kumar , Safoora Naaz , Nahida Jabin , Arun Sasidharan , Ravindra P. Nagendra , Ravi Yadav , Bindu M. Kutty","doi":"10.1016/j.concog.2025.103869","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.concog.2025.103869","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Studies on the electrophysiological and phenomenological aspects of dream experiences provide insight on consciousness during sleep. Whole night polysomnography (PSG) studies were conducted among 29 healthy young participants with high dream recall abilities. Dreams reports were collected during the second night by multiple awakening protocol. On the third night, participants were presented with an audiovisual task and during subsequent sleep, dream reports were collected following an auditory stimuli presentation.</div><div>REM sleep dreams favor high dream recall rates when compared to N2 dreams. Enhanced EEG beta activity, functional connectivity across the brain structures of the default mode network (DMN) and activation of medial frontal cortex were observed during dream recall irrespective of the sleep states. Auditory stimulations influenced emotional dream experiences highlighting the possibility of target memory reactivation. The study highlights the potential role of dream states and dream experiences in understanding consciousness during sleep.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":51358,"journal":{"name":"Consciousness and Cognition","volume":"132 ","pages":"Article 103869"},"PeriodicalIF":2.1,"publicationDate":"2025-05-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143917950","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-05-07DOI: 10.1016/j.concog.2025.103875
Nicola Di Stefano , Charles Spence
Multistable percepts are intriguing phenomena whereby an ambiguous sensory input can be perceived in one of several qualitatively different ways. In such cases, people can switch their attention to perceive the stimulus in either way, though they typically cannot maintain both interpretations in awareness simultaneously. The abundance of evidence demonstrating multistable perception in the visual and auditory modalities can be contrasted with the scarcity, if not absence, of studies reporting similar phenomena in the chemical senses (primarily olfaction and gustation), prompting an intriguing question about this apparent qualitative difference between the senses. This paper seeks to address this question by first briefly reviewing multistable perceptual phenomena in vision and audition to underscore their defining features. We then assess the limited body of research that has occasionally linked multistability to the chemical senses. While a few studies suggest loose analogies between olfactory perception and visual or auditory multistability, no compelling evidence exists for such phenomena in taste. We argue that this absence is unlikely to be explained by any single factor. Rather, it appears to stem from a confluence of constraints, including the lack of spatio-temporal structure and intrinsic dimensionality in chemosensory stimuli, as well as their distinct evolutionary functions and cognitive framing. Together, these factors may help to explain why multistable perceptual experiences seem not to emerge in the chemical senses.
{"title":"Smelling x as y? On (the impossibility of) multistable perception in the chemical senses","authors":"Nicola Di Stefano , Charles Spence","doi":"10.1016/j.concog.2025.103875","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.concog.2025.103875","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Multistable percepts are intriguing phenomena whereby an ambiguous sensory input can be perceived in one of several qualitatively different ways. In such cases, people can switch their attention to perceive the stimulus in either way, though they typically cannot maintain both interpretations in awareness simultaneously. The abundance of evidence demonstrating multistable perception in the visual and auditory modalities can be contrasted with the scarcity, if not absence, of studies reporting similar phenomena in the chemical senses (primarily olfaction and gustation), prompting an intriguing question about this apparent qualitative difference between the senses. This paper seeks to address this question by first briefly reviewing multistable perceptual phenomena in vision and audition to underscore their defining features. We then assess the limited body of research that has occasionally linked multistability to the chemical senses. While a few studies suggest loose analogies between olfactory perception and visual or auditory multistability, no compelling evidence exists for such phenomena in taste. We argue that this absence is unlikely to be explained by any single factor. Rather, it appears to stem from a confluence of constraints, including the lack of spatio-temporal structure and intrinsic dimensionality in chemosensory stimuli, as well as their distinct evolutionary functions and cognitive framing. Together, these factors may help to explain why multistable perceptual experiences seem not to emerge in the chemical senses.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":51358,"journal":{"name":"Consciousness and Cognition","volume":"132 ","pages":"Article 103875"},"PeriodicalIF":2.1,"publicationDate":"2025-05-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143912160","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-05-06DOI: 10.1016/j.concog.2025.103877
Zhonglu Zhang, Yue Su, Yuxin Gang, Qiang Xing
This study investigates the role of chunk restructuring, particularly its decomposition and composition processes, in the memory superiority effect of insight. Participants completed a Chinese character transformation task in three conditions: decomposition-focused (DE), composition-focused (CO), and control. Individuals made old/new judgments on Chinese characters and confidence judgments after 4 min or 24 h later. Results showed that for the solution character obtained from decomposition, the DE condition had higher recognition rates and confidence compared to the CO and control conditions, with no significant difference between the latter two. Similarly, for the solution character obtained from composition, the CO condition had higher recognition rates and confidence compared to the DE and control conditions, with no significant difference between the latter two. The study dissociated the critical roles of the decomposition and composition processes of chunk restructuring in the insight memory advantage effect.
{"title":"The mechanism of chunk restructuring in the memory superiority effect of Insight: Dissociating the roles of decomposition and composition","authors":"Zhonglu Zhang, Yue Su, Yuxin Gang, Qiang Xing","doi":"10.1016/j.concog.2025.103877","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.concog.2025.103877","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>This study investigates the role of chunk restructuring, particularly its decomposition and composition processes, in the memory superiority effect of insight. Participants completed a Chinese character transformation task in three conditions: decomposition-focused (DE), composition-focused (CO), and control. Individuals made old/new judgments on Chinese characters and confidence judgments after 4 min or 24 h later. Results showed that for the solution character obtained from decomposition, the DE condition had higher recognition rates and confidence compared to the CO and control conditions, with no significant difference between the latter two. Similarly, for the solution character obtained from composition, the CO condition had higher recognition rates and confidence compared to the DE and control conditions, with no significant difference between the latter two. The study dissociated the critical roles of the decomposition and composition processes of chunk restructuring in the insight memory advantage effect.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":51358,"journal":{"name":"Consciousness and Cognition","volume":"132 ","pages":"Article 103877"},"PeriodicalIF":2.1,"publicationDate":"2025-05-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143912159","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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