Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics最新文献

We study gender differences in a taking-framed dictator game. We expand on past studies documenting gender differences in the taking-framed dictator game by asking whether gender differences persist when endowments are earned. We find a strong and robust gender effect. Women take less than men both in terms of overall amounts and share taken. We further elicit emotions following the taking game. Shame is positively correlated with taking behavior; this could be a contributing factor to taking aversion documented in the literature. Interestingly we do not observe gender differences in reported emotions or emotional intensity by either dictators or receivers.

We revisit the analyses by Sheremeta (2013) and Chowdhury and Moffatt (2017), who pool experimental data from 30 Tullock contests to explain the phenomenon of overbidding. The authors find that the overbidding rate is positively related to the number of contestants and has an inverted U-shaped relationship with the relative endowment. We reuse their data and extend the analysis in the direction of cross-cultural differences, focusing on ethno-linguistic-religious fractionalization as a country-level measure. The results suggest an increased explanatory power of the model, with fractionalization negatively relating to overbidding. In addition, the extended model shows that in the one-shot game the overbidding rate is significantly higher than in the case of repeated interactions. We discuss possible interpretations of our findings.

The menstrual cycle and associated issues are still considered taboo in many societies, causing a lack of understanding and sub-optimal decision making. Sport can effectively promote awareness of social issues in general, including those concerning the menstrual cycle. One such issue is the anxiety arising from wearing white shorts. Despite increased awareness, still over half the teams participating in the recent 2023 FIFA Women's World Cup played in white shorts. In this study, I investigated women's and men's football games from the World Cups and the European Championships between 2002 and 2023. Using regression analysis, and after controlling for teams’ abilities and other factors, I found that women's teams wearing white shorts achieved between 0.32 and 0.37 fewer points per game. No such effect was observed among men. This result illustrates that a lack of understanding of period anxiety has an immediate cost that is very easy to avoid by simply not playing in white shorts. Most importantly, given that sport is an important vehicle of gender equality, increased awareness of period anxiety could result in higher participation of women in sports and, ultimately, in narrowing other gender gaps.

We postulate a general salience framework where, under bounded rationality, agents can be biased in their perception about the impact of consumption on their (intertemporal and otherwise) budget constraints. Under weak assumptions, we prove this distorts several aspects of their consumption and production plans, and, in order to estimate the willingness to pay to get rid of these biases, we measure how this distortion generates inefficiencies. We provide three applications. First, we trace and illustrate the consequences of applying this salience framework to assess the impact of underestimating labor’s effects on nonlinear (or linear) budget constraints. Second, following a traditional hyperbolic intertemporal model, we add salience biases to disentangle and measure the effects of present vs. salience biases, which are generally confounded. This allows us to address the heterogeneous effects of some nudges. Third, we investigate the implications of firm managers incurring salience biases in production plans. With these results, we derive monetary estimations about inefficiency costs and talk about their policy implications. Finally, we discuss experimental designs that test the existence of salience biases and distinguish them from other present biases such as hyperbolic discounting.

The divergence of attitudes towards their ideological extremes has become an identifying feature in the United States. Little is known about its source, how large it is, whether information can attenuate it, and its causal impact on civic behavior. We design a survey experiment that identifies differences in beliefs rather than preferences as a source of division. We randomly introduce factual information about government spending and show that it corrects beliefs. We further use this variation and estimate effects on a suite of outcomes. For individuals who learn the government spends worse than they would prefer, they become 0.35 s.d. less supportive towards the government, believe the government is less efficient by 0.42 s.d. and are less willing to compromise and trust by 0.43 s.d. We do not find any changes for those who learn the government spends more in line with their preferences. This asymmetric response is consistent with a literature showing that negative information has a greater impact on attitudes and beliefs than positive information.

Typically, a linear public goods game with a voluntary contribution mechanism (VCM) sees declining contributions over repeated one-shot periods of play. However, contributions under uncertainty or ambiguity over heterogeneous productivity on individual contributions have yet to be investigated. We compare contributions under homogenous productivity of 0.6; and certain, uncertain (for future periods only and all periods) or ambiguous heterogeneity in productivity, which can be either a high (0.9) or a low (0.3) type. Certain heterogeneity unexpectedly stabilizes contributions over homogenous, led by high productivity types. Uncertain or ambiguous heterogeneity in productivity weakly lowers contributions, but they remain stable. Thus, in a novel finding that is replicated across our treatments, heterogeneous productivity appears to support stable contributions over time, even when productivity is unknown at time of contribution. This finding suggests uncertain and heterogeneous productivity are an important characteristic of public goods that needs to be considered when modelling them in the field, and reinforces the role of productivity itself in driving voluntary public good contributions.

We investigate the impact on employability when job candidates signal different personal tastes for competitions. In three experiments, with close to 3,000 participants in total, we show that non-competitive candidates risk being perceived as less productive, while those who signal a willingness to compete with others may be perceived as less socially skilled. However, displaying a willingness to self-compete, i.e. to challenge oneself to improve over time, seems to increase the likelihood of being perceived as both productive and socially skilled, for both female and male job candidates.

This paper reports the results from a lab experiment to simulate negotiation on innovative therapy commercialization. Using a between-subject design, we analyzed the consequences of two light choice interventions: (1) guiding negotiations towards early wins, and (2) inviting negotiators to share information about their priority goals. In both treatments, the total value created exceeded the control value by approximately 9 % of the maximal value that can be created in this experiment. However, it was essentially the buyer who captured the additional value. We found that, conditional on the success of the negotiation, the total value created increased with the time spent negotiating. Negotiator gender had an impact on the negotiation outcome, with women underperforming compared to men.

Individuals frequently struggle with the challenge of sufficiently saving for retirement, a problem that can significantly impact the quality of life for retirees. Numerous strategies have been devised to mitigate this issue, ranging from traditional methods such as monetary incentives and tax advantages to more innovative approaches aimed at strengthening the individual's connection with their future self. The latter, though theoretically promising, has not yet been field-tested. The underlying premise is that by amplifying the perceptual vividness of one's future self, individuals might be more inclined to make decisions in line with their long-term interests. This study evaluates this hypothesis through a field experiment involving 415 customers of an investment firm. Participants were randomly assigned into three groups: one without any future self-reference (the control group), a second group presented with a text referencing their future selves, and a third group that was given the same text along with a digitally-aged image of themselves. The results indicate that interventions cultivating a more vivid connection to their future selves increase individuals' intentions to save for retirement. This effect on intentions, however, only translated into a short-term, modest impact on the actual amount of money invested.

We study the behavioral determinants of COVID-19 vaccination uptake. The vaccine-pass policy, implemented in several countries in 2021, conditioned the access to leisure and consumption places to being vaccinated against COVID-19 and created an unprecedented situation where individuals’ access to consumption goods and vaccine status were interrelated. We rely on a quasi-hyperbolic discounting model to study the plausible relationships between time preference and the decision to vaccinate in such context. We test the predictions of our model using data collected from a representative sample of the French population (N = 1034) in August and September 2021. Respondents were asked about their COVID-19 vaccination status (zero, one, or two doses), as well as their economic and social preferences. Preference elicitations were undertaken online through incentivized tasks, with parallel collection of self-stated preferences. Factors associated with COVID-19 vaccination were investigated using a logistic model. Both elicited and stated impatience were found to be positively associated with COVID-19 vaccination decisions. These results suggest that impatience is a key motivational lever for vaccine uptake in a context where the vaccination decision is multidimensional and impacts the consumption potential. Results also serve to highlight the potential effectiveness of public communications campaigns based on time preferences to increase vaccination coverage.