Pub Date : 2022-07-14DOI: 10.1515/kierke-2022-0020
J. Marek, Anna Janoušková
Abstract This article revisits the existing accounts of the early Czech Kierkegaard reception. It argues that Kierkegaard has had a greater reception than previously assumed and that one must take into account the cultural and historical contexts. Two major points are made: first, the earliest Kierkegaard reception was closely related to the Czech national political struggles and Kierkegaard was used as a political argument supporting the need for a Czech national reformed Church. Second, we provide evidence for a surprising politicized Catholic reception of Kierkegaard: Kierkegaard’s critique of the Danish Lutheran Church was appropriated to attack Protestantism and support the Roman Catholic Church.
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Pub Date : 2022-07-14DOI: 10.1515/kierke-2022-0005
Henrike Fürstenberg
Abstract By analyzing prefaces and other short excerpts written by different pseudonyms (Nicolaus Notabene, Hilarius Bookbinder, Frater Taciturnus, Judge William and, in contrast, Johannes the Seducer), this paper explores the pseudonymous authors’ relation to their spouses. It assumes that recurring motifs in the prefaces, such as ‘voice’ and the metaphor of ‘fertility,’ reveal, often in ironic tones, general gender-related aspects of identity in Kierkegaard’s works. The paper thus explores how the seemingly stereotyped and archaic conception of gender in the prefaces, such as the pseudonymous author’s assertion of superiority of (male) reasoning through writing over the (female) immediacy represented in voice, reflect aspects of the individual’s disposition before God.
摘要本文通过分析不同笔名(Nicolaus Notabene, Hilarius Bookbinder, Frater Taciturnus, Judge William，以及相形之下的Johannes the Seducer)所写的序言和其他短文节选，探讨笔名作者与配偶的关系。它假设在前言中反复出现的主题，如“声音”和“生育能力”的隐喻，通常以讽刺的语气揭示了克尔凯郭尔作品中与性别相关的一般身份方面。因此，本文探讨了前言中看似刻板和古老的性别概念，如假名作者断言(男性)通过写作推理优于(女性)直接发声，如何反映个人在上帝面前的性格。
{"title":"Voice and Fertility, (Self‐)Impregnation and (Inter‐)Dependence: The Pseudonyms and their (Narratives about) Wives","authors":"Henrike Fürstenberg","doi":"10.1515/kierke-2022-0005","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/kierke-2022-0005","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract By analyzing prefaces and other short excerpts written by different pseudonyms (Nicolaus Notabene, Hilarius Bookbinder, Frater Taciturnus, Judge William and, in contrast, Johannes the Seducer), this paper explores the pseudonymous authors’ relation to their spouses. It assumes that recurring motifs in the prefaces, such as ‘voice’ and the metaphor of ‘fertility,’ reveal, often in ironic tones, general gender-related aspects of identity in Kierkegaard’s works. The paper thus explores how the seemingly stereotyped and archaic conception of gender in the prefaces, such as the pseudonymous author’s assertion of superiority of (male) reasoning through writing over the (female) immediacy represented in voice, reflect aspects of the individual’s disposition before God.","PeriodicalId":53174,"journal":{"name":"Kierkegaard Studies Yearbook","volume":"86 1","pages":"73 - 93"},"PeriodicalIF":0.1,"publicationDate":"2022-07-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"78224339","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-07-14DOI: 10.1515/kierke-2022-0011
Milan Petkanič
Abstract Deontology is mostly reflected and discussed in connection with Kantian ethics, but in the history of thought there is found another outstanding concept of deontological ethics: Kierkegaard’s ethics of love. This paper clarifies the deontological nature of Kierkegaard’s ethics as it is formulated in his key ethical treatise Works of Love (1847). According to Kierkegaard, whose ethics of love was basically his own original interpretation of the Christian concept of neighbor-love, duty is the distinctive feature of love—since Christian love is defined as a command to ‘love thy neighbor.’ For Kierkegaard it is precisely this duty that creates a dividing line between authentic love and non-authentic love: the first one stands for the Christian love for the neighbor, while the latter refers to the natural concept of love as an emotion or inclination exemplified mainly by éros and friendship. The deontological concept of love is challenged later in the article by other aspects of love, such as a need, feeling, and virtue, which at first sight seem to be in a contrast with the concept of love as a duty.
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Pub Date : 2022-07-14DOI: 10.1515/kierke-2022-0018
A. Słowikowski
Abstract The aim of this essay is to create a coherent theistic model of a solution to the problem of evil. To this end, it is shown that the differences in Kierkegaard’s and Plantinga’s accounts of the problem of evil can be reconciled if looked at from a broader theistic perspective. This requires, on the one hand, that Plantinga’s immanent and logical vision be extended to include Kierkegaard’s spiritual and existential view of evil, and, on the other hand, that a correction be made to Kierkegaard’s view thereof, as a result of the way in which Plantinga presents the relationship between good and moral evil in the world. Consequently, in Plantinga’s Free Will Defense the existence of God is consistent with the existence of evil, not because God has a reason to permit evil in the world, but because evil as a real element of the temporal world does not come from God. In Kierkegaard’s Free Spirit Offense, in turn, the interpretative model applied demonstrates that the existence of moral good must be independent of the existence of spiritual evil, for otherwise the moral evil of immanence would not be able to be forgiven by the spiritual good of transcendence.
{"title":"Who Permits Evil? Plantinga’s Free Will Defense and Kierkegaard’s Free Spirit Offense: In Search of a Coherent Theistic Solution to the Problem of Evil","authors":"A. Słowikowski","doi":"10.1515/kierke-2022-0018","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/kierke-2022-0018","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract The aim of this essay is to create a coherent theistic model of a solution to the problem of evil. To this end, it is shown that the differences in Kierkegaard’s and Plantinga’s accounts of the problem of evil can be reconciled if looked at from a broader theistic perspective. This requires, on the one hand, that Plantinga’s immanent and logical vision be extended to include Kierkegaard’s spiritual and existential view of evil, and, on the other hand, that a correction be made to Kierkegaard’s view thereof, as a result of the way in which Plantinga presents the relationship between good and moral evil in the world. Consequently, in Plantinga’s Free Will Defense the existence of God is consistent with the existence of evil, not because God has a reason to permit evil in the world, but because evil as a real element of the temporal world does not come from God. In Kierkegaard’s Free Spirit Offense, in turn, the interpretative model applied demonstrates that the existence of moral good must be independent of the existence of spiritual evil, for otherwise the moral evil of immanence would not be able to be forgiven by the spiritual good of transcendence.","PeriodicalId":53174,"journal":{"name":"Kierkegaard Studies Yearbook","volume":"49 1","pages":"369 - 402"},"PeriodicalIF":0.1,"publicationDate":"2022-07-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"90807154","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-07-14DOI: 10.1515/kierke-2022-0016
Raquel Carpintero Acero
Abstract This paper aims to portray the human being as spirit, in dialogue with Levinas’ first philosophy. The relation between time and eternity is addressed in the work of both Kierkegaard and Levinas. However, in Kierkegaard’s notion of spirit there lies a discernible further development of the relation between the subject and that which transcends it (that is, exteriority or otherness). In Kierkegaard’s authorship, the absolute exteriority of the eternal does not break or suspend the finite structure of the subject. Contrary to Levinas’ critique of the Danish philosopher, the possibility of a life is opened in which neither the external world nor the relation with the others is disdained.
{"title":"Time or Eternity? An Approach to the Kierkegaardian Notion of Spirit through the Movement of Finitude in Dialogue with Levinas","authors":"Raquel Carpintero Acero","doi":"10.1515/kierke-2022-0016","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/kierke-2022-0016","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract This paper aims to portray the human being as spirit, in dialogue with Levinas’ first philosophy. The relation between time and eternity is addressed in the work of both Kierkegaard and Levinas. However, in Kierkegaard’s notion of spirit there lies a discernible further development of the relation between the subject and that which transcends it (that is, exteriority or otherness). In Kierkegaard’s authorship, the absolute exteriority of the eternal does not break or suspend the finite structure of the subject. Contrary to Levinas’ critique of the Danish philosopher, the possibility of a life is opened in which neither the external world nor the relation with the others is disdained.","PeriodicalId":53174,"journal":{"name":"Kierkegaard Studies Yearbook","volume":"23 1","pages":"315 - 340"},"PeriodicalIF":0.1,"publicationDate":"2022-07-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"90077994","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-07-14DOI: 10.1515/kierke-2022-0003
T. P. Miles
Abstract It can be unnerving to read and teach Kierkegaard’s Fear and Trembling in a world plagued by religious violence. The book’s praise of Abraham as the “father of faith” precisely for his willingness to kill his son Isaac, combined with its suggestion that through faith one could “suspend” ethics, seems to provide a defense and even an endorsement of religiously motivated violence. In order to see why this is a misreading of the text, we will need to go beyond arguments based on the book’s pseudonymous or symbolic nature. Only by considering in detail what Fear and Trembling says about Abraham’s faith can we see that, far from endorsing religious violence, the book provides an insightful contrast between true Abrahamic faith and the orientation of hatred, bigotry, ideological blindness behind today’s religious violence.
{"title":"Wielding Fear and Trembling Against Religious Violence and Bigotry","authors":"T. P. Miles","doi":"10.1515/kierke-2022-0003","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/kierke-2022-0003","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract It can be unnerving to read and teach Kierkegaard’s Fear and Trembling in a world plagued by religious violence. The book’s praise of Abraham as the “father of faith” precisely for his willingness to kill his son Isaac, combined with its suggestion that through faith one could “suspend” ethics, seems to provide a defense and even an endorsement of religiously motivated violence. In order to see why this is a misreading of the text, we will need to go beyond arguments based on the book’s pseudonymous or symbolic nature. Only by considering in detail what Fear and Trembling says about Abraham’s faith can we see that, far from endorsing religious violence, the book provides an insightful contrast between true Abrahamic faith and the orientation of hatred, bigotry, ideological blindness behind today’s religious violence.","PeriodicalId":53174,"journal":{"name":"Kierkegaard Studies Yearbook","volume":"21 1","pages":"35 - 48"},"PeriodicalIF":0.1,"publicationDate":"2022-07-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"89427841","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-07-14DOI: 10.1515/kierke-2022-0009
Ștefan Bârzu
Abstract The issue of anxiety has been thoroughly debated in Kierkegaardian scholarship from multiple standpoints and traditions, but not so much when it comes to the hermeneutic undertone. This article is primarily concerned with tackling the concept of anxiety as a hermeneutical concept, or working with it through hermeneutical lenses; nevertheless, the implications go deeper—making a case for an original hermeneutic anxiety, an agonistic trait of hermeneutics. By exploring the hermeneutical dimensions of the Kierkegaardian anxiety we unravel a whole genealogy of the agonistic phenomena—a hermeneutical way that thrives in the paradox. The scope of it all is to break with the conciliatory ways of an epistemic hermeneutics, by regaining the Kierkegaardian hermeneutics of anxiety: preferring the fertile struggle over the passionless synthesis, paradox over soundness and agony over apathy.
{"title":"Kierkegaard’s Hermeneutics of Anxiety and Agonistic Hermeneutics","authors":"Ștefan Bârzu","doi":"10.1515/kierke-2022-0009","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/kierke-2022-0009","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract The issue of anxiety has been thoroughly debated in Kierkegaardian scholarship from multiple standpoints and traditions, but not so much when it comes to the hermeneutic undertone. This article is primarily concerned with tackling the concept of anxiety as a hermeneutical concept, or working with it through hermeneutical lenses; nevertheless, the implications go deeper—making a case for an original hermeneutic anxiety, an agonistic trait of hermeneutics. By exploring the hermeneutical dimensions of the Kierkegaardian anxiety we unravel a whole genealogy of the agonistic phenomena—a hermeneutical way that thrives in the paradox. The scope of it all is to break with the conciliatory ways of an epistemic hermeneutics, by regaining the Kierkegaardian hermeneutics of anxiety: preferring the fertile struggle over the passionless synthesis, paradox over soundness and agony over apathy.","PeriodicalId":53174,"journal":{"name":"Kierkegaard Studies Yearbook","volume":"42 1","pages":"175 - 191"},"PeriodicalIF":0.1,"publicationDate":"2022-07-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"82439931","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-07-14DOI: 10.1515/kierke-2022-0014
Jamie Aroosi
Abstract The right to revolt is a central concept in political philosophy, denoting when it is justified to replace a corrupt government with a new one. As such, it is a normative concept that would-be revolutionaries should consult in order to determine the justness of a possible revolution. However, this article argues that within Kierkegaard’s thought lies a wholly new conception of revolution that does not look to describe when it might be just to revolt but that instead sees revolution as an act we are sometimes obligated to enact. Consequently, revolt transforms from a right to a responsibility, with important ethical and political consequences.
{"title":"Revolutionizing the Right to Revolt: Søren Kierkegaard and the Responsibility to Revolt","authors":"Jamie Aroosi","doi":"10.1515/kierke-2022-0014","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/kierke-2022-0014","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract The right to revolt is a central concept in political philosophy, denoting when it is justified to replace a corrupt government with a new one. As such, it is a normative concept that would-be revolutionaries should consult in order to determine the justness of a possible revolution. However, this article argues that within Kierkegaard’s thought lies a wholly new conception of revolution that does not look to describe when it might be just to revolt but that instead sees revolution as an act we are sometimes obligated to enact. Consequently, revolt transforms from a right to a responsibility, with important ethical and political consequences.","PeriodicalId":53174,"journal":{"name":"Kierkegaard Studies Yearbook","volume":"1 1","pages":"265 - 285"},"PeriodicalIF":0.1,"publicationDate":"2022-07-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"83145712","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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