Pub Date : 2023-07-11DOI: 10.1515/kierke-2023-0015
Andrew Ka Pok Tam
Abstract Early in the 1950s, Kierkegaard’s philosophy had already been introduced to the academic circle of Hong Kong, which was an in-betweener between Chinese and Western cultures. Nevertheless, while Kierkegaard was frequently discussed by the Japanese philosophers of the Kyoto school, Hong Kong Chinese philosophers (remarkably New Confucians) from the 1950s to the 2010s rarely appreciate Kierkegaard’s philosophy. This paper argues that these Chinese philosophers are uninterested in Kierkegaard because their major concerns are the preservation of traditional Chinese culture in Hong Kong, and Kierkegaard’s philosophy seems to be irrelevant to their visions and missions, and Kierkegaard’s Christian ontology seems to be inconsistent with New Confucian ontology.
{"title":"The Hong Kong Reception of Kierkegaard: From the 1950s to the Present","authors":"Andrew Ka Pok Tam","doi":"10.1515/kierke-2023-0015","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/kierke-2023-0015","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Early in the 1950s, Kierkegaard’s philosophy had already been introduced to the academic circle of Hong Kong, which was an in-betweener between Chinese and Western cultures. Nevertheless, while Kierkegaard was frequently discussed by the Japanese philosophers of the Kyoto school, Hong Kong Chinese philosophers (remarkably New Confucians) from the 1950s to the 2010s rarely appreciate Kierkegaard’s philosophy. This paper argues that these Chinese philosophers are uninterested in Kierkegaard because their major concerns are the preservation of traditional Chinese culture in Hong Kong, and Kierkegaard’s philosophy seems to be irrelevant to their visions and missions, and Kierkegaard’s Christian ontology seems to be inconsistent with New Confucian ontology.","PeriodicalId":53174,"journal":{"name":"Kierkegaard Studies Yearbook","volume":"10 1","pages":"329 - 357"},"PeriodicalIF":0.1,"publicationDate":"2023-07-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"83617668","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-07-11DOI: 10.1515/kierke-2023-0017
E. Ziolkowski
Abstract This second part of a two-part article (the first part of which appeared in the Kierkegaard Studies Yearbook 2022) surveys the varying uses made of Kierkegaard’s writings by four twentieth- and, in two of their cases, also twenty-first-century contributors to Religionswissenschaft: Joachim Wach, Mircea Eliade, Wendy Doniger, and Bruce Lincoln, all four of whom happen to have taught at the University of Chicago Divinity School. Far from being irrelevant or being regarded as a theologically-inclined persona non grata by comparatists of religion, Kierkegaard was embraced in three main capacities by these influential contributors to the field: as a datum (mostly in the history of theology and/or philosophy), as a theorist, and, in one case, as an existential soulmate. In Lincoln’s case, the reduction to memes—the memeification—of certain ideas ascribed to Kierkegaard comes under consideration.
{"title":"Kierkegaard and Religionswissenschaft: A Source- and Reception-Historical Survey (Part 2)","authors":"E. Ziolkowski","doi":"10.1515/kierke-2023-0017","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/kierke-2023-0017","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract This second part of a two-part article (the first part of which appeared in the Kierkegaard Studies Yearbook 2022) surveys the varying uses made of Kierkegaard’s writings by four twentieth- and, in two of their cases, also twenty-first-century contributors to Religionswissenschaft: Joachim Wach, Mircea Eliade, Wendy Doniger, and Bruce Lincoln, all four of whom happen to have taught at the University of Chicago Divinity School. Far from being irrelevant or being regarded as a theologically-inclined persona non grata by comparatists of religion, Kierkegaard was embraced in three main capacities by these influential contributors to the field: as a datum (mostly in the history of theology and/or philosophy), as a theorist, and, in one case, as an existential soulmate. In Lincoln’s case, the reduction to memes—the memeification—of certain ideas ascribed to Kierkegaard comes under consideration.","PeriodicalId":53174,"journal":{"name":"Kierkegaard Studies Yearbook","volume":"38 1","pages":"377 - 410"},"PeriodicalIF":0.1,"publicationDate":"2023-07-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"78150890","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-07-11DOI: 10.1515/kierke-2023-0010
Daniel R. Esparza
Abstract Kierkegaard’s distinction of chatter from silence gives forgiveness a linguistic spin. How can forgiveness be spoken? Is forgiveness something to be said and heard? Is saying it aloud saying too much, or too little? What is said when (and if) forgiveness is said? Should forgiveness be chatted away, or reserved in silence? For Kierkegaard, the answer(s) is (are) neither/nor: forgiveness can only be said indirectly, kept (almost) indistinguishable from resentment or indifference, as if discarded in the face of offense—if it is to happen.
{"title":"“Forgiveness is forgiveness:” Kierkegaard’s Spiritual Acoustics","authors":"Daniel R. Esparza","doi":"10.1515/kierke-2023-0010","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/kierke-2023-0010","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Kierkegaard’s distinction of chatter from silence gives forgiveness a linguistic spin. How can forgiveness be spoken? Is forgiveness something to be said and heard? Is saying it aloud saying too much, or too little? What is said when (and if) forgiveness is said? Should forgiveness be chatted away, or reserved in silence? For Kierkegaard, the answer(s) is (are) neither/nor: forgiveness can only be said indirectly, kept (almost) indistinguishable from resentment or indifference, as if discarded in the face of offense—if it is to happen.","PeriodicalId":53174,"journal":{"name":"Kierkegaard Studies Yearbook","volume":"40 1","pages":"191 - 214"},"PeriodicalIF":0.1,"publicationDate":"2023-07-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"78103859","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-07-11DOI: 10.1515/kierke-2023-0006
Mikael Brorson
Abstract This article examines the Kierkegaard reception of the Danish theologians K. Olesen Larsen and Johannes Sløk, who both understood Kierkegaard as attempting to radically subvert the freedom of the human being. Initially, I show how current Kierkegaard research on the question of subjectivity, freedom and indirect communication differs from the readings of Olesen Larsen and Sløk. Subsequently, and in contrast to this, Olesen Larsen’s somewhat ambivalent attempt to read Kierkegaard as undermining human freedom is presented. Third, I show how Sløk arrives at a somewhat similar result, though in a more coherent way. In conclusion, the article offers a brief discussion on the plausibility of this interpretation.
{"title":"Is There a Suspension of Subjectivity?","authors":"Mikael Brorson","doi":"10.1515/kierke-2023-0006","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/kierke-2023-0006","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract This article examines the Kierkegaard reception of the Danish theologians K. Olesen Larsen and Johannes Sløk, who both understood Kierkegaard as attempting to radically subvert the freedom of the human being. Initially, I show how current Kierkegaard research on the question of subjectivity, freedom and indirect communication differs from the readings of Olesen Larsen and Sløk. Subsequently, and in contrast to this, Olesen Larsen’s somewhat ambivalent attempt to read Kierkegaard as undermining human freedom is presented. Third, I show how Sløk arrives at a somewhat similar result, though in a more coherent way. In conclusion, the article offers a brief discussion on the plausibility of this interpretation.","PeriodicalId":53174,"journal":{"name":"Kierkegaard Studies Yearbook","volume":"90 1","pages":"99 - 113"},"PeriodicalIF":0.1,"publicationDate":"2023-07-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"90886600","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-07-11DOI: 10.1515/kierke-2023-0012
S. Böhm
Abstract The article aims at giving an account of and comparing Hegel’s and Kierkegaard’s critique of contemporary culture by focussing on the category of seriousness. Both thinkers diagnose a general tendency of downplaying, in fact, suppressing or even abolishing consciousness of sin and a concomitant disappearance of seriousness in what they consider „the modern age of reflection.“ First, the concept of seriousness is spelled out within their respective philosophies of religion, and this in relation to the reality of sin as a misguided and distorted relationship to God. Second, the idea of seriousness is analysed with special reference to the different forms and stages of spirit (in Hegel), on the one hand, and „dialectical seriousness“ (in Kierkegaard) on the other hand. Third, major similarities and differences in both accounts are pointed out, in order, finally, to draw some, partly critical, consequences regarding current and future Kierkegaard research.
{"title":"Der Begriff Ernst. Zur Kritik ironischer Selbstverhältnisse bei Hegel und Kierkegaard","authors":"S. Böhm","doi":"10.1515/kierke-2023-0012","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/kierke-2023-0012","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract The article aims at giving an account of and comparing Hegel’s and Kierkegaard’s critique of contemporary culture by focussing on the category of seriousness. Both thinkers diagnose a general tendency of downplaying, in fact, suppressing or even abolishing consciousness of sin and a concomitant disappearance of seriousness in what they consider „the modern age of reflection.“ First, the concept of seriousness is spelled out within their respective philosophies of religion, and this in relation to the reality of sin as a misguided and distorted relationship to God. Second, the idea of seriousness is analysed with special reference to the different forms and stages of spirit (in Hegel), on the one hand, and „dialectical seriousness“ (in Kierkegaard) on the other hand. Third, major similarities and differences in both accounts are pointed out, in order, finally, to draw some, partly critical, consequences regarding current and future Kierkegaard research.","PeriodicalId":53174,"journal":{"name":"Kierkegaard Studies Yearbook","volume":"116 1","pages":"249 - 279"},"PeriodicalIF":0.1,"publicationDate":"2023-07-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"83472054","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-07-11DOI: 10.1515/kierke-2023-0014
Hjördis Becker-Lindenthal
Abstract The article examines the explicit and implicit role that Kierkegaard played in the cultural criticism developed in the literary circle of the Danish journal Heretica (1948 – 1954). The cultural criticism of Kierkegaard and eminent Danish post-war authors (Martin A. Hansen, Vilhem Grønbech, Bjørn Poulsen, Tage Skou-Hansen and Ole Wivel) is contextualized in the tradition of Western cultural criticism. An analysis of central concepts such as crisis, rationality, spirit and reflection as well as alienation, individuality and community, demonstrates the original contributions these authors make to the modern understanding of culture. Furthermore, the article addresses the reservations that some of the Heretica- authors had towards Kierkegaard. The accusation of solipsism, however, turns out to be unwarranted. Rather, it becomes clear that Kierkegaard’s emphasis on the individual, like the post-war authors’ critique of fascism, is directed against the power of the masses and the increasing bureaucratization of life. Finally, Kierkegaard as well as the 20th century authors depict neighbor love as decisive for a post-restitutive, forward-oriented way out of a severe cultural crisis.
{"title":"Fast vergessen: Die Nachwirkungen von Kierkegaards Kulturkritik im Krisendiskurs der dänischen Nachkriegszeit","authors":"Hjördis Becker-Lindenthal","doi":"10.1515/kierke-2023-0014","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/kierke-2023-0014","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract The article examines the explicit and implicit role that Kierkegaard played in the cultural criticism developed in the literary circle of the Danish journal Heretica (1948 – 1954). The cultural criticism of Kierkegaard and eminent Danish post-war authors (Martin A. Hansen, Vilhem Grønbech, Bjørn Poulsen, Tage Skou-Hansen and Ole Wivel) is contextualized in the tradition of Western cultural criticism. An analysis of central concepts such as crisis, rationality, spirit and reflection as well as alienation, individuality and community, demonstrates the original contributions these authors make to the modern understanding of culture. Furthermore, the article addresses the reservations that some of the Heretica- authors had towards Kierkegaard. The accusation of solipsism, however, turns out to be unwarranted. Rather, it becomes clear that Kierkegaard’s emphasis on the individual, like the post-war authors’ critique of fascism, is directed against the power of the masses and the increasing bureaucratization of life. Finally, Kierkegaard as well as the 20th century authors depict neighbor love as decisive for a post-restitutive, forward-oriented way out of a severe cultural crisis.","PeriodicalId":53174,"journal":{"name":"Kierkegaard Studies Yearbook","volume":"81 1","pages":"305 - 327"},"PeriodicalIF":0.1,"publicationDate":"2023-07-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"84271266","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-07-14DOI: 10.1515/kierke-2022-0018
A. Słowikowski
Abstract The aim of this essay is to create a coherent theistic model of a solution to the problem of evil. To this end, it is shown that the differences in Kierkegaard’s and Plantinga’s accounts of the problem of evil can be reconciled if looked at from a broader theistic perspective. This requires, on the one hand, that Plantinga’s immanent and logical vision be extended to include Kierkegaard’s spiritual and existential view of evil, and, on the other hand, that a correction be made to Kierkegaard’s view thereof, as a result of the way in which Plantinga presents the relationship between good and moral evil in the world. Consequently, in Plantinga’s Free Will Defense the existence of God is consistent with the existence of evil, not because God has a reason to permit evil in the world, but because evil as a real element of the temporal world does not come from God. In Kierkegaard’s Free Spirit Offense, in turn, the interpretative model applied demonstrates that the existence of moral good must be independent of the existence of spiritual evil, for otherwise the moral evil of immanence would not be able to be forgiven by the spiritual good of transcendence.
{"title":"Who Permits Evil? Plantinga’s Free Will Defense and Kierkegaard’s Free Spirit Offense: In Search of a Coherent Theistic Solution to the Problem of Evil","authors":"A. Słowikowski","doi":"10.1515/kierke-2022-0018","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/kierke-2022-0018","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract The aim of this essay is to create a coherent theistic model of a solution to the problem of evil. To this end, it is shown that the differences in Kierkegaard’s and Plantinga’s accounts of the problem of evil can be reconciled if looked at from a broader theistic perspective. This requires, on the one hand, that Plantinga’s immanent and logical vision be extended to include Kierkegaard’s spiritual and existential view of evil, and, on the other hand, that a correction be made to Kierkegaard’s view thereof, as a result of the way in which Plantinga presents the relationship between good and moral evil in the world. Consequently, in Plantinga’s Free Will Defense the existence of God is consistent with the existence of evil, not because God has a reason to permit evil in the world, but because evil as a real element of the temporal world does not come from God. In Kierkegaard’s Free Spirit Offense, in turn, the interpretative model applied demonstrates that the existence of moral good must be independent of the existence of spiritual evil, for otherwise the moral evil of immanence would not be able to be forgiven by the spiritual good of transcendence.","PeriodicalId":53174,"journal":{"name":"Kierkegaard Studies Yearbook","volume":"49 1","pages":"369 - 402"},"PeriodicalIF":0.1,"publicationDate":"2022-07-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"90807154","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-07-14DOI: 10.1515/kierke-2022-0006
Thomas J. Millay
Abstract Near the end of Practice in Christianity, Kierkegaard’s pseudonym Anti-Climacus denies that progress occurs within history. We are not getting better every day, in every way. According to Anti-Climacus, we are the same as we have always been. This essay sets Anti-Climacus’s denial of progress in its historical context, arguing that he develops a counter-philosophy of history which combats the prevailing Hegelianism of his age. The essay also draws connections between Anti-Climacus’s philosophy of history and the themes of imitation and contemporaneity, showing how a denial of history’s progress enables contemporary humans to interact with the same world Christ faced.
{"title":"The Logic of Contemporaneity: On Anti-Climacus’s Philosophy of History","authors":"Thomas J. Millay","doi":"10.1515/kierke-2022-0006","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/kierke-2022-0006","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Near the end of Practice in Christianity, Kierkegaard’s pseudonym Anti-Climacus denies that progress occurs within history. We are not getting better every day, in every way. According to Anti-Climacus, we are the same as we have always been. This essay sets Anti-Climacus’s denial of progress in its historical context, arguing that he develops a counter-philosophy of history which combats the prevailing Hegelianism of his age. The essay also draws connections between Anti-Climacus’s philosophy of history and the themes of imitation and contemporaneity, showing how a denial of history’s progress enables contemporary humans to interact with the same world Christ faced.","PeriodicalId":53174,"journal":{"name":"Kierkegaard Studies Yearbook","volume":"298 1","pages":"95 - 121"},"PeriodicalIF":0.1,"publicationDate":"2022-07-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"73578876","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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