Pub Date : 2021-08-11DOI: 10.1515/kierke-2021-0011
R. Rosfort
Abstract This article argues that Kierkegaard’s account of emotions has something important to contribute to contemporary philosophy of emotions. The argument proceeds in five steps. The first section starts by outlining two influential paradigms in contemporary philosophy of emotions: the feeling theories and the cognitive theories. The second section then turns to a critique of two prominent approaches that read Kierkegaard’s conception of emotions as belonging to the cognitive theories. The third section presents Kierkegaard as a phenomenologist of emotional ambiguity, while the fourth section attempts to outline a taxonomy of Kierkegaard’s phenomenology of emotional experience. The fifth and final section argues that Kierkegaard’s primary contribution to contemporary philosophy of emotions is to be found in his concept of anxiety as the experience of human freedom particularly with respect to the ambiguity of feeling and understanding characteristic of this fundamental affective phenomenon.
{"title":"The Liberating Cacophony of Feelings: Kierkegaard on Emotions","authors":"R. Rosfort","doi":"10.1515/kierke-2021-0011","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/kierke-2021-0011","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract This article argues that Kierkegaard’s account of emotions has something important to contribute to contemporary philosophy of emotions. The argument proceeds in five steps. The first section starts by outlining two influential paradigms in contemporary philosophy of emotions: the feeling theories and the cognitive theories. The second section then turns to a critique of two prominent approaches that read Kierkegaard’s conception of emotions as belonging to the cognitive theories. The third section presents Kierkegaard as a phenomenologist of emotional ambiguity, while the fourth section attempts to outline a taxonomy of Kierkegaard’s phenomenology of emotional experience. The fifth and final section argues that Kierkegaard’s primary contribution to contemporary philosophy of emotions is to be found in his concept of anxiety as the experience of human freedom particularly with respect to the ambiguity of feeling and understanding characteristic of this fundamental affective phenomenon.","PeriodicalId":53174,"journal":{"name":"Kierkegaard Studies Yearbook","volume":"5 1","pages":"241 - 269"},"PeriodicalIF":0.1,"publicationDate":"2021-08-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"80337057","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-08-11DOI: 10.1515/kierke-2021-0022
Andrew Ka-Pok-Tam
Abstract In 1959, Lao Sze-Kwang (1927 – 2012), a well-known Chinese Kantian philosopher and author of the New Edition of the History of Chinese Philosophy, published On Existentialist Philosophy introducing existential philosophers to Chinese readers. This paper argues that Lao misinterpreted Kierkegaard’s ultimate philosophical quest of “how to become a Christian” as a question of ‘virtue completion,’ because he failed to recognize and acknowledge Kierkegaard’s distinction between aesthetic, moral and religious passion. By describing and clarifying Lao’s misinterpretation, the paper then argues that Lao’s trichotomy of the self fails to give due credit to the independence of religiousness from morality and aesthetics in Kierkegaard’s thought.
{"title":"On the Limitations of Lao Sze Kwang’s “Trichotomy of the Self” in His Interpretation of Kierkegaard","authors":"Andrew Ka-Pok-Tam","doi":"10.1515/kierke-2021-0022","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/kierke-2021-0022","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract In 1959, Lao Sze-Kwang (1927 – 2012), a well-known Chinese Kantian philosopher and author of the New Edition of the History of Chinese Philosophy, published On Existentialist Philosophy introducing existential philosophers to Chinese readers. This paper argues that Lao misinterpreted Kierkegaard’s ultimate philosophical quest of “how to become a Christian” as a question of ‘virtue completion,’ because he failed to recognize and acknowledge Kierkegaard’s distinction between aesthetic, moral and religious passion. By describing and clarifying Lao’s misinterpretation, the paper then argues that Lao’s trichotomy of the self fails to give due credit to the independence of religiousness from morality and aesthetics in Kierkegaard’s thought.","PeriodicalId":53174,"journal":{"name":"Kierkegaard Studies Yearbook","volume":"125 1","pages":"523 - 545"},"PeriodicalIF":0.1,"publicationDate":"2021-08-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"86448642","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-08-11DOI: 10.1515/kierke-2021-0012
Kasper Lysemose
Abstract The aim of the paper is to demonstrate that the concept of Eiendommelighed in Kierkegaard has a considerable philosophical weight, although it figures only marginally. It is emphasized that Kierkegaard—well ahead of the deconstruction of community in contemporary philosophy—creates a concept by which the complicity of singularity and community becomes evident. The gist of the concept is an indistinction between the proper and the improper. Eiendommelighed is that by which singularities, or neighbors, are called into the inappropriability of their ownmost being. This call is then recalled between neighbors who in this way form an (im)proper community.
{"title":"The (Im)proper Community: On the Concept of Eiendommelighed in Kierkegaard","authors":"Kasper Lysemose","doi":"10.1515/kierke-2021-0012","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/kierke-2021-0012","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract The aim of the paper is to demonstrate that the concept of Eiendommelighed in Kierkegaard has a considerable philosophical weight, although it figures only marginally. It is emphasized that Kierkegaard—well ahead of the deconstruction of community in contemporary philosophy—creates a concept by which the complicity of singularity and community becomes evident. The gist of the concept is an indistinction between the proper and the improper. Eiendommelighed is that by which singularities, or neighbors, are called into the inappropriability of their ownmost being. This call is then recalled between neighbors who in this way form an (im)proper community.","PeriodicalId":53174,"journal":{"name":"Kierkegaard Studies Yearbook","volume":"33 1","pages":"271 - 299"},"PeriodicalIF":0.1,"publicationDate":"2021-08-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"85467103","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-08-11DOI: 10.1515/kierke-2021-0013
Frances Maughan-Brown
Abstract The phrase, “Without Authority,” is used so frequently by Kierkegaard that it becomes a kind of signature; yet it remains little understood. I argue that the phrase works to resist patriarchal, top-down, institutionally sanctioned authority: the authority of “direct” communication. Kierkegaard is not alone in contesting the tyranny of patriarchy: another tyranny—of anonymity, of the crowd—threatens to do away with patriarchal authority too, and with it all authority, all communication. Kierkegaard’s “without authority” defies patriarchy and does so at the risk of this wild-fire destruction, for the sake of a different communication that might yet be possible.
{"title":"Without Authority: Kierkegaard’s Resistance to Patriarchy","authors":"Frances Maughan-Brown","doi":"10.1515/kierke-2021-0013","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/kierke-2021-0013","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract The phrase, “Without Authority,” is used so frequently by Kierkegaard that it becomes a kind of signature; yet it remains little understood. I argue that the phrase works to resist patriarchal, top-down, institutionally sanctioned authority: the authority of “direct” communication. Kierkegaard is not alone in contesting the tyranny of patriarchy: another tyranny—of anonymity, of the crowd—threatens to do away with patriarchal authority too, and with it all authority, all communication. Kierkegaard’s “without authority” defies patriarchy and does so at the risk of this wild-fire destruction, for the sake of a different communication that might yet be possible.","PeriodicalId":53174,"journal":{"name":"Kierkegaard Studies Yearbook","volume":"26 1","pages":"301 - 323"},"PeriodicalIF":0.1,"publicationDate":"2021-08-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"85727133","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-08-11DOI: 10.1515/kierke-2021-0009
Mathias G. Parding
Abstract It is known that Kierkegaard’s relation to politics was problematic and marked by a somewhat reactionary stance. The nature of this problematic relation, however, will be shown to lie in the tension between his double skepticism of the order of establishment [det Bestående] on the one hand, and the political associations of his age on the other. In this tension he is immersed, trembling between Scylla and Charybdis. On the one hand Kierkegaard is hesitant to support the progressive political movements of the time due to his skepticism about the principle of association in the socio-psychological climate of leveling and envy. On the other hand, his dubious support of the order of the establishment, in particular the Church and Bishop Mynster, becomes increasingly problematic. The importance of 1848 is crucial in this regard since this year marks the decisive turn in Kierkegaard’s authorship. Using the letters to Kolderup-Rosenvinge in the wake of the cataclysmic events of 1848 as my point of departure, I wish to elucidate the pathway towards what Kierkegaard himself understands as his Socratic mission.
{"title":"Towards the Socratic Mission: Imitatio Socratis","authors":"Mathias G. Parding","doi":"10.1515/kierke-2021-0009","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/kierke-2021-0009","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract It is known that Kierkegaard’s relation to politics was problematic and marked by a somewhat reactionary stance. The nature of this problematic relation, however, will be shown to lie in the tension between his double skepticism of the order of establishment [det Bestående] on the one hand, and the political associations of his age on the other. In this tension he is immersed, trembling between Scylla and Charybdis. On the one hand Kierkegaard is hesitant to support the progressive political movements of the time due to his skepticism about the principle of association in the socio-psychological climate of leveling and envy. On the other hand, his dubious support of the order of the establishment, in particular the Church and Bishop Mynster, becomes increasingly problematic. The importance of 1848 is crucial in this regard since this year marks the decisive turn in Kierkegaard’s authorship. Using the letters to Kolderup-Rosenvinge in the wake of the cataclysmic events of 1848 as my point of departure, I wish to elucidate the pathway towards what Kierkegaard himself understands as his Socratic mission.","PeriodicalId":53174,"journal":{"name":"Kierkegaard Studies Yearbook","volume":"142 1","pages":"193 - 222"},"PeriodicalIF":0.1,"publicationDate":"2021-08-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"77371149","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-08-11DOI: 10.1515/kierke-2021-0015
Jon Stewart
Abstract The present article argues that the philosopher Frederik Christian Sibbern played a fairly substantive role in the development of what has come to be known as Kierkegaard’s critique of Hegel. Specifically, Sibbern had already worked out some of the key elements of Kierkegaard’s critique that culminates in the Concluding Unscientific Postscript. This is demonstrated by means of an analysis of two works by Sibbern which are important for his critical discussion of Hegel’s philosophy: Remarks and Investigations Primarily Concerning Hegel’s Philosophy from 1838, and On the Concept, Nature and Essence of Philosophy: A Presentation of Philosophy’s Propaedeutic from 1843.
{"title":"Sibbern’s Anticipations of Kierkegaard’s Polemic against the Hegelians: The Critique of Abstraction","authors":"Jon Stewart","doi":"10.1515/kierke-2021-0015","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/kierke-2021-0015","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract The present article argues that the philosopher Frederik Christian Sibbern played a fairly substantive role in the development of what has come to be known as Kierkegaard’s critique of Hegel. Specifically, Sibbern had already worked out some of the key elements of Kierkegaard’s critique that culminates in the Concluding Unscientific Postscript. This is demonstrated by means of an analysis of two works by Sibbern which are important for his critical discussion of Hegel’s philosophy: Remarks and Investigations Primarily Concerning Hegel’s Philosophy from 1838, and On the Concept, Nature and Essence of Philosophy: A Presentation of Philosophy’s Propaedeutic from 1843.","PeriodicalId":53174,"journal":{"name":"Kierkegaard Studies Yearbook","volume":"72 1","pages":"353 - 370"},"PeriodicalIF":0.1,"publicationDate":"2021-08-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"74809627","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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