Pub Date : 2022-07-14DOI: 10.1515/kierke-2022-0012
Henrik Jøker Bjerre
Abstract In the opening of The Sickness unto Death, Anti-Climacus establishes the essential relation to otherness that characterizes the human self. He also defines two different modes of failing to live in accordance with this relation, which are subsequently described as “feminine” and “masculine” despair. Starting from this somewhat surprising gendering of despair, the article compares Kierkegaard’s understanding of self and other to that of psychoanalysis. It is claimed that psychoanalysis offers a fruitful reinterpretation of the meaning of “the Other,” while Anti-Climacus, on the other hand, gives new inspiration to the analysis of the despair of being a sexed being.
{"title":"What Thinkers Call “the Other”","authors":"Henrik Jøker Bjerre","doi":"10.1515/kierke-2022-0012","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/kierke-2022-0012","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract In the opening of The Sickness unto Death, Anti-Climacus establishes the essential relation to otherness that characterizes the human self. He also defines two different modes of failing to live in accordance with this relation, which are subsequently described as “feminine” and “masculine” despair. Starting from this somewhat surprising gendering of despair, the article compares Kierkegaard’s understanding of self and other to that of psychoanalysis. It is claimed that psychoanalysis offers a fruitful reinterpretation of the meaning of “the Other,” while Anti-Climacus, on the other hand, gives new inspiration to the analysis of the despair of being a sexed being.","PeriodicalId":53174,"journal":{"name":"Kierkegaard Studies Yearbook","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.1,"publicationDate":"2022-07-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"74179283","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-07-14DOI: 10.1515/kierke-2022-0004
Nassim Bravo, Fernanda Rojas
Abstract In this paper we wish to analyze how Kierkegaard understood the art of writing novels, that is, as a way to express and develop the life-view of the author. We would like to argue that this notion, presented for the first time in From the Papers of One Still Living (1838), was put into practice in the short novel Repetition (1843), in which Kierkegaard used the biblical story of Job to explain the development of selfhood through the existential category of repetition. According to Kierkegaard, true repetition—which is the central category of the life-view he is trying to convey—helps the individual “recollect” the past correctly so he or she can reconcile with the present and grow into the future.
本文旨在分析克尔凯郭尔是如何理解小说写作艺术的，即作为表达和发展作者人生观的一种方式。我们认为，这一概念首次出现在《从一个还活着的人的论文》(From the Papers of One Still Living, 1838)中，并在短篇小说《重复》(Repetition, 1843)中得到了实践。在《重复》中，克尔凯郭尔用圣经中约伯的故事，通过重复的存在范畴来解释自我的发展。根据克尔凯郭尔的说法，真正的重复——这是他试图传达的人生观的核心范畴——有助于个人正确地“回忆”过去，这样他或她就能与现在和解，并向未来成长。
{"title":"Repetition and the Art of Writing Novels","authors":"Nassim Bravo, Fernanda Rojas","doi":"10.1515/kierke-2022-0004","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/kierke-2022-0004","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract In this paper we wish to analyze how Kierkegaard understood the art of writing novels, that is, as a way to express and develop the life-view of the author. We would like to argue that this notion, presented for the first time in From the Papers of One Still Living (1838), was put into practice in the short novel Repetition (1843), in which Kierkegaard used the biblical story of Job to explain the development of selfhood through the existential category of repetition. According to Kierkegaard, true repetition—which is the central category of the life-view he is trying to convey—helps the individual “recollect” the past correctly so he or she can reconcile with the present and grow into the future.","PeriodicalId":53174,"journal":{"name":"Kierkegaard Studies Yearbook","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.1,"publicationDate":"2022-07-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"75358359","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-07-14DOI: 10.1515/kierke-2022-0015
Roman Winter-Tietel
Abstract The concept of the corrective is among Kierkegaard’s pivotal categories of self-interpretation. Situated mainly in his journals, it is used by Kierkegaard for the purpose of specifying his task as a religious author. The overall goal of the present article is systematically to develop the concept and its relation to and relevance for Kierkegaard’s entire oeuvre. In doing so, it will contextualize the term and its use by invoking related concepts, such as the martyr, the fool in Christ or the reformer, in order to shed new light on the corrective’s meaning and function/s. In particular, four motives for the usage of the „corrective“ will be distinguished; they help to identify those elements and parts of Kierkegaard’s authorship which are obviously supposed to function as a corrective to „the established order.“ The identification of these parts allows for making sense of and for critically evaluating Kierkegaard’s viewpoints, in particular those which appear to be one-sided and/or exaggerated. After all, a corrective is meant to do its job in the service of an existing order, not as its opposition or enemy. Hence, according to Kierkegaard, the task of a corrective is deeply dialectical, both affirmative and critical at the same time. And yet, considering the latter, the historical and cultural context is paramount and as such must not be overlooked; for otherwise a corrective is erroneously taken as an absolute norm—a mistake, which fatally repeats the very flaw that it is supposed to correct.
{"title":"‚Für das Bestehende spendiert‘: Die Kategorie des Korrektivs als Instrument der schriftstellerischen und existentiellen Selbstpositionierung Kierkegaards","authors":"Roman Winter-Tietel","doi":"10.1515/kierke-2022-0015","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/kierke-2022-0015","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract The concept of the corrective is among Kierkegaard’s pivotal categories of self-interpretation. Situated mainly in his journals, it is used by Kierkegaard for the purpose of specifying his task as a religious author. The overall goal of the present article is systematically to develop the concept and its relation to and relevance for Kierkegaard’s entire oeuvre. In doing so, it will contextualize the term and its use by invoking related concepts, such as the martyr, the fool in Christ or the reformer, in order to shed new light on the corrective’s meaning and function/s. In particular, four motives for the usage of the „corrective“ will be distinguished; they help to identify those elements and parts of Kierkegaard’s authorship which are obviously supposed to function as a corrective to „the established order.“ The identification of these parts allows for making sense of and for critically evaluating Kierkegaard’s viewpoints, in particular those which appear to be one-sided and/or exaggerated. After all, a corrective is meant to do its job in the service of an existing order, not as its opposition or enemy. Hence, according to Kierkegaard, the task of a corrective is deeply dialectical, both affirmative and critical at the same time. And yet, considering the latter, the historical and cultural context is paramount and as such must not be overlooked; for otherwise a corrective is erroneously taken as an absolute norm—a mistake, which fatally repeats the very flaw that it is supposed to correct.","PeriodicalId":53174,"journal":{"name":"Kierkegaard Studies Yearbook","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.1,"publicationDate":"2022-07-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"84082309","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-07-14DOI: 10.1515/kierke-2022-0008
A. Nagy
Abstract There are several reasons to explore the role theater played in the life of Søren Kierkegaard and in the inspiration for his works. There are probably more reasons to analyze the role Kierkegaard played for theater, both as a source of inspiration and as a thinker reflecting on different facets of drama, performance, and acting. In the present study I focus on the diversity and complexity of Kierkegaard’s views on theater to elaborate on the possible connections and types of influence he exercised on stage artists and theorists, shaping our contemporary theater theories. Approaches include literature, philosophy, theology, staging, acting, audience, and the history of theater, both in Kierkegaard’s times and later.
{"title":"Kierkegaard’s View on Theater “with Continual References” to Contemporary Theater Theories","authors":"A. Nagy","doi":"10.1515/kierke-2022-0008","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/kierke-2022-0008","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract There are several reasons to explore the role theater played in the life of Søren Kierkegaard and in the inspiration for his works. There are probably more reasons to analyze the role Kierkegaard played for theater, both as a source of inspiration and as a thinker reflecting on different facets of drama, performance, and acting. In the present study I focus on the diversity and complexity of Kierkegaard’s views on theater to elaborate on the possible connections and types of influence he exercised on stage artists and theorists, shaping our contemporary theater theories. Approaches include literature, philosophy, theology, staging, acting, audience, and the history of theater, both in Kierkegaard’s times and later.","PeriodicalId":53174,"journal":{"name":"Kierkegaard Studies Yearbook","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.1,"publicationDate":"2022-07-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"78863617","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-08-11DOI: 10.1515/kierke-2021-0021
K. B. Söderquist
Abstract This study asks how Sartre’s version of the dialectic of recognition is present in Kierkegaard’s works. For Sartre, the dialectic begins with an awareness that the other sees me and judges me. I experience this as a threat to my autonomy, and I fight back with a variety of strategies designed to mitigate the effects. Inter-subjective relationships are grounded in conflict from which there is no exit. Similarly, Kierkegaard characterizes the natural, self-centered way of seeing the other as inherently self-centered and contentious. And yet some of Kierkegaard’s texts lay the ground for a way out. Unlike Sartre, he is sensitive to modifications to the structure of the dialectic of recognition that depend on a change in the basic mode of looking. That is, how I see, evaluate, and judge the other can alter the foundation of the interaction from something mutually contentious to something mutually edifying.
{"title":"Is Hell the Other? Kierkegaard and Sartre on the Dialectic of Recognition","authors":"K. B. Söderquist","doi":"10.1515/kierke-2021-0021","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/kierke-2021-0021","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract This study asks how Sartre’s version of the dialectic of recognition is present in Kierkegaard’s works. For Sartre, the dialectic begins with an awareness that the other sees me and judges me. I experience this as a threat to my autonomy, and I fight back with a variety of strategies designed to mitigate the effects. Inter-subjective relationships are grounded in conflict from which there is no exit. Similarly, Kierkegaard characterizes the natural, self-centered way of seeing the other as inherently self-centered and contentious. And yet some of Kierkegaard’s texts lay the ground for a way out. Unlike Sartre, he is sensitive to modifications to the structure of the dialectic of recognition that depend on a change in the basic mode of looking. That is, how I see, evaluate, and judge the other can alter the foundation of the interaction from something mutually contentious to something mutually edifying.","PeriodicalId":53174,"journal":{"name":"Kierkegaard Studies Yearbook","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.1,"publicationDate":"2021-08-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"73791540","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-08-11DOI: 10.1515/kierke-2021-0016
C. Thompson
Abstract This article examines three early writings of Hans L. Martensen, Søren Kierkegaard’s teacher and the target of his criticisms. The writings focus respectively on self-consciousness, mysticism, and freedom. They each make important claims about religion, and together they disclose the young Martensen’s systematic understanding of the epistemological, mystical, and moral-ethical dimensions of human experience as shaped by the representations of Christian faith and life. The analysis reveals an agile thinker, whose creative philosophical and theological ideas are the product of imaginative speculation growing out of passionate religiosity. Some connections will be drawn from these essays to the writings of Søren Kierkegaard.
{"title":"Hans L. Martensen on Self-Consciousness, Mysticism, and Freedom","authors":"C. Thompson","doi":"10.1515/kierke-2021-0016","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/kierke-2021-0016","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract This article examines three early writings of Hans L. Martensen, Søren Kierkegaard’s teacher and the target of his criticisms. The writings focus respectively on self-consciousness, mysticism, and freedom. They each make important claims about religion, and together they disclose the young Martensen’s systematic understanding of the epistemological, mystical, and moral-ethical dimensions of human experience as shaped by the representations of Christian faith and life. The analysis reveals an agile thinker, whose creative philosophical and theological ideas are the product of imaginative speculation growing out of passionate religiosity. Some connections will be drawn from these essays to the writings of Søren Kierkegaard.","PeriodicalId":53174,"journal":{"name":"Kierkegaard Studies Yearbook","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.1,"publicationDate":"2021-08-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"75038958","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-08-11DOI: 10.1515/kierke-2021-0005
Kresten Lundsgaard-Leth
Abstract In this paper, I look into the identity of the neighbour in Kierkegaard’s Works of Love, whom I argue has not been identified adequately by previous interpreters. I propose to clarify the identity of the neighbour by contrasting her with the ethical other as presented in four alternative ethical theories. I then set out to reconstruct ethical otherhood in a comparative analysis of Aristotelian virtue ethics, Kantian deontology, Hegelian theory of recognition, and Millian utilitarianism. Ultimately, through a both close and—admittedly—productive reading of Works of Love, I interpret and discuss the fundamental features of Kierkegaard’s neighbour over against these four positions.
{"title":"“Your Existence is a Delight to Us.” An Investigation into the Identity of the Neighbour in Kierkegaard’s Works of Love","authors":"Kresten Lundsgaard-Leth","doi":"10.1515/kierke-2021-0005","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/kierke-2021-0005","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract In this paper, I look into the identity of the neighbour in Kierkegaard’s Works of Love, whom I argue has not been identified adequately by previous interpreters. I propose to clarify the identity of the neighbour by contrasting her with the ethical other as presented in four alternative ethical theories. I then set out to reconstruct ethical otherhood in a comparative analysis of Aristotelian virtue ethics, Kantian deontology, Hegelian theory of recognition, and Millian utilitarianism. Ultimately, through a both close and—admittedly—productive reading of Works of Love, I interpret and discuss the fundamental features of Kierkegaard’s neighbour over against these four positions.","PeriodicalId":53174,"journal":{"name":"Kierkegaard Studies Yearbook","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.1,"publicationDate":"2021-08-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"78323832","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-08-11DOI: 10.1515/kierke-2021-0018
Petr Vaškovic
Abstract The present study poses a simple question, namely, what are the specific forces that might at times hinder rather than advance individual moral development? To answer this inquiry, I will investigate the writings of Kierkegaard and Dostoevsky, examining the two aesthetic protagonists found in their works—Johannes the Seducer and Dmitri Karamazov. I will utilise the Kierkegaardian framework of the three existential stages to illustrate that it is an over-reliance on gratification, coupled with an instrumental approach towards beings that not only prevents these two aesthetes from behaving morally, but also from even recognising the ethical perspective as a viable existential position.
{"title":"The Tale of Two Seducers: Existential Entrapment in the Works of Kierkegaard and Dostoevsky","authors":"Petr Vaškovic","doi":"10.1515/kierke-2021-0018","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/kierke-2021-0018","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract The present study poses a simple question, namely, what are the specific forces that might at times hinder rather than advance individual moral development? To answer this inquiry, I will investigate the writings of Kierkegaard and Dostoevsky, examining the two aesthetic protagonists found in their works—Johannes the Seducer and Dmitri Karamazov. I will utilise the Kierkegaardian framework of the three existential stages to illustrate that it is an over-reliance on gratification, coupled with an instrumental approach towards beings that not only prevents these two aesthetes from behaving morally, but also from even recognising the ethical perspective as a viable existential position.","PeriodicalId":53174,"journal":{"name":"Kierkegaard Studies Yearbook","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.1,"publicationDate":"2021-08-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"79456919","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-08-11DOI: 10.1515/kierke-2021-0019
C. Djordjevic
Abstract In contemporary philosophy, there is a growing interest in how Søren Kierkegaard’s metaphilosophy and philosophical methodology may have influenced Ludwig Wittgenstein. This paper contributes to this discussion by arguing that each shares and critiques a particular conception of logic that I term “worldly logic.” Roughly, “worldly logic” contends logic and metaphysics are intimately interconnected. It further argues that reading Kierkegaard’s brief thoughts on logic, in the Climacus texts, through the lens of the later Wittgenstein, helps to clarify the nature of Kierkegaard’s critique. Finally, it argues that their shared abhorrence of a particular sort of philosophy of logic is principled and apt.
{"title":"What is Worldly Logic and Why Might it Lead to Suicide? Kierkegaard, Wittgenstein, and the Critique of Logic","authors":"C. Djordjevic","doi":"10.1515/kierke-2021-0019","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/kierke-2021-0019","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract In contemporary philosophy, there is a growing interest in how Søren Kierkegaard’s metaphilosophy and philosophical methodology may have influenced Ludwig Wittgenstein. This paper contributes to this discussion by arguing that each shares and critiques a particular conception of logic that I term “worldly logic.” Roughly, “worldly logic” contends logic and metaphysics are intimately interconnected. It further argues that reading Kierkegaard’s brief thoughts on logic, in the Climacus texts, through the lens of the later Wittgenstein, helps to clarify the nature of Kierkegaard’s critique. Finally, it argues that their shared abhorrence of a particular sort of philosophy of logic is principled and apt.","PeriodicalId":53174,"journal":{"name":"Kierkegaard Studies Yearbook","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.1,"publicationDate":"2021-08-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"79585997","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-08-11DOI: 10.1515/kierke-2021-0010
A. Kulak
Abstract This study is dedicated to exploring the ways in which Kierkegaard provides a criterion for thinking about the principles of plurality when, in the context of distinguishing between Socrates and Christ, between different conceptions of difference—between those that support the difference of the other and those that do not—he writes that, just as no one must separate what God has joined, so no one must join what God has separated. When Kierkegaard then makes central to faith the incommensurability of single individuals, he indicates that the inviolable singularity of self and other is the one principle that can be true for all—that can be plural—since it is the one principle that is inclusive of all. In my paper I argue through Kierkegaard that the relationship between the singular and the plural embraces the paradox of absolute difference, the paradox of difference as absolute: the single individual exists only by standing in absolute relation to all others as absolute; the plural exists only insofar as it involves the commitment to the singular standard that, as absolute, preserves the difference of all.
{"title":"Between Singularity and Plurality: Kierkegaard and the Paradox of Absolute Difference","authors":"A. Kulak","doi":"10.1515/kierke-2021-0010","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/kierke-2021-0010","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract This study is dedicated to exploring the ways in which Kierkegaard provides a criterion for thinking about the principles of plurality when, in the context of distinguishing between Socrates and Christ, between different conceptions of difference—between those that support the difference of the other and those that do not—he writes that, just as no one must separate what God has joined, so no one must join what God has separated. When Kierkegaard then makes central to faith the incommensurability of single individuals, he indicates that the inviolable singularity of self and other is the one principle that can be true for all—that can be plural—since it is the one principle that is inclusive of all. In my paper I argue through Kierkegaard that the relationship between the singular and the plural embraces the paradox of absolute difference, the paradox of difference as absolute: the single individual exists only by standing in absolute relation to all others as absolute; the plural exists only insofar as it involves the commitment to the singular standard that, as absolute, preserves the difference of all.","PeriodicalId":53174,"journal":{"name":"Kierkegaard Studies Yearbook","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.1,"publicationDate":"2021-08-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"88333998","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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