Pub Date : 2018-09-02DOI: 10.1080/19409419.2018.1533426
Lyudmila Ulitskaya
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Pub Date : 2018-09-02DOI: 10.1080/19409419.2018.1534602
L. Gudkov
Yuri Levada and his team took a keen interest in the Russian intelligentsia. Their ongoing research was stimulated by the need to identify those forces that can initiate changes in the Soviet system and transform it into a more open and democratic society. In this context, the intelligentsia was reputed to be an elite group capable of articulating new moral and behavioral norms, disseminating them throughout society, and influencing the most receptive social strata. This outlook, consistent with the traditional view of the intelligentsia in Russia, comports with the well-known model of ‘transmitting ideas’ in social and cultural anthropology, as well as with the models of sociocultural change found in the works of Abraham Moles and Norbert Elias’ theory of the ‘civilizing process.’ Empirical sociological studies that we conducted before and during perestroika and its aftermath lent credibility to this approach. Between 1985 and 1990, the consolidation of national elites in republics of the Soviet Union had been facilitated by the flurry of publications in national languages. In Russia, informal public associations spearheaded by scientists, teachers, journalists, writers, artists, and other members of the intelligentsia facilitated a similar transformation. Public opinion polls, made possible after the founding of VCIOM (the Russian Public Opinion Research Center), demonstrated that the vector of change was directed by the most advanced societal groups – highly educated young residents of major Russian cities demanding institutional reforms, the foremost of which were ending the Communist Party’s monopoly and establishing a market economy. After the collapse of the USSR, the mass support for political reforms of Gaydar’s government, which was led chiefly by academics and political scientists, gave more weight to this interpretation. However, at the end of 1991, doubts as to whether the intelligentsia was really ‘the elite’ arouse, with the doubts increasing through this decade (Gudkov & Dubin, 1991, pp. 97–99). It soon became clear that the ‘intelligentsia,’ or the educated class, finding itself incapable of putting the proclaimed course of reforms into practice, was yielding leadership to the former Communist/Soviet or economic nomenklatura (now operating under a different name). This forced us to reconsider the interpretation of the intelligentsia as the ‘elite.’ In the standard sociological definition of ‘elite,’ this category is identified as fulfilling three main
尤里·列瓦达和他的团队对俄罗斯知识分子有着浓厚的兴趣。他们正在进行的研究是由于需要确定那些能够在苏联制度中发起变革并将其转变为一个更开放和民主的社会的力量。在这种背景下，知识分子被认为是一个精英群体，能够阐明新的道德和行为规范，在整个社会中传播它们，并影响最容易接受的社会阶层。这种观点与俄罗斯知识分子的传统观点一致，符合社会和文化人类学中著名的“传播思想”模型，也符合亚伯拉罕·莫尔斯(Abraham mole)和诺伯特·埃利亚斯(Norbert Elias)的“文明过程”理论中发现的社会文化变化模型。我们在改革前、改革中以及改革后进行的实证社会学研究为这种方法提供了可信度。1985年至1990年期间，苏联各加盟共和国的民族精英的巩固得益于大量以民族语言出版的出版物。在俄罗斯，由科学家、教师、记者、作家、艺术家和其他知识分子领导的非正式公共协会促进了类似的转变。在VCIOM(俄罗斯民意研究中心)成立后进行的民意调查显示，变革的方向是由最先进的社会团体引导的——俄罗斯主要城市受过高等教育的年轻居民要求体制改革，其中最重要的是结束共产党的垄断和建立市场经济。苏联解体后，主要由学者和政治科学家领导的盖达尔政府的政治改革得到了广泛的支持，这给这种解释增加了更多的份量。然而，在1991年底，关于知识分子是否真的是“精英”的质疑引起了人们的怀疑，这种怀疑在这十年中不断增加(Gudkov & Dubin, 1991, pp. 97-99)。很快就清楚了，“知识分子”或受过教育的阶级，发现自己无法将所宣布的改革付诸实践，正在把领导权让给前共产主义/苏联或经济权力派(现在以不同的名义运作)。这迫使我们重新考虑将知识分子解释为“精英”的问题。在“精英”的标准社会学定义中，这一类别被认为满足了三个主要方面
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Pub Date : 2018-09-02DOI: 10.1080/19409419.2018.1533420
M. Lipovetsky
Cynicism has a dual origin as a social phenomenon. Firstly, it is ‘C. of power’ typical of the dominant groups exploiting the population and using their power to enrich themselves in a blatant and amoral fashion (fascism, cult of violence, etc.). Secondly, the term refers to the rebellious attitudes and actions (for instance, vandalism) observed among social strata, groups and individuals suffering from the oppression, lawlessness and the moral hypocrisy of the exploiting class yet finding no relief from their predicament and succumbing to the feeling of spiritual emptiness.
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Pub Date : 2018-09-02DOI: 10.1080/19409419.2018.1533424
Gasan Gusejnov
Since the late 1980s, we witnessed vigorous attempts to bury the Soviet intelligentsia along with Soviet literature. Some efforts along these lines were truly inspired (Anninsky, 1992; Yampolsky, 1991). And yet, forecasts about the imminent demise of Russian intelligentsia have proved premature. Plenty of people still identify themselves with this vaunted group. Some go out of their way to sell their services to the official authorities, to Vladimir Putin – the surprising monarch that emerged after breakup of the Soviet Union. Others, still in self-criticism mode, agitate against the reigning powers and official establishment or sport a decidedly apolitical attitude. Then there are those who enjoy a cozy relationship with the establishment and milk it to their advantage. Structurally, the situation uncannily resembles the one that prevailed in the Soviet era (Beyrau, 1993). The notion that the intelligenty will transform themselves into pragmatic intellectuals – a common assumption in the 1990s – didn’t pan out (Kordonsky, 1994). The intelligentsia is still very much with us, even though it has adapted to the circumstances. It’s been at least a hundred-fifty years since basic literacy has secured a foothold in Russia, but the conflict between faith and reason continues unabated. And the feeling appears to be winning over the intellect. In1866, Tyutchev memorably quipped that you cannot fathom Russia without applying its unique measuring rod – arshin – which almost no one of my acquaintances is able to identify with any precision. Hence, the continued befuddlement on the part of those trying to understand Russia and its intelligentsia in rational terms. That Tyutchev formula – ‘Reason fails those who seek to fathom Russia’ – still rules the day can be gleaned from the political slogan made popular in the 1996 election, ‘Vote with your heart.’ There is a kind of self-serving condescension lurking behind the tired wisdoms of intelligenty: ‘If you have to explain, you have already failed,’ ‘You’ve got to figure this out on your own,’ ‘People won’t understand if we attempt this.’ Do nothing, however, excuse your idleness as virtue, and people will not only understand but also sympathize with you. The intelligenty are more likely to get a pass for its feeblemindedness amidst the harsh realities of Russia. Don’t they love their poor country and its people? That alone should have dissuaded Lenin from complaining to Maxim Gorky that the intelligentsia ‘is not the nation’s brain but the nation’s shit’ (Lenin, 1919/1970).
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Pub Date : 2018-09-02DOI: 10.1080/19409419.2018.1533425
V. Shenderovich
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Pub Date : 2018-09-02DOI: 10.1080/19409419.2018.1533419
L. Gozman
It’s flattering to feel you are a part of something so complex mere words can’t describe it. I’m talking about the Russian intelligentsia. So as not to end up drowning in definitions, let us be guided by the intuitive understandings that almost always suffice. We don’t require precise definitions for a horse or a table – we understand what it is without venturing ‘A horse is... ’ With regards to the intelligentsia, it’s clear that education is a necessary qualification for membership in this group, but not a sufficient one. The working definition must also include a certain system of values, lifestyle, and aesthetic preferences. At the same time, the professed moral ideals of responsibility to country and its people are not always put into practice. The very act of proclaiming these values does, however, inform one’s sense of self. In the same way, a person can sincerely believe he loves the theater while barely attending any shows, with the love of theater remaining a part of his or her identity. The same is with books – a member of the intelligentsia must have books in his home. He may never read them, but the bookshelves nonetheless create a certain atmosphere in the apartment. In the Soviet Union, everything belonged to the bureaucracy, and yet it was the intelligentsia that formed a privileged class. It wasn’t about the money. Many of the Soviet intelligentsia members were not well off. University professors with higher academic degrees and the staff of research institutes made a decent living, but young engineers, for example, lived rather humbly. Still, almost all of them had a clean – ‘brainy’ – job. This was quite important in a country where a huge percentage of the population earned their living through physical labor, often toiling in terrible conditions. If you belonged to the intelligentsia, you didn’t have to lift heavy loads, freeze on construction sites, or work in dirty overalls. This, along with the higher education, which became a widespread norm only in the post-Soviet period, gave him or her the sense of being among the elect, of belonging to a sort of nobility. Interestingly, the bureaucrats also considered the intelligentsia to be the privileged class – the nomenklatura sought to place their children into academic institutions rather than Party jobs. A comfortable life awaited the children of the party bosses after they defended their dissertations, which they did without fail.
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Pub Date : 2018-09-02DOI: 10.1080/19409419.2018.1535911
N. Ivanova
The last time literature had a serious influence in this country and stood up to the authorities was during the period of so-called ‘perestroika and glasnost.’ That period was marked by an incredible jump in the circulation of books and, even more so, of journals (2,500,000 for Novy mir, 1,800,000 for Druzhba narodov, 1,000,000 for Znamya, with comparable figures for other periodicals). Another indicator of the writers’ high status was their success in politics. Parliamentary elections were direct, open, and honest; they empowered real writers – Yevgeny Yevtushenko, Vitaly Korotich, Fazil Iskander, Sergei Averintsev, Boris Oleynik... Literary criticism flourished, and even non-specialists dabbled in it. A good example is Gavril Popov’s acclaimed review of Alexander Bek’s novel The New Appointment in which he discussed the ‘administrative-command system’ (Popov, 1986). Real criticism was in the lead during perestroika, apprizing readers of previously banned books that finally saw the light of day when censorship ended in 1990. Over time, the trove of ‘banned’ books emptied out, publications decreased, circulations went down, and literature went into decline. Its impact turned out to be largely illusory. Little by little, literature turned upon itself, while criticism abandoned its lofty mission of enlightenment and returned to its traditional concerns. No wonder the first independent award for critics founded in the new era was named after the nineteenth -century critic Apollon Grigoriev whose ‘organic criticism’ privileged aesthetic analysis over public engagement. New fault lines surfaced in the 90s when society and readership splintered and unprecedented literary institutions sprang up across the country. Two names frequently mentioned in this period served to highlight the new trends: Soros and Booker. Both came to Russia from the West, both referred to institutions of key significance to the literary world. One, initiated by the Soros Foundation (Open Society Foundations), aimed to boost literary periodicals in Russia. The other, the Booker (Russian Booker), was a nonstate literary award for the best Russian novel. The Apollon Grigoriev prize also had no state sponsor; it was sponsored by two Russian billionaires, Mikhail Prokhorov and Vladimir Potanin, and ONEXIM Bank.
上一次文学在这个国家产生重大影响并对抗当局是在所谓的“改革和开放”时期。这一时期的特点是图书发行量的惊人增长，期刊发行量更是如此(《新月刊》250万册，《德鲁日巴·纳罗多夫》180万册，《Znamya》100万册，其他期刊也有类似的数字)。这些作家地位高的另一个标志是他们在政治上的成功。议会选举是直接、公开和诚实的;他们赋予了真正的作家——叶夫根尼·叶夫图申科、维塔利·科罗蒂奇、法齐尔·伊斯坎德尔、谢尔盖·阿维林采夫、鲍里斯·奥利尼克……文学批评蓬勃发展，甚至非专业人士也涉足其中。一个很好的例子是加夫里尔·波波夫(Gavril Popov)对亚历山大·贝克(Alexander Bek)的小说《新任命》(The New Appointment)的评论，他在其中讨论了“行政指挥系统”(Popov, 1986)。真正的批评在改革期间处于主导地位，在1990年审查制度结束后，那些以前被禁的书终于看到了曙光。随着时间的推移，“禁书”的宝库被清空，出版物减少，发行量下降，文学走向衰落。事实证明，它的影响在很大程度上是虚幻的。文学逐渐转向自身，而批评则放弃了启蒙的崇高使命，回归到传统的关注。难怪新时代成立的第一个独立评论家奖是以19世纪评论家阿波罗·格里戈里耶夫(Apollon Grigoriev)的名字命名的，他的“有机批评”将美学分析置于公众参与之上。新的断层线在90年代浮出水面，当时社会和读者分裂，前所未有的文学机构在全国各地涌现。这一时期经常被提及的两个名字突显了新趋势:索罗斯和布克。两者都是从西方传入俄罗斯的，都涉及到对文学界具有重要意义的机构。一个是由索罗斯基金会(开放社会基金会)发起的，旨在促进俄罗斯文学期刊的发展。另一个是布克奖(俄罗斯布克奖)，这是一个非国家文学奖，旨在表彰最佳俄罗斯小说。阿波罗·格里戈里耶夫奖也没有国家赞助;它是由两位俄罗斯亿万富翁米哈伊尔·普罗霍罗夫和弗拉基米尔·波塔宁以及ONEXIM银行赞助的。
{"title":"Literature and power in the new age: institutions and divisions","authors":"N. Ivanova","doi":"10.1080/19409419.2018.1535911","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/19409419.2018.1535911","url":null,"abstract":"The last time literature had a serious influence in this country and stood up to the authorities was during the period of so-called ‘perestroika and glasnost.’ That period was marked by an incredible jump in the circulation of books and, even more so, of journals (2,500,000 for Novy mir, 1,800,000 for Druzhba narodov, 1,000,000 for Znamya, with comparable figures for other periodicals). Another indicator of the writers’ high status was their success in politics. Parliamentary elections were direct, open, and honest; they empowered real writers – Yevgeny Yevtushenko, Vitaly Korotich, Fazil Iskander, Sergei Averintsev, Boris Oleynik... Literary criticism flourished, and even non-specialists dabbled in it. A good example is Gavril Popov’s acclaimed review of Alexander Bek’s novel The New Appointment in which he discussed the ‘administrative-command system’ (Popov, 1986). Real criticism was in the lead during perestroika, apprizing readers of previously banned books that finally saw the light of day when censorship ended in 1990. Over time, the trove of ‘banned’ books emptied out, publications decreased, circulations went down, and literature went into decline. Its impact turned out to be largely illusory. Little by little, literature turned upon itself, while criticism abandoned its lofty mission of enlightenment and returned to its traditional concerns. No wonder the first independent award for critics founded in the new era was named after the nineteenth -century critic Apollon Grigoriev whose ‘organic criticism’ privileged aesthetic analysis over public engagement. New fault lines surfaced in the 90s when society and readership splintered and unprecedented literary institutions sprang up across the country. Two names frequently mentioned in this period served to highlight the new trends: Soros and Booker. Both came to Russia from the West, both referred to institutions of key significance to the literary world. One, initiated by the Soros Foundation (Open Society Foundations), aimed to boost literary periodicals in Russia. The other, the Booker (Russian Booker), was a nonstate literary award for the best Russian novel. The Apollon Grigoriev prize also had no state sponsor; it was sponsored by two Russian billionaires, Mikhail Prokhorov and Vladimir Potanin, and ONEXIM Bank.","PeriodicalId":53456,"journal":{"name":"Russian Journal of Communication","volume":"149 1","pages":"251 - 261"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-09-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"75961534","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2018-09-02DOI: 10.1080/19409419.2018.1558495
D. Shalin
In the early 1990s, a group of Russian and American scholars teamed up to investigate the impact of Gorbachev’s reform on Soviet society, focusing especially on the role the intelligentsia played in fomenting glasnost and perestroika. Results of this collaborative study were published in a volume Russian Culture at the Crossroads: Paradoxes of Postcommunist Consciousness (Shalin, 1996a). The contributors worked on the assumption that perestroika was an irreversible achievement, that distortions the reforms wrought in Russian society would be smoothed out over time. Today, this assumption appears overoptimistic. After nearly twenty years in power, Vladimir Putin dismantled key democratic institutions, badly weakened other, and established a personalistic regime that reversed many political gains brought about by his predecessors. An international team assembled for the present project starts with the premise that we live in the age of counterperestroika. Our focus is still on the intelligentsia and its contribution to dismantling the Soviet system, but now we want to explore the unanticipated consequences of social change threatening the existence of the intelligentsia as a distinct group. Our team includes prominent scholars, writers, and civil rights leaders who illuminate the political agendas and personal choices confronting intellectuals in today’s Russia. Contributors look at the current trends through different lenses, they disagree about the intelligentsia’s past achievements and looming future, yet they all feel the need to examine its local and world-historical significance. This essay aims to place the debate in historical context and elucidate its relevance to the field of communication studies. I begin with the communication-specific conditions fortifying democratic institutions and show how distorted communications have hobbled the Russian intelligentsia throughout history. Next, I review the social context within which the intelligentsia emerged, the special place it occupies in Russian discourse, and the acute distress counterperestroika inflicted on Russian society in general and public intellectuals in particular. After examining the systematic distortions that communication suffers in repressive societies, I zero in on the intelligentsia’s role in modeling emotionally intelligent conduct and scrutinize the communication sphere as the condition of possibility for a viable democracy. I close this introduction with a brief survey of the articles collected in this volume and reflections on the prospects for a communication theory in the pragmatist key.
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Pub Date : 2018-01-02DOI: 10.1080/19409419.2017.1421095
A. Kozintsev
ABSTRACT Attempts at combining Uexküll’s ideas with those of Peirce within a single quasi-discipline called ‘biosemiotics’ are ill-founded. Peirce’s ‘interpretant’ sensu lato refers to two qualitatively different mental states, one relating to indexes and icons (INT 1) and the other to symbols (INT 2). Animal communication is dyadic – the referent is a directly induced mental state (INT 1). Glottocentric communication is triadic because the connection between symbol and INT 1 is mediated by INT 2. Whereas the gradualist view of glottogenesis is erroneous, Müller’s and Chomsky’s saltationist theories may imply that the idea of language Rubicon is anti-evolutionary. However, the views of Pavlov and Vygotsky and of their modern followers, Deacon and Tomasello, while being Darwinian, support the saltationist scenario. The emergence of the second signal system, of symbols, and of INT 2 was a psychological leap. In human communication, apart from the semiotic triangle (INT 1 – INT 2 – symbol), the dyadic relation between non-symbolic signs and INT 1 still holds. To Ekaterina Velmezova
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Pub Date : 2018-01-02DOI: 10.1080/19409419.2017.1421096
Robert S. Hinck, Randolph Kluver, S. Cooley
ABSTRACT This study examines the strategic narratives embedded in Russia broadcast and news media to determine how the country advances a narrative framework portraying the Kremlin’s world view as propagated through Russian media. We argue these narratives help construct Russian identity in building domestic cohesion while fending off criticisms by Western nations. The study furthers our theoretical understanding of public diplomacy and global narratives by drawing from the work of rhetoricians and IR scholars in addressing how domestic and international narratives become tied together for strategic purposes and their reception by local actors. We analyzed 1016 broadcast and online news segments from 17 different sources representing governmental and official news sites, oppositional sites, and independent news sources. Two studies were conducted focusing on one particular ‘contour’ of the Russian worldview: Russian multilateral engagement through BRICS, SCO, and Iranian nuclear negotiations as well as media portrayals of NATO. The study concludes by discussing strategies for effective messaging.
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