Bioethics最新文献

Some feminists hold that surrogacy contracts should be unenforceable or illegal because they contribute to and perpetuate unjust gender inequalities. I argue that in developed countries, surrogacy contracts either wouldn't have these negative effects or that these effects could be mitigated via regulation. Furthermore, the existence of a regulated surrogacy market is preferable on consequentialist grounds.

As bioethics matures, a number of voices have called for a narrowing of what officially “counts” as bioethics. Bioethics defined broadly, they argue, creates a space that lacks objectivity and rigor, jeopardizing the credibility of the profession. Although a variety of proposed solutions exist, most advance a definitional narrowing of bioethics. In doing so, they mimic the siloed nature of the academy writ large, an institution that organizes itself through the logic of atomization, the belief that knowledge is generated through the process of isolation, examination, theorization, and ultimately reintegration. Borrowing language from Isaiah Berlin's essay “The Hedgehog and the Fox,” I argue that bioethics has thrived precisely because it stands distinct from other departments of learning, constituting one of the few places within the academy where true inter, multi, and cross-disciplinary scholarship can thrive. Reducing bioethics to an internally defined set of axiomatic rationales does violence to this vision, eroding, in the process, one of the field's greatest assets.

Involuntary psychiatric holds, such as the 5150 hold in California, allow for an individual to be taken into custody for evaluation and treatment for up to 72 h when they present a risk of danger to themselves. 5150s and other coerced holds present a bioethical tension as patient autonomy is overridden to provide psychiatric care. I discuss two arguments that aim to provide ethical justifications for overriding patient autonomy during 5150 holds: the “clinical benefit” and “lack of capacity” arguments. By demonstrating that these arguments do not always hold, I argue that overriding patient autonomy during 5150 holds is not always ethical and can be harmful. Lastly, I make recommendations for the 5150 and similar involuntary psychiatric holds to minimize harmful breaches of patient dignity: creating consistent field guidelines for assessing prehospital capacity, educating prehospital providers about the potential harms of 5150s, and utilizing existing support structures within the social context of the patient when they have capacity to refuse further prehospital care.

Can a human right to good mental health be justified? This is an under-explored question: until recently, rights in relation to mental health have been framed and debated primarily in terms of their relevance to psychosocial disability and mental ill-health/mental distress. By contrast, in this article, I propose the basis of a normative justification for a population-wide right to good mental health, focusing in particular on individuals who do not experience mental ill-health/distress or do not have (or may never have) a psychiatric diagnosis or a psychosocial disability. The article is structured into three parts. First, I will outline the emergence of a population-wide right to good mental health in mental health discourse, led by recent reports published by the former United Nations Special Rapporteur on the Right to Health, Danius Pūras. I will then go on to explore what we might understand by ‘good mental health’. Finally, I will explain how a right to good mental health may be justified, drawing on insights from compassion, ‘vulnerable agency’, and James Wilson's account of ‘a right to public health’. I then respond to feasibility and demandingness concerns about such a right, which together inform the basis of the qualified public health right to good mental health I propose.

The modern concept of ‘family’ in the United States recognizes many types of social groups as families, a conceptual shift which was largely helped along by advancements in assisted reproductive technologies enabling those formerly unable to biologically reproduce to have children, as well as by social movements aimed at garnering recognition for these emergent nonbiologically related social groups spearheaded by LGBTQ+ and adoption activists. That these social groups are now recognized as types of families is unquestionably an improvement to the concept, though there are still defects in the concept that preclude these nonnuclear families from achieving the same social–ontological status as nuclear families. Drawing from the nascent philosophical field of conceptual engineering, I analyze our current conception of ‘family’ and argue that it is tacitly exclusionary of nonnuclear families, which can be attributed to a combination of widespread genetic essentialism and linguistic practices that unduly cast the nuclear family as a more desirable type of family by emphasizing genetic relatedness as a valuable quality. I then offer proposals to ameliorate these defects, such as educational interventions to reduce genetic essentialism and the introduction of new terminology that does not connote one type of family as being superior to another. In doing so, my hope is to reveal and begin to resolve an overlooked defect in the concept of ‘family’ in order to bolster the movement to view all families as equal.

The integration of genetic information (GI) into the electronic health record (EHR) seems inevitable as the mainstreaming of genomics continues. Such newly provided accessibility to GI could be beneficial for improving health care, as well as for supporting clinical decision-making and health management. Notwithstanding these promising benefits, the automatic integration of GI into the EHR, allowing unrestricted access to one's GI through patient portals, carries various knowledge-related risks for patients. This article is focused on the potential case of inadvertently revealing misattributed parentage through such practice. The article aims to identify key clinical and ethical implications of such revelation for adult patients. Clinical implications include, for example, altering the physician-patient interaction and the need to enhance physician's genetic literacy to improve genetic-information-specific communication skills. Ethical implications yield arguments supporting disclosure of MP, such as autonomy, individuals' right to know medical information pertaining to them, and the right to know one's genetic origins. Arguments opposing disclosure of MP centre on the right not to know GI and concerns for post-disclosure family relationships. Following the clinical and ethical analyses of these respective implications, we consider how such integration of GI into the EHR ought to be carried out, ethically. We therefore suggest a solution, featuring an autonomy-based approach, built around EHR users' right not to know. Our solution of nuanced consent options (including a ‘genetic ignorance option’) is designed to enable patients' informed exposure to GI through the EHR, allowing them some control over their self- and familial narrative.

This article starts by examining the present state of death ethics by attending to the euthanasia debate. Given that voluntary active euthanasia has seen strong support in the academic community, insights on the choiceworthiness of continued existence may be derived. Having derived cases of choiceworthy nonexistence (which I refer to as choiceworthy nonexistence [CNE] cases), I extend these intuitions to lives not worth starting, or choiceworthy nonexistence for potential people (which I refer to as foetal-CNE, or fCNE cases). Although I depart from Benatarian antinatalism by rejecting Benatar's claim that all existence is necessarily a harm, I posit a weaker argument that all existence is likely a harm since we cannot know until later in life if an existence is a harm. If I am right, then we have prudential reasons not to bear children, since they are more likely to suffer in lives not worth living than not.

This article objects to two arguments that William MacAskill gives in What We Owe the Future in support of optimism about the prospects of longtermism, that is, the prospects of positively influencing the longterm future. First, it grants that he is right that, whereas humans sometimes benefit others as an end, they rarely harm them as an end, but argues that this bias towards positive motivation is counteracted by the fact that it is practically easier to harm than to benefit. For this greater easiness makes it likely both that accidental effects will be harmful rather than beneficial and that the means or side-effects of the actions people perform with the aim of benefiting themselves and those close to them will tend to be harmful to others. Secondly, while our article agrees with him that values could lock-in, it contends that the value of longtermism is unlikely to lock in as long as human beings have not been morally enhanced but remain partial in favor of themselves and those near and dear.

Controlled human infection studies (CHIs) involve the intentional infection of human subjects for a scientific aim. Though some past challenge trials have involved serious ethical abuses, in the last few decades, CHIs have had a strong track record of safety. Despite increased attention to the ethics of CHIs during the COVID-19 pandemic, CHIs remain controversial, and there has been no in-depth treatment of CHIs through the lens of virtue ethics. In this article, we argue that virtue theory can be helpful for addressing CHIs that present a constellation of controversial, unresolved, and/or under-regulated ethical issues. We begin with some brief background on virtue ethics. We then substantiate our claim that some CHIs raise a constellation of ethical issues that are unresolved in the ethics literature and/or lack adequate regulatory guidance by demonstrating that CHIs can present indeterminate social value, risks to third parties, limitations on the right to withdraw from research, and questions about the upper limit of allowable risk. We argue that the presence of a virtuous investigator, with virtues such as prudence, compassion, and integrity, is especially important when these unresolved research ethics issues arise, which is the case for certain types of controlled human infection studies. We use the historical example of Walter Reed and the Yellow Fever Commission to illustrate this claim, and we also highlight some contemporary examples. We end by sketching some practical implications of our view, such as ensuring that investigators with experience running CHIs are involved in novel CHI models.