This study examines sustainability cooperation within online game supply chains. First, we develop three cooperation models, including transactional cooperation, operational cooperation, and strategic cooperation, based on Nash bargaining. These models capture the variations in operators' investment levels and revenue-sharing mechanisms across the supply chain. Through equilibrium analysis, we identify the optimal decision strategies for each model and elucidate their distinct characteristics. Second, our findings reveal that investment behaviors in the online game supply chain differ fundamentally from those in physical product supply chains. Specifically, enterprises in the online game sector exhibit complementary, rather than substitutive, investment behaviors. Furthermore, within the strategic cooperation model, profit distribution is significantly influenced by both the relative bargaining power of the enterprises and the disparities in their comprehensive input-output effects. Finally, strategic cooperation can maximize supply chain performance. However, if enterprises select strategic cooperation, they need to consider the relationship between the gap in their comprehensive input-output effects and bargaining power on the basis of price. Moreover, this study validates its main conclusions as robust.
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