Marketers and antitrust practitioners have long raised concerns regarding market power abuses through bundling in the Information and Communication Technology (ICT) industry. Anticompetitive issues can arise if market-dominant operators frame bundle discounts as “free” offers (i.e., zero-price marketing)—a topic still underexplored in the literature. While research on consumer behavior around free offers in bundles exists, it remains unclear if zero-pricing strengthens or weakens anticompetitive effects. We developed a theoretical model of bundling across different competition levels and empirically tested consumer preferences for zero-priced bundles using a conjoint experiment. Consistent with strategic foreclosure theory, we found that market-dominant operators can increase their pay-TV market share through zero-price marketing. Economically vulnerable consumers are particularly susceptible to these offers. Moreover, bundles often have hidden costs, such as long-term contracts, leading to potential lock-in effects. These findings suggest the need for regulatory attention to zero-price marketing in bundles.
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