IntroductionAccording to Samuel Huntington's widely discussed thesis of the clash of civilizations, conflicts in the post-Cold War era will be driven by differences in culture rather than differences in political ideology.1 Today, North Korea is undergoing its own domestic clash of cultures; in fact, this is the country's second culture clash in modern times, and it may prove to be the beginning of the end for the Kim regime.We two authors are not anthropologists, and we do not claim to be offering a definitive analysis of the cultures that contend in North Korea today. If we are covering ground that other scholars have already explored, we apologize to them, but perhaps there are others like ourselves who are not familiar with Korea's social science literature and who will therefore find this concept or our treatment of it to be not entirely redundant.Culture provides the framework in which people define themselves and pursue their life goals. Culture is usually taken for granted because it is shared by the people who live in it. Only when they travel to places in which different cultures predominate or meet people from those places, or when their own culture changes rapidly, do people take notice of their culture-and often rush to defend it. This not to say that everyone in a country lives in exactly the same culture: there are anomalies and variations from individual to individual and between people living in different subcultures.An important characteristic of culture is that it is an organized structure in which one part is compatible with another. For example, if the culture worships animals, it is not likely to be a meat-eating culture. If it highly values religion, it will have many churches. Culture is often viewed as consisting of values (what people think is good and bad), norms (written and unwritten rules about how to behave), and material goods (everything from food and household appliances to architecture). Although it is true that they usually change very slowly, cultures are by no means static. Perhaps the easiest way to see how cultures change is to compare the lives of the younger with the older generation. The youngsters often think and behave differently from their elders, and acquire different possessions. Yet even though young people may live in a somewhat different culture, they often gradually become assimilated to the established adult culture as they grow older, changing it less than one might expect.Three cultures coexist in North Korea today. The original culture is based on Confucianism, and this culture is largely overlaid by succeeding cultures. Beginning in the late 1940s, Confucianism (under Japanese colonial rule) was forcibly replaced by communist culture-specifically, Stalinism as interpreted by Kim Il-sung. Then in the late 1980s-Pyongyang's World Festival of Youth and Students in 1989 may mark the beginning-Western, or what communists like to call "bourgeois" culture, began to make an appearance, especially
{"title":"North Korea's Clash of Cultures","authors":"Ralph C. Hassig, Kongdan Oh","doi":"10.3172/NKR.4.2.68","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3172/NKR.4.2.68","url":null,"abstract":"IntroductionAccording to Samuel Huntington's widely discussed thesis of the clash of civilizations, conflicts in the post-Cold War era will be driven by differences in culture rather than differences in political ideology.1 Today, North Korea is undergoing its own domestic clash of cultures; in fact, this is the country's second culture clash in modern times, and it may prove to be the beginning of the end for the Kim regime.We two authors are not anthropologists, and we do not claim to be offering a definitive analysis of the cultures that contend in North Korea today. If we are covering ground that other scholars have already explored, we apologize to them, but perhaps there are others like ourselves who are not familiar with Korea's social science literature and who will therefore find this concept or our treatment of it to be not entirely redundant.Culture provides the framework in which people define themselves and pursue their life goals. Culture is usually taken for granted because it is shared by the people who live in it. Only when they travel to places in which different cultures predominate or meet people from those places, or when their own culture changes rapidly, do people take notice of their culture-and often rush to defend it. This not to say that everyone in a country lives in exactly the same culture: there are anomalies and variations from individual to individual and between people living in different subcultures.An important characteristic of culture is that it is an organized structure in which one part is compatible with another. For example, if the culture worships animals, it is not likely to be a meat-eating culture. If it highly values religion, it will have many churches. Culture is often viewed as consisting of values (what people think is good and bad), norms (written and unwritten rules about how to behave), and material goods (everything from food and household appliances to architecture). Although it is true that they usually change very slowly, cultures are by no means static. Perhaps the easiest way to see how cultures change is to compare the lives of the younger with the older generation. The youngsters often think and behave differently from their elders, and acquire different possessions. Yet even though young people may live in a somewhat different culture, they often gradually become assimilated to the established adult culture as they grow older, changing it less than one might expect.Three cultures coexist in North Korea today. The original culture is based on Confucianism, and this culture is largely overlaid by succeeding cultures. Beginning in the late 1940s, Confucianism (under Japanese colonial rule) was forcibly replaced by communist culture-specifically, Stalinism as interpreted by Kim Il-sung. Then in the late 1980s-Pyongyang's World Festival of Youth and Students in 1989 may mark the beginning-Western, or what communists like to call \"bourgeois\" culture, began to make an appearance, especially ","PeriodicalId":40013,"journal":{"name":"North Korean Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2008-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"69763200","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
IntroductionThe North Korea of the 1990s was associated with stark images of economic disruption and famine. Although economic distress and famine have subsided since 1998, North Korean food shortages and industrial recession have persisted to the present. Battered by a nearly bankrupted economy and continuous shortages of capital, energy and food, North Korea ("the North") has recently been opening its doors to strike political and economic deals.North Korea's economy has resulted in low industrial productivity and efficiency, technological backwardness, and, in the end, economic stagnation. The North Korean economy withered to the point that almost all of its sectors no longer functioned properly. Confronted with economic difficulties and no options for rehabilitating the economy without international help, the North undertook drastic measures for reforming its economy. The move has been toward a market economy with a price mechanism aimed at fostering industrialization, deviating from its traditional planned economy. Rudimentary market economics have gradually been introduced to the North's centralized economic system and its functions.Economic System and Its DysfunctionThe North possessed a unique type of command economy based on a system of self-reliance, Juche. The North's economy was characterized by state ownership of means of production and centralized economic planning and command, and emphasized military development. The North's economy got into trouble as it grew more complex, having difficulties in controlling the many intertwined variables of the economic system in the absence of a market mechanism for allocating resources and distribution. The centrally planned system lacked entrepreneurship, and the North's central planning did not allow the profit motive and did not reward innovation and enterprise.The prices of goods and services were derived from labor costs, not through the pricing mechanism of supply-and-demand interactions. The North's commercial management system was made up of wholesale commerce, which was controlled by the central government, and retail commerce, which was controlled by the regional governments. The government was therefore the North's sole source for the production and distribution of goods.1As a result, there was no private gain incentive to managers or workers for improving product quality or developing more efficient production techniques. Enterprise managers and workers actually resisted government-imposed innovations because higher and sometimes-unrealistic production targets usually accompanied them. Innovation also lagged because of a lack of competition. Entrepreneurs were essentially government-owned monopolies, and the North's innovation was often resisted. There were no new startup firms, driven by the profit motive, to introduce better products, superior managerial techniques, or more efficient production methods.Over an extended period, enterprises produced the same products with the same te
{"title":"Current North Korean Economy: Overview and Prospects for Change","authors":"Youn Suk Kim","doi":"10.3172/NKR.4.2.16","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3172/NKR.4.2.16","url":null,"abstract":"IntroductionThe North Korea of the 1990s was associated with stark images of economic disruption and famine. Although economic distress and famine have subsided since 1998, North Korean food shortages and industrial recession have persisted to the present. Battered by a nearly bankrupted economy and continuous shortages of capital, energy and food, North Korea (\"the North\") has recently been opening its doors to strike political and economic deals.North Korea's economy has resulted in low industrial productivity and efficiency, technological backwardness, and, in the end, economic stagnation. The North Korean economy withered to the point that almost all of its sectors no longer functioned properly. Confronted with economic difficulties and no options for rehabilitating the economy without international help, the North undertook drastic measures for reforming its economy. The move has been toward a market economy with a price mechanism aimed at fostering industrialization, deviating from its traditional planned economy. Rudimentary market economics have gradually been introduced to the North's centralized economic system and its functions.Economic System and Its DysfunctionThe North possessed a unique type of command economy based on a system of self-reliance, Juche. The North's economy was characterized by state ownership of means of production and centralized economic planning and command, and emphasized military development. The North's economy got into trouble as it grew more complex, having difficulties in controlling the many intertwined variables of the economic system in the absence of a market mechanism for allocating resources and distribution. The centrally planned system lacked entrepreneurship, and the North's central planning did not allow the profit motive and did not reward innovation and enterprise.The prices of goods and services were derived from labor costs, not through the pricing mechanism of supply-and-demand interactions. The North's commercial management system was made up of wholesale commerce, which was controlled by the central government, and retail commerce, which was controlled by the regional governments. The government was therefore the North's sole source for the production and distribution of goods.1As a result, there was no private gain incentive to managers or workers for improving product quality or developing more efficient production techniques. Enterprise managers and workers actually resisted government-imposed innovations because higher and sometimes-unrealistic production targets usually accompanied them. Innovation also lagged because of a lack of competition. Entrepreneurs were essentially government-owned monopolies, and the North's innovation was often resisted. There were no new startup firms, driven by the profit motive, to introduce better products, superior managerial techniques, or more efficient production methods.Over an extended period, enterprises produced the same products with the same te","PeriodicalId":40013,"journal":{"name":"North Korean Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2008-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"69762529","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
IntroductionKim Il Sung claimed expertise in an array of disciplines, but few areas appeared to enliven his intelligence more fully than the musical arts. Music served Kim's statist ambitions from 1945 to 1950, strengthening national consciousness among the first post-colonial generation of North Koreans. Musical techniques pioneered by Christian missionaries would aid in the Kim's cultivation of a corps of North Korean youth steeped, as he said in October 1945, in "people's democracy ... proletarian internationalism [and] hatred for the imperialists."1 North Korean music depicted Korea's imperialistic enemies and concurrently plunged down the taproot of Kim Il Sung's powerful personality cult, feeding the legend of the "great general" with persuasive poetry and attractive melodies. Finally, music promoted the spirit of revolutionary militancy and suffused the Korean War, promoting alliances and ultimately memorializing the conflict as a triumph for the state and its surviving leaders.Christian InfluencesNorth Korea's revolutionary musical techniques did not emerge ex nihilo, but represented a singular amalgamation inclusive of Korean folk tradition, practices of Christian missionaries, legacies of Japanese military government, and Soviet influence. Of these, the importance of Christian and Japanese influences could be considered the greatest external influences on North Korean musical development, not least because the story of the sculptor of North Korea, Kim Il Sung, begins within the church and stands juxtaposed against the crimson backdrop of Japanese imperialism.Kim Il Sung's recognition of music's power to motivate and unify disparate groups was rooted in his youthful experience in a church in Mangyongdae, where he grew of age under the influence of Protestantism. His father, a church rector, and his mother, a Pentecostal deaconess, encouraged him to participate in the musical life of the church as an organist.2 His late-appearing autobiography With the Century explained in part his Christian heritage and youthful love of music, but Kim Il Sung's much earlier Works imply with equal clarity the impact of Kim's experience as a church musician.3 (While the Works remain problematic because of their heavy and multiple editing, they are used here in conjunction with contemporary materials to suggest the broader gesture of North Korean arts policy.)4 Kim's childhood experience as an organist not only solidified his belief in music as good propaganda, it gave him a firm grounding in music theory. The depth of Kim's understanding of music's key relationships (for example, tonality) was wholly apparent when, comparing the keys of D and E major for his son in the 1960s, the elder Kim betrayed a close knowledge of key structure and its emotional impact on singers and listeners. The notion that each key retains the power to provoke certain emotions (including discomfort) originated from European music theorists such as Robert Schumann, and was almost c
{"title":"Song of Youth: North Korean Music from Liberation to War","authors":"A. Cathcart","doi":"10.3172/NKR.4.2.93","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3172/NKR.4.2.93","url":null,"abstract":"IntroductionKim Il Sung claimed expertise in an array of disciplines, but few areas appeared to enliven his intelligence more fully than the musical arts. Music served Kim's statist ambitions from 1945 to 1950, strengthening national consciousness among the first post-colonial generation of North Koreans. Musical techniques pioneered by Christian missionaries would aid in the Kim's cultivation of a corps of North Korean youth steeped, as he said in October 1945, in \"people's democracy ... proletarian internationalism [and] hatred for the imperialists.\"1 North Korean music depicted Korea's imperialistic enemies and concurrently plunged down the taproot of Kim Il Sung's powerful personality cult, feeding the legend of the \"great general\" with persuasive poetry and attractive melodies. Finally, music promoted the spirit of revolutionary militancy and suffused the Korean War, promoting alliances and ultimately memorializing the conflict as a triumph for the state and its surviving leaders.Christian InfluencesNorth Korea's revolutionary musical techniques did not emerge ex nihilo, but represented a singular amalgamation inclusive of Korean folk tradition, practices of Christian missionaries, legacies of Japanese military government, and Soviet influence. Of these, the importance of Christian and Japanese influences could be considered the greatest external influences on North Korean musical development, not least because the story of the sculptor of North Korea, Kim Il Sung, begins within the church and stands juxtaposed against the crimson backdrop of Japanese imperialism.Kim Il Sung's recognition of music's power to motivate and unify disparate groups was rooted in his youthful experience in a church in Mangyongdae, where he grew of age under the influence of Protestantism. His father, a church rector, and his mother, a Pentecostal deaconess, encouraged him to participate in the musical life of the church as an organist.2 His late-appearing autobiography With the Century explained in part his Christian heritage and youthful love of music, but Kim Il Sung's much earlier Works imply with equal clarity the impact of Kim's experience as a church musician.3 (While the Works remain problematic because of their heavy and multiple editing, they are used here in conjunction with contemporary materials to suggest the broader gesture of North Korean arts policy.)4 Kim's childhood experience as an organist not only solidified his belief in music as good propaganda, it gave him a firm grounding in music theory. The depth of Kim's understanding of music's key relationships (for example, tonality) was wholly apparent when, comparing the keys of D and E major for his son in the 1960s, the elder Kim betrayed a close knowledge of key structure and its emotional impact on singers and listeners. The notion that each key retains the power to provoke certain emotions (including discomfort) originated from European music theorists such as Robert Schumann, and was almost c","PeriodicalId":40013,"journal":{"name":"North Korean Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2008-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"69763235","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Research Purpose and SummaryThis research is designed to assess the current state of the North Korean economy caused by the July 1 measures in 2002, through interviews with North Korean refugees, whose numbers have recently increased dramatically (see Table 1).* Research target: North Korean refugees who fled into South Korea in 2006 and who currently reside in Seoul, Gyeonggi Province, and Busan* Research period and methodology: November to December 2006, survey and in-depth interviews with ten refugees* Numbers: 335 refugees, or 1 7 percent of the total number of North Korean refugees who fled into South Korea in 2006.* We interviewed 21 9 North Koreans who fled from North Korea between 1997 and 1999 and between 2004 and 2006, to ascertain changes in the North Korean economy after the July 1 measures (see Table 2).* Contents of research: profile of North Korean refugees, income and consumption, and market activitiesResearch FindingsA Profile of the North Korean RefugeesOur findings concerning gender are shown in Table 3:* Among the refugees, the proportion of men increased remarkably, from an average of 7 percent during 1997-9 to an average of 44 percent during 2004-6.* The particularly high proportion of women among those refugees who had left North Korea before the July 1 measures results from the fact that women were allowed to retire early and therefore it was easier for them to escape from North Korea.* The number of male refugees has gradually increased since the July 1 measures, because the increased number of men engaged in trade has made it easier for them to move, and female refugees have helped their families and relatives to leave North Korea.Age profiles are shown in Table 4:* Overall, the proportion of those refugees in their twenties is highest, but in recent years the proportions of the youngest age cohort (those aged between ten and nineteen) and of those in their forties have increased, while the proportion of those in their twenties has decreased.* The shares of the youngest age group and of those in their forties among the total number of refugees have increased since the July 1 measures, because those in their forties engaged in trade and they helped their families to move to South Korea.The educational background of the refuges is shown in Table 5:* The percentage of refuges who had not finished high school has decreased, while the proportion of those refugees who had completed high school and college education has increased.The occupations of refugees when they were in North Korea are shown in Table 6:* The proportion of production workers has declined, whereas that of the unemployed has risen.* This is largely attributable to the gradual increase in the early retirement of women engaged in production.Income StructureIncome structure is shown in Table 7:* As shown in the table, there is not much difference in the income structure of those two groups of refugees who had fled North Korea before and after the July 1 measures
{"title":"Changes in the North Korean Economy Reported by North Korean Refugees","authors":"Young-hoon Lee","doi":"10.3172/NKR.4.2.49","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3172/NKR.4.2.49","url":null,"abstract":"Research Purpose and SummaryThis research is designed to assess the current state of the North Korean economy caused by the July 1 measures in 2002, through interviews with North Korean refugees, whose numbers have recently increased dramatically (see Table 1).* Research target: North Korean refugees who fled into South Korea in 2006 and who currently reside in Seoul, Gyeonggi Province, and Busan* Research period and methodology: November to December 2006, survey and in-depth interviews with ten refugees* Numbers: 335 refugees, or 1 7 percent of the total number of North Korean refugees who fled into South Korea in 2006.* We interviewed 21 9 North Koreans who fled from North Korea between 1997 and 1999 and between 2004 and 2006, to ascertain changes in the North Korean economy after the July 1 measures (see Table 2).* Contents of research: profile of North Korean refugees, income and consumption, and market activitiesResearch FindingsA Profile of the North Korean RefugeesOur findings concerning gender are shown in Table 3:* Among the refugees, the proportion of men increased remarkably, from an average of 7 percent during 1997-9 to an average of 44 percent during 2004-6.* The particularly high proportion of women among those refugees who had left North Korea before the July 1 measures results from the fact that women were allowed to retire early and therefore it was easier for them to escape from North Korea.* The number of male refugees has gradually increased since the July 1 measures, because the increased number of men engaged in trade has made it easier for them to move, and female refugees have helped their families and relatives to leave North Korea.Age profiles are shown in Table 4:* Overall, the proportion of those refugees in their twenties is highest, but in recent years the proportions of the youngest age cohort (those aged between ten and nineteen) and of those in their forties have increased, while the proportion of those in their twenties has decreased.* The shares of the youngest age group and of those in their forties among the total number of refugees have increased since the July 1 measures, because those in their forties engaged in trade and they helped their families to move to South Korea.The educational background of the refuges is shown in Table 5:* The percentage of refuges who had not finished high school has decreased, while the proportion of those refugees who had completed high school and college education has increased.The occupations of refugees when they were in North Korea are shown in Table 6:* The proportion of production workers has declined, whereas that of the unemployed has risen.* This is largely attributable to the gradual increase in the early retirement of women engaged in production.Income StructureIncome structure is shown in Table 7:* As shown in the table, there is not much difference in the income structure of those two groups of refugees who had fled North Korea before and after the July 1 measures","PeriodicalId":40013,"journal":{"name":"North Korean Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2008-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"69762780","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Northeast Asia consists of China, Japan, the two Koreas, the Russian Far East, and Mongolia. The heavyweight neighbors' spheres of influence (China, Japan, and Russia), along with that of the United States, overlap in Korea. Consequently, the world's heaviest concentration of military and economic capabilities is in Northeast Asia, with the three largest nuclear-weapons states (China, Russia, and the United States), three threshold nuclear-weapons states (North Korea, South Korea, and Japan), and the world's five largest economies (China, South Korea, Japan, the United States, and Russia). In the middle of this precarious and tough neighborhood, divided Korea stands as a strategic pivot. History and geography have consigned Korea to the position of a highly contested strategic crossroads, the site for over a century of recurrent collisions between great-power interests. Consequently, many view Northeast Asia as primed more for international conflict than for international peace, because this region replicates the global North-South divide with its sharp divergence between wealthy capitalist countries (the United States, Japan, and South Korea) and poor socialist or transitional countries (China, Russia, and North Korea).North Korean Review, however, is based on the premise that these countries will work together as they are increasingly interdependent in all major areas of national interest-national security, energy supply, and economic welfare. First, they have no other choice but to resolve the North Korean nuclear standoff through peaceful negotiations, because a nuclear North Korea poses a greater threat than that posed by the Middle East. Second, the Northeast Asian countries are likely to cooperate for their national energy security because this region is home for major energy consumers such as China, as well as major energy producers such as Russia. The United States is likely to support such a region's cooperation because the United States does not want these countries to depend on the Middle East oil too much. Third, scholars argue that Northeast Asia is a region with every possibility of becoming the best trading bloc in the future, because of Japanese capital and technology, Chinese labor, Russian natural resources, and the Korean work ethic. In addition, the Northeast Asian countries and the United States have already had close economic ties for many years and have been increasingly interdependent economically. These factors are likely to eventually compel the United States, China, Japan, Russia, and South Korea to collaborate on their security, energy, and economy, even if they have differences on these issues.NKR has played a defining role in the field of studies on the relations between North Korea and other countries since its Fall 2005 inaugural issue. The purpose of the journal is to provide the world with opportunities for improved understanding of North Korean relations with the United States and other countries. This internat
{"title":"Editor's Comments: Northeast Asian Peace, Energy, and Economy: The North Korean Factor","authors":"Suk‐Hi Kim","doi":"10.3172/NKR.4.2.3","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3172/NKR.4.2.3","url":null,"abstract":"Northeast Asia consists of China, Japan, the two Koreas, the Russian Far East, and Mongolia. The heavyweight neighbors' spheres of influence (China, Japan, and Russia), along with that of the United States, overlap in Korea. Consequently, the world's heaviest concentration of military and economic capabilities is in Northeast Asia, with the three largest nuclear-weapons states (China, Russia, and the United States), three threshold nuclear-weapons states (North Korea, South Korea, and Japan), and the world's five largest economies (China, South Korea, Japan, the United States, and Russia). In the middle of this precarious and tough neighborhood, divided Korea stands as a strategic pivot. History and geography have consigned Korea to the position of a highly contested strategic crossroads, the site for over a century of recurrent collisions between great-power interests. Consequently, many view Northeast Asia as primed more for international conflict than for international peace, because this region replicates the global North-South divide with its sharp divergence between wealthy capitalist countries (the United States, Japan, and South Korea) and poor socialist or transitional countries (China, Russia, and North Korea).North Korean Review, however, is based on the premise that these countries will work together as they are increasingly interdependent in all major areas of national interest-national security, energy supply, and economic welfare. First, they have no other choice but to resolve the North Korean nuclear standoff through peaceful negotiations, because a nuclear North Korea poses a greater threat than that posed by the Middle East. Second, the Northeast Asian countries are likely to cooperate for their national energy security because this region is home for major energy consumers such as China, as well as major energy producers such as Russia. The United States is likely to support such a region's cooperation because the United States does not want these countries to depend on the Middle East oil too much. Third, scholars argue that Northeast Asia is a region with every possibility of becoming the best trading bloc in the future, because of Japanese capital and technology, Chinese labor, Russian natural resources, and the Korean work ethic. In addition, the Northeast Asian countries and the United States have already had close economic ties for many years and have been increasingly interdependent economically. These factors are likely to eventually compel the United States, China, Japan, Russia, and South Korea to collaborate on their security, energy, and economy, even if they have differences on these issues.NKR has played a defining role in the field of studies on the relations between North Korea and other countries since its Fall 2005 inaugural issue. The purpose of the journal is to provide the world with opportunities for improved understanding of North Korean relations with the United States and other countries. This internat","PeriodicalId":40013,"journal":{"name":"North Korean Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2008-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"69762716","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
IntroductionI have repeatedly pointed out the adverse impact of numerous U.S. economic sanctions on North Korea's trade. I have written, for instance, that the large trade deficit, unless compensated somehow, is not sustainable.1 Further, since China and Japan were the only two steady importers of North Korean products from 2000 to 2005, if one or both countries turned against North Korea by joining the U.S.-led economic sanctions, it would be difficult for North Korea not to feel the impact. And so it came to be. "Japan rapidly tightened its economic relations with North Korea during the past year or two," I wrote in 2007, "including a total ban of imports from North Korea, over the issues of kidnapping and nuclear weapons, leaving China as the only country that has a key influence on North Korea's trade. Prospects are that North Korea's exports may decline, making North Korea's trade deficit issue even more difficult."2 Even with these premonitions, it was a pleasant surprise to see the way in which North Korea responded to the nuclear talks later in 2007.The objective of this paper is to explore the economic reasons behind North Korea's positive response to the nuclear talks in 2007, by hypothesizing that the North Korean leaders altered their approach partly because of the adverse impact of economic sanctions on North Korea's trade that had reached an unsustainable stage, and partly because of a greater calculation of benefits and costs by the North Korean leaders since the collapse of the Soviet Union, the process of which began in 1989.Key Economic Sanctions against North KoreaThe economic sanctions that have been imposed against North Korea since the beginning of the Korean War in 1950 are chronologically explained elsewhere by me.3 Among the many sanctions imposed on North Korea are three that currently have a direct impact on North Korea's trade. One is the U.S. denial of a most-favored nation (MFN) trade status on North Korea's exports, which was imposed on September 1, 1951. Because of the widespread use of the MFN tariffs, these are known as Normal Trade Relations (NTR) tariffs. Without MFN status, tariffs on North Korean exports to the United States can be so high that it would be impossible for North Korea to even consider exporting anything to the United States.Another important sanction was levied when North Korean agents blew up Korean Air 858 on November 29, 1987, when the plane was on its way from Baghdad to Bangkok. The explosion killed 115 passengers and crew members. On January 20, 1988, North Korea was placed on a list of countries that support international terrorism, on the basis of the U.S. Export Administration Act of 1979. The importance of this sanction is that placement on the list made it impossible for North Korea to borrow development funds from international financial institutions, including the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund.4The third key economic sanctions may be termed collectively the "U.S.-l
{"title":"Why Has North Korea Responded Positively to the Nuclear Talks in 2007","authors":"Semoon Chang","doi":"10.3172/NKR.4.2.6","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3172/NKR.4.2.6","url":null,"abstract":"IntroductionI have repeatedly pointed out the adverse impact of numerous U.S. economic sanctions on North Korea's trade. I have written, for instance, that the large trade deficit, unless compensated somehow, is not sustainable.1 Further, since China and Japan were the only two steady importers of North Korean products from 2000 to 2005, if one or both countries turned against North Korea by joining the U.S.-led economic sanctions, it would be difficult for North Korea not to feel the impact. And so it came to be. \"Japan rapidly tightened its economic relations with North Korea during the past year or two,\" I wrote in 2007, \"including a total ban of imports from North Korea, over the issues of kidnapping and nuclear weapons, leaving China as the only country that has a key influence on North Korea's trade. Prospects are that North Korea's exports may decline, making North Korea's trade deficit issue even more difficult.\"2 Even with these premonitions, it was a pleasant surprise to see the way in which North Korea responded to the nuclear talks later in 2007.The objective of this paper is to explore the economic reasons behind North Korea's positive response to the nuclear talks in 2007, by hypothesizing that the North Korean leaders altered their approach partly because of the adverse impact of economic sanctions on North Korea's trade that had reached an unsustainable stage, and partly because of a greater calculation of benefits and costs by the North Korean leaders since the collapse of the Soviet Union, the process of which began in 1989.Key Economic Sanctions against North KoreaThe economic sanctions that have been imposed against North Korea since the beginning of the Korean War in 1950 are chronologically explained elsewhere by me.3 Among the many sanctions imposed on North Korea are three that currently have a direct impact on North Korea's trade. One is the U.S. denial of a most-favored nation (MFN) trade status on North Korea's exports, which was imposed on September 1, 1951. Because of the widespread use of the MFN tariffs, these are known as Normal Trade Relations (NTR) tariffs. Without MFN status, tariffs on North Korean exports to the United States can be so high that it would be impossible for North Korea to even consider exporting anything to the United States.Another important sanction was levied when North Korean agents blew up Korean Air 858 on November 29, 1987, when the plane was on its way from Baghdad to Bangkok. The explosion killed 115 passengers and crew members. On January 20, 1988, North Korea was placed on a list of countries that support international terrorism, on the basis of the U.S. Export Administration Act of 1979. The importance of this sanction is that placement on the list made it impossible for North Korea to borrow development funds from international financial institutions, including the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund.4The third key economic sanctions may be termed collectively the \"U.S.-l","PeriodicalId":40013,"journal":{"name":"North Korean Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2008-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"69763065","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2008-04-01DOI: 10.1163/2468-1733_shafr_sim300060053
Lee Hwan-Hee
{"title":"Economic Sanctions against a Nuclear North Korea: An Analysis of United States and United Nations Actions since 1950","authors":"Lee Hwan-Hee","doi":"10.1163/2468-1733_shafr_sim300060053","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1163/2468-1733_shafr_sim300060053","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":40013,"journal":{"name":"North Korean Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2008-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"64435770","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
IntroductionThe KIC is emerging as a matter of interest both domestically and internationally-displaying characteristics of being North Korea's national development project to resolve its economic troubles after the Rajin-Sunbong and Sinuiju special economic zone projects fell through. North Korea can use the KIC as a testing ground for possible economic reform that could eventually lead to the complete liberalization of North Korea's economy, and also as a strategic means of easing military tensions between the two Koreas.It is essential for North Korea to open up its doors for its long-term survival. Leaders in Pyongyang deem that a limited opening of the North Korean economy through the establishment of special economic zones is the best plan of action for regime preservation and economic rehabilitation. However, the KIC's potential for success has to be assessed in a more prudent manner. First, North Korea is unable to procure enough funds to autonomously establish the infrastructure necessary to maintain foreign capital in the special economic zone. Second, the country's limited domestic market provides very few incentives to attract foreign investors. Third, the related industries are underdeveloped, making production costs relatively high for potential investors. Fourth, there is a lack of skilled workers who understand the market economy and who are equipped with the latest technology. Finally, there is not enough confidence that North Korea will be able to make the wholesale changes needed or to establish the legal and institutional infrastructure that conforms to international standards. This paper focuses on the issues of attracting foreign investment to the KIC and building a legal and systematic infrastructure that will help maintain this investment. These key indicators can predict the stability and sustainability of the KIC's development henceforth.The North Korean authorities' attitude toward the KIC is very favorable, regardless of how slowly they have met various demands made by South Korea. Most transitional states have been able to experiment with flexible institutional incentives in SEZs, where possible political and economic side effects could be contained within the zones. For example, China's experimentation with liberal market reform was too politically dangerous on a national level, but was possible in SEZs. Based on experience, China began to reform its laws and institutions, creating more diverse SEZs nationwide, such as the Shanghai-Podong Development District, the Weihai Torch High-Tech Industries Development Zone, and free trade zones (Ministry of Justice, 2005).North Korea has also shown deep interest in learning market economics and capitalism from China's model of SEZs. Frequent visits to China's most successful SEZs by North Korean leader Kim Jong Il and the North Korean elite are a good indication that North Korea is benchmarking China. The KIC is a melting pot of capitalism and socialism.The Current State of D
{"title":"Legal Reforms and Foreign Investment in the Inter-Korean Project: The Kaesong Industrial Complex","authors":"Eul-chul Lim","doi":"10.3172/NKR.4.1.26","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3172/NKR.4.1.26","url":null,"abstract":"IntroductionThe KIC is emerging as a matter of interest both domestically and internationally-displaying characteristics of being North Korea's national development project to resolve its economic troubles after the Rajin-Sunbong and Sinuiju special economic zone projects fell through. North Korea can use the KIC as a testing ground for possible economic reform that could eventually lead to the complete liberalization of North Korea's economy, and also as a strategic means of easing military tensions between the two Koreas.It is essential for North Korea to open up its doors for its long-term survival. Leaders in Pyongyang deem that a limited opening of the North Korean economy through the establishment of special economic zones is the best plan of action for regime preservation and economic rehabilitation. However, the KIC's potential for success has to be assessed in a more prudent manner. First, North Korea is unable to procure enough funds to autonomously establish the infrastructure necessary to maintain foreign capital in the special economic zone. Second, the country's limited domestic market provides very few incentives to attract foreign investors. Third, the related industries are underdeveloped, making production costs relatively high for potential investors. Fourth, there is a lack of skilled workers who understand the market economy and who are equipped with the latest technology. Finally, there is not enough confidence that North Korea will be able to make the wholesale changes needed or to establish the legal and institutional infrastructure that conforms to international standards. This paper focuses on the issues of attracting foreign investment to the KIC and building a legal and systematic infrastructure that will help maintain this investment. These key indicators can predict the stability and sustainability of the KIC's development henceforth.The North Korean authorities' attitude toward the KIC is very favorable, regardless of how slowly they have met various demands made by South Korea. Most transitional states have been able to experiment with flexible institutional incentives in SEZs, where possible political and economic side effects could be contained within the zones. For example, China's experimentation with liberal market reform was too politically dangerous on a national level, but was possible in SEZs. Based on experience, China began to reform its laws and institutions, creating more diverse SEZs nationwide, such as the Shanghai-Podong Development District, the Weihai Torch High-Tech Industries Development Zone, and free trade zones (Ministry of Justice, 2005).North Korea has also shown deep interest in learning market economics and capitalism from China's model of SEZs. Frequent visits to China's most successful SEZs by North Korean leader Kim Jong Il and the North Korean elite are a good indication that North Korea is benchmarking China. The KIC is a melting pot of capitalism and socialism.The Current State of D","PeriodicalId":40013,"journal":{"name":"North Korean Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2008-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"69762241","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The Sixth Round of the Six-Party TalksNorth Korea shut down its nuclear reactor at Yongbyon in July 2007 and began disablement of its three facilities in exchange for energy aid, political guarantees, and normalized relations with the United States. This came after the 13 February sixparty agreement, which entitles the impoverished Stalinist state to receive 950,000 tons of heavy fuel oil or its equivalent, so long as certain conditions are met. The events of July were followed by U.S.-North Korea talks in August, a bilateral working group meeting in Geneva from 1 to 2 September, and the 2 to 4 October sixDuksung party talks in Beijing. The latter laid out a timetable of 31 December for disablement in the tentative six-party accord, "Second-Phase Actions for the Implementation of the Joint Statement," announced on 3 October. A team of U.S. nuclear experts arrived in North Korea on 1 November and began monitoring disablement of the Yongbyon nuclear facilities four days later.The Bush administration is now pursuing a more reconciliatory foreign policy of engagement with Pyongyang, having vaguely promised in Geneva to begin the process of delisting North Korea as a state sponsor of terrorism upon its completing the disablement process and providing a full declaration of all nuclear programs by the end of 2007. If North Korea is removed from the U.S. list of terror-sponsoring states, the poverty-stricken regime will be eligible for large multilateral financial aid, including loans from the World Bank. North Korea has completed phase one of the February agreement by shutting down the Yongbyon reactor complex; phase two consists of declaring and permanently disabling all nuclear facilities, which is ongoing as of this writing; and the third phase, complete dismantlement of all nuclear programs and facilities, is set for the end of 2008. The possibility of a sudden reversal in U.S.-North Korea policy cannot be ruled out, however.According to an unnamed senior U.S. official quoted in Chosun Ilbo in October, delisting North Korea as a terror sponsor would take a considerable amount of time to actually implement. Furthermore, it would require Congressional approval. Hardliners representing contending political factions in Washington, such as Vice President Dick Cheney and former U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations John Bolton, who are committed to the rightwing doctrine of "regime change," as carried out in the invasion and occupation of Iraq, have criticized engagement and raised allegations about North Korea providing nuclear assistance to Syria, an ally of Iran. These accusations followed an apparently unprovoked Israeli air raid on Syrian targets on 6 September. North Korea has provided missile technology to Syria, but both countries strongly denied any nuclear connection.The Japanese government also expressed opposition to delisting North Korea, citing the abduction issue. On 9 October, Tokyo extended by six months trade sanctions originally imposed
{"title":"North Korean Newsbriefs","authors":"A. David-West","doi":"10.3172/NKR.4.1.142","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3172/NKR.4.1.142","url":null,"abstract":"The Sixth Round of the Six-Party TalksNorth Korea shut down its nuclear reactor at Yongbyon in July 2007 and began disablement of its three facilities in exchange for energy aid, political guarantees, and normalized relations with the United States. This came after the 13 February sixparty agreement, which entitles the impoverished Stalinist state to receive 950,000 tons of heavy fuel oil or its equivalent, so long as certain conditions are met. The events of July were followed by U.S.-North Korea talks in August, a bilateral working group meeting in Geneva from 1 to 2 September, and the 2 to 4 October sixDuksung party talks in Beijing. The latter laid out a timetable of 31 December for disablement in the tentative six-party accord, \"Second-Phase Actions for the Implementation of the Joint Statement,\" announced on 3 October. A team of U.S. nuclear experts arrived in North Korea on 1 November and began monitoring disablement of the Yongbyon nuclear facilities four days later.The Bush administration is now pursuing a more reconciliatory foreign policy of engagement with Pyongyang, having vaguely promised in Geneva to begin the process of delisting North Korea as a state sponsor of terrorism upon its completing the disablement process and providing a full declaration of all nuclear programs by the end of 2007. If North Korea is removed from the U.S. list of terror-sponsoring states, the poverty-stricken regime will be eligible for large multilateral financial aid, including loans from the World Bank. North Korea has completed phase one of the February agreement by shutting down the Yongbyon reactor complex; phase two consists of declaring and permanently disabling all nuclear facilities, which is ongoing as of this writing; and the third phase, complete dismantlement of all nuclear programs and facilities, is set for the end of 2008. The possibility of a sudden reversal in U.S.-North Korea policy cannot be ruled out, however.According to an unnamed senior U.S. official quoted in Chosun Ilbo in October, delisting North Korea as a terror sponsor would take a considerable amount of time to actually implement. Furthermore, it would require Congressional approval. Hardliners representing contending political factions in Washington, such as Vice President Dick Cheney and former U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations John Bolton, who are committed to the rightwing doctrine of \"regime change,\" as carried out in the invasion and occupation of Iraq, have criticized engagement and raised allegations about North Korea providing nuclear assistance to Syria, an ally of Iran. These accusations followed an apparently unprovoked Israeli air raid on Syrian targets on 6 September. North Korea has provided missile technology to Syria, but both countries strongly denied any nuclear connection.The Japanese government also expressed opposition to delisting North Korea, citing the abduction issue. On 9 October, Tokyo extended by six months trade sanctions originally imposed","PeriodicalId":40013,"journal":{"name":"North Korean Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2008-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"69762602","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
IntroductionIn 1948, two different governments were formed on the Korean Peninsula. Since then, South and North Korea have gone through the Korean War (1950-1953) and have maintained hostile relations for more than 55 years. The two Koreas' fierce arms race has turned the Korean Peninsula into the most heavily populated area with a military capacity. The collapse of the Soviet Union and the Eastern European communist countries in the early 1990s ended the Cold War order in most parts of the world. However, the Korean Peninsula is still locked in a Cold War of its own. The North's nuclear issues started in the early 1990s and surfaced again in 2002, thereby creating international tensions that have yet to be defused. Although there are realistic hopes for solving the North's nuclear issues through the denuclearization agreement of February 13, 2007, it is likely to take years for the United States and North Korea to resolve this standoff completely.Nevertheless, inter-Korean exchanges, especially those on some economic cooperative projects, such as the South Korea-U.S. Free Trade Agreement signed on April 30, 2007, continue unabated (Kim and Moussawi, 2007). A new trend of inter- Korean exchange has been initiated at the South Korean local government level since June 2000, when the South Korean government issued the so-called "Guidelines for Local Governments on Inter-Korean Exchange and Cooperation," a framework of inter-Korean exchange and cooperation for local government. To make it easier for local governments to engage in inter-Korean cooperation, South Korea abolished these guidelines in May 2003. Since then, only the Ministry of National Unification's approval is required for local governments' inter-Korean exchange and cooperation projects. These inter-Korean exchange and cooperation projects are being conducted by both high and low levels of local government.So, what has brought about these changes? First, a new globalization order caused by the end of the Cold War era called for fundamentally different national strategies from those that prevailed during the Cold War. In the early 1990s, South Korea established diplomatic relations with Russia and China, which used to be the major patrons of North Korea. In addition, the post-Cold War order prompted a reevaluation of the Korea-U.S. alliance.Second, in 1987, the amended constitution for a direct presidential election ended the military dictatorship in Korea and made it possible for the peaceful transition of power from the ruling party to the opposition party through elections (Snyder, 2004, pp. 23-24). Local governments obtained "autonomy" in 1995 for the first time, which enhanced their role not only with regard to their affairs, but also other areas such as inter-Korean relations. Finally, serious North Korean economic problems in the mid-1990s have created the kind of climate in which South Koreans should help their brotherly North Koreans through humanitarian aid and other inter-Kore
1948年，朝鲜半岛成立了两个不同的政府。此后，韩国和朝鲜经历了朝鲜战争(1950-1953)，并保持了55年以上的敌对关系。韩朝之间激烈的军备竞赛使朝鲜半岛成为人口最密集、军事能力最强的地区。上世纪90年代初，苏联和东欧共产主义国家的解体结束了世界大部分地区的冷战秩序。然而，朝鲜半岛本身仍处于冷战状态。朝鲜的核问题始于上世纪90年代初，并于2002年再次浮出水面，从而造成了迄今尚未缓解的国际紧张局势。虽然通过2007年2月13日的无核化协议解决北韩核问题有现实的希望，但要彻底解决这一僵局，美国和北韩可能需要数年时间。但是，南北交流，特别是韩美等部分经济合作项目的交流，仍然处于停滞状态。2007年4月30日签署的自由贸易协定继续有增无减(Kim and Moussawi, 2007)。2000年6月，韩国政府发布了“地方自治团体交流合作纲要”，确立了地方自治团体之间的交流合作框架。此后，地方自治团体之间的交流开始出现新的趋势。为了让地方自治团体更容易参与南北合作，韩国于2003年5月废除了上述规定。此后，地方自治团体的南北交流合作事业只需要得到统一部的批准。南北交流合作项目是由地方自治团体和地方自治团体共同进行的。那么，是什么带来了这些变化呢?首先，冷战时代结束后形成的全球化新秩序要求各国采取与冷战时期完全不同的国家战略。上世纪90年代初，韩国与俄罗斯和中国建立了外交关系，这两个国家曾是朝鲜的主要资助国。此外，冷战后的秩序也促使人们重新评估韩美关系。联盟。其次，1987年修改的总统直选宪法结束了韩国的军事独裁统治，使执政党通过选举向反对党和平过渡成为可能(Snyder, 2004, pp. 23-24)。1995年，地方自治团体首次获得了“自治权”，不仅在地方事务上，在南北关系等其他领域，地方自治团体的作用也得到了加强。最后，20世纪90年代中期朝鲜严重的经济问题创造了一种氛围，即韩国应该通过人道主义援助和其他朝韩项目来帮助他们的兄弟朝鲜。尽管国内和国际形势发生了变化，但冷战的最后遗产仍然留在朝鲜半岛。经常相互冲突的趋势共存，在两个朝鲜之间的合作方面造成了更多的摩擦。其中一些摩擦与语义问题有关，例如“同一种族内的相互合作”与“国际合作”。然而，在这些矛盾和混乱之下，确实存在着南北关系的特殊性。官方上，韩国和朝鲜是不同的国家，在联合国拥有不同的席位，但朝韩关系(至少在韩国人的印象中)是同一种族内部交流的特征。例如，外交通商部负责旨在解决北韩核问题的六方会谈。另一方面，统一部负责南北交流问题。在政府机构中，南北事务由不同的部门负责，而地方自治团体和民间团体则主要负责南北交流合作。…
{"title":"The Roles of South Korean Central and Local Governments in Inter-Korean Cooperation","authors":"Yongbum Choi","doi":"10.3172/NKR.4.1.109","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3172/NKR.4.1.109","url":null,"abstract":"IntroductionIn 1948, two different governments were formed on the Korean Peninsula. Since then, South and North Korea have gone through the Korean War (1950-1953) and have maintained hostile relations for more than 55 years. The two Koreas' fierce arms race has turned the Korean Peninsula into the most heavily populated area with a military capacity. The collapse of the Soviet Union and the Eastern European communist countries in the early 1990s ended the Cold War order in most parts of the world. However, the Korean Peninsula is still locked in a Cold War of its own. The North's nuclear issues started in the early 1990s and surfaced again in 2002, thereby creating international tensions that have yet to be defused. Although there are realistic hopes for solving the North's nuclear issues through the denuclearization agreement of February 13, 2007, it is likely to take years for the United States and North Korea to resolve this standoff completely.Nevertheless, inter-Korean exchanges, especially those on some economic cooperative projects, such as the South Korea-U.S. Free Trade Agreement signed on April 30, 2007, continue unabated (Kim and Moussawi, 2007). A new trend of inter- Korean exchange has been initiated at the South Korean local government level since June 2000, when the South Korean government issued the so-called \"Guidelines for Local Governments on Inter-Korean Exchange and Cooperation,\" a framework of inter-Korean exchange and cooperation for local government. To make it easier for local governments to engage in inter-Korean cooperation, South Korea abolished these guidelines in May 2003. Since then, only the Ministry of National Unification's approval is required for local governments' inter-Korean exchange and cooperation projects. These inter-Korean exchange and cooperation projects are being conducted by both high and low levels of local government.So, what has brought about these changes? First, a new globalization order caused by the end of the Cold War era called for fundamentally different national strategies from those that prevailed during the Cold War. In the early 1990s, South Korea established diplomatic relations with Russia and China, which used to be the major patrons of North Korea. In addition, the post-Cold War order prompted a reevaluation of the Korea-U.S. alliance.Second, in 1987, the amended constitution for a direct presidential election ended the military dictatorship in Korea and made it possible for the peaceful transition of power from the ruling party to the opposition party through elections (Snyder, 2004, pp. 23-24). Local governments obtained \"autonomy\" in 1995 for the first time, which enhanced their role not only with regard to their affairs, but also other areas such as inter-Korean relations. Finally, serious North Korean economic problems in the mid-1990s have created the kind of climate in which South Koreans should help their brotherly North Koreans through humanitarian aid and other inter-Kore","PeriodicalId":40013,"journal":{"name":"North Korean Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2008-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"69762124","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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