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Bo R. Meinertsen: Metaphysics of States of Affairs: Truthmaking, Universals, and a Farewell to Bradley’s Regress 博·r·迈纳特森:《事态的形而上学:造真、普遍性和告别布拉德利的倒退》
IF 0.2 0 PHILOSOPHY Pub Date : 2020-03-17 DOI: 10.1515/mp-2020-2019
W. Vallicella
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引用次数: 0
Peirce and Leibniz on Continuity and the Continuum 皮尔斯和莱布尼茨论连续性和连续体
IF 0.2 0 PHILOSOPHY Pub Date : 2020-02-14 DOI: 10.1515/mp-2019-0008
D. Anapolitanos, D. Christopoulou
Abstract This paper discusses some of C. S. Peirce’s insights about continuity in his attempt to grasp the concept of the mathematical continuum. After a discussion of his earlier notions which he called ‘Kanticity’ and ‘Aristotelicity’ we arrive at his later belief that a continuum is rather a system of potential points. In his mature views, Peirce grasps a continuum as “a whole range of possibilities” without points at all. In the sequel, we turn to take into account some of Leibniz’s attempts to deal with continuity and the continuum and we compare Peirce and Leibniz’s approaches detecting certain impressive similarities and differences.
摘要本文讨论了皮尔斯在试图理解数学连续统概念时关于连续性的一些见解。在讨论了他早期所谓的“康德性”和“亚里士多德性”的概念之后,我们到达了他后来的信念,即一个连续体是一个潜在点的系统。在他成熟的观点中,皮尔斯把连续体理解为没有点的“一系列可能性”。在续集中,我们转而考虑莱布尼茨在处理连续性和连续体方面的一些尝试,并比较皮尔斯和莱布尼茨的方法,发现某些令人印象深刻的异同。
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引用次数: 0
Blackburn’s Supervenience Argument Against Moral Realism: Revisited 布莱克本对道德现实主义的监督性论证:重新审视
IF 0.2 0 PHILOSOPHY Pub Date : 2020-02-14 DOI: 10.1515/mp-2020-0004
H. Noonan
Abstract Blackburn argues against naturalistic moral realism. He argues that there is no conceptual entailment from satisfying a naturalistic predicate to satisfying a moral predicate. But the moral is conceptually supervenient on the natural. However, this conjunction of conceptual supervenience with lack of conceptual entailment is something the non-realist can explain, but the realist cannot. I argue first that Blackburn’s best formulation of his challenge is his first one. Subsequently he reformulates it as a demand for a ‘ban on mixed worlds’. Critics have directed their arguments against this formulation but they are ineffective against Blackburn’s first formulation. My second thesis is, even so formulated the realist can meet the challenge. The bare conceptual supervenience of the moral on the natural can be given a realist explanation by understanding names of moral properties as descriptive names of natural properties.
布莱克本反对自然主义的道德现实主义。他认为,从满足自然主义谓词到满足道德谓词,没有概念上的蕴涵。但是道德在概念上是先于自然的。然而,这种概念直觉与缺乏概念蕴涵的结合是非实在论可以解释的,而实在论却不能。我首先认为,布莱克本对他的挑战的最佳表述是他的第一个挑战。随后,他将其重新表述为“禁止混合世界”的要求。批评家们把他们的论点指向了这个提法,但他们对布莱克本的第一个提法是无效的。我的第二个论点是,即便如此,现实主义者也能应对挑战。道德对自然的纯粹概念上的监督可以通过将道德属性的名称理解为自然属性的描述性名称来给出现实主义的解释。
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引用次数: 0
Two Sides of the Same Coin? Neutral Monism as an Attempt to Reconcile Subjectivity and Objectivity in Personal Identity 同一枚硬币的两面?中性一元论:调和个人身份主客观的尝试
IF 0.2 0 PHILOSOPHY Pub Date : 2020-02-08 DOI: 10.1515/mp-2019-0021
Nils-Frederic Wagner, I. Apostolova
Abstract Standard views of personal identity over time often hover uneasily between the subjective, first-person dimension (e. g. psychological continuity), and the objective, third-person dimension (e. g. biological continuity) of a person’s life. Since both dimensions capture something integral to personal identity, we show that neither can successfully be discarded in favor of the other. The apparent need to reconcile subjectivity and objectivity, however, presents standard views with problems both in seeking an ontological footing of, as well as epistemic evidence for, personal identity. We contend that a fresh look at neutral monism offers a novel way to tackle these problems; counting on the most fundamental building blocks of reality to be ontologically neutral with regards to subjectivity and objectivity of personal identity. If the basic units of reality are, in fact, ontologically neutral – but can give rise to mental as well as physical events – these basic units of reality might account for both subjectivity and objectivity in personal identity. If this were true, it would turn out that subjectivity and objectivity are not conflictive dimensions of personal identity but rather two sides of the same coin.
随着时间的推移,个人同一性的标准观点常常在主观的、第一人称的维度(例如:心理连续性),以及客观的第三人称维度(如:(人生命的)生物连续性。由于这两个维度都捕捉到了个人身份中不可或缺的东西,我们表明,任何一个都不能被成功地抛弃,而转而支持另一个。然而,调和主观性和客观性的明显需要,在寻求个人同一性的本体论立足点和认识论证据时,给标准观点提出了问题。我们认为,对中性一元论的新看法为解决这些问题提供了一种新颖的方法;指望现实的最基本组成部分在个人同一性的主观性和客观性方面在本体论上保持中立。事实上,如果现实的基本单位在本体论上是中立的——但可以产生精神和物理事件——这些基本的现实单位可能会解释个人同一性中的主观性和客观性。如果这是真的,那么主观性和客观性就不是个人同一性的冲突维度,而是同一枚硬币的两面。
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引用次数: 1
Two Geometrical Models for Pixelism 像素主义的两个几何模型
IF 0.2 0 PHILOSOPHY Pub Date : 2020-01-24 DOI: 10.1515/mp-2019-0002
Fabio Patrone
Abstract Pixelism is the combination of three metaphysical thesis, namely a radical form of exdurantism, mereological nihilism and counterpart theory. Pixelism is a theory that evaluates all the metaphysical phenomena of persistence, composition and modality in a homogeneous and consistent manner. In a pixel world, there is no identity over time and over possible worlds and nothing persists over more than an instant or a world. Entities can be univocally identified by a five-coordinates system (the three spatial dimensions, the temporal one and the possible worlds), and their relation is a counterpart relation both in different worlds and at different times or different regions of space. In this paper I will provide two models for pixelism: the first one takes pixels to be hypercubes, i. e. four-dimensional cubes, the acceptance of which is conditional on the acceptance of extended simples. The second one considers pixels as points in a four-dimensional space.
摘要皮克斯主义是三种形而上学命题的结合,即超现实主义的激进形式、纯粹虚无主义和对等理论。像素主义是一种以同质一致的方式评价所有形而上学现象的持久性、构成和形态的理论。在像素世界中,随着时间的推移和可能的世界,没有什么是同一性的,也没有什么比瞬间或世界更持久的了。实体可以通过五个坐标系(三个空间维度、时间维度和可能的世界)进行唯一识别,它们的关系在不同的世界、不同的时间或不同的空间区域都是对应关系。在本文中,我将为像素主义提供两个模型:第一个模型将像素视为超立方体,即I。 e.四维立方体,接受它的条件是接受扩展单纯形。第二种方法将像素视为四维空间中的点。
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引用次数: 0
Intrinsicality, Independence and Grounding 本质、独立性和接地
IF 0.2 0 PHILOSOPHY Pub Date : 2020-01-21 DOI: 10.1515/mp-2020-2018
Sophie R. Allen
Abstract This paper investigates the plausibility of Witmer, Butchard and Trogdon’s proposal to distinguish intrinsic properties from extrinsic ones in terms of independence from accompaniment and grounding. I argue that the proposed criterion is not adequate to determine intrinsicality, since according to it some intuitively extrinsic properties turn out to be intrinsic. I suggest and evaluate two responses: first, one could characterize a conception of independence which is specific to the individual instantiating the property; and second, one could justify two assumptions about properties which entail that counterexample properties of the kinds I present do not exist, most importantly that there are no fundamental properties which are instantiated in an intrinsic fashion by some individuals and an extrinsic fashion by others. Although the latter seems prima facie plausible, I present some potential counterexamples to it from current physical theory. I conclude that the grounding- and independence-based criterion of intrinsicality can be defended from my objections, although the cost of doing so might make it more attractive to characterize intrinsicality in terms of independence, or in terms of grounding, alone.
摘要本文探讨了Witmer、Butchard和Trogdon从独立于伴奏和根据的角度来区分内在属性和外在属性的合理性。我认为,所提出的标准不足以确定内在性,因为根据它,一些直观的外在性质被证明是内在的。我建议并评估了两种反应:首先,人们可以描述独立性的概念,这是具体到实例化属性的个体的;第二,人们可以证明关于属性的两个假设,这两个假设意味着我所呈现的反例属性不存在,最重要的是,没有基本属性是由某些个体以内在方式实例化而另一些个体以外在方式实例化的。虽然后者似乎表面上是可信的,但我从当前的物理理论中提出了一些潜在的反例。我的结论是,基于基础和独立性的内在性标准可以在我的反对意见中得到辩护,尽管这样做的代价可能会使从独立性或仅从基础的角度来描述内在性更有吸引力。
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引用次数: 0
Necessitarianism and Dispositions 必需品主义与处置
IF 0.2 0 PHILOSOPHY Pub Date : 2020-01-15 DOI: 10.1515/mp-2019-0022
S. Gozzano
Abstract In this paper, I argue in favor of necessitarianism, the view that dispositions, when stimulated, necessitate their manifestations. After introducing and clarifying what necessitarianism does and does not amount to, I provide reasons to support the view that dispositions once stimulated necessitate their manifestations according to the stimulating conditions and the relevant properties at stake. In this framework, I will propose a principle of causal relevance and some conditions for the possibility of interference that allow us to avoid the use of ceteris paribus clauses. I then defend necessitarianism from recent attacks raised by, among others, Mumford and Anjum, noting that the antecedent strengthening test is a test for causal relevance that raises no difficulties for necessitarianism.
摘要在这篇论文中,我支持必要主义,即当性格受到刺激时,就必须表现出来。在介绍和澄清了什么是必要主义,什么不是必要主义之后,我提供了理由来支持这样一种观点,即一旦刺激了倾向,就必须根据刺激条件和相关性质来表现。在这个框架中,我将提出一个因果相关性原则和一些干扰可能性的条件,使我们能够避免使用其他同等条款。然后,我为必要主义辩护,使其免受Mumford和Anjum等人最近提出的攻击,并指出先行强化测试是对因果相关性的测试,不会给必要主义带来任何困难。
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引用次数: 4
Five Sources of Contingency for Dispositionalism 处置主义的五个偶然性来源
IF 0.2 0 PHILOSOPHY Pub Date : 2020-01-07 DOI: 10.1515/mp-2019-0004
Michele Paolini Paoletti
Abstract Law dispositionalism is the doctrine according to which laws of nature are grounded on powers/dispositions. In this article, I shall examine how certain laws of nature can turn out to be contingent on this view. First of all, I shall distinguish between two versions of law dispositionalism (i. e. a weak and a strong one) and I shall also single out two further theses that may be conjoined with it (i. e. strong and weak dispositional essentialism). I shall also single out four different sorts of laws of nature. Afterwards, I shall examine five sources of contingency for law dispositionalism: the contingent existence of the relevant entities involved in the laws; the contigent activation, background and possession conditions of the powers at stake; the presence of contingent constants in the laws; the presence of indeterministic powers; the presence of powers that are not essential to the entities involved in the laws.
摘要法律处置主义是以权力/处置为基础的自然法学说。在这篇文章中,我将研究某些自然规律是如何取决于这种观点的。首先,我将区分两种版本的法律处置主义(即。 e.一个弱命题和一个强命题),我还将挑出另外两个可能与之结合的命题(即。 e.强的和弱的倾向本质主义)。我还将挑出四种不同的自然规律。之后,我将研究法律处置主义的五个偶然性来源:法律所涉及的相关实体的偶然性存在;利害关系权力的突然激活、背景和占有条件;定律中偶然常数的存在;不确定性权力的存在;对法律所涉及的实体而言并不重要的权力的存在。
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引用次数: 0
Metaphysical Explanation Separated from Grounding 脱离接地的形而上学解释
IF 0.2 0 PHILOSOPHY Pub Date : 2019-12-24 DOI: 10.1515/mp-2019-0009
Márta Ujvári
Abstract Grounding is typically associated to metaphysical explanation on the basis of the explanatory role’s being characteristic of grounding as well. Some even say that all what metaphysical explanation does is tracking the grounding relation. However, recently Maurin has argued that grounding does not “inherit” its properties from metaphysical explanation and, consequently, we should be “separatists”. In this paper separatism will be defended from the perspective of metaphysical explanation thus giving a turn to the separatist strategy. In particular, the structural difference between grounding and metaphysical explanation will be pointed out as affecting also the explanatory function. It will be shown how dispositions and essentialist claims play different roles in the two theories. Lastly, it will be claimed that the two theories diverge on accounting for law-like and accidental generalizations. Provided these arguments are sound, there will be good reason to tell metaphysical explanation apart from grounding.
摘要根据是形而上学解释的典型特征,其解释作用也具有根据的特征。有些人甚至说,形而上学的解释所做的一切都是在追踪基础关系。然而,最近莫林认为,根植并没有从形而上学的解释中“继承”它的属性,因此,我们应该是“分离主义者”。本文将从形而上学解释的角度为分离主义辩护,从而转向分离主义策略。特别要指出的是,基础解释和形而上学解释之间的结构差异也会影响解释功能。它将显示性格和本质主义主张如何在两种理论中发挥不同的作用。最后,它将声称,这两种理论分歧的会计类法律和偶然的概括。如果这些论证是合理的,那么就有很好的理由将形而上学的解释与基础区分开来。
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引用次数: 0
Apriority and Essential Truth 先验性与本质真理
IF 0.2 0 PHILOSOPHY Pub Date : 2019-11-09 DOI: 10.1515/mp-2019-0007
T. Haze
Abstract There is a line of thought, neglected in recent philosophy, according to which a priori knowable truths such as those of logic and mathematics have their special epistemic status in virtue of a certain tight connection between their meaning and their truth. Historical associations notwithstanding, this view does not mandate any kind of problematic deflationism about meaning, modality or essence. On the contrary, we should be upfront about it being a highly debatable metaphysical idea, while nonetheless insisting that it be given due consideration. From this standpoint, I suggest that the Finean distinction between essence and modality allows us to refine the view. While liberal about meaning, modality and essence, the view is not without bite: it is reasonable to suppose that it is able to ward off philosophical confusions stemming from the undue assimilation of a priori to empirical knowledge.
摘要有一种在近代哲学中被忽视的思路,根据这种思路,诸如逻辑和数学的先验可知真理由于其意义和真理之间的某种紧密联系而具有其特殊的认识地位。尽管存在历史关联,但这种观点并没有要求对意义、形式或本质采取任何有问题的通货紧缩。相反,我们应该坦率地承认这是一个极具争议的形而上学概念,同时坚持要对其给予应有的考虑。从这个角度来看,我认为Finean对本质和情态的区分使我们能够完善这种观点。尽管这种观点在意义、形式和本质上是自由的,但它并非没有吸引力:可以合理地假设,它能够避免由于先验知识与经验知识的过度同化而产生的哲学困惑。
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引用次数: 0
期刊
Metaphysica-International Journal for Ontology & Metaphysics
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